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Abstract 
Recent "turns" in social sciences, namely the visual, qualitative, actorial or spatial turns, all 
indicate a rising interest in individuals. Since the aesthetic dimension always nourishes and 
informs individuals’ spatialities and their decision-making processes, my research explores how the 
subjective realm of the aesthetic has proved itself able to generate conditions that lead to action, 
and consequently influence other dimensions of society, especially in the ethical, political or legal 
realms. My systemic approach is grounded in the relational theory of space, the phenomenological 
study of the imagination, and the theory of urbanity. Hence, I investigated both urbanity and 
beauty as some of the most intriguing and interesting emergent (and not resultant!) phenomena of 
the urban system — where urbanity belongs to its objective realm and beauty to its subjective 
realm.  
It is essential to recognize that humans, unlike the components that create the natural systems, are 
capable of a particular sort of action due to their imaginative capacities that allow them to 
overpass the actual perceived world. The aesthetic dimension directly involves the human 
imaginative consciousness, which in turn activates the realm of the virtual, i.e., the realm that 
which exists only in a latent state, and does not appear visibly (fr. qui n'est qu'en puissance). 
While engaged in aesthetic experience, humans exhibit a particular sort of intentionality through 
which they bring to mind what is not visible through what is present and perceived. By making 
use of their lived body, individuals are capable to engage in a particular sort of imaginative play 
through which memories of the past, anticipations of the future and the actualized perceived 
present are conjured together, informing one another. Since every human intentional experience is 
spatialized, I investigated a particular spatial structure through which aesthetic experience occurs 
as such. I called this structure aesthetic space. 
In the last chapter, I investigate more precisely the influence of the urban environment on the way 
in which individuals’ aesthetic judgments evolve and mature. By considering the experience of 
modernity and the city as pivotal in the construction of individuals’ aesthetic sensitivities, I 
explore the spatial component of aesthetic judgments on some particular cases. I also focus on the 
importance of the urban public space, the lifestyle change, as well as on the period of childhood, 
which appear to be critical to the (aesthetic) development of individuals. 
 
Keywords: space, aesthetics, urban system, urbanity, city, imagination, experience, Switzerland. 
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Résumé 
Les nouveaux tournants en sciences sociales, et notamment le visual turn, le tournant qualitatif, le 
tournant actoriel, ou le tournant spatial, mettent tous un accent particulier sur l’importance de 
l’individu. Puisque la dimension esthétique nourrit et façonne la spatialité des individus et leurs 
processus de prise de décision, ma recherche explore comment la subjectivité de l’esthétique peut 
générer des conditions qui mènent à des action concrètes, et donc influencer d’autres dimensions 
de la société, en particulier les domaines éthiques, politiques et légaux. Mon approche systémique 
est fondée sur la théorie relationnelle de l’espace, l’étude phénoménologique de l’imagination, et la 
théorie de l’urbanité.  J’ai donc étudié les concepts esthétiques et le concept d’urbanité, qui sont 
parmi les phénomènes les plus intrigants et intéressants qui puissent émerger (et non résulter !) des 
phénomènes du système urbain — l’urbanité faisant partie de son objectivité, et les concepts 
esthétiques de sa subjectivité.  
Il est essentiel de souligner que les humains, contrairement aux éléments de systèmes naturels, 
sont capables de mener des actions particulières grâce à leurs capacités imaginatives. Celles-ci leur 
permettent de transcender le monde actuel perçu par les sens. La dimension esthétique fait 
directement appel à la conscience imaginative, qui, à son tour, active l’espace virtuel, c’est-à-dire 
l’espace qui n’existe que dans un état latent — ce qui n’est qu’en puissance. Lorsqu’un individu 
vit une expérience esthétique, il démontre une sorte d’intentionnalité en faisant appel à ce qui 
n’est pas visible à travers ce qui est perçu et présent. En utilisant son corps vécu, il se livre à une 
sorte de jeu imaginaire, où les souvenirs du passé, les attentes futures, et la connaissance sur le 
présent actualisé, ont évoqués en simultané, se nourrissant les uns les autres. Puisque toute 
expérience humaine est spatialisée, j’ai décidé d’étudier une structure spatiale particulière où se 
manifeste l’expérience esthétique. J’ai appelé cette structure l’espace esthétique.  
 
Mots-clé : espace, esthétique, système urbain, urbanité, ville, imagination, expérience, Suisse.  
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Introduction: An Opening 
Question 
To begin, I suggest taking a moment to briefly observe Ives André’s 
photograph of a residential area in the Swiss municipality of Bulle (Fig. I). Here is a 
possible description of what can be seen in the photograph: a group of single-family 
houses, each with their own small garden; a number of houses behind them; a wooden 
storage warehouse; a grassy field; flowers along a fence; and a crane and construction site 
in the background. In the distance, there are mountains and a sky. That’s about it. The 
photograph creates a persistent impression that there isn’t much else to see. Than if one 
wants to know more about this neighborhood, they can investigate who exactly lives in 
the blue house or the yellow house, how much they earn, where and how do they go for 
work, shopping and school, and so on. If one accumulates more and more facts about 
this particular urban situation, it is certain that one will begin to perceive a greater 
number of details in the photograph itself. This leads to a number of questions: Is the 
entire reality of the neighborhood encompassed only in what presents itself to the eyes of 
the spectator? Is the visual completely surrendered to the dictatorship of the visible? This 
would imply that the accumulation of factual objective knowledge on what actually and 
materially exist (or have existed) is the only way that humans grasp the reality.  
 
But isn’t it true that when an individual looks at an object, they also imagine it? Isn’t it 
easily verifiable that two individuals with a similar economic, cultural and educational 
background can significantly differ in the ways they experience inhabited environments? 
These are the questions that arose as I looked at André’s photograph with my thesis 
advisor Jacques Lévy; and they became encapsulated in this rather simple question: Why 
is it that some people find the neighborhood represented on the photograph beautiful 
while others see nothing but ugliness? This thesis is the result of my attempt to answer 
that question.  
 
Like anyone who has ever decided to step out of their own discipline and enter into a 
new field, I first had to pay some theoretical dues. As an architect, I was almost 
completely unaware of the theoretical richness of human geography and urban sociology, 
and I had little understanding of the 2000 year-old debate around the concept of beauty, 
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and even less understanding of the 267 year-old western philosophical disagreements on 
aesthetics. Coming from a discipline that claims, perhaps more than any other discipline, 
to be involved in space-making, I realized how deficient architecture was in its 
instruments of self-criticism. By uncritically employing an understanding of space that 
dates back to the Renaissance or Antiquity, and also by stubbornly insisting on its total 
autonomy as a discipline, architecture has constantly remained stuck at the beginnings of 
its transformation which was supposed to go along with the urban transformation. Since 
architects constantly fail to engage substantively with other disciplines, the abyss between 
architecture and society just keeps getting bigger. As George Kubler observes in his 
influential work “The Shape of Time” (1962), no major architect of the twentieth 
century has been able to practice without taking on the evangelist mission of improving 
the visible world by imposing his own sensibility on the world. I believe that this comes 
as a manifestation of a hidden ontological belief that architectural education provides 
architects with a unique knowledge that allows them alone to climb Platonic leaders, 
leaving behind laypersons in an aesthetic darkness. Both academia and architectural 
practices still remain dominated by the idea that architects (together with artists perhaps) 
have exclusive access to the ‘Beautiful’.  
 
More recently, some important steps were made towards interdisciplinarity and many 
architects are beginning to understand that architecture is becoming more and more 
about research. Architects have understood that they are actors at the service of society, 
and not vice-versa. My intention with this thesis is not to negate the materiality on 
which the field of architecture is founded, nor am I questioning the particular conditions 
of the historical development of architecture; Rather, I argue that architecture must go 
beyond formalism and engage more substantively and critically in the production of the 
contemporary urban fabric. Architectural problems are societal problems and, as such, 
are multidimensional, complex, and highly dependent on the agency of individuals, 
where each individual has their own understanding and portrayals of society. 
 
Today, I see that in my academic childhood, I was given the opportunity to explore a 
variety of disciplines, without being given too much epistemological ground a priori. I 
can thank Jacques Lévy for giving me this freedom, with his enthusiastic encouragements 
and his excitement for novel ideas. I realized during the writing of my thesis that the 
difficulty in structuring a conversation between the fields of urban sciences and aesthetic 
theory has a lot to do with the extreme richness of each of the approaches, and even more 
to do with the fact that each discipline has evolved more or less independently. Only a 
few urban scientists are profoundly interested in the nature of the aesthetic experience, 
and even less scholars in the field of aesthetics consider the existential nature of our 
modern urban condition as being important. While space still represents a major 
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epistemological obstacle for many researchers, this thesis is a contribution to a bridge that 
needs to be built between aesthetic theories and urban theories.  
 
Beauty does not emerge as a result of a simple aggregation. A collection of beautiful 
houses does not necessarily create a beautiful neighborhood. Different types of beauty 
emerge at each level of complexity. The same principle applies to urbanity, which 
belongs to the type of unplanned and unintended phenomena that emerge from people’s 
intentions and actions. The failure to acknowledge this fact has led some thinkers and 
researchers to proclaim that both urbanity and beauty are mere myths. But fact, they 
simply failed to realise that aesthetic and urban problems are systemic problems and 
therefore need to be approached as such. My systemic approach is grounded in the 
relational theory of space, the phenomenological study of the imagination, and the 
theory of urbanity. Hence, I investigated both urbanity and aesthetic concepts, as some 
of the most intriguing and interesting emergent (and not resultant!) phenomena of the 
urban system, urbanity belonging to its objective realm and aesthetic concepts to its 
subjective realm. Since aesthetics belongs to the subjective realm of our conceptual 
scheme of reality, it raises the question of the emergence of a subject. I consider aesthetics 
to be one of the dimensions of the complex multidimensional system called ‘society’, and 
consider subjectivity to be spatialized and spatially produced. In this sense, I approached 
the aesthetic experience from a spatial perspective, which helped me investigate the 
mechanisms by which the aesthetic dimension influenced the structuration of the Swiss 
urban environment.  
 
By definition, the systemic approach favors multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity. I 
want to emphasize the importance of the word ‘approach’ because systemism, as Mario 
Bunge writes, is not an encompassing theory, but rather just a framework, “a skeleton to 
be fleshed out with specific hypotheses and data" (Bunge 1996, 265). The ‘skeleton’ of 
this study is made up of elements from a variety of different fields: the relational theory 
of space by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (supplemented by writings of Martin Heidegger); 
the systemism of Mario Bunge and Norbert Elias; the aesthetic theory of Immanuel 
Kant, John Dewey and Roger Scruton; the phenomenological tradition of Jean-Paul 
Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty; the writings of Henri Lefebvre and Michel de 
Certeau on the subject of the city; the theory of urbanity by Jacques Lévy, the research 
on photography by Roland Barthes and John Collier, and many others scientist and 
thinkers who wrote on space, place, experience, beauty, image, urbanity, city, modernity, 
and style — to name some of the principal keywords covered in this thesis. The ‘flesh’ of 
this study came primarily from the experience of Swiss inhabitants who accepted to 
participate in the study and to whom I am unbelievably grateful. I can’t thank them 
enough. By pointing out some of the most intriguing aspects of human existence, which 
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they arrived at by engaging their imagination, these individuals became true co-producers 
of scientific knowledge.  
 
The thesis is divided into two parts, with three chapters to each part. The first chapter 
concerns the epistemological background required to understand this thesis. It also 
contains my arguments for adopting two assumptions upon which the rest of my work 
strongly depends: First, that space is relational and not an absolute category; Second, that 
the study of society, which is a multidimensional complex system, needs to take into 
account both individual agency and social structures. Society is organized according to 
the articulation of the various dimensions that run through it. Therefore, it would be 
wrong for a researcher to assume that one dimension is more important than any 
other — though they can still be studied separately. The second chapter introduces the 
idea that one of the many dimensions of society is the aesthetic dimension. I first provide 
arguments to reject the idea that the aesthetic is the equivalent of the artistic, and then 
argue that the agency of urban actors is highly influenced by the aesthetic component. 
The third chapter introduces a concept of urbanity based on the ideas of functional and 
sociological diversity and multidimensional density. The main goal was to use urbanity as 
a means of approaching the spatial component of aesthetic judgments and aesthetic 
experiences. In the fourth chapter, I introduce my main method, which consisted in the 
preparation, conduction and analysis of interviews with inhabitants of the Lemanic lake 
region in Switzerland. In the fifth chapter, I develop what I consider to be the principal 
novelty of my work: the concept of aesthetic space, an order that allows the co-existence 
of the realm of the actual and the realm of the virtual. The idea is that the possibility of 
things does not simply precede their existence, or in other words, that the virtual does 
not simply precede the actual — rather, the virtual is an aspect of the real. As aesthetic 
experience embraces both the actual and the virtual, it becomes a constitutive part of 
one’s spatiality, and therefore, aesthetics cannot be ignored by any science interested in 
human spaces. Finally, in the last chapter, I investigate more precisely the influence of 
the urban environment on the way in which individuals’ aesthetic judgments evolve and 
mature. By considering the experience of modernity and the city as pivotal in the 
construction of individuals’ aesthetic sensitivities, I explore the spatial component of 
aesthetic judgments on some particular cases in the Swiss distant and near history. I also 
focus on the importance of the urban public space, as well as on the period of childhood, 
which both appear to be critical to the (aesthetic) development of individuals. While this 
work was inevitably written in linear manner, I must underline the circular process 
through which the theories, hypotheses and results mutually nurtured and influenced 
each other. What is involved here is the process known as abduction, which implies 
going from a fact to the theory that most likely explains it. 
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This is a study made jointly with Swiss inhabitants. However, my intention was not to 
give an overview of the complex processes that have structured the Swiss urban 
environment. Others researchers, with an in-depth knowledge of the local historical, 
political and social circumstances, have already attempted this task, with varying degrees 
of success. By taking an aesthetic perspective, my intention was to tackle certain 
particular aspects of contemporary society that have been taken for granted up till now. 
What I learned quite rapidly as I worked on my thesis is that writing about 
contemporary society cannot be done without underlining the singularity of the 
individuals that participate in its day-to-day production. This is why I decided to write 
about the deepest feelings of several Swiss inhabitants, hoping that, in doing so, I will 
have revealed something new about the emerging world-society and its contemporary 
urban condition. 
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1 Society as a Multidimensional 
Complex System 
“Man is faber and sapiens, economicus and politicus, 
artifex and ludens.”   
Mario Bunge 
When a researcher is confronted with problems raised by the aesthetic 
appreciation of an environment, they often perform their studies by isolating the realm 
of aesthetics as an autonomous dimension of human existence and search for solutions 
within it. In this study, I will use a different method. I will discuss aesthetics as being one 
of the mutually interconnected dimensions of the human complex system we call society. 
It is important to keep in mind that unlike the components of natural systems, human 
beings are capable of carrying out specific actions due to their capacity to make choices 
and create new alternatives in spite of external constraints. Since space is rooted in the 
separation between humans and their artefacts one of the most important tasks of urban 
sciences is to investigate the nature and structure behind this separation. Aesthetics is 
important precisely because it makes things closer in one respect and puts things further 
away from each other in another. However, before I tackle the problem of aesthetics I 
will provide some arguments on why is it so important to first investigate the very nature 
of space. It is only through one or another understating of space that the scientific 
knowledge can expand and develop and scientists need to know why this is so. 
  20 
Space, Time & Knowledge 
Each experience is spatial. It is also temporal. In this sense, space and time are the two 
basic pillars that support all knowledge, including theoretical knowledge. However, their 
deeper meaning for the structure of knowledge is not exhausted in this. It is rather that 
through a certain understanding of space and time, knowledge gradually expands and 
moves into new directions. As Cassirer put it: “The more knowledge inquires into the 
structure of space and time, the more certainly it returns into itself; only through inquiry 
into the structure of space and time does knowledge grasp the nature of its basic premises 
and particular principles. Knowledge wishes to encompass being in its completeness, to 
measure it in its spatial and temporal infinity; but it learns that this task of measuring can 
only be accomplished when it has drawn up and secured the measurements for itself in 
advance” (Cassirer 1969, 3). The question is thus: How does a certain conception of 
space and time relate to human understanding of the world at large? Once the answer to 
this question is provided, a researcher will be able to provide an answer to another 
question, equally important to anyone who studies urban space and spaces created by 
humans in general. This second question is: How do human actions and practices 
(including scientific actions and practices) change when the different conceptions of 
space and time are used? 
 
Let me begin by discussing the first problem. The entry point I chose was informed by 
philosophical reflection, for two main reasons. First, philosophy aspires to rise above 
different fields of human practices in order to assign all-encompassing meanings to the 
categories we use, and by doing so it can bring clarity, depth and coherence to a scientific 
discourse. Second, we call upon philosophy because it is a practice that not only help us 
to know ourselves and help us to think, but also teaches us to act as if nothing were self-
evident — an attitude of fundamental importance for any scientist involved in a better 
comprehension of reality. Bearing this in mind, let me introduce the problem of space 
and the importance of this problem for the rest of theoretical and scientific knowledge.  
 
When one say that something is “in space”, the idea that spontaneously imposes itself is 
that space is made of some kind of substance in which one can put things. It is as if space 
itself is an absolute and stable being upon which one can build relations and further 
determine the quality of things (e.g. here or there, up or down, big or small, etc.). But 
then the logical question would be to ask what is this substance or being of space? The 
existence of a “substance” above all categories was one of the fundamental postulates of 
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Aristotelian logic and metaphysics, and thus everything, and space itself, was an 
extension of this primal matter. It’s possible, as Cassirer argues, that modern theories and 
science emerged with the attempt to replace these medieval Aristotelian categories. This 
epistemological and metaphysical problem gave birth to one the most famous 
disagreements in the history of modern thought: the disagreement between Newton and 
Leibniz, which is not completely concluded even today. The theories of these two 
important thinkers have by no means lost their value and they are still very present in 
modern thought, even though their ideas are expressed in a different manner. 
Newton versus Leibniz 
At end of the Aristotelian dominance of western philosophy, which is also the moment 
when the empirical philosophy was born, there were two avenues through which 
scientific and philosophical thought expressed itself. In the correspondence between 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, who acted as a spokesman for Isaac 
Newton, these two alternatives were clearly indicated. This correspondence was one of 
the most important philosophical exchanges of the eighteenth century, and perhaps one 
of the most substantial of such exchanges in the history of western thought. Although 
Newton and Leibniz grew up in the same philosophical environment and their 
philosophical relationship was initially marked by respectful disagreement, after the 
publication of Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy in 1687 (often 
referred to as simply the Principia), their ways strongly diverged. It was a collision 
between two fundamentally different philosophical approaches: the deductive ideal of 
scientific thought in the case of Leibniz, and the empirical, merely inductive method 
championed by Newton. The dispute between Leibniz and Newton started off as a 
religious and metaphysical disagreement about the nature of God and the structure of the 
material universe, but today the disagreement between the two philosophers is seen as a 
logical and epistemological problem, rather than a metaphysical one. In the philosophy 
of Leibniz, it was first of all the logical structure of space and time which was seen in a 
new light. The novelty of his approach was to critically study the meaning of notions of 
space and of time, and not desperately searching for the essence of these notions. This 
critical tendency of thought proved to have far-reaching consequences not only in the 
fields of science and philosophy, but also on the way humans understand and shape the 
world today. 
 
According to the theory of Newton, space is distinct from body. He used the term 
absolute space to distinguish it from the different ways by which we measure it. Space 
was “an infinitely extended absolute entity quite independent of matter, in all its essential 
logical and mathematical properties” (Cassirer 1943, 423). Matter occupies only a small 
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part of space and cannot exist independently. Space becomes thus a container within 
which matter is located. For Newton space and time were both real things which 
belonged to the material world and constituted the framework of reality itself. When 
Newton speaks of individuation of a physical object he thinks of its particular position in 
absolute space. Thus the individuality of particular physical mass is defined by its 
location is space. Another important thing to retain is that Newton’s space was 
homogeneous and had no qualitative differences to distinguish one part from another.  
 
Leibniz asserts this to be all wrong, for it violated both of Leibniz’s basic philosophical 
premises. First, the homogeneity of Newton’s space is incompatible with the Leibnizean 
principle of identity of indiscernibles, meaning that there cannot be separate objects or 
entities that have all their properties in common. According to Leibniz, it is from the 
intrinsic differences of the substances that relationships between substances are derived. 
And second, the location of the bodies at certain points in absolute space rather than at 
other points becomes completely random (for a detail analysis see Northrop 1946). If 
such a conception is taken as a basic premise of physics than, as F.S.C. Northrop 
observes, violates the Leibnizean principle of sufficient reason, meaning that everything 
must have a reason or a cause.1  
 
Thus Leibniz proposed a view according to which space possessed no substantial reality 
of its own. The same was true for the notion of time. His idea was that space and time 
were based on relations and mere entia rationis, like mathematical entities. He expressed 
his famous definition in his third letter to Clarke:  
 
“For my part, I have said several times that I hold space to be something 
merely relative, as time is, taking space to be an order of coexistences, as 
time is an order of successions” (Alexander 1998).  
 
When Clarke responded that “space and time are quantities; which situation and order 
are not”, Leibniz further explained in his last letter) the three-step process by which “men 
come to form to themselves the notion of space” (Alexander 1998, see also Vailati 1997). 
The first step begins as an observation of the elements that make the real world: 
“(Humans) consider that many things exist at once and they observe in them a certain 
                                                      
1 On the problem of this principle see Mario Bunge’s work “Causality and Modern Science”: 
“The admission of this axiom dispenses us from performing the impossible task of explaining the 
existence of the sum total of existents-a task that is thereby rendered an apparent question. It does 
not dispense us, however, from the duty of explaining the changes in the world or the existence of 
the various parts of it - which can be explained, at least in principle, as the outcome of processes” 
(Bunge 2012, 238).?
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order of co-existence, according to which the relation of one thing to another is more or 
less simple. This order is their situation or distance”. (Here the notion of metrics is 
essential, for it provides us with a quality or a type of distance among the different 
realities that enter into the constitution of a particular space. Without metrics all spaces 
would be the same!). Then, according to Leibniz, the process of abstraction takes place, 
and it includes the construction of the notion of the “same place”. He therefore writes 
that “[w]hen it happens that one of those coexistent things changes its relation to a 
multitude of others, which do not change their relation among themselves; and that 
another thing, newly come, acquires the same relation to the others, as the former had; 
we then say, it is come into the place of the former” (Alexander 1998). We do not stop at 
the consideration of the positions bodies actually occupy or have occupied, but we also 
consider "that relation which any other co-existent would have to this, or which any 
other co-existent would have to any other, if it had not changed, or if it had changed any 
otherwise" (Alexander 1998). This means, as Vailati has observed “that we employ 
counterfactuals by considering, for example, that body A could have been in place of 
body B and that body D could have been between A and B, where nothing is now. Now 
two bodies having the same relation of situation with respect to others assumed as fixed, 
have the same place” (1997, 114). Richard Arthur also noticed that Leibniz's 
construction of space and place involves the use of counterfactuals (see Arthur 1994). 
Here it is important to highlight the fundamental importance of place formation; as for 
Leibniz, the third and the final step is to consider all the places together: “that which 
comprehends all those places, is called space” (Alexander 1998). We might sum this up 
by saying that first we construct places from possible relations of distance between 
different realities, and then from places, we construct space (see Arthur 1994; Khamara 
1993; Broad 1946). It would be safe to say that the process of space formation and place 
formation is, in fact, cyclic - from places we abstract spaces which then serve us to create 
other places. 
 
Leibniz illustrates his idea with an example. He suggests that space is analogous to a 
genealogical tree that exists only as a system of relations between different members of a 
family. This abstracted structure, as Leibniz writes to one of his critics, “relates not only 
to what actually is but also to anything which could be put in its place, just as numbers 
are indifferent to the things which can be enumerated. This inclusion of the possible 
with the existent makes a continuity which is uniform and indifferent to any division" 
(Vailati 1997, 115). In this sense, the relational conception of space can embrace 
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Newton’s absolute conception (if we want to situate body “A” in an absolute space, we 
can do it just by relating it to body “B” and body “C”). This means that the relational 
understanding allows us a much larger implication of space: indeed, it implies that space 
is real and can be known, which is an essential premise for any scientific criticism on 
spatial distribution and differentiation. In this sense, the relational paradigm provides us 
with a tool for critical thinking, which, as Karl Popper has argued, is the very essence of 
rationality. 
Absolute Space versus Relational Space: Being versus Order 
Space and time are thus an ideal set of relations. This resolved the fundamental problem 
of how to unite the very natures of space and time, with the nature of the content which 
enters into their constitution. As Cassirer explains, there was a fundamental 
contradiction in Newton’s conception of space: 
 
“If, (…) we insist on putting ‘things’ like space and time under the genus of 
being as an all-encompassing primary concept, than we find that this genus 
itself represents only an illusory unity. It includes not only different things 
but opposing and antagonistic ones. (…) Being cannot transform its nature 
without denying and losing itself in this transformation i.e. falling victim to 
its opposite - non-being. (…) When it is brought under the category of 
thing, of the mere category of substance, and examined under this 
viewpoint, the absolute being of space soon becomes its non-being; it is 
transformed from something all-encompassing and all-explaining into an 
absurdity” (1969, 5-6).  
 
Leibniz managed to override this paradox by establishing the concept of order. Space and 
time have their true objectivity in relations (now truth itself is to be searched in 
relations!), and in this sense Leibniz “anticipated the solution which modern physics has 
found regarding the problem of space and time”. For modern physics, “The world is not 
defined as an entity of bodies ‘in’ spacetime, not as an occurrence ‘in’ time, but it is 
viewed as a ‘system of occurrences’, of events, as Whitehead says; space and time enter 
into the determinations of these events, into their lawful order, as conditions, as essential 
and necessary moments” (Cassirer 1969, 7). Space thus becomes a possibility of 
coexistence and it is important to note that it refers not only to the actual but as well as 
the virtual. It is equally important to emphasize that the “ideality” of Leibniz’s space and 
time never meant to cast any doubt upon the objectivity of these concepts. Now, the 
question is: what does the transformation of the concept of being into a concept of order 
imply?  
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In the “New Essays” Leibniz writes: “By virtue of insensible variations, two individual 
things can never be perfectly alike (…) and they must always differ more than numero. 
This at one puts out of court (…) a substance without action, the void in space, atoms 
and even particles not actually divided in matter, absolute rest, complete uniformity in 
one part of time, place, or matter” (cited in Northrop 1946, 435). As it has been stated 
previously, it is exactly in the uniformity of Newton’s absolute space, that his concept 
falls into a contradiction. Let us not forget that the absolute identity of being, of which 
unity and uniformity constitute its basic logical character, was recognized by its first 
philosophical discoverer, a pre-Socratic Greek philosopher Parmenides. In an important 
passage for the future history of the Western philosophy, Parmenides rejects motion in 
favour of immobility, arguing that reality is unchanging whole: 
 
“Abiding the same in the same place it rests by itself, and so abides from 
where it is; for strong Necessity holds it firm within the bounds of the limit 
that keeps it back on every side …” (Cassirer 1969).  
 
Cassirer reminds us of this fact and further argues that “[a]s soon as the point of gravity 
in thought shifts from the pole of being to the pole of order in the total theoretical view 
of reality and specifically in the theoretical conception and interpretation of space, then a 
victory of pluralism over abstract monism, of a multiplicity of forms over a single form, is 
established” (Cassirer 1969, 8). This means that the diversity of possible formations of 
space depends on the diversity of possible relations between its constitutive elements. As 
we shall see later, this shift in understanding of space and time does not only hold a 
profoundly different way of formulating questions regarding aesthetics, but it represents 
a fundamental transformation for the larger spectrum of practical knowledge and our 
scientific understanding of the world. 
Space of Knowledge and Knowledge of Space 
For Immanuel Kant human experience depends on both the sensory data that we receive 
passively and the way our mind actively processes this data according to its own a priori 
categories. This second component of our experience brings order into the indeterminate 
manifold of our sensation. In this sense it is a priori element to all experience - a pure 
form of sensibility which Kant calls pure intuition. Space and time as two pure 
intuitions, as Kant famously argued in the “Critique of Pure Reason”, become thus 
structural conditions of existence.  
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Unlike Kant, I will not argue that space and time precede experience, but like Kant, I 
would like to underline the fact that humans have innate (i.e. natural) cognitive 
capacities for observing and creating relations between elements of reality which evolve to 
become structures of space and time. Consequently space becomes not an object of 
perception, but rather a possibility of experiencing the world. Recent findings in 
neurobiology suggest that space formation is one of the fundamental cognitive functions 
and that humans as well as other animals have functional brain cells that allow them to 
have spatial representations. A 2014 Nobel prize in physiology or medicine was 
attributed to John O’Keefe, May‐Britt Moser and Edvard I. Moser precisely for their 
discoveries of cells that constitute a positioning system in the brain (Hafting et al. 2005; 
Fyhn et al. 2004). These cells are found in the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex - the 
components of the brain that are known to be affected in the early stages of Alzheimer's 
Disease which causes difficulties in finding our way around and recognizing 
environment. However, the scientific understanding of just what the hippocampus and 
other brain components do are still issues of considerable controversy (Kraus et al. 2015; 
Eichenbaum 2004; Eichenbaum et al. 1999). It might be safe to say that today, scientists 
are only at the beginning of understanding the physiological bases that lie behind 
information procession and its implications on human experience and space 
construction. It is in the early childhood that humans become engaged in the process of 
observing spatial relations and creating spatial differentiation and this act of separating 
and relating, comes on, with various intensity, until death.  
 
Space matters. Michel Foucault illustrated this point by reminding us that “the real 
scandal of Galileo’s work lay not so much in his discovery, or rediscovery, that the earth 
revolved around the sun, but in his constitution of an infinite, and infinitely open space. 
In such a space the place of the Middle Ages turned out to be dissolved” (Foucault and 
Miskowiec 1986). The idea here is that adopting one conception over another of space 
always brings with it heavy consequences for the rest of theoretical knowledge. From 
René Descartes to Hannah Arendt and Gilles Deleuze almost every philosopher has 
made their conception of space one of the essential components of their theoretical 
system. Yet when two different authors use the words such a “space” or “place” there is 
always a far-reaching uncertainty of interpretation, for, as Albert Einstein recognized, 
psychological relations with such concepts are less direct than with concepts such as 
“red”, “hard” or “disappointed” (see Einstein’s preface to Jammer 1969). 
 
Different types of space, as Jammer points out, developed as the result of “a long and 
continuous process of abstraction” which “started in the mind of primitive man”, who 
was incapable of “abstracting the concept of space from the direct experience of it”. “To 
primitive man, ‘space’ was merely an accidental set of concrete orientations, a more or 
  27 
less ordered multitude of local directions, each associated with certain emotional 
reminiscences. This primitive ‘space’, as experienced and subconsciously formed by the 
individual, may have been coordinated with a ‘space’ common to the group, the family 
or the tribe” (Jammer 1969, 6). Here it is important to observe that the constitution of 
space is based on relations manifested in experience and shared experience with other 
members of society in particular. I will elaborate on this fact later. 
 
Although modern physics is surprisingly close to the definition of space as an “order of 
coexistences”, nothing that Leibniz had to say against the idea of absolute space could 
prevent Newton’s concept of becoming a fundamental prerequisite of most of scientific 
investigation. In his excellent analysis of the development of the notion of space, Jammer 
noticed “how little the actual progress of the science of mechanics was affected by general 
considerations concerning the nature of absolute space. Among the great French writers 
on mechanics, Lagrange, Laplace, and Poisson, none of them was much interested in the 
problem of absolute space. They all accepted the idea as a working hypothesis without 
worrying about its theoretical justification” (Jammer 1969, 137). Today, it can certainly 
be argued that the relational character of space is accepted on a rational basis, but there 
remains the question as to what extent it has been accepted on a philosophical or 
psychological basis?  
 
Space is thus a different kind of knowledge from the knowledge of empirical phenomenal 
data for space itself is not known directly through senses. This is an important point of 
contact between the theories of Newton and Leibniz for they both agree on the fact that 
space is not given to us, i.e. it is not an observable physical quantity. They have different 
reasons for stating this. For Newton, space and time, as absolute entities, are beyond the 
reach of immediate sense perception. However, Newton felt that absolute space is 
indirectly accessible to us by means of observations of the effects of forces on bodies 
which are accelerated relative to absolute space (Erlichson 1967, 95). Leibniz denies this 
for his position is that “any physical concept such as force or acceleration can only have 
meaning within the observable universe, and cannot be referred to as metaphysical 
absolute space and time” (Erlichson 1967, 95). For him space and time are “pure 
intellectual forms which involve a constructive power of the human mind” (Cassirer 
1969, 387).   
 
A direct consequence of this position is that it puts the observer in an active rather than a 
passive position because the standpoint of the observer plays a critical role in the 
constitution of space. This further implies that societies, as Henri Lefebvre demonstrated 
(Lefebvre 1991), do not just occupy pre-given static space but they actually create space. 
Space is an active, not a passive element in the constitution and functioning of a society. 
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Therefore space and society are in a dialectical tension. The entry point in favor of a 
relational conception of space is not innocent and it already constitutes a heavy act for 
anyone who would study the problems raised by human societies. Once I have presented 
arguments in favor of the relational paradigm, I can continue my discussion, keeping in 
mind a notion of space as a element that actively participates in the creation of a society. 
Systemism as an Anchor for a Critical Social 
Theory 
Space is both a possibility of coexistence and an obstacle to interaction. It brings humans 
together and separates them at the same time. It is “a dimension of society, 
corresponding to the entirety of relations between different realities established by 
distance” (Lévy 2013, 359, translated from French). This definition provided by the 
“Dictionnaire de la géographie et de l'espace des sociétés”, underlines two important 
facts. First, that society is dimensional, or to be more precise, multidimensional. Every 
society organizes itself in the articulation between its different dimensions - economic, 
political, temporal, aesthetic or the spatial dimension, to name a few. And each of these 
different dimensions cuts across the whole of society. These dimensions hold together 
bonds of various kind among the different components of society. As society changes, all 
dimensions of society change. Individuals’ understanding of economy and politics, as 
well as their ethical and aesthetic judgments follow this evolution. Second, it underlines a 
fundamental importance that space plays in human lives, resulting from the fact that 
there exists a distance between different realities of society. To understand and to master 
a distance provides us with a means of mastering and understanding our existence, our 
environments, and the world we live in. In the words of Boris Beaude, “to change space, 
is to change relational conditions between what is, it is to change the World, it is to 
change the society” (Beaude 2012, p.21). In every human action there is a spatial 
dimension. A non-spatial element of society cannot exist, for every element of society can 
be understood only in relation to other elements. 
Intentionality of Collective and Individual Action 
When Jacques Monod, who won the Nobel Prize for his contribution to biology, wrote 
his celebrated work “Chance and Necessity”, he was inspired by the following line 
attributed to Democritus: "Everything existing in the universe is the fruit of chance and 
necessity”. For Monod, nature is not projective and systems in nature, such as enzymatic 
biofeedback loops, can be explained without appealing to a final causality. However, in 
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the first chapter entitled “Of Strange Objects” he argues that “it is through reference to 
our own activity, conscious and projective, intentional and purposive” that our 
judgments are formed (Monod 1971, 3). This means that when studying human 
environments and societies scientists cannot count on general indetermination (chance) 
specific to natural sciences, but must insist on the intentional character of human 
actions.  
 
Intentionality, as a central concept in philosophy of mind and a cornerstone of 
phenomenology, has influenced a wide range of literature in philosophy, sociology and 
cognitive sciences. The term derives from the Latin word intentio, which in turn derives 
from the verb intendere, which means “to point to” or “to aim at”. It was rehabilitated by 
the philosopher Franz Brentano in his work “Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint”, 
and is defined as follows: 
 
“Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the 
Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and 
what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a 
content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as 
meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon 
includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in 
the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment 
something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire 
desired and so on. (…)  
This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental 
phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We could, 
therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those 
phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves.” 
(Brentano 1995, 88-89). 
 
In these who famous passages Brentano characterized the intentionality of mental states 
(such as loving, remembering, believing, desiring, hoping) as their feature of each being 
‘directed toward something’, i.e. a mental state of ‘aiming’ toward a certain state of 
affairs, as in the everyday sense of doing something with ‘intention’. As conscious beings, 
we are not only affected by the world: we are also ‘conscious of’ ourselves and other 
persons, of material or ideal objects and natural or urban environments which we bring 
before our mind. If we think about a car, something in our thought picks out a car. If we 
want to have a coffee, something in our speech refers to a coffee. Intentionality thus 
relates to the human self-consciousness, for when we are in a conscious mental state, it is 
‘directed at’ or ‘about’ something. This representational character of consciousness, it’s 
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being ‘of’ or ‘about’ something, is intentionality. What is essential to understand is that 
while human visual experience is intentional it is also object-dependent and this 
important point will be elaborated later.  
 
There are two fundamental features of intentionality, its existence-independence (we 
might think of things that do not exist as actualised) and its conception-dependence (we 
always conceive something in one or another particular way) (Smith and McIntyre 
1982). This second feature of intentionality will appear to be of a particular important 
for understanding the aesthetic experience. Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot have 
demonstrated a richness of the concept of intentionality in sociology, by aiming for a 
better understanding of individual and collective action (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991). 
It is precisely this broadening of the concept of intentionality to include both mental 
states and human action that make intentionality a rich concept for studying human 
spaces. This fact was recognised by Jacques Lévy who argued that “L’intentionalité – le 
fait que les actions humaines préexistent dans les représentations des agents sous forme de 
finalités de la volonté ou du désir et les transforment ainsi en acteurs” (1994 p.36). This 
position, according to Michel Lussault, allows us to avoid the actor being reduced to a 
mere agent, which comes as inevitable result if we apply constructivist frame of 
interpretation (Lussault and Lévy 2000, 18). If the aim here is to consider issues raised by 
spaces of contemporary society, and if there is an interest in understanding how the 
urban actors get engaged in action, the question to be asked is what social theories are 
most appropriate for this investigation? 
Can We Reject and Affirm Both Individualism and Holism? 
There are three general and coherent research approaches in social studies: individualism, 
holism and systemism (Bunge 2000). Since each approach is characterized by its own 
problematics, each approach can handle only certain problems. If we attempt to reduce 
the three doctrines to a single thought we might use the following statements: 1. “There's 
no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families.” 
(Margaret Tacher in an interview in “Women's Own” in 1987); 2. “Social life can be 
explained, not by the conceptions of those who participate in it, but by the deep causes 
which lie outside of consciousness.” (Durkheim 2010, 250); 3. “Everything is a system or 
a component of one.” (Bunge 1996, 264). Since the systemic approach accounts for both 
individual agency and social structure, the advantages of systemism are best appreciated 
when compared with its alternatives, methodological individualism and holism. 
 
According to individualism, a society is a collection of individuals – an accumulation of 
individual actions. Consequently, social studies are ultimately studies of beliefs, 
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intentions and actions of the individuals concerned. This position usually implies the 
axiom, coming from utilitarianism, by which humans act rationally – that is, from self-
interest (whether egoistic or altruistic). Many scientists have provided several objections 
to this view, particularly to its radical version. First, by postulating that all individuals are 
rational decision-makers who maximize utility, it does not allow for the uniqueness of 
every individual (Bunge 1996, 249). Since all individuals are considered identical and 
interchangeable, this presupposed uniformity; and constancy of human nature leads to a 
well-known paradox of sociology without a subject. Second, it is blind to the historical 
component of social interactions. By asserting the absolute primacy of the individual and 
of individual interests, this paradigm fails to account for the peculiarities of different 
societies, social movements and historical periods. Consequently feelings and intentions 
of individual actors become historically unavailable for questioning. Third, it provides a 
sterile opposition between the parts and the whole (Lévy 2013, 544). Fourth, it ignores 
one of the most “intriguing of all kinds of events in society”: the emergence of novelty 
(Bunge 1996). Finally, and perhaps most important of all, it fails to take into an account 
the multidimensional nature of societal problems – such as urban sprawl and pollution – 
that cannot be solved by doing one thing at a time precisely for they affect various 
dimensions at the same time (eg. political, economic or aesthetic dimension). However, 
the main virtue of individualism is its opposition to holism and its overly socialized 
picture of humans. 
 
Holism holds that nature and society should be viewed and studied as whole entities, not 
as collections of parts. There are multiple meanings of the term holism (scientific, 
philosophical, epistemological, complementary, dialectical, moral etc.), reflecting diverse 
philosophical and methodological traditions (Ralston 2011). Bunge summarized its 
general ontological principles in the following theses: 1. A society is a whole entity 
transcending its members; thus any proper social study is a study of whole social entities; 
2. A society has global properties, irreducible to any properties of the parts. Individual 
behavior is understandable in terms of the action of the entire structure (society) upon 
the individual; 3. Societies behave as units, they interact and change as whole entities 
(Bunge 1996, 260). Assuming for thesis that facts concerning the social world do not 
decompose into facts concerning individual entities, holism is the logical opposite of 
methodological individualism. The main objection to this paradigm is in its difficulty in 
dealing with change and thus in explaining emergence, subsistence or the decline of a 
society.    
 
Methodological (or social) holism further implies that in conducting social inquiry, 
group qualities should be treated as emergent and irreducible to the isolated elements, a 
view closely associated with social theorist Emile Durkheim (Durkheim 1964; Ralston 
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2011). It does not hold the strong ontological claim that says that social groups exist in 
the same way as individuals, but postulates this only for the sake of the inquiry. This 
approach treats all individuals as reciprocally related and interdependent, such that the 
group displays independently emergent properties, rather than qualities that can be 
decomposed and attributed to individual members of the group. This should be 
considered as one of most important contributions of holism to social theory. The best 
example of how group properties influence individuals has been theorized by 
structuralists,2 who appreciate structures in society as having independent causal powers 
beyond those attributed to individuals (Ralston 2011). Although, it has the merit of 
insisting that society is not just a collection of individuals and that every person is born 
in a pre-existing social system, it regards individual action as either negligible or the effect 
of pressure from above (Bunge 2011, 22).  
 
A longstanding and unresolved debate over the primacy of individualism or holism stems 
from, which appears to be, two different understandings of social reality. Is society a 
structure transcending its members or simply as an aggregate of rational individuals? 
Recently, there has been a growing interest in developing a social theory that would 
combine the advantages of the two opposing approaches. As a result, today we are faced 
with significant theoretical diversity, different methodological tools and a rising number 
of studies of heterogeneous social phenomena. Despite this variety of approaches, Filippo 
Barbera, an Italian economic sociologist, argues that it is nevertheless possible to detect a 
shared approach, summarized in the expression ‘analytical sociology’ (Barbera 2004, see 
also Wan 2012).  
 
In the introductory essay to the “Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology”, Peter 
Hedström assigns the following mission to this intellectual project:3 “to explain complex 
social processes by carefully dissecting them, bringing into focus their most important 
constituent components, and then to construct appropriate models which help us to 
understand why we observe what we observe” (Hedström and Bearman 2009). 
Hedström argues that “a path must be hewn between the eclectic empiricism of variable-
                                                      
2 Cornerstones of structuralist thought, according to Piaget (Piaget 1975) are: wholeness, 
transformation and self-regulation. Wholeness or completeness is “defining mark of structures” 
and relates to the scope of investigation. Transformation was introduced to the theory after 
criticism addressed to the early structuralists since structures would ossify without possibility to 
change over time. Altdought, theoretical constructs have been adopted to allow change which 
rendered theory dynamic, structuralist models are not typically made to address larger temporal 
horizons. This is particularly true in economics (Gibson 2003). Transformation is related to the 
third hallmark of structuralist methodology, self-regulation, which refers to the internal rules of 
the logical system meaning that “there is no external force that causes the system to follow a 
determinate path” (Gibson 2003). 
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based sociology and the often vacuous writings of the “grand” social theorists” (such as 
Talcott Parsons or Niklas Luhmann). He thus seeks precision in definition, action-based, 
mechanism-based and realistic explanation for various social phenomena (Hedström 
2005, 1-9). Although analytical sociology rightly focuses on “the mechanism-based 
explanation that is grounded in action theory and a ‘powerful’ conception of causality” 
(Wan 2011, 163), there are two important objections that might be addressed to it. First, 
“by stipulating that every causal explanation of social facts has to include explicit 
reference to individuals" (Wan 2011, 167), it denies the possibility that groups 
(corporations, political parties, social and cultural movements) can act as social actors as 
well. Collective intentional action (the “we-mode” of acting) must be taken into account 
as well (Searle 2006, 16). Second, by identifying action at the level of individuals only, it 
“eliminates structural features conceptually from the core of the mechanism directly 
responsible for a macro-phenomenon” (Mayntz 2004, 250).  
 
As Bunge suggests, scientists should reject yet affirm both individualism and holism. By 
adopting a systemic approach they should take into consideration the whole 
multidimensionality and complexity of human society. This dialectical solution allows 
researchers to perform their analysis at different equally legitimate levels and 
acknowledging this simple yet fundamental fact will turn out to be of particular 
importance for my study of the aesthetic dimension of the urban system. 
Studying Human Agency 
Systemism is a scientific approach which accounts for both individual agency and social 
structure, postulating that “everything is either a system or a component of a system”, 
and according to which “every system has peculiar (emergent) properties that its 
components lack.” (Bunge 2000) In the lenses of systemism, society is seen as a complex 
supersystem composed of interrelated entities (individuals or groups) organized into 
systems and networks of various kinds. As Bunge writes, it allows human agency to been 
seen through Weber’s microscope, and structure through Marx’s telescope. Actions can 
belong simultaneously to a plurality of systems, so we might speak of the “nesting of the 
diverse types of system within one another” (Luhmann 1982, 86; see also Mingers 2003; 
Pickel 2007, 394). 
 
Moreover, Bunge emphasizes the role of the environment and suggests studying the 
mechanisms of cooperation and the mechanisms of conflict. This allows researchers to 
                                                                                                                                             
3 For more on recent “analytic turn” in sociological thought see Barbera (2006) or Noguera 
(2006). 
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observe both social stasis and social change. If its correct to say that every science studies 
systems of some kind, the task of social sciences is to study social systems. It is important 
to underline the fact that there is not any single “systems theory” which explains social or 
spatial facts of all kinds. The systemic approach thus is not a theory to replace other 
theories. Hence empirical findings are essential, but not sufficient, for any systemic-based 
research. 
 
Many scientists (perhaps even all natural scientists and most social scientists) adopt some 
kind of systemic approach in their everyday work, even if they do not explicitly declare 
themselves as systemists.4 This might be due to the fact that the term “system” has 
become somehow associated with concepts of strong political repute. On the other hand, 
those who use concepts such as “system” or “emergence” tend to do it in a vague and 
ambiguous manner. This allows for common misunderstandings such as equating the 
term system with “organic whole”, considering that a network is other than a system or 
denying systemism the possibility of addressing problems related to change (Bunge 1996, 
265). Another difficulty, as observed by Wan, comes from the fact that researchers in the 
field of social theory have tended to regard the work of German social theorist Niklas 
Luhmann’s and in his famous work “Systemtheorie” as “the sole representative of system 
thinking” (2011, 3), a fact which contributed to the exclusion of a number of important 
approaches from scientific discussion.  
 
Luhmann’s system’s theoretical position is that of functional structuralism. He borrowed 
this approach from Talcott Parson’s structural functionalism, namely, an approach to 
society based on its main functions. Luhmann’s functional comparative method consists 
of pointing “to us a huge number of possibilities, namely functional accomplishments, 
by means of which systems can stabilize their external borders vis-à-vis their 
environment” (Heikkinen, Silvonen, and Simola 1999, 255). The concept of function is 
meant to challenge the concept of causality and replace it with “a technique of 
comparing functionally equivalent alternatives” (see Verschragen 2002).  
 
For Luhmann the cause or effect is fixed and serves as a point of reference for comparison 
within the field of functionally equivalent alternatives (Verschragen 2002); while 
function is seen as a reduction of alternatives (Schwanitz 1995, 138). This approach 
“explains an institution as as a possible but not necessary response to a problem, as one 
contingent solution among several possibilities (…) And from this it follows that “the 
specificity of a system in the presence of (certain) universal problems lies in its decision 
for one against all other (functionally equivalent solutions) (Michaels 2005, 358-59). 
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Therefore, the functional analysis of Luhmann followers aims to demonstrate that 
“everything can be done otherwise, that what in social life is considered effective and 
familiar is a contingent outcome of processes that have a range of possible alternatives” 
(Turner 2009, 119). Luhmann himself writes about this constructivist-oriented view5 on 
causality in the following manner: “causality is a judgment (Urteil), an observation of an 
observer, a coupling of causes and effects, depending upon how the observer forms his 
interests, how the observer considers the effects and causes to be important or not 
important” (Luhmann 2002; cited in Wan 2011, 94).  
 
Now, Luhmann’s important contribution to contemporary social theory, as Poe Yu-Ze 
Wan points out in his excellent work on systemism and social theory, lies in his 
recognition of the causal complexity of the world, which accounts for the fact that 
“invariant cause-effect relations”, i.e. regularity-deterministic (when A, then B) are 
difficult to find (Wan 2011, 115). Although one’s own knowledge and epistemic 
positions are essential to the very study of causality (Porpora 2007), Luhmann himself 
fails to stick to the end to his extreme constructivist and completely avoid realist account 
of causality (see Wan 2011). The more important objection concerns functionalism in 
general (even if Luhmann’s functional structuralism is undeniably more sophisticated 
than the earliest of Parson’s versions of structural functionalism). 
 
Anthony Giddens sees three major limitations in the functionalist approach. First, he 
considers that functionalist authors rest “upon a false division between statics and 
dynamics, or between the synchronic and the diachronic”. In stressing system needs, they 
“have been unable to see human beings as reasoning agents who know a great deal about 
what they are doing in their social conduct”. The second objection concerns inadequate 
accounts of human action in functionalist theory, in spite of the fact that Parson labeled 
his approach “the action frame of reference”. The argument of Giddens is “that human 
agents appear in Parson’s scheme, as in that of Althusser, as ‘cultural dopes’, not as actors 
who are highly knowledgeable (discursively and tacitly) about the institutions they 
produce and reproduce in and through their actions”. (He suggests an approach that is 
more in line with Erving Goffman, who “treats human beings as skilled and 
                                                                                                                                             
4 Structuralism, for example, employs systemic approach, although, as it has been argued in 
previous section, it plays down individual action. 
5 Luhmann’s theory is, in fact, not easy to understand. The author himself described his thinking 
as "labyrinth-like" and claimed he was deliberately keeping his writing enigmatic to prevent it 
from being understood too quickly and so to prevent simplistic misunderstandings (Luhmann 
1970). It therefore becomes difficult to situate him firmly in one or another epistemological 
school of thought. When debating with a realist, he appears more constructivist (stressing the self-
referential moment of knowledge) than he appears to be when he addresses skeptical idealists 
(insisting on the external referential moment of knowledge) (see Christis 2001). Therefore it 
would be most correct to call his approach constructivist realism. 
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knowledgeable actors who employ their knowledgeability routinely in the production 
and reproduction of social encounters”). The final objection, according to Giddens, is 
the most decisive. He argues that social systems have no “needs” or “functional 
exigencies”, and he offers an illustration of his position. Functionalists often interpret 
Marx’s discussion of the reserve army in the capitalist economy by saying that 
“Capitalism has its own ‘needs’, which the system functions to fulfill. Since capitalism 
needs a ‘reserve army’, one comes into being”. Giddens argues that no institution has 
ever emerged, persisted or disappeared because a society needed it to do so. For him, 
institutional features of society “come about historically, as a result of concrete 
conditions that have to be directly analyzed; the same holds true for their persistence or 
their dissolution” (1987). 
 
Thus we need a systemic approach which provides us with tools for capturing 
mechanisms underlying both macrosocial dynamics (and constraints) and the passage 
from passive agents to active actors with unique causal and imaginative powers. There are 
two complementary theories that I find particularly stimulating: “emergentist 
systemism”6 advocated by physicist and philosopher Mario Bunge (2000; 1982; 1996; 
2006) and “dialogical systemism” (in French, systémisme dialogique) of geographer and 
urbanist Jacques Lévy (1999). Both authors advocate a complex and relational 
understanding of social systems and formulate mechanism-based explanations to 
establish links between actors and their actions at multiple levels (from a single individual 
to the level of world-society). As Bunge states explicitly: “the features of a social system 
depend upon the nature, strength, and variability of social relations, which in turn are 
reducible to social actions” (Bunge 1999, 311). The emphasis is thus on actors (and 
more particularly on urban actors in the work of Lévy) and their actions in creating, 
reforming and destroying human social systems. Moreover, both authors consider that 
social issues are multidimensional, i.e. that society is a multidimensional system in a way 
that each dimension undergoes the totality of levels of a society.  
 
These dimensions hold together social systems of various kinds and we would be 
mistaken to assign a privileged status to any of them (biological over cultural, or 
economic over political). This allows us, for example, to search for an aesthetic 
dimension of (spatial) action or an historical dimension of aesthetic judgment. As Levy 
writes, “It is society taken as a whole that can explain society.” (Levy 1994, p.38). This 
means that when social change originates in any of the social dimensions it drags other 
                                                      
6 Some authors call Bunge’s approach an “ontological-emergentist concept of system” (Sagebiel 
and Vanhoefer 2006). The term emergentist systemism is used by some important exponents of 
Bunge’s writings such as Poe Yu-Ze Wan, Michael Klaassen and Werner Obrecht (see Wan 2011, 
4). 
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dimensions along. The European Renaissance serves as a good example of how a 
dramatic social movement affects all of societal dimensions. It was a period of change in 
all sorts of fields. In social terms there has been the growth of cities, in the context of a 
great increase of population in general across the Europe. That fact already brings the 
great number of changes in the economic dimension. In cultural terms, there has been a 
growth of universities alongside the cathedral schools and a rediscovery of classical 
writings (which had been temporarily lost or forgotten). Politically this has been the 
period of increasing stability and growing strength of the state and the church and 
interestingly, in the legal terms, there has been the development of grand legal systems 
together with the recovery of the Roman law. And all of these things are happening at 
the same time when aesthetic sensibilities shift from Gothic to neoclassical. Of course, 
this did not imply abandoning all previous hierarchisation. In this sense, anyone studying 
a change in society always needs to identify as much as possible of relations that 
constitute the structure of a system in which action (and thus change) takes place, while 
always bearing in mind that, when it comes to human beings, we must accept never to 
know the totality of relations that constitute them as individuals. 
Adopting Systemic Approach 
Mario Bunge suggests adopting the following postulates for anyone studying the world in 
systemic manner: “1. Everything, whether concrete or abstract, is a system or an actual or 
potential component of a system; 2. Systems have systemic (emergent) features that their 
components lack; 3. All problems should be approached in a systemic rather than in a 
sectorial fashion; 4. All ideas should be put together into systems (theories); and 5. The 
testing on anything, whether idea or artifact, assumes the validity of other items, which 
are taken as benchmarks, at least for the time being.” (Bunge 2000, 149) Systemism thus 
favors that which is multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary because the research question 
of the systemic approach must be connected to the totality of problems that may concern 
any kind of system. Bunge is quite clear on this point: “Any discipline that borrows 
nothing from, and gives nothing in return to, other disciplines is worthless.” (1996, 267) 
Now, as systemic reasoning has always been characterized by its diversity, it will be 
necessary to define some fundamental concepts to be used as an epistemological base in 
the following chapters. It would be fair enough to define the word “system” first of all. 
 
In the fourth volume of his impressive “Treatise on Basic Philosophy”, entitled 
“Ontology II: A World of Systems”, Mario Bunge offers this general definition of a 
system: “An object is a concrete system7 iff it is composed of at least two different 
                                                      
7 A concrete system can be physical, biological or social. 
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connected things.” He offers a few simple examples: a molecule, a coral reef, a family and 
a factory are systems, while a set of states of a thing or a collection of events, even if 
ordered, are not. The simplest possible system, for Bunge, is one composed of two 
connected things, “a” and “b”, in an environment lumped into a single “c” (Bunge 1982, 
7). It means that any two social agents (for example one actor and one object), held 
together by bonds of some kind in an environment, make a system. These bonds are 
logical in the case of a conceptual system, such as a theory; and they are material in the 
case of a concrete system, such as an atom, cell or immune system. Here, it is essential to 
recognize that humans, unlike the components that create the natural systems, are 
capable of a particular sort of action due to their power and capacity to make choices and 
create new alternatives in spite of external constraints. A number of social scientists, such 
as Antony Giddens or Margaret Archer, argue that humans are self-aware and reflexive 
(Giddens 2013; Archer 2007) which makes them entities with unique causal powers.8 In 
this sense, the influential actor-network theory advocated by a French philosopher, 
anthropologist and sociologist of science, Bruno Latour is flawed to a certain extent by 
attributing intentional powers to physical objects and social networks.  
 
At any given time a system is characterized by an ordered triple: composition, 
environment and structure.9 System, structure and processes that make the system in 
question work (mechanisms) are distinguished things defined in relation to one another. 
Notice that structure is not equal to system as some authors seem to suggest. This allows 
one to “alter the structure of a system without altering its mechanism, as when a state 
enterprise is transformed into a private company offering exactly the same product or 
services” (Wan 2011, 147). Moreover it is important to remember that social structures 
are not accessible to our senses so they must be conjectured (once conjectured, they may 
be visualized). In this process both ideal and material aspects of social structures must be 
taken into account. Families, labor unions, clubs, hospitals, firms, political parties, 
villages, towns, cities and world-society are all systems, whose members cooperate in 
                                                      
8 “Causes” shall not be understood in terms of events, state of affairs or variables, but as “those 
things, forces, powers, mechanisms or set of relations that make things happen or ‘trigger’ events” 
(Kurki 2007, 174). 
9 Bunge illustrates this with the example of a health system and defines the three components in 
the following manner: The first component, the composition represents the collection of parts of 
a system at the time concerned (e.g., physicians, nurses, administrators, clerks, janitors, in-
patients, out-patients). The environment is defined by the collection of things that are not in 
system but are connected to the different parts of system (e.g. hospital buildings, furniture, 
instruments, ambulances, families of the members of the system, etc ). The second component, 
the structure is the collection of relations among the members of the system, plus the relations 
among them and the environmental items (e.g. relations of diagnosing and prognosticating, 
medications and operating, advising or otherwise acting on patients, keeping their families 
informed, organizing work, teaching, and supplies, keeping the wards clean, etc.) (Bunge 1996b, 
270; see also Bunge 1982, 191). 
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some respects and compete in others – a thesis that combines, as Bunge writes, Marx’s 
emphasis on conflict and Durkheim’s on solidarity.  
 
In sum, human society is a multidimensional open system of systems that is defined by 
environment and actions (actual and virtual) exerted by some of its components upon 
others. As a complex system it is enormously varied (its components can be grouped into 
different levels), changeable, and composed of humans and non-humans. The strongest 
objection we might address to the Bunge’s theory is precisely related to his over-
materialistic position which overlooks the non-objectivist and imaginary dimensions of 
social life (see Bradford 2010, 143). His approach should therefore be supplemented by a 
reading of authors such as Lévy or Elias.  
Emergent System Properties: More is Different 
Merely specifying the composition is not sufficient to describe a system, for it has 
properties that none of its components have. The peculiarity of the system is that its 
characteristics cannot be deduced from the knowledge of its components taken 
separately. This is something that neo-positivists, who are advocates of a self-explanatory 
power of Big Data, fail to recognize. It is thus useful to clearly distinguish two types of 
properties possessed by any system – resultant and emergent properties.  
 
Resultant properties are “properties of wholes that are possessed by its parts in isolation, 
and or in an unstructured aggregation. (…) The classic example of a resultant property is 
mass – the mass of a molecule, for example, is the sum of the mass of its constituent 
atoms.” (Elder-Vass 2005) The emergent properties, which are routinely invoked in 
critical realist theory, are properties of a whole that are not possessed by its parts. As 
Dave Elder-Vass explains, “Emergence occurs when an entity possesses one or more 
‘emergent properties’. An ‘emergent property’ is one that is not possessed by any of the 
parts of the entity individually, nor when they are aggregated, without a structuring set 
of relations between them.” (Elder-Vass 2005) A classic example of emergent properties 
is that of the properties of water, which are very different from those of its components 
oxygen and hydrogen. Another example is that of color which only makes sense for bulk 
matter (Cohen and Stewart 2000, 232). 
 
As one of the leading systems philosophers William C. Wimsatt argues, emergence 
appears to be an extremely common phenomenon. “It is the rule, rather than the 
exception.” (Wimsatt 2007, 304) Thus he chooses to define emergence in negative 
terms, i.e. as a failure of aggregativity, and proposes four criteria to be met so that a given 
property can be aggregative. A given property is considered emergent if it violates one or 
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more of the following conditions: First, the parts are intersubstitutable without affecting 
the system property; the system property is not a product of the way the system is 
organized. (It is clear that individuals can hardly meet these criteria, for the network of 
relationships among individuals is significant.) Second, the systemic property should 
remain qualitatively similar when parts are removed or added. Third, the systemic 
property remains unchanged under decomposition and re-aggregation of its parts. (i.e. 
How many members of an organisation can be added or removed in order to have a 
qualitative change?) Fourth, there are no cooperative or inhibitory interactions among 
the parts of the system – the relations between parts and whole is linear. Again, it is 
unlikely for individuals to have linear relationships for their relations are often 
cooperative or inhibitory (see Sawyer 2005, 95).  
 
As most social properties fail to satisfy all four criteria, scientific attention should 
primarily be directed in recognition and analysis of various emergent phenomena. In this 
work I will investigate particularly urbanity and beauty as some of the most intriguing 
and interesting emergent phenomena of urban systems as the former belongs to its 
objective and the latter to its subjective realm.  
 
The concept of emergence has had a long and controversial history. Christopher 
Goldspink and Robert Kay argue that it is important to recognize why emergence in 
social systems is fundamentally different from that found in natural systems (Goldspink 
and Kay 2007). They distinguish two types of emergence: non-reflexive (where the 
agents in the system are not self-aware) and reflexive (where the agents in the system are 
self-aware and linguistically capable). According to Goldspink and Kay, what 
distinguishes human systems from natural systems is the fact that humans are capable of 
coordination of their actions by means of language. Language “makes possible the 
emergence of domains of interaction that can themselves become the target for further 
linguistic distinction and hence new domains”, that further makes the social world even 
more complex (see Wan 2011, 79).  
 
Hyper-complexity and the discursive dimension of human social systems have been 
recognized by Lévy (1999, 72), who argues furthermore that the complexity of human 
social systems is dialogical, i.e. dialectical and “pragmatic” at the same time. This means 
that the complexity of human systems is not created by actors interacting through their 
physical movements (like a wave “interacting” with a rock); they do it, instead, with the 
totality of their ideal and their material relationships with the world. Levy proposes that 
we comprehend societies as relational whole entities in which human actors play a 
fundamental role. What is essential, according to this perspective, are not only language 
and strategies and competences of different actors, but also the specific roles of objects or 
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organizations – an approach which makes systemism compatible with human historicity 
(often neglected in structuralist conceptions) (Lévy 1999, 398). Levy isolates four 
decisive aspects of historicity: complexity, intentionality, acceleration of movement and 
cumulative irreversibility (Lévy 1999). An action that is opposed to these principles 
might be considered as anti-historical.  
 
It is important to underline that changing scale from the individual to the societal level, 
or vice versa, does not decrease the level of complexity. It is rather a different complexity 
that emerges every time we change scale. As Philip Anderson, American physicist and 
Nobel laureate reminds us in his famous article “More is Different” (1972):  
 
“At each level of complexity entirely new properties appear (…) At each 
stage entirely new laws, concepts, and generalizations are necessary, 
requiring inspiration and creativity to just as great a degree as in the 
previous one. Psychology is not applied biology; neither is biology applied 
chemistry.”  
 
I would like to add that architecture is not applied anthropology, or even less applied 
ergonomics. Now, Anderson is not arguing that a change of scale implies that 
phenomena at a new scale may obey different fundamental laws, but rather that “the 
whole becomes not only more but very different from the sum of its parts.”  
 
Robert Meyers, the editor of the massive 10,000-page Encyclopaedia of Complexity and 
Systems Science, defines complex systems as “systems that comprise many interacting 
parts with the ability to generate a new quality of collective behavior through self-
organization, e.g. the spontaneous formation of temporal, spatial or functional structures. 
They are therefore adaptive as they evolve and may contain self-driving feedback loops. 
Thus, complex systems are much more than a sum of their parts. Complex systems are 
often characterized as having extreme sensitivity to initial conditions as well as emergent 
behavior that are not readily predictable or even completely deterministic. The 
conclusion is that a reductionist (bottom-up) approach is often an incomplete 
description of a phenomenon.” (Metzler, Chechkin, and Klafter 2009) Here it is 
important to pause for a moment to consider the notion of self-organization which has 
been attracting the attention of philosophers and scientists from at least as far back as the 
time of Descartes.  
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Humans and Self-organization  
A sociological application of self-organization has been particularly developed by 
Luhmann who introduced the concept of self-referentiality in social theory (Luhmann 
1984). According to Luhmann, social systems are autopoetic, i.e. self-referential and this 
self-referentiality is used by social systems to sustain the distinction between a system 
itself and its environment (1983, 992). Luhmann expanded the concept of autopoiesis 
from the biological systems theory to a general systems theory to be able to propose a 
new social system theory. The term autopoiesis is a pseudo Greek term that comes from 
auto, meaning “self”, and poiesis, meaning “creation, production”, and refers to a system 
capable of reproducing and maintaining itself.  
 
It was initially coined by the Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francesco 
Varena (1973), who defined an autopoietic system as a “machine organized (defined as a 
unity) as a network of a process of production (transformation and destruction) of 
components that produces the components.” Luhmann appropriated this theory and 
developed his “Systemtheorie” by suggesting that social systems are not comprised of 
persons and actions but of communications (Luhmann 1988, 145). Social systems 
become networks of communication that produce further communication (and nothing 
but communication - if we push the point to its end). This might be one of most 
important pitfalls of Luhmann’s theory (Schatten and Bača 2010), for even the original 
authors of the concept of autopoiesis had strong reservations for Luhmann’s attempt to 
directly apply the concept of autopoiesis derived from natural systems to human systems. 
The objection of Maturana deserves to be quoted entirely:  
 
“Just imagine for a moment a social system that is, in actual fact, 
functioning autopoietically. It would be an auto poetic system of the third 
order, itself composed of auto poetic systems of the second order. This 
would entail that every single process taking place within this system would 
necessarily be subservient to the maintenance of the autopoesis of the 
whole. Consequently, the individuals with all their peculiarities and diverse 
forms of self-presentation vanish. They would have to subordinate 
themselves to the maintenance of autopoesis. Their fate is of no further 
relevance. They must conform in order to preserve the identity of the 
system. This kind of negation of the individual is among the characteristics 
of totalitarian systems” (Maturana and Poerksen 2007, 72). 
 
  43 
My theoretical attention thus will not be focused on autopoietic, self-reproducing 
natural-like systems suggesting that social structure might exert causal powers 
independently from the agency of system’s components. I will agree with Wan that “the 
world, natural and social, is an open system that consists of things (or systems) possessing 
causal powers or potentialities by virtue of their intrinsic structures, which may or may 
not be exercised, and when exercised may or may not be actualized as a particular 
outcome pattern.” (Wan 2011, 120)  
 
I will insist on the theory of social organization that emphasises auto-reflexive and 
imaginative human agents with their interests, beliefs and commitments, and allows 
distinction between the mechanisms of organization in human and natural systems. Thus 
my gaze will primarily be on “actors with their orientations and capabilities, actor 
constellations, and modes of interaction.” (Scharpf 1997, 39) 
 
In society, humans, artefacts and events are separated by various distances that can have 
subjective or objective character. My investigation will be focused on the particular 
imaginative capacity of humans that make subjective distances not only possible but the 
constitutive element of the functioning each urban system. Since space is rooted in the 
separation between things (relative to the same frame of reference), I will now return to 
the problem of space and proceed by closely analyzing its fine structure, i.e. its scale, 
metrics and substance. 
Space and Distance 
“We have said that space is existential; we could just as 
well have said that existence is spatial.”  
Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
 
Space separates. The task of scientists is to investigate the nature of the separation 
between things or sets of things, i.e. to investigate the distance between the elements of 
what is real. There are four main views on the nature of space (and time): the container 
(Newton), the prime stuff (Descartes), the property of things (Berkeley) and the 
relational view (Leibniz). At the beginning of this chapter, I have already presented the 
arguments in favour of the relational view of space seen as a set of relations between 
factual items. In short, no things or ideas, no spatial relations and thus no space. An 
empty space is a contradictio in adjecto. Space always includes objects, being those virtual 
or real, ideal or material. In philosophy this view has been expounded, with various 
  44 
degrees of clarity, by diverse thinkers, e.g. Leibniz, Lambert, Riemann, Schopenhauer, 
Engels, Mach, Whitehead, Lefebvre, Bunge, and many others. However, the relational 
paradigm, even when accepted as fact on a rational basis (which is certainly true in the 
contemporary francophone human geography), is not an easy one to conceive on a 
psychological basis. Einstein clearly stated this: “It required a severe struggle to arrive at 
the concept of independent and absolute space, indispensable for the development of 
theory. It required no less strenuous exertions subsequently to overcome this concept – a 
process which is probably by no means as yet completed.” (quoted in Jammer 1969, 117) 
Now, Einstein said this more than half a century ago but the authority of Newton stays 
with us much more than we are ready to admit. This is particularly true in biology, 
psychology, some of the social sciences and engineering, but in architecture as well this is 
the case. Some sciences, like biology or engineering, simply take space for granted. Other 
disciplines, like architecture, remain heavily influenced by inherited views on space 
which dates back to the Renaissance or even Antiquity.  
Three Attributes of Space: Scale, Metrics and Substance 
The question: What is space? cannot be fully answered without answering the following 
one: What is the structure of space? Since my investigation concerns human spaces and 
more in particular urban spaces, I will turn my attention to geography – a discipline 
involved in investigation of social spaces in general and whose object involves a spatial 
dimension of the social system. In the “Dictionnaire de la géographie et de l’espace des 
sociétés”, space is defined as a dimension of society corresponding to the total of relations 
established between different realities by a distance, each space having at least three 
elemental attributes: metrics, scale and substance (Lévy 2013, 353). Each attribute of 
space is dependent upon the other two, but as Lévy argued (1994, p.49), it is useful to 
dissociate them for better understanding of the essential features of space. 
 
In general terms, scale is the interval representing degrees of a property. Sometimes we 
express it in quantitative concepts which are numeric or mathematical in nature 
(numerical quantification) and sometimes in class or qualitative concepts, such as 
satisfaction or happiness. When one adopt a relational and systemic approach, their 
understanding of scale must follow. This means that when degrees of a property change, 
this entails change on the content as well. A big city is not only bigger but also different 
than a small city, and it is important to say that the “bigness” of a city (as any other 
property of a system) can be represented in different ways. In fact, it might be said that 
there are infinite ways of measuring a property of a system and an infinite number of 
scales to express its qualities. Everything depends on what one measures and how they 
measure it. What is measured is important because two different things are not big in the 
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same way. A big city and a big house are not big in the same way. How one measures, on 
the other hand, depends on whether their measuring tools belong to economic, political, 
sociological, historical or some other dimension. Geneva, for example, is a small city in 
terms of a number of inhabitants, a big one in terms of economic or political impact. 
Everything depends upon the question asked.  
 
When dealing with space we deal with distances. Scale matters for it brings forward size-
relations between different realities. However, switching over to one or another order of 
grandeur cannot be defined by any a priori criteria. The systematic approach makes it 
both challenging and essential to identify a threshold values for any scale. If a researcher 
is dealing with complex questions such as the size of a city or the proximity of a 
particular urban space, Cartesian reduction of the entire variety of realities to extension 
and shape only, will not help us much. One of the great failures of the Modern 
Movement lies precisely in the pervasive ignorance of scale by modernist architects and 
urban planners who treated the city as if it was a house, only bigger. They failed to 
recognize that when we transgress a threshold between a house and a city we change 
order from private space to societal space – which requires a totally different approach 
when it comes to spatial planning and spatial action (see Lévy 2013). The task of finding 
an appropriate scale threshold can be accomplished neither by the Euclidian geometry 
only, for meters and square-meters tell us little when it comes to the question of distances 
between humans. This means that scale is not an auto-referential notion (Berque 2000) 
as it happens to be directly dependent on two other spatial attributes, metrics and 
substance. 
 
The notion of metrics has its origin in the Greek word metron, meaning both the 
measure itself and that by which anything is measured (an instrument). In western 
geography the notion of metrics has been taken for granted for a long time, 
topographical metrics (Euclidian measure) having been employed almost exclusivity 
when measuring distances. Today, due to the expansion of spatial theory to topological 
and subjective spaces, the notion of metrics has been expanded to such a degree that 
there is not any a priori distance, but rather distances that we can measure and overcome 
in various ways.  
 
In addition, choosing one mode over another for treating distances often means choosing 
between two opposing lifestyles, e.g. choosing a lifestyle practiced in the center of a dense 
city often implies a willingness to use public transportation and pedestrian metrics; while 
the choice of a suburban lifestyle is closely associated with a strong dependence on a car. 
This means that individuals’ managing of distances is not innocent and implies a number 
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of political or ethical decisions. As we shall see later, this choice is strongly influenced by 
an aesthetic component as well.    
 
Lévy defines substance as a non-spatial component of a spatial configuration (1994 
p.49). Spatial substance is an answer to a vaguely formulated question of the world itself. 
Substance implies that the space is always the space of something. As the last attribute of 
the spatial triad, substance could simply be described as an adjective we use to determine 
a type of a space in question (e.g. urban space, political space, genealogical space). This 
why a relational theory of space is sometimes called adjectival. For example, urban space 
(or urban space-time, if we want to add the element of time as a succession of events) is 
the basic structure of the totality of possible urban-related facts, scientific space as the 
basic structure of the totality of possible science-related facts, etc. As a matter of fact, a 
recognition of a spatial substance is crucial for being able to (inter)act in society.  
 
It is a well known fact that young children relate everything with everything (Piaget 
1971). From the very early age, children are trained by other humans to learn and 
recognise an incredible number of spatial substances, a knowledge without which the 
societal objects would have no meaning. By creating roles in play children test different 
spatial substances which is “their first step on the road not just to Oz but also toward 
inhabiting human institutional reality” (Tomasello 2008). In this sense, substance is not 
an isolated fact but an entry point which allows scientists to investigate all dimensions of 
society with the spatial point of view.  
 
In 2017 a Danish TV network commercial entitled “All that we share” (“Alt Det Vi 
Deler”) went viral for its touching message about humanity. While the commercial 
celebrates the concept of a modern diverse society, it is also an exceptional exercise in 
spatial substance. The commercial begins by inviting 80 individuals from all walks of life 
to place themselves inside the ten squares that were previously drawn on the ground. In 
one square was a group of medical workers, in another a group of business people, than a 
group of people from the countryside and after a group of those who have never seen a 
cow, and so on. Thus each group was constituted by one spatial substance that was 
previously defined as a relevant. Once all the squares were occupied, the narrator started 
to asked questions: Who in this room was the class clown? Who are step parents? Who 
are those who have been bullied and those who have bullied others? Who are the 
brokenhearted and those who are madly in love? Those who feel lonely and those who 
are bisexual? As the questions continued, the individuals displaced themselves by forming 
new clusters each time the new question was asked. These clusters are precisely the newly 
formed spaces defined by a substance that was considered as relevant (which also implies 
that other substances were suspended as irrelevant in the given moment). The message is 
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that what we share is precisely our common spaces, and that the categories of “us” and 
“them” are primarily spatial categories.   
 
It is important to underline here that complex spaces (as with the case of most of human 
spaces) have various scales, metrics and substances. As distance appears to be 
fundamental for understanding the nature of space, and consequently, affects the human 
being in the world, I will turn my attention to the problem of distance in the following 
section.  
Distance as a Keyword 
Distance represents the absence of contact (or a degree of separation) between different 
components of a system. Thus any analysis of a system, including human social systems, 
must include the analysis of distances between components of a system. This is given that 
there is no interaction at a distance only a distance relevant to the issue in question. In 
“L’espace légitime”, which is written as a series of scientific and philosophical 
propositions, Jacques Lévy offered a new approach to spatial theory in geography by 
putting distance at the center of problems raised by societies. In the in the twenty-second 
proposition, he writes in the following manner: 
 
“Space is a problem for societies insofar as a distance exists between social 
objects. This distance is in contradiction with the maximization of social 
interaction.” (p.48, translated from French) 
 
Distance appears as a key notion in social sciences of space, for interaction between 
components of a social system becomes a necessary condition for the very existence of 
society. It is essential to recognize that any measurement of distances cannot be done in 
isolation from the theories that make such measurements possible. In the chapter “Space, 
Time and Knowledge”, I have argued how adopting a certain conception of space always 
comes with heavy consequences for the rest of theoretical knowledge. This statement 
shows its full relevance for anyone interested in measuring distances. If one adopt the 
Newtonian approach (the absolute space paradigm), they remain strongly limited by the 
uniformity of the Euclidian geometry, which imposes equal metrics at any point.  
 
The relational paradigm gives both the observer and the things themselves an active 
rather than a passive position in the constitution of space – itself now considered as 
dynamic rather than static. This opens up a wide range of new possibilities to sciences 
interested in the spatial dimension of the social. Geography, for example, which has been 
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a self-imprisoned science of territories, could expand its scope to study various networks 
and rhizomes.   
 
Through the notion of metrics, distance appears in the center of any spatial analysis. 
Take, for example, a person living next to the border of a country having high passport-
restrictions. Even if the territory of a bordering state may seem close in Euclidian terms, 
it becomes extremely distant if measured by political or economically driven metrics. 
And this distance is objective even though not material. For the underprivileged 
individual in question, it is as if someone has constructed a wall between his country and 
a bordering country. Thus any opposition between between physical space and social 
space should be rejected. In the course of history, various ways of managing distances 
have been combined in a mixture of competition and cooperation, which Beaude calls 
coopetition (2009, 105). They often coexist but are not equally distributed among 
individuals and their societies. 
 
If contact makes interaction possible between the two realities, and if distance is an 
obstacle to this interaction, we might ask ourselves what are the conditions that make 
distance irrelevant? Geography has found an answer to this question in the concept of 
place, which some geographers have elevated to nothing less than the condition of 
human experience (Entrikin 1991, 1). 
Place as a Distance Made Irrelevant 
Place (fr. lieu) is a central concept in geography in general, and particularly in humanistic 
geography. The concept of place has evolved together with the evolution of geographical 
thought from pre-Darwian naturalism (expressed in the possibilisme of Vidal la Blanche, 
father of modern French geography) towards an idea that humans act upon their 
environment in a way that allows them to detach their own evolution from that of 
nature. 
 
Restricted to milieu during the first half of twentieth century, the concept of place could 
finally become deliberated from the confines of soil and territory by a theoretical turn 
upheld by various researchers and re-assembled by the name “humanistic geography”, a 
term which designates an intellectual movement that took place around 1970. By taking 
into account the human actor and human experience, humanistic geography was finally 
able to move forward from the naturalistic, deterministic and positivistic aspiration of the 
preceding period.  
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This important theoretical shift did not happen outside of social and societal movements 
in general. It followed a change in individuals’ relationship to the world, which emerged 
with modernity, having for consequence the weakening of local communities and the 
emergence of a global society of individuals. To explain the mechanisms behind this 
process that has no precedent in human history, geography and as well as other social 
sciences, had to change completely its way of understanding the world at large which, 
among other things, necessitated adoption of a relational i.e. dynamic understanding of 
space.  
 
This implied a shift from the understanding of place as a thing-in-itself, i.e. a delimitated 
portion of territory which could be measured by the help of Euclidian geometry, to the 
understanding of place as an order of things whose mediation is in perpetual 
reconfiguration (see Beaude 2015; Berque 2000, 555; Santos 1997; Lévy 1996; Retaillé 
1996, 95). Space has changed its scientific status progressively from that of a constraint 
to that of a liberty (Lévy 1996, 51). Milton Santos, who was one of leading figures to 
give fresh life to French and South American geography from 1975 to 2000, argued for 
the importance of place in the constitution of space and society. He therefore defines the 
importance of place in the following manner: “It’s place that offers the world’s 
movement the greatest possibility for its most efficient realization. To become space the 
world depends on the virtual nature of place.” (Translated from French , Santos 1997, 
242).  
 
Here Santos speaks the language of Leibniz and we should remind ourselves of the 
discussion in the section “Newton versus Leibniz”. As for Leibniz, the third (and final) 
step in space formation is to consider all places together. (What is perhaps missing in the 
theory of Leibniz is precisely the fact that he does not give sufficient attention to the 
importance of place.) Now, it is essential to recognize that place itself is a space – only a 
kind of space where “distance is considered non-relevant” (Lévy 2013, 612). This elegant 
and powerful definition, proposed by Lévy, allows us to consider place formation as a 
necessary condition of experience itself. Here again metrics and substance are of 
fundamental importance, for without them all places would be the same. A restaurant is 
considered to be a place since we might expect to be served by a waiter without paying 
attention to the table we choose. In the same way an amphitheater, a train, a city, a 
mountain – and finally even the world – can all be considered as places, depending on 
the scale, metrics and substance in question. Thus a place is not purely and simply the 
distance denied, but rather always the distance denied from a certain point of view. We 
might even say that every space could become place depending on the type of 
phenomenon we consider to be relevant. To experience a world, a world must become a 
space where distance is not relevant. It must become a place.  
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Spatiality As an Action that Produces Space 
Space cannot be defined without being a space of something. To spatialise things means 
to establish relationships between them, which would allow action to take place. This 
action is called spatiality. Space, spatialization and spatiality are elements of the same 
process. Space proceeds from spatiality while at the same time it offers a context 
(structure) that allows one or another style of spatiality. Human agents, as components 
of urban systems, mobilize their various spatial competences to achieve their goals (e.g. 
assure mobility to go to work or school, renovate an apartment, establish social relations 
with other members of society, etc.). Each of these goals implies heavy consequences to 
the totality of the urban space in question (e.g. to live in a single-family house in a peri-
urban area necessitates various spatial arrangements that make the practice of this 
particular lifestyle possible). A style of spatiality (Lévy 2013, 950; Lussault 2007) thus 
represents a way of making do with space (Certeau 1990).  
 
Human agency, the capacity of each individual or group of individuals to act upon, is 
thus defined by space and spatiality. This is why we may say that human experience, i.e. 
human existence, is spatial. Space and spatiality, as essential notions for all science 
studying the spatial dimension of human societies, represent the base upon which we 
may construct and develop other fundamental concepts, such as the concept of 
inhabiting, urbanization, boundaries, territories, networks etc.  
 
Inhabitants always see their immediate environment in relation to themselves, as the 
objective part of their style of spatiality in which their humanity may be either denied or 
confirmed. The aesthetic experience assumes an importance for its potential to activate 
the agency of urban actors, and fundamentally influences our actions towards the urban 
environment. This is why I will turn my attention to the aesthetic dimension of society 
and explore how the subjective realm of the aesthetic has proved itself able to generate 
conditions that lead to action, and consequently influence other dimensions of society, 
especially the realm of the objective, i.e. what is ethical, political or legal. 
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Fig. 2 – La Clairvoyance, René Magritte, 1936 © 2017, ProLitteris, Zurich 
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2 The Aesthetic Dimension of 
Society 
“Croire qu'il suffit d'ouvrir les yeux pour posséder le monde 
comme représentation est une erreur. C'est le présupposé 
général selon lequel il suffit d'ouvrir les portes de nos sens 
pour posséder le monde de manière sensible et que l'activité 
intellectuelle commence seulement lorsqu'il s'agit de 
parvenir à une activité conceptuelle.”  
Konrad Fiedler 
 
In his 2007 essay entitled “In Search of Aesthetics”, Roger Scruton argued 
that many recent studies in the field of aesthetics have been rather futile. A huge amount 
of time and energy has been consumed in a constant struggle to define and redefine art, 
to decide whether found objects are works of art, whether John Cage’s 4’33’’ is a work of 
music, whether copies are versions or new works, and so on and so on. Scruton might be 
too strong in his judgment but he is right to say that such questions do not cast any light 
on why works of art are significant to humans, and what kind of significance they carry 
for human actions (2007, 238). It might be argued that the reason why research in the 
field of aesthetics is not progressing lies in the fact that many researchers tend to consider 
aesthetics as a synonym of the artistic and thus they limit their study to works of art. In 
this thesis, I will take the position that everyday experiences are replete with aesthetic 
character, to the extent that any real situation of consciousness in the world is imbued 
with the aesthetic. From the earliest stages of human history, a specific form of 
imaginative consciousness developed in which the aesthetic relations of man to reality 
were established and developed. This is why I argue that the aesthetic dimension runs 
through our entire society and is strongly and inseparably interconnected to the other 
dimensions of society that hold it together as a system. Studying aesthetic concepts and 
the aesthetic experience is important for they open up particular aspects of human 
existence to which scientists wouldn’t otherwise have access. 
  54 
Art versus Aesthetics 
The theory of aesthetic appreciation has often identified aesthetic objects as being 
separate from human experience. One of the reasons for this misunderstanding may be 
related to the Western philosophical study of aesthetics, which focused, with some 
noteworthy exceptions, almost exclusively on the study of art. As a consequence, 
aesthetics became the affair of art critics or aestheticians, something to be discussed by 
the “experts in taste”. The shortcoming of any aesthetic theory that neglects human 
experience was famously discussed by John Dewey in “Art as Experience” (2005), a work 
that is regarded by many as one of the most important contributions to the aesthetic 
theory in the 20th century. As a leading proponent of American pragmatism, Dewey 
argued that the task of aesthetics consists in examining the construction of beauty from 
the standpoint of a certain “situation”, which is not a purely mental act, separate from 
action. Art is a medium which is able to communicate the artist’s experience with the 
world, the works of art being the gateways to the lived experience of the painter or writer. 
In this view, art involves an experience related to a particular material object and thus 
both the artist and the observer actively encounter each other and their environment 
through the expressive object that we name “the work of art”. Consequently, aesthetic 
concepts lose their objective significance and the accent is shifted to the space of human 
representation. This important shift later allowed Nelson Goodman to propose that we 
replace the question “what is art?” with the question “when is art?” (Goodman 1978, 
70). In the following paragraphs, we will reveal some of the reasons for the apparent 
blindness of many researchers with regards to the existence of aesthetic experiences that 
could take place outside of fine art museums. 
The Aesthetic is Other Than the Artistic 
The discussion around the idea of a distinctively aesthetic state of mind (as being the 
very concept of the aesthetic) has a long history. It seems to be a highly versatile notion 
and remains a matter of ongoing controversy (Carroll 2001). The issue has been 
addressed by a variety of thinkers. Examples include Schopenhauer’s insistence on a pure 
will-less contemplation as a necessary condition for the appreciation of the beautiful and 
the sublime, Kant’s discussion on the disinterested character of aesthetic contemplation, 
or Friedrich Schiller, who considered the aesthetic state of mind as a disposition of the 
mind which contains in itself the whole of humanity (precisely because it takes no 
individual function of humanity exclusively under protection, it is favorable to all). In 
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opposition to this, certain thinkers of both analytical and continental philosophy, like 
George Dickie, considered that a state of mind that is specifically aesthetic is an empty 
notion, i.e., a myth (Dickie 1964). For Dickie, the only thing that distinguishes the 
aesthetic domain from some other human activity is the particular object of its attention, 
i.e., the work of art. This latter position became dominant among philosophers who 
wrote on the subject of aesthetics in the XXth century.10 A dilemma thus emerges: 
Should we first investigate a kind of attitude or mode of observing things that is 
distinctively aesthetic and then extend it to the subject of art, or should we first discuss 
the notion of art and from this derive a theory of the aesthetic? 
 
I argue that there exists a mode of observing the world that is distinctively aesthetic 
which, in turn, cannot be “bracketed” or studied in isolation. A particular aesthetic state 
of mind (as it may be the case with most of our mental states) is intentional, i.e., directed 
outwards from subject to object.11 This position follows the theory of aesthetic 
appreciation developed by the British philosopher Roger Scruton, who reminds us that 
“it is impossible to describe or understand a mental state in isolation from its object: it 
might be said that the object, or at least a certain conception of the object, is of the 
essence of a mental state” (Scruton, Scruton, and Sparshott 1979, 73). In this sense, a 
theory of the aesthetic appreciation of the urban environment cannot stop short of giving 
a theory of its proper object and consequently is intricately related to urban theory in a 
larger sense. In addition, cognitive psychology has demonstrated that the aesthetic 
experience is just as mediated by language and socially situated as any other conscious 
human activity (see Schaeffer 2015). The same applies to art, whose scope cannot be 
solely reduced to aesthetic appreciation.12 There are other dimensions of society 
(economic, cultural, political, etc.) that are equally important in the activities of making 
and appreciating art. In short, I suggest that the aesthetic should not be conceived as an 
overarching concept that includes all artistic value and its potential for action, nor should 
the artistic be conceived as a synonym of the aesthetic. 
 
It is equally important to underline that when researchers speak of human mental 
capacities, we should not assume that these processes are divided into neatly separable 
compartments that can exist autonomously. Multiple studies in the fields of psychology 
                                                      
10 One of the reasons for this may lie in apparent distrust among some XX century philosophers 
in regard to the notion of “experience” (in the sense of “lived experience”), merely for their 
association of the notion of experience to different forms of “psychologism” (see Schaeffer 2015, 
30). 
11 The question of intentionality has been discussed previously, in the chapter “Collective and 
Individual Action“. 
12 Otherwise, we would be tempted to agree with Bartett Newmann, the abstract color-field 
painter, when he said: “Aesthetics is for me like ornithology must be for the birds” (Newman and 
O'Neill 1992, 304). 
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and economy, for example, have demonstrated that emotions are a necessary condition 
for correct reasoning. Thus, when I speak of different categories of mind (thought, 
feeling, will) I do it rather “to understand the fundamental powers of the mind: not what 
mind is, but what it can do” (Scruton, Scruton, and Sparshott 1979, 7:106). This 
holistic understanding of the human mind allows me to consider the aesthetic state of 
mind as a particular mode of experience, without supporting the idea that some cognitive 
or affective resources are exclusively aesthetic. With this being clarified, I can proceed 
with a closer investigation of the character and specificity of the aesthetic experience. 
Thus, to approach the problem of aesthetics, I will begin by using a theory of the 
aesthetic state of mind, and not by using a theory of art. 
Art as Experience 
“Art as Experience” was published in 1934, only two years before Walter Benjamin 
published his seminal essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”. 
Although different in nature, these two texts share the same criticism towards the 
doctrine of art for art's sake (l’art pour l’art) — an idea that art constituted a separate 
closed world devoid of any ethical, social or cognitive purpose and that teaches us 
nothing about life or society’s values. This idea emerged with modernism and the 
unprecedented mobility of trades and population, which “destroyed the connection 
between works of art and the genius loci of which they were the natural expression. As 
works of art […] lost their indigenous status, they […] acquired a new one — that of 
being specimens of fine art and nothing else” (Dewey 2005, 8). This movement, which 
appeared at the end of the 19th century, was later replaced by another paradigm of 
Western culture — the “avant-garde”, which gradually became an umbrella term for art 
pervaded by political, social, and aesthetic radicalism. The avant-gardists saw themselves 
literally as the guardians of society, whose role was to lead radical social progress. This 
movement, which emerged in the modern metropolis, was trying to provide some 
answers to the basic questions that Paul Gauguin (1848–1903) asked in the title of one 
of his last paintings (1897–1898): Where Do We Come From? What Are We? Where 
Are We Going? 
 
One of the missions of avant-garde artists and thinkers was to give back the human 
dimension to art, that is, to reconnect art with life. However, as Jean-Marie Schaeffer 
observes, their attempt came with a paradox. The life they had in mind was not that of 
the experience of observers. Rather it was its opposite, for lived life was considered to be 
“alienated”, “inauthentic”, “wrong”, while the life of art was “the real life” that was being 
betrayed (2015, 23-24). In this sense, the role of art was to announce the arrival of 
another life and of the new man, or “l’homme nouveau”, to use the exact term of 
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Mondrian (see Michaud 1997, 58). In this sense, the experience of avant-garde art 
necessitated a break from the lived experience of contemporary people. In this sense, 
avant-garde art shared the same conviction as the paradigm of art for art's sake — a 
separation between art and life, between art and common experience. In opposition to 
this, Dewey’s argument was directed directly against this understanding of the human 
condition and Dewey argued that the only anchor for aesthetic experience was the lived 
experience of individuals. If this is the case, it is essential to clarify what he meant when 
he spoke of aesthetic experience. This explanation will also help us make a fundamental 
distinction between two terms that some thinkers seem to wrongly consider as being 
synonymous: the artistic and the aesthetic. 
The Aesthetic 
In “The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics”, Jerold Levinson defines aesthetics as “the 
branch of philosophy devoted to the conceptual and theoretical inquiry into art and 
aesthetic experience” (Levinson 2003, 3). He then isolates three foci of philosophical 
inquiry in the field. One focus involves “a certain kind of practice or activity or object” 
related to the domain of aesthetics. A second focus involves “a certain property, feature, or 
aspect of things” that can be called aesthetic. The list spans a great range of properties and 
seems endless: beauty, ugliness, sublimity, grace, elegance, delicacy, harmony, unity, 
serenity, coolness, tragicalness, awkwardness, etc. (The difficulty of this open-textured 
vocabulary is two-fold: in that it isolates a shared set of terms that would be genuinely 
aesthetic, and in the fact that terms such as “beautiful” are mediated by language and 
history, which allows their usage in all kind of contexts.) Levinson’s third focus involves a 
certain kind of attitude, perception, or experience that could be labeled aesthetic. My study 
will be concerned with all three aspects, for it is only in the understanding of the 
intimate relations between the object, its properties and a person’s experience of it that I 
can make progress in better understanding the aesthetic phenomenon. I argue that the 
relational space paradigm will allow us to perform such an analysis. 
 
Gary Iseminger isolates four aims for those who study a distinctively aesthetic state of 
mind: (i) giving an account of what distinguishes an aesthetic state of mind from other 
states of minds, that are like it in some ways, such as sensual pleasure or drug-induced 
experiences; (ii) giving an account in a way that appeals neither to any prior idea of 
aesthetic, nor to the concept of art; (iii) explaining ideas related to the distinctively 
aesthetic, e.g., ideas on the aesthetic properties, qualities, aspects, or concepts, of the 
aesthetic object, of the aesthetic judgment, and of aesthetic value, in terms of the idea of 
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the distinctively aesthetic state of mind; and (iv) defending a certain connection between 
the realm of the aesthetic thereby explained, and the realm of art, while recognizing that 
the aesthetic state of mind may appropriately be directed towards, or grounded in, non-
art (Levinson 2003, 99-100).  
The Origin of Aesthetics 
Contemporary understandings of the aesthetic dimension of human experience are all 
informed by complex intellectual and philosophical debates going back at least to the 
Age of Enlightenment. There are many fundamental questions related to the notion of 
aesthetics: What is beauty and is it powerful in motivating people? What is the 
connection between ethics and aesthetics? Does beauty exist independently of human 
experience or is it a product of the mind? The great Cartesian break separated nature 
from the mind, and paved the way towards a subjectivist view13 of the aesthetic quality. 
Humans were finally able to appreciate the role of their own subjective feelings in 
determining the aesthetic properties of objects, so the great novelty of the Cartesian 
break was that it displaced the notion of the beautiful from the field of metaphysics 
towards a new science called Aesthetics. Thus, aesthetics as a discipline was born at the 
same time as the recognition of the human individual as being a modern reflective 
subject. This is why some thinkers, such as Pierre Bourdieu and Terry Eagleton, tried to 
represent the invention of the concept of aesthetics as a means of pursuing certain 
economic and political activities in the interest of the dominant bourgeois class 
(Bourdieu 2013; Eagleton 1991). For them, the domain of aesthetics emerged only 
under certain historical conditions and thus has no universal character as an essential part 
of human mental equipment. 
 
Until the 18th century, the focus of philosophical inquiry was the concept of beauty. In 
about 1750, the German philosopher Alexander Baumgarten formulated the term 
                                                      
13 Two major paradigms were developed over the course of time: the objectivist paradigm and the 
subjectivist paradigm. Classical philosophers regarded aesthetic qualities as inherent in objects (the 
objectivist approach). Plato argued that objects “are always beautiful in their very nature” and he 
considered order and proportion as essential elements of beauty. He also influenced the link 
between beauty and morality. Christian philosophers (Augustine, Aquinas, Bonaventure) saw 
beauty as an expression of God and thus inherent in the object — in this case, beauty was related 
to religion. Beauty was evidence that the Earth was divinely created. The Renaissance emerged 
through the classical influence of ancient Greece and Rome. Thus classical characteristics were 
essential for the conception of beauty at the time. Leon Battista Alberti in his famous work “On 
the Art of Building in Ten Books” argued for aesthetic absolutism and considered beauty to reside 
“in a reasoned harmony of all the parts within a body, so that nothing may be added, taken away, 
or altered, but for the worse” (VI, 2). Beauty was not a subjective question — it was entirely a 
rational matter. 
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aesthetics by referring to the Greek aesthesis.14 His goal was to establish a new 
philosophical discipline by opposing it to that of logic. As an attempt to introduce 
sensations in the rationalist post-Cartesian philosophy, Baumgarten formed a definition 
of the term as follows:  
 
“Aesthetics (the theory of liberal arts, lower gnoseology, the art of beautiful 
thinking, the art of the analogue of reason) is the science of sensitive 
cognition” (Baumgarten 1986, 1.).  
 
Baumgarten used the term to describe cognition that mediates between the generalities of 
reason and the particulars of sense: According to him, the aesthetic is the realm of 
existence that partakes in the perfections of reason, but in a ‘confused’ mode (Eagleton 
1991, 15). He understood aesthetic judgments as a judgments of cognition that are not 
yet fully developed. For him, taste is the ability to judge perfections and imperfections 
sensibly rather than intellectually, and some contemporary scholars still insist on using 
Baumgarten’s definition of aesthetics and approach aesthetics as a problem raised by the 
human senses. Yet, right from the start, Baumgarten’s theory was criticized as being 
inaccurate on philosophical as well as etymological grounds. Kant expressed his criticism 
in the following words: “Those who, like Baumgarten, make taste a confused knowledge 
of perfection, do not stick to the concerns of aesthetics. For the mere fact of confusion 
on our knowledge has nothing to do with its reference to pleasing form. (…) Clearness 
of knowledge differs from confusion only quantitatively, and is the result of more 
concentration of attention. Therefore a position on this quantitative scale cannot 
constitute the distinguishing tribute of a kind of judgment” (Gilbert and Kuhn 1939, 
324). However, Baumgarten’s work created a space where Kant's aesthetic theory could 
be developed — the fundamental work that has shaped our view of beauty to this day. 
The Kantian Method 
Aesthetics as a discipline appeared when the human was recognised as a modern subject. 
According to Bernstein, modernity was announced by the Kantian separation of the 
domains of truth, morality and beauty (1992). Between 1781 and 1790, Kant published 
his three fundamental works: “Critique of Pure Reason”, “Critique of Practical Reason” 
and “Critique of Judgment”, with the aim of answering this question: What does it mean 
to be human? He regarded humans as having three modes of consciousness: knowledge, 
desire and feeling. The last Critique, concerned with feeling, contains his ideas on 
                                                      
14 The perception of the external world by the senses. Etymology: ancient Greek αἴσθησις sense 
perception, sensation, perception (Oxford English Dictionary, 2014). 
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aesthetics, which he saw as “a bridge between theoretical and practical reason, causality 
and freedom, nature and morality, which he held to be separated by an abyss” (Gasché 
2003, 7). What preceded his philosophy were important advances in the aesthetics of 
nature, written mainly by English empirical philosophers: John Locke, Anthony Ashley 
Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, Frances Hutcheson, Joseph Addison, David 
Hume and Edmund Burke. 
 
Kant argued that the judgment of beauty are like cognitive judgments yet different from 
any act of cognition. He famously isolated two fundamental conditions for a judgment 
to be a judgment of taste: subjectivity and universality.15 Aesthetic judgments are neither 
objective universal claims such as “this is a tree”, nor subjective particular claims such as 
“I like root beer”. “Rather the claim that Da Vinci's Last Supper is beautiful is a 
subjective universal claim, a claim on our common humanity and not purely a 
psychological claim of preference”  (Valle, 2009, p.264). His arguments is that everyone 
should be able to experience whatever each of us feel in the aesthetic experience. Kant 
describes the universal validity of aesthetic judgment as follows:  
 
“(…) when [a man] puts a thing on a pedestal and calls it beautiful, he 
demands the same delight from others. He judges not merely for himself, 
but for all men, and then speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things. 
Thus he says that the thing is beautiful; and it is not as if he counts on 
others agreeing with him in his judgment of liking owing to his having 
found them in such agreement on a number of occasions, but he demands 
this agreement of them. He blames them if they judge differently, and 
denies them taste, which he still requires of them as something they ought 
to have; and to this extent it is not open to men to say: Every one has his 
own taste. This would be equivalent to saying that there is no such thing as 
taste, i.e. no aesthetic judgment capable of making a rightful claim upon 
the assent of all men.” (Kant 2007 [1790], p.52) 
 
The aim of Kant was not to establish conceptual rules for the beautiful. Instead, he 
performed an inquiry into the necessary conditions of aesthetic judgment in general. He 
introduces the notion of the “free play of faculties”, as an attempt to reconcile 
subjectivity and universality. He claims that each of us is capable of engaging in the 
unconstrained coordination of imagination and understanding. To him, the pure 
judgment of taste come up when our imagination and understanding are employed in 
                                                      
15 Kant's idea that in a judgment of taste, individuals demand or require agreement from others is 
important for my intention to demonstrate the consequence of this aspiration to our ethical 
judgments as regards to inhabited environments in general. 
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such a way that they do not follow any rules. The subject becomes literally “free”. The 
peculiarity of Kant’s aesthetics is that he considered the ability to aesthetically judge 
objects not primarily as a product of socio-historical conditions, but rather as inherent to 
human nature. In other words, he assumed that the ability to judge things as beautiful or 
sublime is a miracle of nature. Consequently, Kant was exclusively interested in the 
aesthetics of nature, for he considered the aesthetic judgment to be pure only when the 
mind is confronted with objects that are still cognitively unmastered, such as a wild 
flower, or objects such as the wild ocean, that are seemingly beyond our control. This 
position led him to conclude that aesthetic judgments are “free from concepts” and 
exercised in a mode of attention that he famously named “disinterested interest”. This 
disinterestedness is expressed as regard to our practical concerns, i.e. historical and 
societal conditions which determine the properties of objects of our aesthetic interest. In 
order to engage in a pure contemplation of the beauty, the subject must put a side any 
concepts, motivations or purposes that they might have. In his view, when human beings 
are able to agree that a certain phenomenon is beautiful or sublime, we exercise a 
particular form of intersubjectivity in a kind of ahistorical and trans-cultural manner. 
 
However, Kant’s attempt to avoid historicity by focusing his attention on the concept of 
nature was quite unfortunate. Indeed, the concept of nature itself is a social construct 
(see Rolston 1997) and so is the very idea of natural beauty, which appeared, it might be 
argued, sometime during the Enlightenment. In this sense, Kant’s idea of beauty is a 
product of its time in the same way as the theories of classical Greek or Christian 
philosophers. Exactly what should be done with the historical dimension of aesthetic 
judgment is a difficult question and there have been numerous attempts to bypass the 
historical issue.16 Recently, several new approaches have emerged following the rising 
interest in human cognition. The idea behind these approaches is to explain and 
understand the aesthetic experience at the neurological level (ex. Chatterjee 2013). 
Nevertheless, the argument of historicity “constantly returns in aesthetics, often changing 
shape and emphasis, but always challenging us to find that trans-historical perspective 
whose possibility it denies” (Scruton 2007, 236; see also Gadamer and Bernasconi 1986). 
 
There is a difference between the contemporary critical method and the Kantian method. 
Instead of searching for formal structures with universal value,17 the task of critical theory 
                                                      
16 In the 1980s and 1990s, different behaviorist theories were very popular. They were based on 
the idea that (aesthetic) reactions to different structural or qualitative components of an 
environment developed alongside humans, and that these reactions are related to our basic 
biological needs. The most discussed theories are the prospect-refuge theory by Appleton (1996) 
and the framework of prediction of preference by Kaplan and Kaplan (1989; 1987). 
17 What came after Kant was the century of Romanticism, which emphasized emotion above 
classical order. It was a reaction to the rationalism and classicism of previous centuries, and a 
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was to conduct historical and social investigations into the particular mechanisms that 
led humans to constitute themselves and to recognize themselves as subjects with distinct 
knowledge, desires and feelings. I will attempt to make a compromise between these two 
methods by both embracing Kant’s determination to describe the underlying mental 
process that allows us to be involved in the aesthetic experience, and by investigating the 
particular social, historical and, most of all, spatial conditions which give particular 
character to this experience. Aesthetic dimension is totally depended on learned forms of 
knowledge, but it must be underlined that this learning process is only possible because 
humans are biologically equipped for it. On the other side, the aesthetic structure 
remains dormant unless it is awakened by the interaction with other persons. What is 
new and original with Kant’s famous method is that it consisted in isolating a particular 
mental state that would justify the emergence of aesthetics as a discipline, and allowed us 
to study the aesthetic experience as one of the fundamental (and not accidental) features 
of the human condition. However, I will agree with Scruton in saying that “the division 
between practical reason and aesthetic understanding is in fact untenable, and that until 
the relation between the two is reestablished, they must both remain impoverished” 
(Scruton, Scruton, and Sparshott 1979, 7:1). 
Imagination 
To see a part of an inhabited environment as a city or a village is not like seeing it as a 
group of buildings or houses. To discriminate between different dwellings, humans need 
information; but for information to be useful, we must organize it (i.e., spatialise it!). 
This organization is provided by acts of synthesis. The first philosopher who placed a 
strong emphasis on this truth was Kant. As he put it in one of his most famous passages 
in Critique of Pure Reason: “Concepts without intuitions are empty, intuitions without 
concepts are blind”. Experience requires both percepts and concepts and thus experience 
and interpretation are inseparable. According to Kant, the faculty through which 
sensation and concept are united is imagination, and he found precisely the same faculty 
at work in aesthetic judgment. He considered that, in normal perception, the 
imagination is bound by the rules of understanding, while in the aesthetic mode, it is 
                                                                                                                                             
bridge to the expressionism of the twentieth century. The writings of noteworthy authors had a 
particularly profound effect on Western thought: Rousseau (as a forerunner of the Romanticism), 
Goethe, Byron and Wordsworth looked towards the countryside as a place where man could 
understand himself and become fulfilled. They described their love of romantic landscapes in 
glowing terms and created images that strongly shaped the mindset of their readers — images that 
strongly resonated, even up until now. Most importantly, romanticism viewed landscapes in 
purely objectivist terms — that is, according to them, landscapes contained intrinsic qualities 
(Lothian 1999). In the nineteenth and twentieth century, philosophers returned to subjectivist 
approaches to aesthetics. The most commonly regarded works of these subjectivist approaches are 
those of George Santayana, Benedetto Croce, John Dewey and Susanne Langer??
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“free” of concepts (see Scruton, Scruton, and Sparshott 1979, 7:75-77). However, by 
considering it present in every act of perception and every cognitive state, Kant did not 
recognize the specificity of imagination as a particular mode of attention. 
 
Imagination has been an object of study at least since the time of the early Greek 
philosophers, and one of the central concepts in the philosophy of Aristotle, Descartes, 
Hume, Kant, Husserl, and Sartre (see Kind 2016, 13-82). From the beginning of the 
Enlightenment, imagination has been the ruling concept in the aesthetic theory and was 
studied not only in aesthetics but in the theory of knowledge as well. Today, it is one of 
the most interesting fields in psychology and cognitive science. The position of Kant 
(and Hume) did not differ much from a definition of imagination recently offered by 
Etienne Pelaprat and Michael Cole, psychologists who consider imagination as a “process 
of resolving and connecting the fragmented, poorly coordinated experience of the world 
so as to bring about a stable image of the world”. Imagination thus becomes a “process of 
image making that resolves ‘gaps’ arising from biological and cultural-historical 
constraints, and that enables ongoing time-space coordination necessary for thought and 
action”. Thus it is an “active process of resolving temporally and spatially dis-coordinated 
sources of experience”, which is fundamental for the constitution of human thought 
(2011).  
 
Consequently, imagination becomes central to human cognitive process since human 
beings are perpetually engaged in a process of image formation. This image of the world 
is generated by the permanent contact with others, which in turn extends the reach of 
our social action. The Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky, whose work has recently been 
rediscovered, indicated that this extension of experience is possible precisely thanks to 
imagination. Imagination is “the means by which a person’s experience is broadened, 
because he can imagine what he has not seen (and) can conceptualize something from 
another person’s narration and description of what he himself has never directly 
experienced” (Vygotsky 2004, 17). As “a form of expansion of human experience” 
(Zittoun and Cerchia 2013), it is the process that makes possible for an individual to 
emerge as such, under particular social and spatial conditions. Imagination enables 
humans to consider alternatives to reality, as Harris showed in his study with children 
(Harris 2007, 39). This enlarged understanding of imagination does not only understand 
it as a means by which we “fill the gaps” of our fragmented experience but also as a 
capacity that feeds “cognitive and affective processes, brings us to anticipate, predict and 
react to situations to which we have not been confronted; consider various possible 
consequences to past or future events; and consider the possible causes of a given event”. 
In that sense, as Zitton and Cerchia argue, it supports our causal understanding of reality 
(Zittoun and Cerchia 2013, 313).  
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Imagination is a modality of apprehending the world that operates in the virtual domain 
of human experience18, and as Vygotsky proposed, it consists in taking “distance – more 
or less consciously, more or less reflexively – from one’s awareness of the unfolding 
reality”. Now the question is: What is the nature of this “distance”, of this particular 
mental process and why is it essential for understanding the problems raised by 
aesthetics? To provide an answer to this question, I will start from Jean-Paul Sartre’s early 
work “The Imaginary”, which is one the most detailed account of the nature of 
imagination in Western philosophical literature. 
The Phenomenology of Imagination 
According to Sartre, imagination is distinct from both perception and conceptual 
thought, in terms of the way our attention is taken towards the experience. He argues 
that in ordinary perception, the meaning of human experience is provided by our 
material environment and the way things appear to us. It is due to our knowledge, 
affections, and goals that we see a certain part of an inhabited environment as a city or a 
village and not as a group of buildings or houses. However, in imagination, the relation 
to the object of attention is different. “The matter is not experienced as properly having a 
certain sense, but as presenting a sense borrowed from some other object. We do not 
perceive the matter as having that sense, but rather imagine that other object. (…) A 
photograph is not confused for the thing it is a photograph of, but that thing is imagined 
through the photograph. This is the structure that unites the various kinds of brain 
events that Sartre understands as imagining: the matter of the experience is endowed 
with sense of another object, and is understood as in some way presenting that other 
object” (Sartre and Elkaïm-Sartre 2004). What Sartre calls imagination should be, as 
Scruton suggests, considered a “special theory of imagination” (1979, 76) that describes 
our active engagement in thought without necessarily asserting that it is true or 
coinciding with actuality. This particular understanding of the world, as I will show you 
later, is at the root of every aesthetic experience.  
 
Sartre isolates four distinctive characteristics of imagining that are intended to capture its 
“intentional” structure. First, the image is a consciousness. Second, imagination emerges 
as a phenomenon of quasi-observation. Third, the imagining consciousness posits its 
object as nothingness. And fourth, it involves spontaneity.  
 
                                                      
18 Virtual is taken in a sense of reality that is not actualized.  
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The first characteristic describes a feature that is common both to perception and 
imagination. Sartre uses the example of a chair. When one imagines the chair on which 
we sit, just as much as when we see it, our mental state presents it to us as directly related 
to something in the world. Whether we perceive it or imagine it, the object of perception 
and the object of our image are identical — it is that leather chair or that red chair that 
our consciousness relates to. Thus, there are no images in consciousness, for an image is 
nothing other than a relation: 
 
 “The word ‘image’ could only indicate therefore the relation of 
consciousness to the object; in other words, it is a certain way in which the 
object appears to consciousness, or, if one prefers, a certain way in which 
consciousness presents to itself an object. To tell the truth, the expression 
‘mental image’ gives rise to confusion. It would be better to say 
‘consciousness of Pierre-as-imaged’ or ‘imaging consciousness of Pierre’. As 
the word ‘image’ is long-standing, we cannot reject it completely. But, to 
avoid all ambiguity, I repeat here that an image is nothing other than a 
relation. The imaging consciousness that I have of Pierre is not a 
consciousness of an image of Pierre: Pierre is directly reached, my attention 
is not directed at an image, but at an object.” (Sartre and Elkaïm-Sartre 
2004, 7) 
 
The image is a mode of attention and not, as Decartes, Leibniz and Hume assumed, an 
object of attention, i.e., a thing in its own right. However, this mode of attention is 
different from both perception and conception in certain ways described by the 
remaining three characteristics. 
 
The second characteristic helps us distinguish perception, in which we observe objects, 
from imagination, which is the phenomenon of quasi-observation. When we see a cube, 
to use Sartre’s example, it appears to us only in a series of profiles so certain of its faces 
will be hidden from view. However, perception is not limited to what is explicitly given 
to senses, and in spite of seeing only two or three faces we see the object as a cube, not a 
mere facade. This means that perception involves a “hypothesis” about the nature of the 
object, and we must learn objects by multiplying our views of them (i.e., an object itself 
becomes a synthesis of all these views). In this sense, perception is perspectival — it 
presents the world only from a certan point of view, a position from which some features 
of the world are immediately accessible, and others are not. However, Sartre reminds us 
that perspective is not always a way in which the human mind engages the world. When 
we conceive a cube, we conceive all its six sides and its eight angles simultaneously — we 
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apprehend its entirety in a single glance (Sartre and Elkaïm-Sartre 2004, 8; see also Kind 
2016, 83).  
 
Imagining appears to be an intermediate case, situated between both perceiving and 
conceiving, yet distinct from them. Like perceiving, imagining is perspectival, for to 
imagine a cube means to picture how it looks from a limited point of view. However, 
like conceiving, “imagining presents its object in its entirety. Despite the fact that my 
visual image of the cube presents only some sides as facing me, that is a cube given not as 
a mere “hypothesis”, but with certainty (Kind 2016, 84; see also Wittgenstein 1958, 39). 
If someone rotates the cube in imagination, it will not change the nature of imagined 
object. Thus imagining has the perspectival character that normally allows observation. 
However, knowledge concerning the object is immediate and does not involve the 
uncertainty of perception — the image is given all at once (d’un seul coup). This is why 
Sartre calls it quasi-observation. “An image is not learned: it is organized exactly as the 
objects that are learned, but, in fact, it is given whole, for what it is, in its appearance” 
(Sartre and Elkaïm-Sartre 2004, 9-10). 
 
The third characteristic of the imaging consciousness is that it posits its object as a 
nothingness (fr. néant), meaning that the object is never posited as present. An imagined 
object can be posited as not existing, as absent, as existing elsewhere, or it can merely not 
present the object as existing. Sartre does not give examples for all of these four cases and, 
as Robert Hopkins observes, one can spend considerable energy trying to work out if 
there really is room for this many subspecies. However, what is central to the four is that 
they all involve a certain negation and this contrasts them not only with perception, but 
also with conception (Kind 2016, 84). This feature of imagination is perhaps its most 
distinctive characteristic and, as we shall see later, is of fundamental significance for the 
theory of aesthetic experience. 
 
The last characteristic of the imaginative mode is the spontaneity it exhibits. As Dustin 
Stokes observes (Kind 2016, 251), by doing this, “Sartre contrasts the passivity of 
perception with the voluntary spontaneity of imagination”:  
 
“[A]n imaging consciousness gives itself to itself as an imaging 
consciousness, which is to say as a spontaneity that produces and conserves 
the object as imaged. It is a kind of indefinable counterpart to the fact that 
the object gives itself as a nothingness. The consciousness appears to itself as 
creative, but without positing as object this creative character. It is thanks 
to this vague and fugitive quality that the image consciousness is not given 
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as a piece of wood that floats on the sea, but as a wave among the waves” 
(Sartre and Elkaïm-Sartre 2004, 14).  
 
Thus it is the combination of these four characteristics that gives images their particular 
power and posits that the observer has a highly active and creative role. The third 
characteristic, involving a reflection on an object that is thought of as non-existent, 
appears as particularly important. This essential nothingness of the imaged object allows 
humans to exhibit a kind of “double intentionality” (Scruton 2007, 247), or what 
philosophers of perception today call the “transparency of experience”. We are presented 
with some non-existing thing through some actual existing thing that our consciousness 
nihilates in order to produce the imagined relation. This existing actual thing is what 
Sartre calls the “analogon”. He gives an example of the picture of Charles III. When one 
sees Charles III in this portrait, the analogon is the painted canvas, and “in order to 
produce the object ‘Charles III” as imaged, consciousness must be able to deny the reality 
of the picture, and that it could deny this reality only by standing back from reality 
grasped in its totality” (Sartre and Elkaïm-Sartre 2004, 183).  
 
This positioning of the world in its synthetic totality and the simultaneous positioning of 
the imagined object out of reach from that synthetic whole is what the aesthetic 
experience is about. This view resonates closely with the concept of “psychic distance”, 
which was proposed by Edward Bullough already in 1912. For consciousness to be able 
to imagine, Sartre writes, it must be able to stand back from the world by its own effort 
— it must be free. In this sense, the world carries in itself the possibility of its negation, 
at each moment and from each point of view (Sartre and Elkaïm-Sartre 2004, 184). Here 
we see the strong interdependence of the perceptual and imaginative consciousness. In 
order to imagine, the consciousness needs to nihilate the world from a particular point of 
view but it learns that it can only do it is on the ground of that world and in connection 
with that ground. Recently, the rising body of work in both psychology and 
neurophysiology supports the idea that imaging exploits some of the same neural 
processing as visual perception (Markman, Klein, and Suhr 2012). 
 
Now the question is: Are we really completely free from the materiality of the analogon? 
According to Merleau-Ponty, who was a close friend of Sartre but also one of his major 
critics, Sartre failed to adequately describe what is distinctive about imagination because 
he was more preoccupied with showing what the image is not, rather than what it really 
is. Merleau-Ponty continually argued that an image is not a mere negation of the 
materiality of its support (a fact that has long been underestimated, even in 
contemporary image theories). In “L’Œil et l'Esprit”, he criticizes the idea that perceptive 
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attitude and imagined consciousness should be regarded as two completely separate states 
of our consciousness: 
 
“The word "image" is in bad repute because we have thoughtlessly believed 
that a drawing was a tracing, a copy, a second thing, and that the mental 
image was such a drawing, belonging among our private bric-a-brac. But if 
in fact it is nothing of the kind, then neither the drawing nor the painting 
belongs to the in-itself any more than the image does. They are the inside 
of the outside and the outside of the inside, which the duplicity of feeling 
[le sentir] makes possible and without which we would never understand 
the quasi presence and imminent visibility which make up the whole 
problem of the imaginary. The picture, the actor's mimicry—these are not 
devices borrowed from the real world in order to refer to prosaic things 
which are absent. For the imaginary is much nearer to, and much farther 
away from, the actual—nearer because it is in my body as a diagram of the 
life of the actual, with all its pulp and carnal obverse exposed to view for the 
first time. (…) And the imaginary is much farther away from the actual 
because the painting is an analogue or likeness only according to the body; 
because it does not offer the mind an occasion to rethink the constitutive 
relations of things, but rather it offers the gaze traces of vision, from the 
inside, in order that it may espouse them; it gives vision to that which 
clothes it within, the imaginary texture of the real.” (Merleau-Ponty 1993, 
126)  
 
What further distinguishes Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological investigations from those 
of Sartre, is his insistence on the body as the medium of consciousness. His study of 
vision shows us that in order for consciousness to unfold into a part of the world, it must 
be embodied. To perceive the world and produce it at the same time, one must be in and 
of its flesh. “We cannot imagine how a mind could paint. It is by lending his body to the 
world that the artist changes the world into painting”. This is why the aesthetic 
experience cannot be fully understood in isolation from the body that embodies it, nor 
from the object of our imaginative attention. This is an important point to which I will 
come back to as I move along with my study.  
Imagination and Freedom 
The problem of freedom was another fundamental point of disagreement between Sartre 
and Merleau-Ponty. According to Sartre, human beings are ontologically free and this 
freedom is intimately bound with imagination. To be free is to be able to nihilate the 
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world as one perceives it. It implies that as humans we “resist responding immediately to 
what reality puts before us, and to consider how we should act. If consciousness only 
presented us with the real, it would not be possible to step back in this way. For that, we 
need a sense of what is not, but which might be” (Kind 2016, 92). In this sense, the 
passage from the actual to the virtual is a necessary condition for the freedom of 
consciousness and human creativity. As Jonathan Weber describes it:  
 
“We can imagine the world or any part of it being different from the way it 
in fact is. This ability is necessary to motivate changing the world. We can 
imagine it, moreover, as being different in any number of ways, and so can 
present ourselves with any number of ways that we might try to mould it. 
We are therefore not compelled to live in the world as we find it. We can 
and do act to change it, and this involves imagination” (Sartre and Elkaïm-
Sartre 2004, xxvi).  
 
It is against this conception of liberty that Merleau-Ponty strongly argued against. In his 
first essay on painting entitled “Cezanne’s Doubt”, he argued that the freedom of 
imagination does not come when human beings turn away from the reality of the world, 
but rather when we turn towards it. Merleau-Ponty starts his essay with a fairly detailed 
description of Cezanne’s approach to painting. He explains that what appears to have 
troubled Cezanne for the whole duration of his life, were deep uncertainties about the 
origin of his own talent. He “wondered whether the novelty of his painting might not 
come from trouble with his eyes, whether his whole life had not been based upon an 
accident of his body.” His first works were painted fantasies, which came as projections 
of imagined scenes: a rape, a murder. Later on, Cezanne came to be influenced by 
impressionists who made him abandon the baroque technique, whose “primary aim is to 
capture movement”, and led him topaint the world as he felt it. Indeed, the 
impressionists devoted themselves to “the exact study of appearances” in a kind of 
pseudo-scientific manner. Therefore, “objects were depicted as they appear to 
instantaneous perception, without fixed contours, bound together by light and air”. 
However, Cezanne was not a devoted impressionist. Although he owes a great deal to 
Impressionism (particularly Pissarro), he quickly realized that he “wished to return to the 
object”. It is precisely at this point — when Cézanne wanted to cultivate an 
understanding of the deep awareness of the actual perceived world as a fundamental 
aspect of "being-in-the-world" — that Merleau-Ponty finds Cézanne's work so 
important for our understanding of imagination. He writes: 
 
“The lived object is not rediscovered or constructed on the basis of the 
contributions of the senses; rather, it presents itself to us from the start as 
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the center from which these contributions radiate. We see the depth, the 
smoothness, the softness, the hardness of objects; Cézanne even claimed 
that we see their odor. (…) It is not enough for a painter like Cézanne, an 
artist, or a philosopher, to create and express an idea; they must also awaken 
the experiences which will make their idea take root in the consciousness of 
others. A successful work has the strange power to teach its own lesson. (…) 
The painter can do no more than construct an image; he must wait for this 
image to come to life for other people. When it does, the work of art will 
have united these separate lives; it will no longer exist in only one of them 
like a stubborn dream or a persistent delirium, nor will it exist only in space 
as a colored piece of canvas. It will dwell undivided in several minds, with a 
claim on every possible mind like a perennial acquisition.” (Merleau-Ponty 
1993, 59). 
 
This insistence on the importance of the object’s materiality to create a painting, led 
Merleau-Ponty to make two important conclusions about freedom: “that we are never 
determined and yet that we never change, since, looking back on what we were, we can 
always find hints of what we have become. It is up to us to understand both these things 
simultaneously, as well as the way freedom dawns on us without breaking our bonds with 
the world”. The argument is that freedom can dawn on us as humans, only if we do not 
break our bonds with the world. Therefore freedom and individuality, even if it remains 
in the realm of imagination, can be won only in direct interaction with others and a deep 
involvement with the world, rather than in a disinterested detachment from it. 
The Double Intentionality of Aesthetic 
Judgement 
The English philosopher Roger Scruton developed a very influential theory of 
imagination and put it to the service of an aesthetic theory in his first book “Art and 
Imagination” (1973). It was an attempt to save aesthetics from being a marginal addition 
to the analytic philosophical agenda at the time. To do so, the only path for Scruton was 
to look at the works of continental thinkers and he found in Sartre’s theory of 
imagination a milestone for his own work. He argues that imagination is a capacity of 
rational beings that is not shared with other members of the animal kingdom. An animal 
can see but cannot imagine. Imagination goes beyond the actual facts and beyond the 
actual world perceived by senses. It is an escape from the actual. This is the foundation 
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for Scruton’s distinction between fantasy and imagination, for fantasy is based on feelings 
that are real and genuine, yet generated by unreal objects. 
 
Scruton made a distinction between the generic (or universal) theory of imagination 
advocated, among others, by Kant and Hume, and what he calls the special theory of 
imagination, which one can find in the work of Sartre but also Wittgenstein (see Scruton 
1973). As I explained above, Sartre does not understand imagination as an extra 
component of consciousness that acts as a container of quasi objects. Indeed, an image is 
not an object of attention, but rather a different mode (or act) of consciousness. Scruton 
identifies imagination as “unasserted thoughts”: It is not identified with what is simply 
“given” to the senses, but with what we, as individuals, can summon. In an imaginative 
act, we exhibit “double intentionality”, meaning that we focus simultaneously on two 
objects: the actual object presented to perception, and the imaginary object that is 
invoked by the actual object. In this sense, the aesthetic response might be a response 
that comes from both a real actual object and an imaginary object. 
 
Scruton’s further argument is that in the aesthetic taste, the connection between 
experience, preference and thought is inextricable. He uses an example of John Ruskin 
who attempted to show that the love of stone that the Gothic cathedral builders had, and 
their respect for sound construction, are of identical origin; “that the process of building 
and the process of ornamentation are continuous parts of a single enterprise, not to be 
understood independently. There is no such thing as an appreciation of ornament that is 
not at the same time an appreciation of function” (Scruton, Scruton, and Sparshott 
1979, 125). He thus puts human action and practical engagement in the core of aesthetic 
experience. Following Suzanne Langer’s work “Feeling and Form” (1953), Scruton 
makes an important distinction between the actual structure and actual function of a 
work of architecture, on the one hand, and the virtual structure and virtual function of a 
work of architecture, on the other. He argues that “actual structure is irrelevant to 
aesthetic judgment except and in so far as it is revealed in virtual structure” (Scruton, 
Scruton, and Sparshott 1979, 125). 
 
Following Sartre, Scruton makes another important distinction between aesthetic and 
sensuous pleasures. “The pleasure of aesthetic experience is inseparable from the act of 
attention to its object; it is not the kind of a pleasure characteristic of mere sensation, 
such as the pleasure of a hot bath or a good cigar. In other words, aesthetic pleasures are 
not merely accompanied by attention to an object. They are essentially connected with 
that attention, and when attention ceases, whatever pleasure continues can no longer be 
exercises of taste” (Scruton, Scruton, and Sparshott 1979, 114). In this sense, Scruton 
concludes that aesthetic pleasure is not so much an effect of its object, as a mode of 
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understanding it. Now, how one’s understanding of architecture (or inhabited 
environments in general) changes comes as a result of complex social, historical, 
economic or political circumstances. It thus comes as a result of particular spatial 
conditions in which each individual lives, evolves and matures, and in which the urban 
space appears to play a fundamental role.  
The City as Aesthetic Object 
Aesthetic contemplation is a mode of attention that, as I explained earlier, presents the 
world not as it is but as it might be through some existing actual object serving as an 
analogon. However, this analogon, i.e., the aesthetic object, should not be taken for 
granted. It is only in connection to this object that we, as humans, can engage in 
imaginative acts. Therefore, I will search for the description of our mental state not only 
inwards (as in the classical phenomenological method, which consists of “bracketing” 
and isolating a particular mental state) but also outwards, where our actions, intentions 
and mental states are visible in various forms of material and ideal expressions. I will 
repeat that objects of art are by no means the only objects that pretend to become 
aesthetic objects. In fact, “any concrete and real situation of consciousness in the world is 
pregnant with the imaginary” (Sartre and Elkaïm-Sartre 2004, 186), and consequently, 
every known thing bears the possibility of producing the imaginative and thus, an 
aesthetic response. This is why one might say that the aesthetic dimension runs through 
our entire society.  
 
If one is interested in writings on the aesthetic appreciation of inhabited environments, 
one discovers that the category of the city seems to be peculiarly absent from the 
principal philosophical investigations, in spite of the high priority assigned to aesthetic 
questions by European philosophers since the Enlightenment. Writings on the aesthetics 
of the city came rather from writers, architects and artists, though their approach is 
descriptive rather than critical (or it lacks strong theoretical groundedness). I have said 
that Kant was involved in investigating the aesthetics of nature for he hoped to find in it 
some universal principles behind our faculty of judgment of taste. Consequently, the 
city, as a pure artifact pregnant with historicity, was excluded from his writings. As for 
Hegel, in his great lectures on aesthetics, turned his attention to art and replaced Kantian 
aesthetics with the philosophy of art (Hegel 1998). There might be several reasons why 
Hegel excluded the category of the city from his aesthetics. First, he might have 
considered the city as a political and economic category and therefore not an aesthetic 
one, although this hypothesis appears rather improbable. Architects and painters in 
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Hegel’s time treated the city as an aesthetic object, so there was no reason for a 
philosopher of aesthetics to ignore it. The second reason for excluding the city as an 
aesthetic category might lay in the fact that the city lacked the kind of unity an artwork 
requires. Third, the city might violate the unity of a total object since it is never 
constructed (apart from some rare exceptions) as a single piece at one time. Fourth, the 
city violates the unity of objective individuality, i.e., the ideal of organicity (see Lampert 
2001). This might explain why Hegel considered art, rather than the city or nature, as 
the highest expression of the “Absolute Spirit”. However, there might be another, 
simpler reason for the absence of the city from the aesthetic investigations of 
philosophers from Kant to Nietzsche. They maybe simply failed to recognize the 
importance that lived inhabited space has on the human condition. It was only after the 
deep societal and environmental changes that took place after the rise of big cities in the 
nineteenth-century that city and urban problems in general started to be a subject of 
interest to philosophers. 
 
In the last third of the 20th century, environmental aesthetics, a relatively new discipline, 
emerged as a sub-field of philosophical aesthetics, its focus of inquiry being natural 
environments as well as human and human-influenced environments. In part, it was a 
response to the “growing public concern about the apparent degeneration of the 
environment”, and a result of “the academic world becoming aware of the significance of 
the environmental movement — at the level of both theoretical discussion and practical 
action” (Carlson 2015). Environmental aesthetics attempt to provide answers to the 
fundamental issues about the appreciation of the world at large.19 Yet, it seems to me that 
                                                      
19 Allen Carlson argues that there are two approaches to the question developed in the discipline 
itself: cognitive (alternatively called conceptual or narrative) and non-cognitive (non-conceptual 
or ambient according to some?authors). The cognitive position unites authors who consider that 
“knowledge and information about the nature of the object of appreciation is central to its 
aesthetic appreciation”. This means that in order to aesthetically appreciate works of architecture, 
the downtown of a big city or a dense old forest, it is taken to be essential that we experience them 
“as what they in fact are”, and in the light of the knowledge of their real qualities, in the same way 
that we appreciate works of art. In all such cases, the knowledge provided by the social sciences is 
as relevant as the knowledge given by the natural sciences, which include “local and regional 
narratives, folklore, and even mythological stories” as complementary to scientific knowledge. In 
contrast to cognitive approaches are several so-called non-cognitive approaches, which argue 
against the necessity of knowledge. However, as Carlson explains, the non-cognitive approach 
should not be taken in its older philosophical sense, as meaning primarily or only emotive. It 
indicates simply that something other than a cognitive component is central to the aesthetic 
appreciation of environments. The leading non-cognitive approach, often called the aesthetics of 
engagement, and upheld by authors such as Arnold Berleant, stresses “the contextual dimensions 
of the environment” and our “multi-sensory experience of it” by calling for “the total immersion 
of the appreciator in the object of appreciation”. It challenges the importance of dichotomy 
between subject and object by “viewing the environment as a unity of places, organisms and 
perceptions” (see Carlson, 2012).?
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the influence of urban space and space in general is still under-investigated, since most 
studies have been taking the concept of space itself for granted.  
 
As Jane Jacobs observed in her influential analysis of “The Death and Life of Great 
American Cities” (1961), it makes no sense to think of the city as “a collection of 
separate file drawers”. She argues that the city raises a problem of “organized complexity” 
and presents “situations in which a half-dozen or even several dozen quantities are all 
varying simultaneously and in subtly interconnected ways”. What is essential to recognize 
is that the city, as a complex urban system, exhibits emerging properties that belong to 
the system as a whole, and vanishes when one changes scale to the level of its subsystems 
or the level of its components (e.g., the level of a single building or a single street). The 
beauty of a city is a classical example of the emerging property of a city, since the 
aesthetic appreciation of the city as a whole cannot be understood as the sum of the 
aesthetic appreciations of its separate parts only.  
 
Although there are several new approaches in the field of aesthetics, the dominant 
analytic aesthetics tends to be heavily influenced by the discussions of the aesthetics 
related to art only. Irvin illustrates this with the following observation. During the 
calendar years 2001–2006, of approximately 270 articles published in the two major 
English-language print journals of aesthetics, the British Journal of Aesthetics and the 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 95 percent focused on art, 3 percent focused on 
nature, and five articles, or under 2 percent, focused on something else (Irvin 2008).  
 
As for urban studies, the subject of aesthetics seems to be present rather in fragments 
(and usually equated with sensuous pleasures!). In the impressive 1128 pages of the 
“Dictionnaire de la géographie et de l'espace des sociétés” (Lévy 2013) and the 1052 
pages of the “Dictionary of Human Geography” (Gregory et al. 2011), there is no 
separate entry for the notion of aesthetics. Of course, this does not mean that aesthetic 
considerations are completely absent from human geography. Kantian aesthetics played 
an important part in discussions of postmodern sensibilities and particular attention was 
paid to the aestheticisation of politics in both modernism and postmodernism (Harvey 
1992). Since many geographers still consider aesthetics as terrae incognitae and seem to 
confirm Wright’s (1947) observation that “aesthetic subjectivity is always unscientific”, a 
bridge needs to be built between the aesthetic theory and the urban theory. This thesis is 
a contribution to this task. 
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3 Urbanity 
“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was 
the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the 
epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the 
season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the 
spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had 
everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all 
going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other 
way – “ 
Charles Dickens 
Today, like in the nineteenth century when cities were rapidly expanding, 
human beings are faced with the challenge of how to move and live in our ever-changing 
environment. Each one of us has to choose the way in which he or she will inhabit the 
Earth and this choice happens to be a choice of society as well. In order to be able to 
make this choice, each individual has to regulate the various relations of distance (that are 
topographical or topological in nature) between the numerous realities that enter into the 
constitution of the world. In other words, each individual has to participate in a societal 
process of space production, which includes various actors with different actions and 
intentions. It is in this sense that Michel Lussault considers humans as “spatial animals” 
(Lussault 2007) who inhabit space in a phenomenological manner, which in turn allows 
each participant of society to observe societal mutations and stasis in the light of, and 
through, a spatial prism. The concept of urbanity, particularly in its critical formulation 
developed by Jacques Lévy (1994), allows me to take such an approach. Urbanity belongs 
to the type of phenomenon that, as Norbert Elias explains, come into being without 
having been planned or intended by anyone, yet emerges from people’s intentions and 
actions (Norbert 1994, 389). It is a result of the functioning of an urban system; though, 
at the same time, it is also a consequence of this functioning, that is, an operator of its 
organization. Studying urbanity forces researchers to consider both ‘the forest and the 
trees’ and to bridge a gap between the holistic approach and the individualistic scientific 
approach. It allows researchers to ask not only: What is city?, but also: When is city? 
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The World is Spatial and Founded on Action 
Many researchers have stressed the fact that until the twentieth century, theoretical 
thought had privileged the concept of time (Foucault and Miskowiec 1986). The 
historical turn that took place in the nineteenth century overtook almost every discipline 
in such a way that every subject matter of Western thought was interpreted from a 
historical perspective. Although space was not absent from theoretical investigations, the 
main European thinkers and philosophers were not concerned with the investigation of 
spaces created by humans organized in societies. They only started becoming interested 
in this question of social spaces during the twentieth century. With the works of Simmel, 
Heidegger, Lefebvre, Foucault, Certeau, Deleuze or Guattari, the spatial dimension 
finally approached the historical dimension in its capacity to interpret and explain the 
social phenomenona. Today, there is a deep shift happening in the way science, but also 
society at large, thinks about space and spatial perspective, in terms of understanding the 
city and the contemporary world. This fundamental change in theoretical knowledge is 
often designated as the spatial turn. It allowed space to become one of the fundamental 
dimensions of society and reinforced the importance of geography within the domain of 
the social sciences. Geography, as a science of space, could not contribute to the spatial 
turn without undergoing an epistemological revolution itself, which it did, in the 
writings of authors such as David Harvey, Edward Soya or Jacques Lévy. This 
“geographical turn” finally allowed researchers to reflect on space in order to decipher the 
world, as the subtitle of Lévy’s book indicates (Penser l’espace pour lire le monde) (Lévy 
1999).  
 
Among the thinkers who put a strong emphasis on space, Martin Heidegger stands out 
with his idea of making humans ontologically spatial beings (see Malpas 2012). He 
crystallized his ideas in the groundbreaking philosophical work “Being and Time”, 
published in 1927 (2010). The novelty of his approach was not only to give a central role 
to space, but also to expand the idea of inhabiting from dwelling to a much larger space. 
Heidegger’s understanding of space has affinities to both relational theory of Leibniz and 
Kantian theory, but at the same time, Heidegger introduces an important distinction in 
his theory. Following Kant, Heidegger recognized space as the condition under which 
individuals can have a coherent experience of the word. However, unlike Kant, who 
defines space as an a priori element to all experience, Heidegger attributes space to 
individuals’ active ‘being’ and their practical involvement in the world. In other words, 
he introduces social space as the fundamental constitutive element of Being. His 
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objections to the traditional debates on space are related to their groundedness in the 
metaphysical dichotomy of subject and object. Whether researchers speak of the 
objective Leibnizian nature of space or the purely subjective Kantian understanding of 
space, both of these theories share the same dichotomy. Heidegger rejects this 
assumption and “seeks the condition for dichotomy itself, a condition under which we 
can have conceptions of both objective and subjective space” (Arisaka 2008). For him, 
humans exist spatially and this space of existence (which could be called the “lived” space 
or “phenomenological” space) is founded on the spatiality of Being-in-the-world (see 
Ströker 1987, 13-170). Spatiality becomes essential to self-consciousness not only 
because the world is spatial but also because the subject is him/herself a spatial element of 
the world. In this sense, the subject is in a constitutive relation to the external world, 
which also becomes a component of being. However, the world as space itself is founded 
on the spatiality of Being. Human beings’ actions thus become the essential element of 
space itself. It is precisely in his understanding of the relation between the subject and 
his/her social environment that the theory of Heidegger generates the fiercest debates. 
 
In the famous fourth chapter of “Being and Time”, entitled “Being-in-the-World as 
Being-with and Being a Self: The ‘They’” and particularly in the 27th paragraph 
“Everyday Being One's Self and the They”, Heidegger develops his ideas on how an 
individual constitutes himself or herself as such. His position is that “I” can only 
constitute itself in some kind of “us” and by means of some “us”, in Being-with: “a mere 
subject without a world "is" not initially and is also never given. And, thus, an isolated I 
without the others is in the end just as far from being given initially” (2010, 116). 
However in Heidegger’s frame of understanding, the community precedes the individual 
and it is thanks to the community that the individual shapes and develops his or her 
individuality. Heidegger’s subject is not even a real subject (at least not the kind of 
subject announced by the modern era). At the beginning of the fourth chapter, he 
indicates that he will be dealing with the ”subject" of everydayness, but he puts the word 
‘subject’ in brackets. This desubjectivated subject does not actively constitute him/herself 
by interacting with the environment but is always already constituted through some 
indefinite “they” that has an existential character: 
 
“We enjoy ourselves and have fun the way they enjoy themselves. We read, 
see, and judge literature and art the way they see and judge. But we also 
withdraw from the ‘great mass’ the way they withdraw, we find "shocking" 
what they find shocking. The they, which is nothing definite and which all 
are, though not as a sum, prescribes the kind of being of everydayness” 
(Heidegger, Stambaugh, and Schmidt 2010, 119). 
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Heidegger is being ironic here. Even when his subject withdraws from the great mass, he 
or she does it in the same way that the great mass does it. In this sense, the individual is 
freed from the responsibility of his/her acts by the homogenous communal society. 
However, this comes with a price. Heidegger assumes here that individuals act as mere 
passive agents who adapt to a set of predetermined collective identities that are constant 
over time. Thus, Heidegger’s demands of us as humans to refuse historicity and mobility, 
and embrace places anchored in a local environment where everything is an expression of 
the changeless character of that environment. The limits of this approach rapidly appear 
to anyone interested in understanding the problems raised by our modern urban 
societies, which are characterized by an increasing importance given to spaces that are 
topological in nature. Topological spaces allow the constitution of “a network full of 
nodes that are more consistent, more numerous and better interconnected” (Lévy 2014, 
55). The Heideggerian conception denies humans the possibility of overcoming the 
limits of territory, which becomes the tragic destiny of our human condition. The 
following question thus arises: Is it possible for the subject to constitute him/herself 
without completely giving up his/her individuality to the community? Or, as Lévy asks: 
“Can the World be inhabited in a non-Heideggerian manner?” (2014, 52).  
Inhabiting in the Society of Individuals 
If I make the assumption that society is not a separate anonymous “entity” weighing 
down upon individuals from the outside, but rather a complex system produced by 
socially interdependent individuals, then each individual actively constitutes a society in 
terms of their various capitals (spatial, economic, intellectual, etc.), their interests, beliefs 
and goals as well as their experiences and expectations. The idea is to study humans not 
from the abstract concept of ‘Dassein’ and hyphenated desubjectivated formulations such 
as “being-with-others”, but from the real actions and discourses of self-conscious actors 
seen as homines aperti (“open people”). This conception of individuals was developed by 
Norbert Elias (Elias 1984), who considered that humans should not be studied as 
“closed” subjects that think only in their container (or what he calls homo clausus). 
Instead, he counterposes his own conceptual starting point of “open” interdependent 
people, bound with each other on various dimensions and co-determining one another 
both in co-operation and competition. It is important to observe that homines aperti is a 
vision of “people in the plural; we obviously need to start out with the image of a 
multitude of people, each of them relatively open, interdependent processes” (Elias 1984, 
121). Thus, he insists on the understanding of individuals as processes rather than static 
agents. 
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Humans exist only in interdependent relation with others. The idea behind Elias’s basic 
position is essentially Weberian. The personality of each individual and social structure 
have a close interrelationship. As a social structure changes, so does the personality of 
each individual, which causes further changes in the social structure (see Elwell 2009). 
To illustrate his position, Elias uses the following metaphor: Social structure, he argues, 
is like a dance. Dancers follow the rules of a dance, but these rules are inherently 
connected to the movements the dancers make in relation to each other (Elias 1978). 
The individual and society are therefore inseparable parts of a single whole, incapable of 
being understood as separate phenomena; ”the concept of the individual refers to 
interdependent persons; the concept of society to interdependent persons in the plural 
form” (Elias cited in Quintaneiro 2006). The categories of ‘the individual’ and ‘society’ 
express only "differences in the viewpoint of the observer, whom at times may focus on 
the persons that form the group and, at other times, on the group formed by them" 
(Elias cited in Quintaneiro 2006). 
 
Elias wanted to show that we as people can only understand ourselves if we study both 
the individual and the social as a “networked agency”, i.e., a complex network of social 
interdependencies (or figuration). This is how he understands the human condition: 
 
“To get a closer view of this kind of interrelationship, one might think of 
the object from which the concept of the network is derived, a woven net. 
In such a net there are many individual threads linked together. Yet neither 
the totality of the net, nor the form taken by each thread in it, can be 
understood in terms of a single thread alone, or even all the threads 
considered singly; it is understood solely in terms of the way they are 
linked, their relationship to each other. This linking gives rise to a system of 
tensions to which each single thread contributes, each in a somewhat 
different manner according to its place and function in the totality of the 
net. The form of the individual thread changes if the tension and structure 
of the whole net changes. Yet this net is nothing other than a linking of 
individual threads; and within the entire net, each thread still forms a unity 
in itself; it has a unique position and form within it.” (Elias 2001, 32) 
 
It is through different social interdependencies that individuals define the self and the 
world, and orient their thoughts and actions. In this sense, our feelings and aesthetic 
judgments can only be understood as part of these interdependencies (which have 
become greater and more complex since the early Middle Ages, and in particular since 
the rise of big nineteenth century cities). Since Norbert Elias’ (dynamic) sociology 
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provides correlations that cross micro-macro perspectives with social-individual 
perspectives, it allows us to analyze social issues that arise and change across different 
contexts. Together with Weber, Durkheim and other contemporary scholars, Elias 
describes the contemporary social world as a “society of individuals” (Elias 2001), 
indicating the emergence of a new form of social organization in developed countries. 
Norberto Bobbio argues that this struggle against various modes of organicism produces 
various modes of individualism (eg., liberal individualism or democratic individualism) 
and explains this condition in the following words: 
 
“Liberalism amputates the individual from the organic body, makes him 
live – at least for much of his life – outside the maternal womb, plunges 
him into the unknown and perilous world of the struggle for survival. 
Democracy joins him together once more with others like himself, so that 
society can be built up again from their union, no longer as an organic 
whole but as an association of free individuals” (Bobbio, Ryle, and Soper 
2005, 43) 
 
This passage from “an organic whole” towards “an association of free individuals” is a 
relatively new societal condition that had already been outlined in 1887 by the German 
sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies. In his famous work “Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft”20 
(1988), he introduced a conceptual tool to make a distinction between Gemeinschaft, a 
community-type of social order based on the ideal of homogeneity and imbued with a 
sense of moral obligation to the group, and Gesellschaft, a society organized by the 
principal of heterogeneity. However, we often find that the two apparently opposing 
impulses are deeply intermingled and mutually reinforce each other. Frederic Jameson 
highlights the “ambivalent envy and resentment of the Gesellschaft” for remaining 
enclaves of “the older Gemeinschaft”, which creates a pretext for various contemporary 
fantasies. An example provided by Jameson can be found in the celebrated movie “The 
Godfather”. At a time when the disintegration of Gemeinschaft communities reinforces 
itself in terms of a deterioration of the family, the growth of permissiveness, and the loss 
of authority of the father, (…) the tightly knit bonds of the Mafia family (in both senses) 
and the protective security of the (god-) father with his omnipresent authority offer a 
contemporary pretext for a Utopian fantasy” (Hardt and Weeks 2000, 145). Similar to 
this view, Marshal Berman argues that this contradiction, consisting of being 
simultaneously enthusiasts and enemies of modern life, lies at the heart of our modern 
                                                      
20 The first English translation appeared in 1940 as “Fundamental Concepts of Sociology” 
(Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft), New York: American Book Co. Note that a 1955 translation 
“Community and Association” (Gemeinschaft und gesellschaft), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
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condition and can even (as was the case of nineteenth-century thinkers) become the 
primary source of its creative power (Berman 1988, 24). 
 
This new society of individuals, according to Lévy, is “by no means less societal than the 
former communal society. On the contrary, it is characterized by both more individuality 
and more society” (Lévy 2014, 54). It gives also a new consistency to a specific 
relationship between actors and their environments. A fundamental question arises: Is 
there a connection between the way of inhabiting and the choice of society? If the notion 
of inhabiting is a fully spatial concept, how does a change in spatial configurations 
influence people’s ways of inhabiting the Earth? 
Urbanity as Phenomenon Emerging From a 
Combination of Density and Diversity 
In one of the founding texts of the Chicago school of urban sociology entitled 
“Urbanism As a Way of Life” (1938), Louis Wirth argues that “what is distinctively 
modern in our civilization is best signalized by the growth of great cities. Nowhere has 
mankind been farther removed from organic nature than under the conditions of life 
characteristic of great cities”. His biggest theoretical concern at the time was the 
inexistence of a sociological definition of the city, despite the multiplication of studies 
and textbooks on the subject. In an attempt to treat the “subject matter in a more 
integrated and systematic fashion”, he famously proposed three variables to explain the 
emergence of “urbanism as a characteristic mode of life”: the number of people, the 
density of the settlement and the degree of heterogeneity. This simple yet powerful 
formulation was later used by Lévy, who proposed to replace the concept of urbanism 
(easily confused with urban planning) with the concept of urbanity. For Levy, urbanity 
emerges in respect to both the functional and sociological diversity of the urban system 
and its multidimensional density (built environment, flows, people, ideas). In this sense, 
the “level” of urbanity is directly proportional to the density and diversity of a given 
urban situation. As an emergent phenomenon of the urban system, including material 
and ideal social realities and referring to both actuality and virtuality, this “level” of 
urbanity is an extremely difficult phenomenon to work with, particularly when 
researchers want to measure it. However, in order to study the processes of urbanization 
and the dynamics of urban societies, the concept of urbanity provides a critical (not just 
descriptive) scientific approach, as well as a detachment from the historical European 
                                                                                                                                             
referred to Gesellschaft as “association”. In 1957, in the edition of East Lansing, the title in English 
changed again to “Community and Society”. 
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matrix epitomized in the image of the walled compact city. The concept of urbanity 
allows researchers like myself to first compare big and small cities, and then to compare 
Neolithic agglomerations with contemporary cities, rich and poor cities, and eastern and 
western cities, and so on.   
 
Since the entire world is undergoing rapid urbanization, the sharp distinctions that 
formerly existed between the urban and the rural can no longer be relevant conceptual 
tools in the field of urban studies. Instead, Lévy proposed to study the urban space as 
consisting of various “geotypes”, each having their own different level (or intensity) of 
urbanity. In a series of books and articles (Lévy 1983; Lévy, Déloye, and Haegel 1993; 
Lévy 1999; Lévy 2013), he defends the position that researchers can identify different 
urban types (or models of urbanity): the center, the suburb, the peri-urban, the infra-
urban, the para-urban, the meta-urban. In this sense, there is no violent switch from city 
to countryside, but rather from one more or less urban context to another. In the 
European context, urbanity is understood as being at its maximum level in the center of 
the city (which is not necessarily in the “geometrical” or historical center), and as 
declining as one moves to areas with lower intensities of density and diversity. For 
example, a mono-functional tourist station is regarded as an urban spatial configuration 
with the lowest possible degree of urbanity. Since each societal dimension is present in 
each “model” of urbanity, they might equally be considered as models of societies. It is 
important however to underline that the city is not just one urban type among others. 
The more urbanity a certain urban reality generates, the more it gains in singularity, and 
finally the more difficult it is to define it as a category (i.e., as a type). 
 
While many leading North-American social scientists focus almost exclusively on the 
economic inequalities of contemporary capitalist societies, others engage in a more 
systematic approach. For example, Richard Florida stresses the importance of social 
diversity for attracting highly skilled workers (the creative class) to urban labor markets 
(Florida 2010; 2005). In addition, Fran Tonkiss, in her close dialogue with Wirth, 
Jacobs and Lefebvre, argues for social, economic and cultural heterogeneity as both the 
products and conditions for the very existence of cities as a particular mode of spatial 
organization (Tonkiss 2014, 50). However, for Tonkiss, “designing for diversity” does 
not simply mean prescribing “mixed uses”, but leaving undefined grounds for 
improvisation as well. In this view, urbanity unleashes its full strength because it allows 
the emergence of a variety of unpredicted social practices, which in turn may become 
important elements of social change. In the same line of thought, Lévy stresses the role of 
serendipity as a particularly creative force of urban public spaces (Lévy 2011). The 
strength of intersections of difference that occur frequently in unobtrusive and incidental 
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ways was also recognized by Saskia Sassen, who finds in them the quality of what she 
calls “cityness” and what we might call “high” or “strong” urbanity. 
 
Urbanity is not to be understood as the eternal reproduction of some ‘magic’ moments 
in the history of great world cities. Without critical connection to the direct experience 
of contemporary spatial actors, any reproduction of the Parisian arcades of Walter 
Benjamin or Manhattan’s West Village of Jane Jacobs (as products of particular social, 
historical and economic circumstances) will remain a mere simulacra. This is often the 
problem with architects and planners of New Urbanism, whose work suffers from a great 
paradox — by constantly repeating the same urban form and thus following the ideal of 
homogeneity and nostalgic visions, they produce spaces that are in total contradiction 
with the forces that gave rise to the very urban forms they are trying to reproduce. What 
is lacking in their approach is the interpolation of all societal dimensions and all societal 
actors in the production of urban forms and urban spaces.  
The City As a Fundamental Concept For 
Critical Urban Theory 
Many scholars posture lost organicity as being one of the central problems of the 
contemporary city and significant time is consumed to address this issue. For example, 
the 22nd ISUF conference, which took place in Rome, was entitled “City as organism. 
New visions for urban life” (2015). During this conference, the possibilities of a “new 
organicity” were widely discussed. I believe that this kind of research is rather 
inefficacious for one and simple fact: A city is simply not an organism – it is an order, 
not a being. If organicity is defined as being a stable balanced whole without internal 
contradictions, then the more urbanity a city generates, the more it moves away from the 
ideal of organicity, which is a sort of final solution that a single individual is capable of 
fully grasping and clearly understanding. Many ‘great’ urban planners, including Frank 
Lloyd Wright, Patrick Geddes or Le Corbusier completely failed to recognize this fact; 
Their plans produced overly simplified mono-functional urbanism, unable to cope with 
complexity of urban social systems and the various spaces that support them. Cassirer 
theoreticized the fundamental difference between an order and a being in the following 
manner: 
 
“As the concept of being is correlated with unity, as ens et unum 
convertuntur, as Scholasticism has formulated it, so there is an analogous 
correlation between multiplicity and order. As soon as the point of gravity 
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in thought shifts from the pole of being to the pole of order in the total 
theoretical view of reality and specifically in the theoretical conception and 
interpretation of space, then a victory of pluralism over abstract monism, of 
a multiplicity of forms over a single form, is established” (Cassirer 1969, 8).  
 
This fact was recognized in 1940 by Wirth, who argued that the task of urban sociology 
was precisely to investigate “the spatial order of urban life” (1940). However, to be able 
to investigate it we must also recognize its complexity, or more precisely its double 
complexity. Juval Portugali argues that cities are dual complex systems in several respects 
(Portugali:te p.5-7 , see also Portugali 2011). First, the city emerges out of the activities 
of its agents and it is precisely the urban agents that, by means of their interaction with 
other components of the human social system (including themselves) and the 
environment, transform the artifact city into a complex system. However, once the city 
emerges, “its structure and dynamics affect the behavior of its agents and so on in circular 
causality”. This is precisely the way in which urbanity emerges and affects the city and its 
components. Second, artifacts are not, according to Portugali “just the outcome of 
human interaction, but are also the media of interaction; artifacts such as texts, cities, 
buildings or roads are external representations of ideas, intentions, memories and 
thoughts that originate and reside in the mind of urban agents — that is to say, of 
internal representations. They interact by means of the externally represented artifacts, be 
they texts, clothes, buildings, neighborhoods or whole cities and metropoles”. Urban 
dynamics thus involve an ongoing interaction between external and internal 
representations. This means that a student of urban dynamics must take into an account 
a whole material and ideal sphere of human existence, as well as an ongoing and never-
ending “interaction between external and internal representations”. And third, humans as 
the components of a hybrid complex system but also as the systems themselves,21 “are 
simultaneously subject to two evolutionary processes: very slow natural evolution, which 
they rarely witness in their lifetime, and very fast cultural evolution, whose effect on the 
urban agents is instantaneous”, forcing urban agents to constantly adapt to the rapidly-
changing urban environment. The question Portugali then asks is this: How do humans 
adapt to such rapid cultural changes? His answer is: “By means of their cognitive 
capabilities”. This might be true, but it is essential to recognize that what helps 
individuals develop and orientate these cognitive capabilities is precisely our experience 
(taken in both senses, as Erlebnis and Erfahrung) with an environment during our 
lifetime. Since each of these experiences is spatial, studying spatial structures gives us an 
excellent insight into the processes that structure urban systems. One more question thus 
                                                      
21 As I stated previously in the section “More is Different. Toward Systemic Approach“, humans 
are biological systems themselves and they can create systems by interacting with other humans or 
non-humans (see also Bunge 1982, 7). 
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arises: What is it with the city that makes it a “rapidly-changing” environment, and how 
does this characteristic of the city affect people’s actions, judgments and feelings? 
 
It is important to understand that the city is  “a concept that is fundamentally spatial” 
(Lévy 1994, author’s translation). Cities have been and still are the most effective places 
to bring different people together on a relatively compact territory. From this simple yet 
fundamental fact emerges the specificity of the city as a particular spatial organization. In 
other words, the city is an extremely efficient spatial tool for abolishing distances between 
people and their artefacts. However, this process has another side to it: Cities are also 
shaped by forces of exclusion, expressed by the spatial actors from other members of 
society through various acts of distance creation (physical, economic, cultural, etc.). 
Thus, a high level of urbanity always comes with certain tensions that appear to be an 
important element behind both vibrancy and liveliness, but also conflict, in big dense 
cities. Contrary to Thomas Wüsts’s assertion that urbanity is a myth (Wüst 2013), I 
argue that it is a reality of the daily lives of millions of people worldwide struggling for 
space, and struggling for their way in the contemporary urban condition and emerging 
World-society. 
 
In the epistemological sense, the category of “the city” is still a matter of dispute in 
contemporary urban theory. Some contemporary urban thinkers feel emboldened to 
proclaim that the city is a residue of the past. With the recent publication of the article 
“Towards a New Epistemology of the Urban?” (2015), Neil Brenner and Christian 
Schmid argue that urban theory now requires a fundamental rethinking. They want to 
set urban research on a new course by criticizing the “city-centrism” they believe is 
holding back both mainstream and critical urban research. According to them, the city, 
as one of the foundational concepts of urban theory, “must be revisited if urban theory is 
to respond to the rapidly changing geographies of urbanization and urban struggle under 
early 21st century capitalism”. The way researchers respond to the Brenner and 
Schmidt’s criticism strongly depends on their epistemological foundations. Only if the 
urban is considered as “coherently contained within or anchored to the city”, can it be 
said that Brenner and Schmidt’s position is untenable. However, I argue that the existing 
concept of urbanity (understood as a phenomenon that emerges from both the 
functional and sociological diversity of the urban system and its multidimensional 
density) is a powerful critical tool for studying past, present and potential spatial realities. 
In addition, abandoning “the city” as an empirical and a theoretical category comes, I 
believe, with the great risk of a driving a cleft between urban theory and human 
experience. This is why I am an advocate of the position defended by Davidson and 
Iveson (2015), who, in response to Brenner and Schmidt, still see the city as “an anchor 
for critical urban studies”. 
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Measuring Emergent Phenomena 
If urbanity exists, how can researchers observe its emergence and its effects? One way of 
doing this is by quantifying the concentrations of people, artefacts, institutions and 
buildings, and their juxtaposition in various networks of communication and flow across 
and beyond the urban fabric. Researchers can then investigate various communal and 
societal practices, such as the norms of household formation in different urban 
environments, people’s patterns of consumption and travel behaviors, ways of interacting 
in the public space, etc. However, though some of these things can be measured and 
mapped, certain characteristics of urban systems cannot be deduced by recourse to 
statistical or behavioral facts. Emily Talen and Chris Ellis (Talen and Ellis 2002, 42) 
stated this in the following way: 
 
“[W]hether compact urban forms produce fewer car trips or impact social 
groups differently can be empirically treated. But there are aesthetic and 
ethical components to these theories that need to be debated on their own 
terms. They cannot be resolved by an appeal to data alone. Some principles 
are not provable in the conventional scientific sense, and indeed, the 
constant war of numbers engaging prosprawl and antisprawl debaters has 
not convinced anyone to change direction.” 
 
The problem lies in the difficulty of establishing causal links between urban actors, their 
actions, and the effects of these actions on the functioning of the entire urban system. 
My position, as elaborated in the previous chapters, is that human actions are always 
multidimensional and socially situated, which further implies that if researchers are faced 
with the problem of measuring subjectivity, we can only do so by taking into account the 
referential social and urban space in which a particular phenomenon emerges. In the 
same way, aesthetic qualities are not to be taken as properties of the environment per se, 
nor as properties of the person reacting to the environment. Rather, aesthetic qualities 
should be considered as properties that emerge from the interaction between individuals 
and their environment, within a process of constituting themselves as subjects, and where 
each individual has an idea of what society should be like and what it should look like.22  
                                                      
22 Studies on social and spatial justice show that people have more or less clear ideas of what kind 
of society they want to live in (Fauchille 2016). 
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Some Hypotheses On the Aesthetic 
Dimension of Urban Agency 
Considering that social relations are “reducible to social actions” (Bunge 1999) and that 
social actions are always spatial — i.e., they occur in a set of relations that are both pre-
established and produced by actors themselves, — a study of (social) spaces is an 
approach par excellence for anyone interested in understanding the logics behind the 
judgments, feelings and desires that influence various actions of the members of society. 
Space holds an existential position in human lives for the character of our societies is 
defined by actions that occur in various spaces produced by these societies. In this sense, 
as individuals, we are all dependent on the interactions with other members of society, to 
the extent that our actions only make sense if taken in regard to other members of 
society. As Elias reminds us, “the special shaping and differentiation of mental functions 
that we refer to as ‘individuality’ is only possible for a person who grew up in a group, a 
society” (Elias 2001). As human beings, we express our individuality because of society, 
not in spite of it.  
 
Each human actor, as a component of the human social system, has the capacity to make 
aesthetic judgments, and exhibits aesthetic agency as a part of his/her everyday 
interactions with both other members of society and the environment. In this sense, the 
aesthetic dimension, together with a number of other dimensions (biological, economic, 
political, etc.), influence the character, strength and diversity of social relations that 
determine the features of the social system. Since society is a complex social system, 
entirely new properties emerge at each level of complexity. In this sense, some emerging 
properties belong to the system as a whole or to its various subsystems, while parts that 
are taken out of the system and considered separately, do not exhibit these properties. 
These properties can be objective, such as urbanity, or subjective, such as the beauty of 
the city.  
 
Contemporary (western) society is an urban society, as both actuality and virtuality 
(Lefebvre 2003, 2). This fact is confirmed to the extent that even the Alpine territory has 
become an urbanized macro-region (Schmid et al. 2001). However, the urban character 
of this enormous system and its subsystems is not homogenous and varies significantly in 
its degrees of urbanity, i.e., the intensity of its density, and the diversity of its various 
components (material and ideal) that coexist in a certain moment of time. In this sense, 
the urbanity of a particular urban situation emerges as a result of the spatial and social 
conditions in which each individual constitutes himself or herself as such and in which 
he/she develops his/her attitudes and judgments toward other members of society. I 
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describe this interactive relation between the spatial actors and spatialised environment 
with the concept of ‘inhabiting’, which “consist[s] of a dynamic balance between acting 
(inhabiting) and becoming (being inhabited)” (Lévy 2014, 65).  
 
To inhabit means to act in society in a way that produces or restricts social relations, and 
this is only possible through particular spatial arrangements that reinforce or reduce 
distances between other members of society and their natural or artificial environments. 
It is in this sense that the concept of inhabiting (as the sum of all actual and virtual 
spatialities of one particular human actor) and his or her habitus (the space that allows 
this or that particular action) are connected. Amongst an innumerable number of actions 
that define the life of an individual, the choice of a residential environment plays a 
particularly important role since it necessitates various spatial arrangements in order to 
become actualized as such. This choice is influenced by all dimensions of society, 
without any particular hierarchy between the different dimensions. In this sense, the 
aesthetic dimension plays a role that is just as important as the political, economic or 
ethical dimensions. Since it is simply impossible to study everything simultaneously, I 
will isolate the aesthetic dimension in order to be able to proceed to the artifice of the 
construction of the scientific object, and raise the following hypotheses: 
 
1. Inhabitants’ immediate residential environment strongly influences their aesthetic 
judgments. 
2. There is a link between aesthetic judgments and political and ethical choices. 
3. For an individual needing to choose a residential environment, aesthetic factors are 
just as important as economic, biological or political factors. 
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4 The Methodology 
“No one, wise Kublai, knows better than you that the city 
must never be confused with the words that describe it. 
And yet between the one and the other there is a 
connection.”  
Italo Calvino 
Recent shifts in the field of social science, namely the visual, qualitative, 
actorial and spatial shifts, all indicate an increasing interest in individuals and their 
interests, beliefs and commitments. In this sense, my main task will be to investigate the 
mechanisms that drive the production of an aesthetic space as a genuine lived space. 
However, this task cannot be accomplished by merely observing individuals as passive 
agents. Instead, my epistemological imperative will consist in acknowledging that 
research participants are also co-producers of knowledge. This does not imply, in any 
case, that I do not start my investigation with a pre-established set of questions and 
general hypotheses, but rather, it keeps me from falling into the positivist trap that arises 
when theory is separated from research. At the same time, it allows me to raise an entirely 
new set of questions and hypotheses while continuing to engage myself in self-
questioning. My method will primarily involve the preparation and conduction of the 
classical semi-structured interview and photo-interview, and will be followed by an 
analysis of the transcribed participants’ discourse. I will use some strategies of the 
grounded theory to dissect, examine and compare the participants’ discourses. This will 
be accompanied by a critical discourse analysis. In addition, I will investigate the 
participants’ choice of residential environment and some spatial planning practices to 
demonstrate how the aesthetic dimension plays a significant role in the actual processes 
that structure the Swiss urban environment, i.e., how aesthetic space interacts with other 
human spaces such as urban, political or architectural spaces. My intention is to study 
the aesthetic dimension of the urban system in both a hermeneutical and a pragmatic 
manner. 
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Studying Subjectivity: A Spatial and Historical 
Analysis of Aesthetic Judgment 
The main objection of Elias to both Weber and Durkheim was related to the fact that 
their understanding of human condition was dominated by a kind of abstraction that 
appears to present concepts such as “actor”, “system”, “individual” or “society” as 
substantives, i.e., as if those categories were isolated objects in a state of rest. This 
“intellectual trap”, according to him, led to a widely-held belief that “there must be a 
borderline or partition between what may be designated as individual and what [may be] 
designated as social” (see Elias 1984, 108). In order to approach human subjectivity, I 
will adopt a position according to which feelings and actions, as well as our aesthetic 
judgments, cannot be interpreted outside of complex interdependencies of networks and 
chains in which each individual find himself or herself – precisely as Elias suggested. If 
researchers are to understand an aesthetic judgment as an “act of creating meaning from 
within the act of creating itself” (Given 2008, 11), they should proceed from connections 
and relationships and work out from there, rather than consider beauty and other 
aesthetic categories as some mysterious autonomous phenomena of the human spirit. 
The actor-network theory of Latour and Callon teaches us to bypass dualities between 
individuals and society; I will therefore seek to avoid studying the individual as an 
independent authonomus self (whose subjectivity can be studied as a “closed box”) by 
examining networks through which a sense of independence of individuals has been 
achieved and sustained. However, my methodology will differ from actor-network 
theorists in two critical aspects. First, I will insist on asymmetry within the 
interdependency network, meaning that interdependency does not constrain actors in the 
same way. And second, I will put a greater stress on human actors than on non-human 
actors, mainly for their intentional powers and the unique forms of agency they exhibit 
(e.g., aesthetic agency), which allow them to constantly redefine reality and translate 
their novel ideas into actions. However, researchers must always remain aware that the 
actions of human actors cannot blow away already existing social structures like dust in 
the wind.  
 
According to Elias, the duty of sociology is “to make the individuals of any association 
understandable to themselves and in relation to one another" and to highlight "the 
mechanisms of interdependences, which from a figuration develops" (Elias cited in 
Quintaneiro 2006). Thus it is important not only to study contemporary configurations 
but also configurations that have changed or disappeared, for “any human relation carries 
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within it something of the times when individuals from other societies were conceived 
only as strangers, and in many cases not even as human beings" (Elias cited in 
Quintaneiro 2006). To support this assertion of the interrelationship and 
interdependence between social and individual structures, I will look at changes in 
aesthetic sensibilities towards urban and natural environments at certain critical moments 
of Switzerland’s modern history.  
 
Elias was intent on illustrating how people often remain largely unaware of the complex 
interdependencies in which they are situated, or of the historical conditions in which 
these interdependencies take place. He argued that we need to see ourselves also from a 
long-term perspective (long duré) and that many of the limitations of social science derive 
from its failure to acknowledge this fact. He presents his point in the following manner: 
 
‘“I once read the story of a group of people who climbed higher and higher 
in an unknown and very high tower. The first generation got as far as the 
fifth storey, the second reached the seventh, the third the tenth. In the 
course of time their descendants attained the hundredth storey. Then the 
stairs gave way. The people established themselves on the hundredth storey. 
With the passage of time they forgot that their ancestors had ever lived on 
lower floors and how they had arrived at the hundredth floor. They saw the 
world and themselves from the perspective of the hundredth floor, without 
knowing how people had arrived there. They even regarded the ideas they 
formed from the perspective of their floor as universal human ideas” (Elias 
1992, 135). 
 
The idea is that our contemporary ideas are not history-independent. As an example, 
world time is a contemporary idea that has become necessary to the co-ordination and 
functioning of most of the contemporary social networks or systems. Most people take 
time and timing for granted “as part of our everyday subjectivity, and often remain 
inattentive to the fact that the ‘working day’ and our whole sense of the measurement of 
time is a modern social construction that would be entirely alien to people living in pre-
modern societies” (see van Iterson et al. 2002 p.xv). As Elias argues, “We have slipped 
into an ever-present sense of time. It has become part of our person. As such it becomes 
self-evident. It seems that we cannot experience the world otherwise” (Elias 1992, 162).  
 
Like time, beauty can become ‘invisible’ to us or can be taken for granted. By solely 
focusing on the here and now, we can easily forget how our understanding of beauty, like 
many other aspects of our subjectivity, represents a figurational development which 
emerged in particular societal conditions. This is why, in order to investigate the 
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historical and, above all, spatial circumstances23 which shaped individuals’ understanding 
of beauty, my study will include both an analysis of action and an analysis of meaning. 
The historical analysis will consist in examining the historical documents and actions of 
some major urban actors in the realm of spatial planning, culture and politics in terms of 
their aesthetic sensibilities towards inhabited environments. Anyone who studies the 
evolution of urban space in Switzerland will notice that a variety of urban actors assigned 
great importance to aesthetic questions. From the 18th century onward, we can trace 
how the Swiss have systematically used aesthetics for political and ideological purposes, as 
well as to develop tourism.  
 
I will thus provide some examples of how aesthetic agency influenced politics regarding 
spatial planning on one hand, and the residential practices of ‘small’ actors on the other. 
This will also help me better understand how urban space influences individuals’ 
aesthetic judgments and how, in turn, their actions are guided by the aesthetic 
dimension. The idea is to demonstrate that this is not only a phenomenon that emerged 
only in the background of a particular historical conditions, but rather, that it is a 
universal capacity of every human endowed with subjectivity. In order to understand 
how the aesthetic dimension shapes individual’s understanding of the world today and 
how it continues to strongly influence their actions, I conducted a series of qualitative 
interviews with residents of the Swiss canton of Vaud. In the following pages, I will 
explain how this method was constructed and how the interviews were organized. 
Action and Discourse on Action 
The fundamental difference between the natural and social sciences is that the latter have 
to take human beliefs, interests and intentions into account. At first glance, this fact 
                                                      
23 Studies have revealed that people have an overall preference for natural environments over 
artificial environments (Nasar 1983; R. Kaplan and Kaplan 1989) and the addition of natural 
material to urban environments tends to dramatically increase the area’s aesthetic appeal (Thayer 
and Atwood 1978). These studies can be criticized. For instance, the apparent consensus on 
preference for habitat may be in fact that samples were taken from people of similar background 
and experiences (Ruso, Renninger, and Atzwanger 2003, 286). Indeed, the inquiries focused on 
the similarities between the participants, not their differences. Some studies have shown that 
landscape preferences differed according to age and gender (Lyons 1983; Heft 1988) or according 
to one’s occupation (Gómez-Limón and Fernández 1999; Brush, Chenoweth, and Barman 2000). 
Eibl-Eibesfeldt, the founder of human ethnology, added to the environmental aesthetics theory 
(1984) by describing the human aesthetic condition globally as being phytophilic (having a strong 
psychological and behavioral affinity to green plants), and hydrophilic (having a strong 
psychological and behavioral affinity to water). However, this kind of finding does not take into 
consideration the full complexity of the human aesthetic experience and its deep social 
groundedness.  
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might appear to be a disadvantage: first, because people’s beliefs, interests and intentions 
can change and are not always thought-through or easily articulated. As Schultz noted, 
“the knowledge of the man who acts and thinks within the world of his daily life is not 
homogeneous; it is (1) incoherent, (2) only partially clear, and (3) not at all free from 
contradictions” (Schuetz 1944). Indeed, humans may consider incompatible positions as 
being equally valid (i.e., they may exhibit some sort of cognitive dissonance), and their 
actions can still be guided by these cognitions even if they are contradictory. In this 
sense, limiting the study of the social world to observable human actions only comes 
with a great risk of neglecting the mechanisms that govern these actions. Since “human 
action is intrinsically meaningful” and arises as “the product of a continuous, ongoing, 
process of experiencing, ordering, classifying and interpreting, (…) it is the investigation 
of these meaning making processes that must become the main topic of any sociological 
investigation” (Lapenta 2005). Thus, sociological study should include both pragmatics 
(an analysis of action) and hermeneutics (an analysis of meaning). Humans are social and 
evaluative animals; therefore, in any given social situation, they are constantly 
renegotiating and reevaluating a shared definition and their proper understanding of the 
situation. In this sense, the answers researchers might elicit from them always make 
reference to the specific social context and processes they are a part of, which include a 
constant renegotiation of social identities and interpretations of social events, as Goffman 
has demonstrated (Goffman 1981; see also Drew and Wootton 1988). The second 
problem of social sciences lies in the irreproducible character of the observed 
phenomena. Social actions are unique and irreproducible in their entirety — a fact 
already stated by Heraclitus. However, the uniqueness of social interactions does not 
mean they cannot be analyzed. It is precisely because human actions are spatialized that 
we can study and compare them to other spatialized human actions. Every time we 
isolate certain criteria to compare interactions between humans, we do it by isolating 
spatial substances, which allows us to make such a comparison.  
Us and Them 
Another fundamental issue for each researcher concerns the production of knowledge. I 
will adopt the position where I consider that both “the observers” and “the observed” are 
active in the process of producing knowledge. Social scientists are not the only ones to 
carry knowledge of society and social phenomena (although it should be noted that that 
they often have a wider systematic understanding of them); Indeed, ordinary lay 
individuals are entitled to provide their own explanations of what they are doing. The 
role of the social scientist is not simply to validate his or her understanding or hypothesis 
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on the actors being studied, but rather, it is to validate it with them. In this process, the 
agency of a researcher24 is not to be bracketed either, but rather foregrounded any time a 
(new) question arises — First, because the “practice of bracketing in research, from its 
origins in phenomenology, has resulted in its frequent reduction to a formless technique, 
value stance, or black-box term” (Gearing 2004); And second, because the prior 
knowledge and hypothesis of the researcher should be made explicit and clearly available 
to critique. As Gadamer argued, we cannot free ourselves from the various motivations 
and presuppositions — conscious and unconscious, hidden or vague — which are “at 
play determining us” (1981). [The researchers] should not try to getbracket their own 
cognition and prejudgements, but rather use them as the building blocks for the 
acquisition of new knowledge (Gadamer 1976). Instead of considering my scientific 
colleagues as “us” and the rest of society as “them”, I argue for the anticipatory kind of 
‘we’ sociology, as advocated by Elias: 
 
[A] predominantly descriptive approach in sociology or history stops short 
at the point where the people one is trying to understand are perceived 
merely as people in the third person. Only if the researcher advances 
further, to the point where he perceives the people he is studying as human 
beings like himself — the sameplane on which the actual experience of the 
people studied, their first-person perspective, becomes accessible — can he 
approach a realistic understanding (Elias 1983, 211). 
 
In Gadamer’s view (Palmer 1969, 165), a researcher is an “inquiring subject” who 
“encounters” the subject matter “through a questioning responsiveness”. In a constant 
position of self-questioning, he or she stays open to subject matter and thus allows 
himself or herself to be “interrogated by the ‘subject matter’ itself”. This was precisely 
what I experienced during my study. 
The Interviews and Selection of Participants 
The principal method I used to investigate the aesthetic experience of people living in 
Lausanne and its metropolitan region was a fairly standard method: the interview. The 
protocol involved a very short explanation of the purpose of the study followed by a 
classic verbal semi-open interview and photo-elicited interview. The conversation was 
                                                      
24 As for the subjectivity of the researcher in regards to the choice of photographs, Sylvain Malfroy 
suggests that researchers should rather speak of the “engaged image” instead of the “subjective 
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recorded and became a ‘text’ that was coded, interpreted, explored and critically 
analyzed. Since the linear character of the written dissertation requires that even 
simultaneous eventualities be reported sequentially, it is extremely hard to represent the 
circular process through which the theories, hypotheses and results mutually nurtured 
and influenced each other. However, it must be noted that my choice to interview the 
participants is consistent with postulates of the “grounded theory”, which states that the 
theory is generated and developed at the same time that data is collected (Glaser and 
Strauss 2009; Blanchet 2007, 15). Grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin 1998) as a 
modus operandi25 became my basic methodological guideline, and it was accompanied 
by a critical discourse analysis that is both interpretative and explanatory (Fairclough 
2013).       
 
There were only two criteria for selecting participants for this study. The first criterion 
was that the participant needed to be a resident of the Swiss canton of Vaud and had to 
have been born in Switzerland (or have lived most of their life in Switzerland). The idea 
behind this was to diminish trans-cultural influences as much as possible and test my 
hypothesis of whether inhabitants’ aesthetic judgements are strongly influenced by the 
degree of urbanity they choose or prefer to have as their residential environment. This 
leads us to the second criterion. Participants were chosen according to their residential 
zone and whether it corresponded to a certain gradient of urbanity, as defined previously 
(dense city, suburb, peri-urban, hypo-urban, etc.). Typologizing individuals according to 
their actual residential environment was a rather tricky task because it raised a very 
important question on whether the residential space corresponds to the inhabited space. I 
will address this issue later on in this study. For the time being, it is important to 
foreground the basic logic behind the participants’ selection. Age, gender, educational 
background, occupation and economic status were taken into account only to diversify 
my corpus, without dispersing my primary intentions. This diversification had another 
purpose: It was meant to allow me to perturb the initial theoretical system and eventually 
challenge it.   
The Semi-Open Interview 
The first part of the interview included verbal semi-open questions on the topic. The 
questions were simple, open-ended and intended to elicit subjective and meaningful 
responses. The participants were clearly instructed that I was not seeking any ‘correct’ 
                                                                                                                                             
image” in order to avoid any doubts regarding the reality of the captured phenomenon (Roeck 
2013, 122). 
25 The approach consisted of a series of strategies that can be adopted to “code” – break down, 
examine, compare conceptualise and categorise texts and discourses (see Lapenta 2005, 103-8). 
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responses or any particular answers and therefore they were encouraged to freely provide 
their own interpretation of the issue. I tried to make an appeal to the lived experience of 
each participant, his or her own logic and rationale. Thus, participants were asked to 
reflect upon their own experiences and the experiences of others in ways that seldom 
occur in their everyday lives. Some of them specifically noted that discussing their own 
judgments was not an easy exercise. This in-depth exploration of a particular topic is also 
known as “intensive interviewing”. “The interviewer is there to listen, to observe with 
sensitivity, and to encourage the person to respond” while “the participant does most of 
the talking” (Charmaz 2014, 25). The interview was intended to resemble a 
conversation, but not a symmetrical one since I tried to restrict my guidance to the 
maximum. My decision to insist on the general linearity of the protocol and to repeat the 
same set of questions to each participant came from my intention of carrying out a 
comparative analysis. The interview was conducted in French and structured as follows: 
 
Consignes initiales : Pensez-vous que ce que vous trouvez beau ou laid est important dans 
les choix que vous faites dans votre vie ? Qu’est-ce la beauté pour vous ? Qu’est-ce que la 
laideur pour vous ? 
 
Guide thématique 
1. Niveau d’importance de la dimension esthétique : Qu’est ce qu’il faut pour qu’un 
espace habité soit beau ? (Quels sont des facteurs qui font qu’un espace habité soit 
beau ?) Pensez-vous que la dimension esthétique joue un rôle important dans l’expérience 
d’un lieu de résidence ? Pensez-vous que la beauté joue un rôle important dans 
l’attachement à un espace ? Pensez-vous que je jugement esthétique joue un rôle 
important dans le choix de l’environnement résidentiel ? 
 
2. L’environnement résidentiel de l’interviewé : Avez-vous choisi l’endroit où vous 
habiter maintenant ? Étés vous heureux en habitant ici ? Pouvez-vous me décrire votre 
environnement résidentiel, votre quartier ? Qu’est qui est beau ? Qu’est qui est laid ? 
Pensez-vous que tout le monde partage vos jugements sur ce qui est beau ou laid ? 
Pourquoi ?  
 
3. Fabrication du jugement esthétique: Comment cela se fait que vous trouviez cela beau 
ou laid ? Comment pensez-vous que votre goût s’est fabriqué ? Avez-vous toujours 
trouvez cela beau ? (Avez-vous pensé que c’était beau quand vous aviez 20 ans ?). Si la 
réponse est négative : dans votre histoire personnelle, quelle est la période qui a influencé 
le plus votre gout ? Pouvez-vous me décrire l’espace résidentiel de votre enfance ? Avez-
vous eu un rapport positif ou négatif par rapport à cet espace ? 
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Utiliser les relances pendant le déroulement des énoncés de l’interviewé pour souligner, 
synthétiser ou demander une précision. Combiner des interventions différentes du type : 
- écho : répéter ou reformuler un ou plusieurs énoncés référentiels du discours de 
l’interviewé. Ex. C’est beau cela ? Cette maison est laide ? 
- reflet : Ex. Vous trouvez cela beau ? Vous pensez que cette maison et laide ? 
- Interprétation : Vous pensez donc qu’avant des gens faisaient plus d’attention à 
l’esthétique ? 
- Interrogation référentielle : Ex. Vous avez un exemple ? Vous pensez à un élément 
précis ? 
 
4. Conclusion de l’entretien : Demander à la personne interviewée si elle n’a pas autre 
chose à ajouter, ou si elle souhaite aborder un sujet qui ne l’a pas été. 
 
The second part of the protocol included a photo-questionnaire. 
A Photography as a Method 
As Howard Becker observed in his influential article (1974), photography and sociology 
have approximately the same birthdate, around 1839, and were products of the same 
social events. It is not a coincidence that this period corresponds to the birth and 
expansion of great European and American cities that, more than ever before, raised 
issues in terms of the representation of inhabited environments. Classical techniques of 
spatial representations (writing, painting, cartography) could not catch up with the speed 
of city expansion, and therefore something, a new media, was needed to complement 
human understanding of the rapidly changing world. This is why photography (and 
some time later, film) became a popular and powerful tool for the exploration of society.  
 
When Jacob Riis (1901) published his photo-journal on the miserable living conditions 
in New York slums in the 1890s, his work immediately led to many reforms and changes 
in working-class housing. An important number of newspaper articles, published prior to 
Riis’ publication, had failed to convey the urgent message and it was not until the 
introduction of photography that sympathy was raised for the individuals living in these 
slums. The immediate success of Riis’s reportage lies maybe in a certain “proximity 
without presence” provided by the photographic image, accompanied by an 
“instantaneity” that is rivaled only by the cinematographic image. It is in this sense that 
Sartre talks of the transparency of a photograph, meaning that each photograph is an 
analogon providing us with access to the referential space represented by it (2004). In a 
similar way, Rolland Barthes writes of the impossibility of distinguishing a photograph 
from its referent:  
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“Show your photographs to someone — he will immediately show you his: 
"Look, this is my brother; this is me as a child," etc.; the Photograph is 
never anything but an antiphon of "Look," "See," "Here it is"; points a 
finger at certain vis-a-vis, and cannot escape this pure deictic language. This 
is why, insofar as it is licit to speak of a photograph, it seemed to me just as 
improbable to speak of the Photograph” (Barthes 1981, 5). 
 
From the beginning, photography was perceived as a medium of realism that “depended 
upon the medium’s technical character and on the social praxis and discursive context 
determining it. (...) Even digital photography, which planted the seed of ontological 
doubt into the heart of the image, has not radically changed our everyday interaction 
with images” (Kelsey and Stimson 2008, 196). Nevertheless, from the very beginning of 
photography, there has been a persistent myth that the camera merely records whatever is 
in front of it, which leads to the common belief that photography is in some way 
‘objective’. As popular idiom tells us: “a picture is worth a thousand words”, and many 
photographers seem to think that the meaning is already in the image — that there is no 
need to verbalize its meaning. This is why, according to Becker, photographic 
exploration of society is so often intellectually thin. Many photographers simply think 
that becoming familiar with sociological prose is too time-consuming and continue to 
rely on what might be considered as “intuition”. Becker argues that photographers do 
actually draw on theories, but not scientific ones. Instead they rely on “lay theories” of 
everyday life that come from the intellectual and artistic circles they move in. 
Furthermore, he argues that without some kind of theory scientists could begin shooting 
almost anything they see in a chosen situation, trying to cover what whatever seems in a 
common-sense way to be worth looking at. However, “the result is likely to be 
incoherent, visually as well as cognitively”. This is why Becker argues that some initial 
theory is indispensable if we are interested in producing any sort of knowledge on the 
phenomenon we choose to observe. He expresses his view in the following words:   
 
“A sociological theory, whether large scale abstract theory or a specific 
theory about some empirical phenomenon, is a set of ideas with which you 
can make sense of a situation while you photograph it. The theory tells you 
when an image contains information of value, when it communicates 
something worth communicating. It furnishes the criteria by which 
worthwhile data and statements can be separated from those that contain 
nothing of value, that do not increase our knowledge of society” (1974). 
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It is clearly understood by now that epistemology and methodology, as two sides of the 
same coin in any scientific inquiry, intrinsically nourish each other and depend on one 
another. “Epistemological assumptions affect the types of methods that we choose, just as 
the methods that we use — their strengths and their limitations — act on our ways of 
thinking about the way we generate valid social knowledge” (Stanczak 2007, 9). To 
make photography more scientifically ‘dense’, researchers using photography must 
become conscious of the theory behind the use of these images.  
 
Becker argues that at a certain moment in time, there was a divorce between sociology 
and photography. “Sociology became more scientific and less openly political, 
photography became more personal, more artistic, and continued to be engaged 
politically. Not surprisingly, then, the two modes of social exploration have ceased to 
have very much to do with one another” (1974). As Harper noticed, from the 1920s to 
the 1960s, there was no visual sociology (Harper 1988). Today many (social) scientists 
have distanced themselves from radical positivism, which postulates that concepts and 
objects of knowledge are already there as they are, with the researcher’s task being simply 
to (objectively) discover them by refining his or her methods of observation (see Lévy 
2013, 224). Instead, within the contemporary episteme, each student of social reality 
‘constructs’ a scientific artifact, allowing “the mind and the world [to] jointly make up 
the mind and the world”, as Hilary Putnam metaphorically writes in his celebrated work 
“Reason, Truth and History” (1981, xi). This accent on the individual point of view, as 
well as the “spatial shift” in social sciences, are perhaps two main reasons that explain 
sociology’s renewed interest in photography. 
 
Today, photographs have become an important research tool for the exploration of 
society across a range of disciplines (anthropology, psychology, sociology, architecture 
and geography). Although the “visual shift” indicates a shift in emphasis in the 
humanities and social sciences towards “the visible” (Thornes 2004; Jay 2002), scientists 
still lack the conceptual frameworks which would relate it to sociological theory (Burri 
2012). This is perhaps because sociological research has been a “word-based” discipline, 
and the capacity of photographs to provide us with substantial knowledge has been 
questioned, despite the fact, observed by many, that the process of envisioning is a key 
element in the way individuals engage with and make sense of the world (see for example 
Crang 1997; 1996). Theories of psychophysiological arousal also assign major 
importance to the visual properties of environments as factors affecting interest and other 
aspects of activation (Berlyne 1971; Kuller 1976, cited in Ulrich 1981).  
 
Although environmental perception is multi-sensory, and all our senses are important, I 
focused mainly on vision, by far the most important sense in terms of yielding 
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information about our environments (see Ulrich 1981). Numerous studies have 
supported the use of photographs as surrogates for real views and environments (Stamps 
1991; Zube, Pitt, and Anderson 1975; Shafer, Richards, and Richards 1974). Since 
visual techniques and sociological inquiry are compatible in nature, mixed methods have 
been widely used in a variety of disciplines. It therefore seems appropriate to use a 
research method that combines classical semi-open structured interviews with a 
technique that engages people’s visual and imaginative apparatus.  
 
According to Hurworth, “photo-interviewing in its various forms can be a particularly 
powerful tool26 for the researcher. It can challenge participants, provide nuances, trigger 
memories, lead to new perspectives and explanations and help to avoid researcher 
misinterpretation” (2004, 76). The difference between interviews with images and 
interviews with words alone lies in the way we respond to these two forms of symbolic 
representation. “The parts of the brain that process visual information are evolutionarily 
older than the parts that process verbal information.” Hence, photograps “evoke deeper 
elements of human consciousness than do words”, and photo-elicitation interviews reveal 
different kinds of information (Harper, 2002). This is why photography, as a ‘surrogate’ 
for an actual scene, is of relevant interest when it comes to research methodology. 
The Meaning of Photographs 
Although photo-interviewing27 was used in early anthropological research (Hurworth 
2004), the use of photographs to provoke a response was established as a research 
methodology and named “photo-elicitation” interviewing (PEI) in a paper published by 
the photographer and researcher John Collier Jr. (1957). Together with his son, he 
published a classic text, “Visual Anthropology: Photography as a Research Method” (J. 
Collier and Collier 1986), which became the milestone of systematic and analytical 
investigations of image-based methodologies. Collier’s team of researchers did photo-
elicitation interviews as well as non-photographic interviews with the same groups of 
participants and introduced photographs as a valid and useful method for collecting data. 
They concluded that the photos sharpened the informants’ memory and reduced areas of 
misunderstanding: 
 
“The characteristics of the two methods of interviewing can be simply 
stated. The material obtained with photographs was precise and at times 
even encyclopedic; the control interviews were less structured, rambling, 
                                                      
26 For some limitations of the method, see (Becker 1978; Blyton 1987; Templin 1978; Wang and 
Redwood-Jones 2001). 
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and freer in association. Statements in the photo interviews were in direct 
response to the graphic probes and different in character as the content of 
the pictures differed, whereas the character of the control interviews seemed 
to be governed by the mood of the informants. (…) The pictures elicited 
longer and more comprehensive interviews but at the same time helped 
subjects overcome the fatigue and repetition of conventional interviews” (J. 
Collier 1957, 856-8).  
 
The Colliers described photographs as projective tools with the potential to constitute a 
communicative path into the lives and worlds of the observers through qualitatively 
informed open-ended interview. They argued that images encouraged “people to take 
lead in the inquiry, making full use of their expertise,” and readily “invited open 
expression while maintaining concrete and explicit reference points. (…) The researcher 
is now asking questions of the photographs, and the informants are now assistants in 
exploring the answers in the realities there depicted” (Collier and Collier 1986, 105). 
The qualities of this method, such as reshaped and refocused communication between 
the interviewer and interviewee, non-directivity of the discourse, and a higher level of 
engagement by the interviewee with the themes and subjects of the interview, were 
confirmed by authors that have used the method (see Margolis and Pauwels 2011, 202-
13; Banks 2002; Harper 2002). The open-ended methodological approach, with the aim 
of granting the interviewee more space for personal interpretations and responses, finds a 
very fruitful expression in photographs. Unlike a verbal exchange that imposes a meaning 
by itself, photographs acquire a specific meaning only through their interpretation by an 
observer (see Lapenta 2005). Like the world itself, a photograph is never a question per se 
– a question must always be ‘completed’ by the observer. 
 
This communicative ambiguity of photographs was first acknowledged by Gombrich in 
his idea of conceptual “incompleteness” of the image (Gombrich 1960, 58-59). He 
argued that image was not structured enough to bear a determined meaning by itself and 
needed some sort of definition (a caption or label) that could clarify the meaning of the 
message. This argument was later developed by Barthes in his description of the 
“polysemous” value of photographs (Barthes 1964), who argued that photographic 
messages are so symbolically incomplete that they cannot serve to convey a determined 
meaning without a “verbal anchorage” (see Barthes 1993, 37). The Colliers shared the 
same position and argued that “ultimately, the only way we can use the full record of the 
camera is through the projective interpretation by the native” (Collier and Collier 1986, 
108). 
                                                                                                                                             
27 Harper (2002) and Hurworth (2004) offer more recent accounts of the method. 
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Though now almost all researchers agree on the projective values of photographs, there 
are still important disagreements about the mechanisms driving us to attribute meaning 
to the photographs (see Lapenta 2005). The fundamental idea of semioticians, who saw 
meaning as embedded within the sign structure and its relationship to other signs, was 
contested by authors such as Voloshinov (1973), and later on by Burgin (1982), Sekula 
(1982) and Tagg (1988), who saw meaning as “the product of the interaction of the user 
and the sign within a context” (Lapenta 2005, 34). Thus the emphasis is less on the 
semiotic analysis of the image’s ontological characteristics, but rather on the different 
uses and interpretative practices of photographs, which are always socially, and thus 
spatially, situated. “A photograph can mean one thing in one context and something else 
entirely in another” (Tagg 1988, 63). In this sense, Sekula supplements: “The 
photograph is an incomplete utterance, it is a message that depends on some external 
matrix of conditions and presuppositions for its readability” (Sekula 1982, 37). My 
position is that photographs have indeed the projective character, but as ‘aestehtic 
objects’ they also have the medial character (we see with them). All this will be explained 
later in the chapter “Aestehtic space”. 
 
For Becker, visual sociology, documentary photography, and photojournalism are social 
constructions whose meaning arises in the contexts, i.e. different spaces of distinctive 
photographic work: 
 
“(I)f we consider, for example, researchers who want to use photographic 
materials for social science purposes, they often appear confused. The 
pictures visual sociologists make so resemble those made by others, who 
claim to be doing documentary photography or photojournalism, that they 
wonder whether they are doing anything distinctive. They try to clear up 
the confusion by looking for the essential differences, the defining features 
of each of the genres, as if it were just a matter of getting the definitions 
right. Such labels do not refer to Platonic essences whose meaning can be 
discovered by profound thought and analysis, but rather are just what 
people have found it useful to make of them. We can learn what people 
have been able to do using documentary photography of photojournalism 
as a cover, but we cannot find out what the terms really mean. Their 
meaning arises in the organisation they are used in, out of the joint action 
of all the people involved in those organisations, and so varies from time to 
time and from place to place. Just as paintings get their meaning in a world 
of painters, collectors, critics, and curators, so photographs get their 
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meaning from the way the people involved with them understand them, use 
them, and thereby attribute meaning to them” (Becker 2008). 
 
Lapenta concludes that “(a)rt photography, portrait photography, news reportage, 
advertising and fashion illustration, erotic photography, the photography of subcultures, 
geographical survey photography, astronomical photography, physics/ biology/ 
documentary photography, police photography, and photographs for sociological 
research then acquire their meaning on the basis of specific practices of use, or 
institutional discourses, (…) by specific users at a specific time and place (context) for 
certain purposes” (Lapenta 2005, 37-8). Lapenta might not be taking into account the 
specificity of each of domains (for it would mean to negate the specificity of the 
photograph itself), but the important message is that there is not any societal domain 
that should be a priori dismissed as irrelevant for the scientific inquiry. 
 
Contemporary post-semiotic analysis goes beyond interpretation of the photographs 
according to their structural characteristics, and searches for “the realities depicted in the 
photographs (…) that influenced and favoured (in and through the interaction) the 
resolution of the photographs’ ambiguity in a literal interpretation” (Lapenta 2005, 38). 
Or to put it differently, the aim of photo-elicitation is the critical analysis of how and 
why some people use and interpret a photograph or a set of photographs in one way or 
another. The meanings and values of a photograph are considered as socially established 
and spatially interpreted and elaborated. This is precisely the approach I chose for the 
purpose of this study. 
A Punctum as an Analogon 
In his 1979 essay on the semiology of the Eiffel Tower, Roland Barthes discusses how 
monuments create meaning in everyday life. For him the famous Parisian icon is pure 
empty sign which is “ineluctable, because it means everything”, and therefore attracts 
meaning like “a lightning rod attracts thunderbolts” (Barthes 1997, 165-6). Photographs 
too act as signs through which individuals produce their own imaginative spaces. Now I 
do not have to agree with Barthes when he claims that the Eiffel Tower is an empty sign 
for this claim would devoid it from all virtuality. However, his writings helps us 
understand how a photograph might provide an access to some deeper meanings that 
inhabited environment have for each, which in turn can help researchers expose forces 
that structure it. Here it is useful to introduce two well-known concepts of Barthes 
related to photographic image expressed in the Latin words studium and punctum. 
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The studium represents the world of codes and conventionalized context. It includes the 
range of meanings shared by everyone belonging to a certain cultural context (e.g. 
education, formal training, academic and intellectual community). Its meaning can be 
taken without a particular effort, or “thinking”. In the words of Barthes “the studium is 
that very wide field of unconcerned desire, of various interests, of inconsequential taste: I 
like / I don’t like. The studium is of the order of liking, not loving; it mobilises a half 
desire, a demi-volition” (Barthes 1981, 27).  
 
The punctum is the element which rises from the scene and pricks the spectator. It is a 
‘detail’ which changes the reading of a photograph and “give the spectator up”. It is a 
door into the unknown where the deeper meaning of the photograph can be revealed – 
the meaning which is intensely private since the punctum is always a personal addition - 
a pure subjectivity. Once perceived, the punctum has a power of expansion – “while 
remaining a ‘detail’ it fills the whole picture” (Barthes 1981, 45). 
 
Thus a researcher should explore, on one side, what reveals itself as identical in 
multiplicity of different point of views including the social mechanisms that influence 
the construction of an intersubjectivity, and on another, particularities of each single 
individual as such. The two discontinuous elements of a photography, studium and 
punctum, leads to a true purpose of photography, that is “to inform, to represent, to 
surprise, to course, to signify, to provoke desire” (Barthes 1981, 28) and finally to learn 
more about ourselves and the world we make part of. Recognition of subjectivity leads to 
recognition of the Individual as a fundamental spatial actor and recognition of the 
individual actions aside the collective ones.  
Preparing and Conducting Photo-elicitation Interview: Theory as a 
Sampling Device 
The advantages of photo-elicitation are based on the method’s ability to “challenge 
participants, provide nuances, trigger memories, lead to new perspectives and 
explanations, and help to avoid researcher misinterpretation” (Hurworth cited in , 
Margolis and Pauwels 2011, 210). According to Epstein et al. (2006), researchers who 
decide to use photo-elicitation must answer these three basic questions: 
 
1. Who is going to make or select the images to be used in the interviews? 
2. What is the content of the images going to be? 
3. Where are the images going to be used, and how? 
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I will therefore try to answer the questions in the following lines. 
 
1. Image production and selection: The photographs can be existing images or can be 
photographs taken by the researcher or the participants, and opting for one or another 
possibility represents a methodologically significant decision. In recent decades, 
participant-driven photographs have been used in many studies,28 with the purpose of 
reducing “the voyeurism of older models of visual research that allowed ‘us’ to view 
‘them’ or provided us with the knowledge of what ‘they’ do and what they are like” 
(Stanczak 2007, 15). This method is particularly used in ethnographic studies. However, 
both researcher-driven and participant-driven photographs are primarily “can opener[s]” 
(Collier and Collier 1986) for deeper reflection and discussion on the topic. For a 
theory-driven study (as is the case with this study), it seems appropriate to elicit answers 
by using photographs produced or chosen by the researcher himself or herself (Clark-
IbáÑez 2004, 1509), despite the fact that this decision (as any other scientific method) 
comes with certain limitations29 that must be kept in mind. I therefore decided to use the 
photographs taken by myself. 30  
 
2. Content of images: Coming up with questions and choosing photographs is never a 
neutral activity. For this reason, I intentionally applied the same methodological and 
theoretical logic to both the selection of the questions of the classic verbal interview and 
the photographs for the photo-elicited interview. Since the verbal interview was 
presented as a series of questions, starting with more general questions and moving on to 
more specific questions, the photo interview was prepared with the same logic in mind. 
The photographs at the beginning represent five main urban types from a distance that 
gave the viewer a relatively general overview. I then moved down to the neighborhood 
level, the street level and the single-family house level. In this way, I wanted to test the 
hypothesis that different aesthetic properties emerge at different levels of the urban 
                                                      
28 (See Clark-Ibánez 2004; Margolis and Pauwels 2011, 206-10) 
29 Dewey puts it very well: “If all meanings could be adequately expressed by words, the arts of 
painting and music would not exist. There are values and meanings that can be expressed only by 
immediately visible and audible qualities, and to ask what they mean in the sense of something 
that can be put into words is to deny their distinctive existence” (Dewey 2005, 77). 
30 A great majority of researchers rely on photographs taken or chosen by themselves (Lapenta 
2005, 84). According to Epstein et al. (2006), there are several factors that influence researchers’ 
decisions to use their own photographs and these studies shared several characteristics: 
“Researchers who were also professional photographers chose to take the photos” (Collier Jr 2010; 
Harper 1997); researchers who were guided by particular conceptual frameworks also took their 
own photographs, as they were aiming to explore particular concepts (Diamond and Hestenes 
1996; S. J. Foster, Hoge, and Rosch 2012; Weinger 2013); In addition, researchers who 
investigated younger children (3-12 years) usually took the photos (Aschermann, Dannenberg, 
and Schulz 1998; Salmon 2001). Finally, researchers who were exploring particular places (e.g., 
rural home care) took the photos, as the photos served not only to facilitate conversation but also 
as a mapping observation to represent particular features of the area (Magilvy et al. 1992)”. 
  106 
system. Anyone who is confronted with the task of photographing a city or any other 
part of an inhabited environment quickly becomes aware of the great difficulties involved 
in its representation because of the simple fact that there exist a seemingly infinite 
number of motives and viewpoints (which themselves are never stable but change 
according to the time of day, the weather, the season, etc.). Thus, it is indispensable to 
have an idea (that comes from some theory and hypothesis, even if it is provisional) of 
what one wants to photograph and why.  
 
It should be understood that the process behind the production of this thesis was far 
from being a linear sequence of operational steps (question - theory - hypothesis - 
method), but rather, that it was a cycle in which constant comparisons had to be made 
between the initial hypothesis and the actual results on the terrain. My choice of 
photographs was guided with this initial idea: If urbanity, as a combination of density 
and diversity, influences the structuration of urban space, then its effects should be 
present at the physical (and thus visually observable) level. The ideal of plurality (as 
opposed to the ideal of uniformity) that is associated with a high level of urbanity should 
be actualised in a variety of urban and architectural styles that enter into the constitution 
of urban fabrics. In this sense, I attempted to represent both ideals in the photographs 
chosen for this study by exploring the heterogeneity and uniformity of the urban 
environment. However, this task was challenged by the subjectivity of the participants, as 
the later analysis will demonstrate.  
 
All photographs were taken in the Vaud canton, on the Swiss shores of Lake Geneva (fr. 
Lac Léman) during late spring and early summer in 2015. Apart from the common shots 
at the street level, particular topographic conditions of the region allowed me to take 
some photographs from the lake level, offering good visibility of the urban type I was 
trying to represent. I took all photographs, except the first, with a Nikon D300 (12.3-
megapixel semi-professional) camera. Once exported to the computer, the white balance 
and lens distortion were corrected if necessary. The photographs were sequenced in the 
following manner:  
 
- The photo-interview begins with a photograph of St. Saphorin village taken from the 
lake. The village has a population (as of December 2015) of 384. The church with a 
Gallo-Roman villa and part of the Lavaux vineyard terraces (UNESCO World Heritage 
Site), is listed as a Swiss Heritage of National Significance, and the entire village of St. 
Saphorin is part of the Inventory of Swiss Heritage Sites. This allowed the homogeneity 
of the village to be well preserved since any new construction is strictly controlled by the 
authorities. 
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- The 2nd photo represents a high-standing peri-urban zone near Geneva with 
exclusively single-family houses placed in a natural setting. The photograph was taken 
from the lakeshore. 
- The 3rd photograph is taken from an ‘unusual point of view’. It has three planes: there 
are single-family houses in the foreground, a social-housing building with a tower block 
in the middleground, and housing blocks with a stadium in the background. 
- The 4th photograph was taken from the lake. Two different urban types are 
represented: On the left side, there is a dense urban tissue with mainly housing, and on 
the right side, there are three tower housing blocks surrounded by plenty of greenery. 
- The 5th photograph represents the cityscape of Lausanne taken from the lake. Since the 
city of Lausanne is constructed on hilly terrain, the particular topographic conditions 
allow us to see the city in all its variety of urban and architectural styles. The top of the 
hill is dominated by the central regional hospital: the CHUV. 
- The 6th photograph represents a typical wine property from the region of Morges. 
There are three separate family houses as well as the old winery, all surrounded by 
vineyards. 
- On the 7th photograph, participants can see a lower-middle class peri-urban zone with 
semi-detached houses. The estate is situated in a valley near the town of Roche (VD). 
- The 8th photograph represents the north part of the Lutry municipality with a variety 
of housing buildings. Some of them are single family houses, but most are terraced 
houses or high-standing housing blocks with no more than 3 floors. 
- The 9th photograph was taken in the Malley neighborhood in Lausanne, depicting the 
inner-courtyard of social housing blocks and a tower block in the back. The inner-
courtyard was turned into a children’s playground. 
- The 10th photograph was taken in Lausanne in order to contrast urban styles. In the 
foreground, there are two single-family houses surrounded, on the left and on the right, 
by terraced houses. Behind them, a social-housing tower imposes itself on the skyline. 
- The center of Lausanne is represented in the 11th photograph, which was taken from 
the Bessières Bridge. In the center of densely packed urban tissue, we can see the historic 
Rôtillon neighborhood. The scene has almost no greenery. 
- The 12th photograph was taken in a typical middle-class peri-urban zone near Morges. 
The neighborhood is exclusively residential, and each house has a garage and a garden. 
- The 13th photograph was taken at the street level and represents a typical social-
housing block near Morges.  
- The 14th photograph represents a street in Montreux characterized by a striking 
stylistic variety. Indeed, there is a 19th century half-timbered house right next to a 
contemporary concrete building, a 1960s housing building and a belle-epoque residential 
building. 
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- The 15th photograph depicts a typical peri-urban house with its well-maintained lawn. 
The picture is taken from the garden and invites the viewer to project him or herself into 
the life of the owners.  
- The last photograph represents a street in Geneva’s rich bourgeois neighborhood, with 
typical architecture from the end of the 19th century. Some cars are parked along the 
street and the greenery is almost completely absent from the scene. 
 
3. Use of images: The 16 photographs (40 x 26 cm), printed in color on photographic 
paper and assembled in a photo-interview kit, were presented to the participants during 
the interview. The participants were shown a portfolio and were given instructions to 
comment on the photographs and express their aesthetic judgments. They were also 
asked to defend their opnions as to why they judged certain scenes or certain elements of 
the scene in one way or another. The answers were recorded, transcribed and later 
analyzed. 
 
My fear was that the photographs would not evoke deep reflections from the 
participants. The risk was that the researcher-driven photographs would not “break the 
frame” of the participants’ view (Harper 2002, 20) because they reflect the researcher’s 
perspective. Nevertheless, since all participants were born in the Vaud region (or spent 
most of their lives there), familiarity with the environment contributed to the high 
engagement of most of the participants. In addition, some photographs were taken from 
an “unusual angle” which, according to Harper (2002, 20; see also Epstein et al. 2006), 
allowed participants to explore a new view of their social world. 
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Fig. 3 – Photo 1, Lavaux Vineyard Terraces, © Nicolas Guérin, 2007, Retrieved from: 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lavaux_côté_Vevey_1.JPG. 
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Fig. 4 - Photo 2, Lemanic Lake Riviera, 2015, © Mirza Tursić 
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Fig. 5 - Photo 3, Lausanne, 2015, © Mirza Tursić 
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Fig. 6 - Photo 4, Lausanne, 2015, © Mirza Tursić 
  113 
 
Fig. 7 - Photo 5, Lausanne, 2015, © Mirza Tursić 
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Fig. 8 - Photo 6, Morges, 2015, © Mirza Tursić 
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Fig. 9 - Photo 7, Roche, 2015, © Mirza Tursić 
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Fig. 10 - Photo 8, Lutry, 2015, © Mirza Tursić 
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Fig. 11 - Photo 9, Lausanne, 2015, © Mirza Tursić 
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Fig. 12 - Photo 10, Lausanne, 2015, © Mirza Tursić 
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Fig. 13 - Photo 11, Lausanne, 2015, © Mirza Tursić 
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Fig. 14 - Photo 12, Lonay, 2015, © Mirza Tursić 
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Fig. 15 - Photo 13, Morges, 2015, © Mirza Tursić 
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Fig. 16 - Photo 14, Montreux, 2015, © Mirza Tursić 
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Fig. 17 - Photo 15, Denges, 2015, © Mirza Tursić 
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Fig. 18 - Photo 16, Genève, 2015, © Mirza Tursić 
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5 Aesthetic space 
“It is our presence in the world which multiplies relations. 
It is we who set up this relationship between this tree and a 
bit of sky. Thanks to us, that star which has been dead for 
millennia, that quarter moon, and that dark river are 
associated in the unity of a landscape.”  
Jean-Paul Sartre 
It is essential to recognize that human beings’ imaginative capacities allow 
them to surpass the limitations of the actual perceived world. The aesthetic dimension 
directly involves this capacity, that of the human imaginative consciousness. It is 
activated in the realm of the virtual, i.e., the realm of the possible. The virtual (lat. virtus) 
thus refers to a reality that exists only in a latent state (fr. qui n'est qu'en puissance) (Le 
Robert 2016). Since each intentional human experience is spatialized, it is possible to 
investigate the particular spatial structure through which the aesthetic experience occurs. 
I will call this structure aesthetic space. Studies performed in the field of cognitive 
psychology found that phenomenal spaces, such as the visual and auditory spaces of 
humans and other animals, are not Euclidean (Bunge 2006, 246). The aesthetic space is 
also part of this phenomenal space. It is topological in nature and a product of active 
imagination — in other words, it is an imaginative space. As a purely subjective space the 
relations between objects do not necessarily exist independently from the perceiver — 
indeed, in aesthetic space, objects are related solely in the ways that individuals imagine 
they are related. In the following section, I will explore the nature and structure of the 
aesthetic space as a genuine life-space through which the world becomes a pure subjective 
representation. 
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The Production of Aesthetic Space 
The production of space reflects not only the human capacity to connect and separate, 
but also the capacity to surpass the conditions of everyday existence. Koehler’s 
experiments from the early twentieth century showed that a chimpanzee can be trained 
to stand on a box to reach something, but it will not use that box as a seat or for any 
other purpose. In the same way, a tree branch that has become a stick for a monkey, 
ceases to be perceived as a tree branch (see Merleau-Ponty 1963). These examples 
illustrate that primates cannot freely choose which property of an object should be taken 
as relevant in a given situation. In contrast, human beings can see a single thing under 
the plurality of its aspects, meaning that we can freely transform the meaning of the real. 
This capacity of humans to freely choose which aspect of the object should emerge as 
relevant, i.e., our capacity to inhabit not just the actual world, but also possible other 
worlds, is a necessary condition for the emergence of aesthetics as a societal dimension. 
Thus, human existence involves an oscilatting involvement with, and detachment from, 
the world. This capacity of humans to position the world as a synthetic totality (as a 
whole) and to step away from it in one and the same act was observed by a variety of 
philosophers, thinkers and scientists, who expressed their observations in various ways. It 
is precisely what Kant was referring to when he coined the famous term “disinterested 
interest” as being the specificity of aesthetic experience; what Schopenhauer had in mind 
when he spoke of the suspension of Will to Power; and what Vygotsky alluded to when 
he wrote of the capacity to step back from one’s awareness of reality unfolding. The fact 
that there should be some kind of space that allows humans to produce these imagined 
spatialities was suggested by one of the interviewees: 
 
“Je pense que c'est parce que ça crée une sorte d'espace quelque part. C’est une 
question intéressante parce que j'allais dire que ça crée une sorte d'espace virtuel, 
comme ça, ou on s'échappe vers un autre, vers un ailleurs temporel.” - Urs, 42, ville 
(campagne)31   
 
The production of the aesthetic space includes the human capacity to nihilate the actual 
perceived world from a certain point of view. The participants of my study repeatedly 
engaged in this capacity for creating imaginary spaces. Every time I presented to them a 
photograph of an urban environment, they immediately started to examine the scene by 
searching for aesthetic objects or group of objects that would allow them to enter into 
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the virtual space of human imagination. Once such an object was isolated, they actively 
engaged in producing a particular relationship that fused the two apparently distinct 
realms: the actual space of human perception and the virtual space of human 
imagination. Indeed, when individuals observed a city and claimed it to be beautiful, that 
city became an analogon of virtual spatialities, allowing the observer to imagine different 
actions that would happen within the city, i.e., to imagine a lifestyle related to the city. 
The particularity of aesthetic attention, in contrast to practical involvement, is that the 
individual in question creates relations between without really being concerned with 
their actuality. The imagined relations might correspond to actual relations, but this does 
not appear to be of fundamental importance. David and Urs provided us with examples 
of such a situation: 
 
“- Ah [le quartier] est assez incroyable. Avec des anciennes fermes, des anciennes 
maisons. (…) Il n’y a quasiment rien de laid, à mes yeux, à part d'un toit d'eternit 
et quelques cabanes de jardin que je trouve pas très esthétiques. Autrement non. 
C'est très plaisant. Il y la route qui est laide. 
- Qu'est-ce qui est beau ? 
- Ces anciennes fermes. Les maisons autour parce que ce sont des maisons qui me 
plaisent, qui ont deux étages. Il y a une petite maison, un peu plus cossue comme 
ça. On peut imaginer que peut-être qu’il n’y avait pas un fermier qui était là, mais 
peut-être un médecin de l'époque ou un notaire, un avocat. Enfin, quelqu'un qui 
avait un peu plus d'argent que les paysans du coin. Mais ça n'a rien d'un manoir. 
C'est une jolie maison ancienne.” - David, 65, périurbain (ville) 
 
“[Photo 5] C’est un beau village. Je pense que c'est le genre d'architecture qui 
suggère un peu quelque chose de positif parce que, ça ne correspond peut-être à 
rien du tout dans les relations actuelles ou même historiques, j'en sais rien, mais ça 
donne un peu le sentiment de communauté, parce qu'il y a des gens qui se sont 
vraiment rapprochés pour vivre ensemble.” - Urs, 42, ville (campagne)  
 
If aesthetic pleasure comes from a certain understanding of the aesthetic object, this 
implies that every aesthetic experience requires a sort of active participation of the 
observer, in which their imaginative attention enables them to see a certain object in a 
certain way. In the aesthetic mode, individuals exhibit a sort of double intentionality, in 
which they see the aesthetic object from two different angles: the first, which they can 
perceptually be aware of, is built around the knowledge they have of the object’s 
qualities, and the second, borrows meaning from another object. This double 
intentionality, as Scruton argues, shapes our response in such a way that “what is absent 
                                                                                                                                             
31 The names of the interviewees have been changed. Age, actual residential environment, as well 
as childhood residential environment (in brackets) were not modified.  
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and imagined is conjured through what is present and believed” (Scruton 2007, 249). 
Thus, beliefs and imaginings, i.e., the actual and the virtual, co-exist with a common 
focus, informing one another. The order that allows this co-existence is precisely the 
aesthetic space. 
 
A famous study by Gaston Bachelard on the poetics of the house, its interior places and 
its outdoor context serves as a good starting point to illuminate the character of this 
space. Bachelard saw a house as a felicitous space, and his aim was to examine the images 
he loved.32 In order to understand the full depth of such images, Bachelard borrowed the 
following comparison from Carl Jung: “We have to describe and to explain a building, 
the upper story of which was erected in the nineteenth century; the ground floor dates 
from the sixteenth century, and a careful examination of the masonry discloses the fact 
that it was reconstructed from a dwelling-tower of the eleventh century. In the cellar, we 
discover Roman foundation walls, and under the cellar a filled-in cave, in the floor of 
which stone tools are found, and remnants of glacial fauna in the layers below. That 
would be a sort of picture of our mental structure.“ (Bachelard and Jolas 1994 p.xxxii). 
This comparison has limitations since the foundations of the mind are active, and not 
inert as in the case of a building. However, despite these limitations, Bachelard used this 
image to demonstrate how a house can be a tool for the analysis of the human 
subjectivity. He believed that in its “countless alveoli”, a house becomes the abode of a 
human half-dreaming consciousness, i.e., of reverie.33  However, our capacity to actively 
contemplate the inhabited environment goes far beyond the private space:  
 
“- Pour moi la lumière c’est un facteur important. Donc la lumière, ça signifie aussi 
quand même dégagement ! Il faut qu’elle puisse accéder, la lumière. Donc, si c’est 
trop dense, si c’est trop serré, ils sont les uns contre les autres. Bah non… la 
lumière. (…) 
- Et ce dégagé, ça vous crée quoi comme sentiment? 
- De la liberté. Mais j’ai besoin d’une ouverture.  
- De la liberté ?     
- Une ouverture. On peut bien respirer. Je ne me sens pas complètement rabougrie. 
C’est une ouverture, j’ai besoin de ça. Je peux me mettre ici. Je peux regarder les 
nuages. Mais je ne pourrais pas si un bâtiment-là me bouchait tout. (…) Ça me 
donne la possibilité de rêver.” - Martha, 65, ville (campagne) 
 
                                                      
32 Authors like Juhani Pallasmaa, Peter Zumthor or Christopher Alexander specifically wrote 
about this kind of experience. 
33 The word “daydreaming” has connotations of absent-mindedness (or of being pleasantly lost in 
one's thoughts), whereas Bachelard used the word “reverie” in the sense that it involves “active 
imagination”. This is why it may be better to use the term “reverie”, as it appears originally in 
French, rather than “daydreaming”. 
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“[Photo 11] Alors là, ça me plaît bien parce qu'il y a des lieux de rencontre. Ça, 
c'est le Rotillon. Des lieux de rencontre et puis j'aime beaucoup ces vieilles, ces 
anciennes maisons-là. Les balcons autour sur les toits, ça j'aime, je trouve ça très 
beau. En même temps en étant là, en voyant ça, j'entends le bruit de la ville.” - 
Monika, 62, périurbain 
 
It is important to understand that Bachelard’s phenomenological method is neither 
inductive nor deductive and furthermore, it is important to distinguish 
phenomenological aesthetics from philosophical aesthetics (aesthetics from “above”) and 
from empirical aesthetics (aesthetics from “below”). It is the aesthetics from “the inside” 
that “studies structures of conscious experience as experienced from the first-person point 
of view, along with relevant conditions of experience” (Smith, 2016). This kind of 
aesthetics enables researchers to study how human beings experience daily life by 
surpassing the actual material world, and how human beings transform the Euclidian 
three-dimensional space into a lived space made of memories, hopes, and expectations. 
Bachelard is often seen as a nostalgic writer who sometimes wrote uncritically about the 
spaces he himself loved. This is why “The Poetics of Space” should be understood 
primarily as a method: It helps researchers like myself to understand how the aesthetic 
space is constituted as a space of the subject, where “one does not feel anymore towards 
the world, but in the world” (see Cohn and Di Liberti 2012). In the following examples, 
one can see how the interviewees produced aesthetic space from a set of imagined 
relations: 
 
“[Photo 14] Là, il y a un mélange de, j'imagine, d'habitations, de commerces. 
Purement esthétiquement, l'ancien et le moderne ça jure pas, c'est assez bien 
équilibré. Là, j'imaginerais des gens qui habitent peut-être depuis un certain temps, 
et qui connaissent d'autres personnes, enfin. J'imagine une certaine vie sociale. 
Donc peut-être avec un confort de vie plutôt positive.” - Walter, 60, village-
periurbain (campagne) 
 
“[Photo 16] J’aime beaucoup ce genre de bâtiments là, donc, je serais sensible à ce 
genre d'architecture là. Je trouve que c'est plutôt de beaux bâtiments, mais par leur 
ancienneté, par leur côté classique dans le sens (…) Ah, je pense que c'est un 
quartier chic de Genève avec les grosses voitures qu'il y a devant, non, et puis voilà, 
en général, ces quartiers-là sont plutôt avec de magnifiques appartements début du 
siècle, haut plafond, beau parquet et tout ça, moulures, donc ça m'évoque, ça 
m'évoque le chic de la bonne société.” - Laure, 30, ville (ville) 
 
“[Photo 5] J'aime bien parce que ça raconte la ville dans ses mutations. J'ai 
l'impression qu'ici il y a des petites maisons encore qui paraissent complètement 
perdu dans cet ensemble, mais il y a une cohérence. Ça raconte une histoire. Ça 
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raconte une histoire d'une société qui a bougé, d'une réflexion urbanistique qui 
s'est vue confronté à, peut-être une augmentation de la population, et en même 
temps par une augmentation du territoire, donc il faut composer avec ça, et je 
trouve que c'est assez bien réussi.” - Anna, 60, village-périurbain (petite ville) 
 
“Alors, moi j'aime bien la cour, là. Ça veut dire qu'il y a une vie de quartier. La 
terrasse aussi. On peut imaginer que les gens se connaissent, s'interpèlent, se 
rencontrent. Leur appartement il est sûrement fonctionnel, sans plus. Ça manque 
de verdure.” - Monika, 62, périurbain 
 
The aesthetic space comes close to Edward Soja’s influential concept of “thirdspace” in 
which everything comes together: “subjectivity and objectivity, the abstract and the 
concrete, the real and the imagined, the knowable and the unimaginable, the repetitive 
and the differential, structure and agency, mind and body, consciousness and the 
unconscious, the disciplined and the transdisciplinary, everyday life and unending 
history” (Soja 1996, 56-57). 
Aesthetic Space Depends on Both Actuality 
and Virtuality of Aesthetic Object 
Researchers’ understanding of the realm of the aesthetic does not derive from the study 
of various aesthetic objects (including art objects, objets trouvés, landscapes, faces, etc.) 
taken separately from the aesthetic experience of these objects, nor does it derive from 
the study of a priori aesthetic experience of aesthetic objects, which only later become the 
intentional targets of that particular experience or attitude. Instead, the aesthetic 
experience is a process of interaction between the individual and his/her environment, 
characterized by the production of a particular set of relations that are distinctively 
aesthetic. Aesthetic concepts, such as the beautiful or the sublime, emerge as a result of 
that interaction.  
 
Aesthetic objects are not to be understood as devoid of meaning. Since the realm of the 
aesthetic activates the realm of the virtual, i.e., the realm of the possible, existing only in 
a latent state, each aesthetic object already holds the seeds of aesthetic experience.  
 
“Je trouvais déjà l'appartement beau quand il était vide. Mais je savais presque, je 
pressentais que je le trouverais encore plus beau quand il serait habité et, donc pour 
moi, c'est déjà ça aussi. Enfin, je pense qu'il y a en tous cas une dimension aussi de 
la beauté, d'un espace habité, qui tient de ce qu'il nous donne à sentir aussi, sur les 
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gens qui l’habitent ou sur la manière dont ils habitent, sur le fait d'être habité. 
Finalement aussi quelque part, ce qu'il y a de vivant dedans.” - Urs, 42, ville 
(campagne) 
 
While Dewey believed that any aesthetic ideal “absorbs into itself memories of the past 
and anticipations of the future” (2005, 17), in a similar way Sartre considered that 
imaginary objects act a sort of "melange of past impressions and recent knowledge” 
(Sartre and Elkaïm-Sartre 2004, 90). This fusion of the current and the imaginary, i.e., 
the actual and the virtual, was clearly expressed by the interviewees:   
 
 (…) C’est aussi possible qu’au contraire il y ait aussi une dimension plutôt un peu 
rassurante parce que c'est finalement aussi des éléments comme ça qu'on voit 
depuis toujours aussi et puis, qui nous sont très familiers aussi d'un autre côté. Il y 
a peut-être aussi ça, je ne sais pas. Et c'est du coup, c'est une explication presque 
contradictoire je trouve, entre ce qui permet de s'échapper et puis ce qui nous 
recentre plutôt sur du connu puis du familier quoi. Mais peut-être qu'il y a un peu 
des deux aussi. C’est aussi possible.” - Urs, 42, ville (campagne) 
 
“Qu’est-ce qui est laid? Rien. Il n’y a rien qui me paraisse laid ici. Il y a même une 
petite route qui est un peu défoncée là-bas. Enfin, ce n’est pas une belle route toute 
droite, moi qui suis maniaque voilà, mais elle est défoncée par une racine d'un 
arbre, je trouve ça juste magnifique parce que ça me rappelle des vacances au sud de 
la France. Voilà, avec ces cèdres qui prennent, qui déforment le béton.” -  Luisa, 
42, périurbain (petite ville) 
 
“C'est de la magie. Et il y a la piscine. Vous vous croyez au 19e siècle.” - Maria, 59, 
ville (ville) 
 
“Une maison de vacances dans laquelle on a passé toutes nos vacances étant enfant, 
ça ravive des souvenirs et l'endroit, on le trouvera peut-être beau simplement parce 
qu'on y a passé de bons moments.” - Luisa, 42, périurbain (petite ville) 
 
“Je pense que c'est un peu la même idée. Ça va être quelque chose qui va avoir un 
effet répulsif. Après la laideur, c'est peut être plus liée à je ne sais pas, les 
expériences négatives. En fin, c'est peut-être pour ça qu'on va trouver des choses 
moins attractives. Quelque chose qui rappelle à un mauvais souvenir, peut-être on 
va trouver cela laid alors qu'on faite ça rappelle un mauvais souvenir.” - Nina, 25, 
ville (petite ville) 
 
Chantal describes well this fusion of the virtual and actual while visiting her old family 
house: 
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“On est retourné visiter la ferme il y’a vingt ans. Avec mes frères et sœurs, c’est fou, 
on a trouvé les pièces petites. Quand j’étais petite j’ai trouvé ça grand, et puis moi 
en fait ce qui me reste le plus maintenant ce sont les bruits. Les bruits des portes 
qui se fermaient. C’est des anciennes fermetures de portes. Alors c’est un bruit 
particulier que tu n’as plus avec les fermetures de portes actuelles. Tu avais aussi la 
targette pour fermer à clé. D’ailleurs l’autre jour j’étais, on était dans un café là, je 
ne sais pas dans quel village. Je vais aux toilettes, c’était encore ce vieux système de 
fermeture de porte, je me dis: Ah ! C’est le même bruit. Le bruit de différentes 
portes: de la cuisine, de la salle à manger. On avait un endroit, comme on avait pas 
de frigo, on a appelé ça la dépense, là où on dépose les aliments, le lait, parce qu’on 
a des vaches et tout ça, et là aussi c’est un bruit particulier et pour moi, c’est vrai 
que j’ai des images qui me reviennent plus qu’avant, je croîs avec l’âge. Les images 
du passé reviennent plus. Donc je me fais mon petit cinéma des différents endroits, 
de la maison. Des fois, comme si je marche autour de la maison avec une petite 
caméra comme ça et je me remémore tout ce que voyais quand j’étais gamine 
quoi.“ - Chantal, 65, périurbain (campagne)     
 
In his seminal work “Critique of Judgment”, Kant famously isolated disinterested 
pleasure as a distinctively aesthetic attitude by which we take up a certain attitude toward 
objects, separating them from our practical concerns.34 Since then, almost every 
philosopher or thinker who is interested in the aesthetic experience has discussed the 
concept of disinterestedness: Schopenhauer turned disinterestedness “into an affecting 
term, marking a sense of deliberation or release from the strivings of the will”; Bell 
characterized it as an emotion that corresponds to a “release from the everyday life”; and 
Beardsley, in a similar way, characterized it as a “felt freedom from the concerns of 
ordinary living” (see Carroll 2002, 146). One of our interviewees specifically pointed out 
this particular character of the aesthetic experience that liberates us from the weight of 
ethical decisions: 
 
“Je pense que la vraie beauté, ce qu'elle évoque, ce qu'elle suscite chez moi, c'est 
une sorte d'émerveillement, ou d'étonnement. Et puis oui, assez souvent aussi, ça 
me fait sortir un peu de, je ne peux pas dire de moi-même, mais plutôt de ce 
monde très agité des fois, dans lequel on est, ou de cet espèce d'univers très agité 
dans lequel on est, où on pense toujours à ce qui va nous arriver dans le futur, en 
train de planifier.” - Urs, 42, ville (campagne) 
 
                                                      
34 If I follow the Kantian division between the aesthetic and the practical to its end, I find myself 
obliged to agree with Théophile Gautier who proclaimed that “Nothing is really beautiful unless 
it is useless; everything useful is ugly, for it expresses a need, and the needs of man are ignoble and 
disgusting, like his poor weak nature. The most useful place in a house is the lavatory” (Gautier 
1900).?
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Seeing in an imaginative way (particularly when one is involved in deep aesthetic 
engagement) is presented to us as a story, as an imaginative walk — a promenade 
(Schaeffer 2015, 49) that brings us to the spatial and temporal character of aesthetic 
experience. For Jean-Marie Schaeffer, one of the major characteristics of the aesthetic 
experience is its attentional treatment, which is not restricted to any single particular task 
— it does not have any goal that would allow a target of attention to be defined before or 
during the visual exploration. As a consequence, the first symptom of an aesthetic 
experience is the phenomenon of “attentional saturation” (fr. saturation attentionnelle), 
which emerges when an indefinite number of characteristics become relevant. Schaeffer 
gives the following example: In the perceptive mode of a stock exchange diagram, only 
the relative positioning of a line in regard to cartesians coordinates matters, while in the 
aesthetic mode, an indefinite amount of information is potentially relevant. This 
characteristic leads Schaeffer to conclude that in the aesthetic mode, our capacity to treat 
different sources of information in a parallel way (that is, more or less simultaneously, 
rather than serially) is significantly higher than in the perceptive mode. He argues that in 
the aesthetic mode our attention is distributed rather than focalized, which is expressed 
in a receptivity that is generalized and undetermined (Schaeffer 2015, 51-62). Finally, he 
claims that aesthetic attention is characterized by an “openness”, in a sense that it 
welcomes everything that presents itself to it, without exclusivity and without hurrying to 
a conclusion. Anna puts it this way: 
 
“Si j'achète un tableau, il faut que ce tableau me plaise. Et me plaire signifie pour 
moi qu'il m'interpelle, qu'il m'invite à m'arrêter. Ça veux dire qu'il porte des 
éléments qui me conduisent à méditer que je le trouve esthétiquement attirant, par 
sa composition, par le jeu chromatique des couleurs et par l'histoire qu'il me 
raconte et aussi par le travail de l'artiste, donc c'est plusieurs éléments, en fait, qui 
construisent chez moi le beau.” - Anna, 60, périurbain (petite ville) 
 
When an individual looks at an aesthetic object that is presented to his/her perception, 
he/she also imagines it. This is due to our capacity as human beings to produce a single 
experience in two simultaneous ways that do not compete with each other. Richard 
Wollheim argues that images require an attentional “twofoldness”, i.e,  a “simultaneous 
attention to what is seen and to the features of the medium” (Wollheim 1980, 212). 
Thus, images are neither fully transparent nor totally opaque: 
 
“[Photo 15] Non, non, alors pas du tout. (…) Mais, non ce n’est pas beau, ce n’est 
pas une belle maison. C’est standard. Il y a rien d’original là-dedans. Et puis, je 
trouve ça très très laid. Et puis ça suggère quelque chose. Ça voudrait faire 
bourgeois et puis ça marque une certaine réussite sociale quand même. C’est cossu. 
Je dirais que ça pourrait être pour un agent de banque, vous voyez, qui a installé sa 
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famille. Ça sent un peu le côté, on est bien, on est en confort, on a réussi quelque 
chose dans notre vie, on va laisser quelque chose pour les enfants, on a le jardin. 
Puis, ça sent le côté cossu, mais ce n’est pas très osé disons.” - Brigitte, 61, ville 
(campagne) 
 
Although the objects of our everyday experiences are replete with aesthetic character, it 
would be wrong to assume that we are always engaged in the aesthetic experience. The 
interviewees confirmed that one must take a certain attitude to be able to experience the 
world in an aesthetic way.  
 
“C’est vrai que par exemple dans mes habitudes de consommation de biens 
matériels, comme ça, quand j'achète des choses, là franchement, je pense que je ne 
fais pas très attention à l'aspect esthétique. Je ne sais pas. Je sais qu'il y a des gens 
pour qui c'est important de quoi leur ordinateur à l'air. Ça c'est vraiment un truc 
que je ne regarde même pas.” - Urs, ville (campagne) 
 
“Vous pouvez être dans un endroit absolument magnifique et être déprimé, vous ne 
trouverez rien de beau au fond.” - Brigitte, 61, ville (campagne) 
 
The incapacity of engaging in an aesthetic experience is related to the incapacity of 
isolating an analogical representative of the real actual situation. In the aesthetic mode, 
an individual does not search to cognize, but rather to recognize. 
 
Alors, je trouve qu’il y a pas d’âme, quelque part. Je ne sais pas, il y a rien. L’œil 
cherche mais il y a rien, auquel on peut s’accrocher, où on se dit « tiens, il y a ça, ça 
», là il y a quelqu’un qui a mis un peu d’imagination, un peu d’âme, qui est un peu 
sorti du fonctionnel. - Peter, 63, ville (ville) 
 
“[Photo 12] L’image en soi, elle n'a rien de particulier, ce n’est pas quelque chose 
qui m'attire, enfin, je ne trouve pas ça très intéressant parce que c'est qu'un lieu 
d'habitation. Les maisons elles ont rien de particulier, oui, y a quand même des 
couleurs un peu moches. Ça ne me repousse pas, ça ne m'attire pas, c'est une image 
qui m'est assez neutre. Bien qu'en soi les bâtiments ils ne me plaisent pas 
particulièrement. Si je passais devant, je pense que je ne regarderais pas, enfin je ne 
m'arrêterais pas pour regarder.” - Amir, 25, ville (ville) 
 
Any aesthetic experience requires a sort of active participation from the observer, because 
it is one's imaginative attention that enables one to see a certain object in one way or 
another. Scruton argues that the “pleasure of aesthetic experience is inseparable from the 
act of attention to its object; (…) [it] is not so much an effect of its object, as a mode of 
understanding it” (1979, p.112). Researchers cannot therefore consider individuals as 
  135 
mere passive agents, for both the production of aesthetic space and the emergence of 
aesthetic phenomena necessitate the engaged activity of individuals. 
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Fig. 19 - Le portrait, René Magritte, 1935 © 2017, ProLitteris, Zurich 
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The Medial Character of Aesthetic Object 
It is worthwhile to repeat that my understanding of the aesthetic refers to a certain type 
of experience and not to a particular type of object. In this sense, I agree with the 
proposition of Schaeffer to consider an object as aesthetic only when its usage is aesthetic 
(Schaeffer 2015, 44), i.e., when an object plays the role of an analogon in the act of 
production of an aesthetic space. Now the question is: What is the importance of the 
aesthetic object in this imaginative process? In “The World as Will and Idea”, 
Schopenhauer speaks of how an individual engaged in an aesthetic experience gives 
himself or herself completely to the object of aesthetic contemplation. According to him, 
this object has the capacity to fill, in a certain way, an individual’s entire consciousness: 
 
“[He] lets his whole consciousness be filled with the quiet contemplation of 
the natural object actually present, whether a landscape, a tree, a mountain, 
a building, or whatever it may be; inasmuch as he loses himself in this 
object (to use a pregnant German idiom), i.e., forgets even his individuality, 
his will, and only continues to exist as the pure subject, the clear mirror of 
the object, so that it is as if the object alone were there, without any one to 
perceive it, and he can no longer separate the perceiver from the perception, 
but both have become one, because the whole consciousness is filled and 
occupied with one single sensuous picture” (Schopenhauer 1957 [1883]).  
 
For Sartre, there is a strong distinction between the physical thing that belongs to the 
realm of the real and an image that is irreal, i.e., absent or non-existent. According to 
him, when an individual looks at a photograph of a friend, he/she is conscious of the 
friend who is not there, thanks to the actual photograph that is presented to our 
perception. The photography in question presents itself as analogous to that friend. It 
becomes fully transparent, a sort of second thing (fr. trompe-l’oeil) who’s sole purpose is 
to provide an access to the irreal. This rather extreme position of Sartre comes as no 
surprise. His existential philosophy is based on a premise that human existence unfolds 
itself only through action. Since Sartre considered humans as living only in the realm of 
the real (which he equated with the actual), he rejected the old Aristotelian doctrine of 
potential and actual reality. His philosophy is based on a study of concrete human beings 
acting in actual situations (he therefore rejected any possibility of a general definition of 
human beings). Since researchers can only study a person through his or her real 
actualized actions, there can be no partway between the real and irreal. He considered 
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beauty as “a value that can only ever be applied to the imaginary”, leading him to 
conclude that “the real is never beautiful” (Sartre and Elkaïm-Sartre 2004, 193). 
Consequently, this position opens up an abyss between ethics and aesthetics, leaving no 
possibility of understanding how one could possibly influence other. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, who spent much of his career criticizing and reformulating many of 
Sartre's dualist positions, argued that humans also live in the imaginary, meaning that 
the imaginary cannot be completely excluded from the real. Although he did not live 
long enough to develop a philosophy of the imaginary solid enough to stand on its own, 
he made a substantial contribution to our understanding of the image, which he 
described as appearing simultaneously quasi-present and imminently visible. According 
to Merleau-Ponty, “the image is somehow both present and absent, real and unreal, and 
visible and invisible at the same time” in a way that “presence and absence, reality and 
unreality, and visibility and invisibility inherently participate with or are implied in one 
another” (Perri 2013). In his unfinished work “The Visible and the Invisible”, he argues 
that “the invisible is not the contradictory of the visible: the visible itself has an inner 
framework [membrure], and the in-visible is the secret counterpart of the visible, it 
appears only within it.” (1968, 215) 
 
Aiming to capture this ambiguous nature of the image, Merleau-Ponty argued that “the 
image has a quasi-presence and partakes in a degree of reality” (Perri 2013). While 
distinguishing an image from a mere sign, he expressed his position in a lecture that he 
gave on French national radio in 1948: 
 
“Is the painting not comparable to the arrows in stations that have no other 
function than to point us towards the exit or the platform? […] If this were 
the case, then the goal of the painting would be to be a trompe-l’oeil and 
the meaning [signification] of the painting would be entirely beyond the 
canvas in the objects it signifies, in its subject. Yet, it is precisely against this 
conception that all valuable painting has come into being.” (cited in Perri 
2013) 
 
According to Merleau-Ponty, Sartre does not pay sufficient attention to the specificity 
and existence of the objects that make the material support of the image. As Perri argues, 
“Merleau-Ponty aims to formulate a new definition of images that, on the one hand, 
does justice to its quasi-present and quasi-real character without reducing it to a thing 
and that, on the other hand, does justice to its quasi-absent and quasi-irreal character 
without reducing it to a nothing” (Perri 2013). In order to give proper emphasis to the 
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actual object an individual can perceive with his/her senses, I will consider that 
individuals imagine according to aesthetic objects rather than despite them.  
 
In the famous passage of “The Book of Tea”, Kakuto Okakura describes a simple 
situation in the Japanese tea ceremony that is highly aesthetic precisely because what is 
perceived and sensed constantly conjures up what is imagined and absent. It is precisely 
because the participants of the ceremony focus on the here and now that they are able to 
detach from the actual world and enter the imaginary: 
 
“(…) quiet reigns with nothing to break the silence save the note of the 
boiling water in the iron kettle. The kettle sings well, for pieces of iron are 
so arranged in the bottom as to produce a peculiar melody in which one 
may hear the echoes of a cataract muffled by clouds, of a distant sea 
breaking among the rocks, a rainstorm sweeping through a bamboo forest, 
or of the soughing of pines on some faraway hill.” 
 
The aesthetic object is not simply a neutral analogical representative of the imaginary 
object that constitutes spaces of human imagination. “[A]n image does not emerge 
despite its material support, but thanks to it” (Alloa 2011, 186). “Rather than seeing it, 
[we] see according to or with it” (Merleau-Ponty, cited in Alloa 2011). This seeing-with, 
as Alloa recently argued, means that we as researchers have to take into account our 
resistance to the total transparency of the image asserted by the philosophy of Sartre. “It 
is because we cannot eliminate the picture’s materiality that we have to see it along its 
own lines” (2011, 188). He then reminds us that Husserl, “who spends much effort 
describing processes of seeing-in, which he also calls ‘perceptive imagination’ (perzeptive 
Imagination), has to admit that we cannot have the appearing image object without the 
medial support which, rather than being a purely neutral projective surface, sometimes 
‘excites’ (erregt) an image which the spectator hadn’t imagined himself beforehand” 
(2011, 188).  
 
“Voilà un lieu où j'aimerais vivre ! De la vigne, de la verdure, des champs. Oui, une 
belle ferme. Oui c'est le genre d'endroit que j'aime beaucoup. Puis la transition de 
couleurs, le bleu, le vert, des endroits calmes. Il y a de l'espace, il y a de l'espace, de 
la verdure, ça, ça me plait. (…) Moi j'imagine une grande famille qui vit ici, les 
grands-parents, les enfants, les petits-enfants. Oui, je vois une belle vie familiale, 
enfin voilà.” - Luisa, 42, périurbain (petite ville) 
 
“Forcément, une maison comme ça, (…), c'est quelque chose de génial. Une 
maison comme ça, vous imaginez tout de suite avoir une grande famille, un super 
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jardin. Mais en même temps, ça signifie ne pas vivre en ville, donc, voilà.” - 
Sabrina, 35, ville (ville) 
 
“Alors là, je pense que, ben c'est typique un quartier de villas de la région. C’est 
assez joli, il n’y a pas de bâtiment qui fait tache à côté des autres. On voit que celui-
ci est beaucoup plus moderne, mais il a respecté aussi. Voilà, c'est aussi un toit, 
c'est pas forcément un toit plat, ils ont respecté là, ils ont refait aussi, ils ont aussi 
respecté le toit. Je pense qu'ils pouvaient pas non plus faire ce qu'ils voulaient, 
j'imagine, mais c'est assez harmonieux, ça a l'air très tranquille. J’aime bien, j'aime 
bien. Pourquoi ? Je me verrai peut être vivre là, oui.” - Daniela, 43, périurbain 
(banlieue) 
 
Societal objects are pregnant with the aesthetic, and each inhabitant, as Laurent Matthey 
writes, is a poet in a practical manner (“poète à l’état pratique”) (Matthey 2008). The 
following examples further illustrate the medial, rather than projective, character of 
aesthetic objects: 
 
“Il y a un film de Disney qui raconte l'histoire d'un homme qui habite une toute 
petite maison, qui est devenu veuf. C'est à New York et puis on lui demande de 
partir de là parce qu'il faut construire une maison et lui il s'arrange pour construire 
toute une structure de ballons gonflables en dessous de sa maison et puis un jour il 
lâche les ballons et la maison se soulève comme ça. Et puis il s'en va se poser 
ailleurs. Je ne sais pas si c'est un film de studio Pixar. Je ne sais pas si vous l'avez vu, 
mais j'ai l'impression que c'est la maison du vieux monsieur qui ne lâchera pas 
devant un promoteur des mobiliers et quand il sera obligé il ne permettra pas que 
sa maison soit rasée. Mais ça, c'est juste une petite fantaisie en voyant cette image.” 
- Anna, 60, village-périurbain (petite ville) 
 
“Alors on ne voit que les balcons donc, on ne voit pas qu'il y a des êtres humains là-
dedans. C’est fermé, on ne voit pas leurs fenêtres, on ne voit que les balcons. 
Comme ça eux ils sont tranquilles, d'accord, puis ils ont leur vue puis ça les abrite 
du bruit, ça doit être l'idéal, mais si vous me posez la question de regarder ça depuis 
là, et bien je trouve ces espèces de trucs, ces balcons, moches. Ça, c'est vraiment 
comme si les gens voulaient se cacher et c'est chacun pour soi.” - Barbara, 65, 
périurbain (périurbain) 
 
“- Ben voilà, ça, c'est un bâtiment relativement ancien, ça doit être beau, enfin ça 
doit me plaire à l'intérieur, ça doit avoir un certain charme. 
- Donc c'est plutôt l'intérieur que vous voyez en regardant l'extérieur ? 
- Ah bah oui ! (rire) Je l'imagine, oui. C'est vrai.” - Monika, 62, périurbain. 
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“[Photo 15] Jolie maison. Bon ça, ça me rappelle un peu les lieux où on vit nous. 
Voilà. Un beau palmier, moi ça j'adore. Ça, ça me rappelle les vacances. Encore les 
souvenirs.” - Luisa, 42, périurbain (petite ville) 
 
Georges Didi-Huberman, French philosopher and art historian, has been continually 
stressing the active role of aesthetic objects (he is primarily focused on the objects of art) 
in the way we see those objects. In the work which explores American minimalist 
sculpture of the sixties and seventies entitled “Ce que nous voyons, ce qui nous regarde” 
(1992), he speaks of “the unavoidable scission of seeing”, meaning that the act of seeing 
is not simply a one way road. The objects that we see, turn back looking at us. According 
to Didi-Huberman, this “paradox of vision” is something that we cannot fight - the act 
of seeing unfolds in the “space-between”. 
 
It is with (aesthetic) objects that images can be produced, and this, in turn, “enable[s] us 
to see what remains otherwise inaccessible, latent or unseen” (Alloa 2011, 186). Each 
aesthetic ideal is both an object of aesthetic interest and a technique for experiencing the 
world in a particular imaginative manner. It is important to underline that since the 
interviewees were presented with a photograph of an urban scene, and did not directly 
experience it, their perceptions were mediated not only by the urban scene in question 
but by the photograph as well. In this sense, one might speak of a double transparency of 
the photograph. Amir expresses this clearly:   
 
“[Photo 15] Autant l'image qui ne me plait pas, autant je la trouve ennuyeuse en 
soi, autant je m'ennuie à m'imaginer habiter ici. Les deux.” 
 
Each aesthetic object “excites” us to produce a certain image (a certain relation) that is 
already (virtually) present in the object itself. However, precisely which virtuality will be 
activated depends on the observer’s imaginative capacities: 
 
“- Vous pensez qu'un HLM de 20 étages n'est pas vivant ? 
- Ce n’est pas ça, c'est l'image qu'il reflète qui n’est pas vivante pour moi, qui est 
moins vivante. Parce que justement c'est tellement grand, que même, vous avez des 
petits balcons, des trucs comme ça, y a des gens ils mettent des plantes des trucs 
comme ça, tout de suite ça donne autre chose. (…) Pour moi, ça, pour moi ce n’est 
pas vivant. C'est un immeuble posé là et puis, bien sûr que ça a une âme, y a des 
gens qui habitent, y a des choses, mais pour moi c'est plus impersonnel, que pour 
moi ça, ça reflète déjà plus un vécu, une vie, quelque chose.” - Sara, 48, ville 
(campagne) 
 
“Si on montre la photo comme ça, justement je dirais que les trois tours elles font, 
elles détonnent avec le reste, elles font un peu tache. Mais, ensuite si je me mets 
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moi dans la perspective d'un résident potentiel, je me dis que si j'ai un appartement 
en haut, ça doit être pas mal quoi. On retrouve un peu l'idée, comme je disais au 
début, dans les autres questions, que c'est différent si tu, si tu vois un quartier ou 
des photos de l'extérieur ou de la perspective de celui qui habite.” - Lucas, 29, ville 
(ville) 
 
What further distinguishes Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy from the philosophy of Sartre, is 
his insistence on the body as the medium of consciousness. In “Phenomenology of 
Perception”, he argues that even simple sensations, like the sensation of a uniform patch 
of color, are never separated from the other senses or from the situation or movement of 
one’s own body. Based on Goldstein’s experiments on the effect of color stimuli on 
muscle tension, he concludes that even the perception of red or green colors involve 
different bodily behaviours and movements. Human beings have a body that is a 
changing and moving environment itself, and it interacts with other natural or artificial 
environments. This interaction with other environments, in turn, defines the limits of 
our capacities. Therefore, it is because of our body that we as humans are conscious of 
various human and non-human actions, whether these actions are in the realm of the 
actual or the virtual. If our body is the reason that we can participate in the perpetual 
process of the production of space, then a body must (re)appear in a pivotal position 
within a theory whose aim is to understand and explain the nature of the aesthetic 
experience. However, a body is not to be understood as a mere sensorial apparatus upon 
which the outside world is imprinted like a photograph, but as a movement that 
produces meanings. The knowing subject and the world appear at one and the same 
time, as the French word connaissance would unintentionally suggest (see Bullington 
2013, 23-24). It is precisely in this moment, when a particular relation between a subject 
and an object is built, that beauty itself emerges.  
 
“Je pense que c'est quelque chose qui est à la fois donné mais que la plupart on est 
aussi en train de découvrir tout au long de notre vie et puis je pense que c'est 
quelque chose qui vient à notre rencontre et puis ou on va à la rencontre de ça 
aussi.” - Urs, 42, ville (campagne) 
 
What the Heidegger’s concept of "being-in-the-world" and Merleau-Ponty’s 
understanding of “ex-istence” teach us is that humans are not the only source of 
meaning. As Hubert T. Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Dreyfus write in their introduction to 
the 1964 English collection of Merleu-Ponty’s texts, “meanings are not given to 
experience but received from it” (Merleau-Ponty 1964 p.xi). Meanings are never ready-
made. They therefore stress the importance of human experience from within the world 
which always appears fundamental to any meaningful production of space, including the 
aesthetic space.  
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Emergence of Beauty and Aesthetic Emotions 
Beauty has intrigued humanity for several thousand years at least, and it is one of the 
oldest philosophical problems. Indeed, according to Hesiod, at the marriage of Cadmus 
and Harmony in Thebes, the Muses sang the following refrain: “Only that which is 
beautiful is loved; That which is not beautiful is not loved.” (Eco 2010, 37) As Plato 
demonstrated in Hippias, it is a paradoxical, elusive and complex notion. There are many 
fundamental questions involved with the notion, but before I tackle some of these, I 
must first ask if beauty is still a relevant topic today, since some scholars seem to find no 
problem in dismissing the concept of beauty as something that belongs to the eighteen 
century debate. I argue that the concept of beauty, along with other aesthetic concepts, is 
as important now as it was in the time of Hesiod, simply because beauty has never ceased 
to be a constitutive element of human existence. Barbara puts it this way: 
 
“C’est primordial. La beauté fait partie de la qualité de vie. Mais ça peut être de la 
beauté toute simple, des fleurs qu'on met devant chez soi, voilà, mais c'est 
primordial. Il y a un lien avec le sens de la vie, avec le spirituel, eh bien oui, la 
beauté c'est essentiel.” - Barbara, 65, périurbain (périurbain) 
 
Ruth Lorand observes that recently the concept of beauty has somehow fallen out of the 
fashion (Lorand 2007). This may be due the fact that contemporary professional 
discourse has limited the concept of beauty to beautiful things, and colors and sounds 
only. If researchers pay close attention to what ordinary people have to say, we can learn 
that everyday discourses are closer to the Greek concept of beauty, which was extended, 
as Tatarkiewicz argues (1972), to “beautiful thought and customs” as well. It seems like 
the ideas, social conducts, or even the “solutions to all kinds of problems are often 
described as beautiful” (Lorand 2007), and the interviewees clearly confirm this finding: 
 
“- Pour moi, alors si on parle de personnes, je pourrais me dire que c’est une 
personne laide à premier abord. Mais, alors à ce niveau-là, ce n’est pas la laideur 
pour moi. Après, c’est la beauté intérieure qui me touchera le plus. Donc j’arrive à 
dépasser peut-être ce qu’au premier abord j’aurais dit laideur. Mais pour moi un 
être humain, il n’est pas absolument laid. Il est... la valeur intérieure a une grande 
valeur.  
- Donc (…) il y a la beauté intérieure et la beauté extérieure ?  
- Ah ! Ça de toute façon.  
- Et qu’est-ce que ça veut dire la beauté intérieure ?  
- C’est la grandeur du cœur. C’est l’approche de la vie. C’est l’approche aux 
personnes. C’est la flamme de vie.” - Martha, 65, ville (campagne) 
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“Je pense, la verdure, c'est un élément beau qui est important, oui. Aussi, le fait 
qu'il y ait peu de trafic. Pour moi ça renforce. L'architecture est pas mal aussi. C'est 
vrai quand il n'y a pas d'immeubles trop élevés, je pense maximum 5 étages, peut-
être... Quand il y a pas mal de familles aussi et c'est vrai que quand il y a des 
enfants qui traversent le quartier et qui jouent, ça c'est un élément qui me semble 
beau aussi. Ça apporte de la vie, disons. Je pense que c'est à peu près ces éléments-
là.” - Martin, 22, ville (ville) 
 
Beauty emerges from social figurations (the word figuration, in the sense of Elias,?? is 
taken to be a network of interdependencies). Beauty is not determined by any general 
law, nor can it be reduced to the sum of the aesthetic values that belong to various parts 
of the aesthetic object. It is possible to say that at each level, at each scale, a different kind 
of beauty can emerge. A collection of beautiful houses does not necessarily make a 
beautiful residential area. Martin and Thomas state this clearly: 
 
“Il y a peut-être des meubles qui sont beaux en soi, mais en les combinant, ça ne va 
pas donner quelque chose de beau.” - Martin, 22, ville 
 
“Si tu prends une maison hors du contexte, je la trouve beaucoup moins jolie. C'est 
surtout le contexte. Le village semble surtout plus joli qu'une seule maison.” - 
Thomas, 25, ville (campagne) 
 
This is true for an urban environment as it is true for poetry. The beauty of a poem does 
not emerge from the beauty of the plot or characters within it. Rather, beauty emerges 
from the relation between the subject experiencing beauty, and the actuality and 
virtuality of a given aesthetic object. It is the space that makes beauty emerge. Since it 
integrates sensual (material) and conceptual (ideal) elements, an aesthetic space allows us 
to derive new meanings, “new interpretations” (Lorand 2007), of the elements that 
constitute it.?? In this sense, that we might speak of aesthetic learning through which we 
expand the realm of possible. Beauty is a subjective expansion of the virtuality of 
aesthetic object.  
 
Like the concept of space, the concept of beauty is always adjectival. Beauty is always the 
beauty of something. One can speak of picturesque beauty precisely because there is a 
picturesque space, or mathematical beauty because there is mathematical space. In this 
work, I primarily focused on the urban space, and therefore my aim was to shed some 
                                                      
35 See the section “Studying Subjectivity: A Spatial and Historical Analysis of Aesthetic 
Judgment.” 
36 It seems that a similar position is offered by Lorand in her work “Aesthetic Order: A 
Philosophy of Order, Beauty and Art” (2002). 
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light on the beauty (or ugliness) of inhabited environments. Although many individuals 
may share similar aesthetic sensibilities, this does not mean that there could ever been a 
beauty, as a property of an object, which is independent of the observer. Urs states this 
quite clearly: 
 
“Ce n’est pas parce qu'il y a une sorte de consensus que c'est objectif. Je pense que 
la beauté, pour moi, comme moi je la conçois, ça peut être que quelque chose de 
foncièrement subjectif, parce que c'est quelque chose de foncièrement relationnel 
en fait. Donc, il y a forcément un sujet au bout de cette relation. Ce n’est pas… 
Pour moi une beauté objective, ça n'a aucun sens. Cette espèce de... même si tout 
le monde serait d'accord, ça ne changera rien pour moi.” - Urs, 42, ville 
(campagne) 
 
It is equally important to understand that beauty is never given as an absolute value. 
Beauty is often only a seed waiting to be taken in and expanded by a person’s imaginative 
consciousness. Sometimes, someone says: “Look what a beautiful building!”, and they 
move on, without actually getting deeply engaged in aesthetic experience. At other times, 
beauty can strike to the point where one totally surrenders to the aesthetic object. In this 
particular moment, the aesthetic object has the capacity of inhabiting a person’s entire 
consciousness, precisely as Schopenhauer described it. This happens in moments of deep, 
or “thick” aesthetic experience, which is always accompanied by strong aesthetic 
emotions. 
 
“Je suis partie une année aux États-Unis, puis j'étais dans le Nebraska où tout est 
plat. Et quand je suis rentrée chez moi, j'habitais près de Nyon et que j'ai vu cela, 
c'est là que j'ai pleuré, parce que tellement que j'ai trouvé beau.” - Barbara, 65, 
périurbain (périurbain) 
 
“J’aime toujours aller au pied du Jura parce que je suis née là-bas, dans ce côté-là. 
Et puis j’aime la vue depuis le pied du Jura contre ici, et sur le lac et les Alpes 
comme ça. C’est vrai que chez moi, ça crée une émotion. Donc c’est vrai que je 
pense que la beauté d’un paysage peut effectivement être augmentée, enfin, on peut 
la percevoir plus fortement quand on a un lien affectif, positif avec ce lieu-là. C’est 
vrai qu’il y a des endroits où, je ne sais pas, quand on a été en Chine où c’était 
beau, mais pour moi, ça me donne pas la même émotion qu’en regardant quelque 
chose ici, qui est peut être presque insignifiant, enfin qui est un paysage d’ici, mais 
moi je le trouve presque beau ou quoi, parce que je suis attachée justement. Je 
n’aurai pas pensé tiens, avant que tu me poses la question. Mais en réfléchissant, 
oui c’est vrai.” - Chantal, 65, périurbain (campagne) 
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“Je pense que ce qui est beau, c'est au moment où ça provoque un sentiment chez 
la personne qui regarde, peu importe, ce que c'est.” - Daniela, 43, périurbain 
(banlieue) 
 
“Ce n'est pas un endroit qui est beau, mais c'est plus le sentiment que j'ai par 
rapport à cet espace qui va rendre cet endroit beau.” - Nina, 25, ville (campagne) 
 
“- Qu'est-ce que la beauté pour vous ? 
- C’est un sentiment. Bon, c'est lié à l'esthétique. Pour moi c'est lié à un sentiment 
esthétique. C'est difficile à exprimer.” - David, 65, périurbain (ville) 
 
“Quand vous êtes dans un endroit où vous avez l’impression que c’est un endroit 
beau, c’est que vous êtes en paix, je crois.” - Peter, 63, ville (ville) 
 
“Je trouve que les gens deviennent beaux quand on les aime.” - Maria, 59, ville 
(ville). 
 
The aesthetic dimension thus plays a fundamental role in the well-being of inhabitants: 
 
“[La beauté] change complètement l’humeur dans laquelle on est. La vision même 
de la journée si on est entourée de choses qui sont de notre choix esthétique. (…) 
Ça fait partie du bien-être. (…) On peut se sentir mal, jusqu’à être agressé, au 
maximum.” - Elisabeth, 64, périurbain (périurbain) 
 
“- Est-ce que vous pensez que notre expérience d’un lieu de résidence change par 
rapport à si on le trouve beau ou laid ?     
- Ah, je pense que oui. 
- Et de quelle manière dans ce cas-là ?  
- Et bah ! Déjà dans une tranquillité d’un lever au matin, dans un apaisement 
comme un habitat. Pour moi, c’est un endroit très privé. Là où on est en contact 
avec soi-même le plus. Et je pense que si on se lève le matin, et qu’on se dit : « oh ! 
quel horrible trou ! », ou bien « quel horrible bâtiment ! », c’est une agression dès le 
matin. Tandis que, si vous avez un endroit où vous vous sentez bien et 
extérieurement bien, vous commencez bien votre journée.” - Brigitte, 61, ville 
(campagne) 
 
“[La beauté] change complètement l’humeur dans laquelle on est. La vision même 
de la journée si on est entouré de choses qui sont, de notre choix, esthétique. (…) 
Ça fait partie du bien-être. (…) On peut se sentir mal, jusqu’à être agressé, au 
maximum.” - Elisabeth, 64, périurbain (périurbain) 
 
“Je pense que si on se lève le matin, et qu’on se dit : « Oh ! Quel horrible trou ! », 
ou bien « Quel horrible bâtiment ! », c’est une agression dès le matin. Tandis que, 
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si vous avez un endroit où vous vous sentez bien et extérieurement bien, vous 
commencez bien votre journée.” - Brigitte, 61, ville (campagne) 
 
“- J’ai habité dans un immeuble très très moche. Ça me déprimait. Bon, c'est 
compliqué parce que le studio était aussi extrêmement moche, mais ça me 
déprimait de rentrer chez moi, je n'avais pas envie de rester chez moi. Le weekend, 
je sortais beaucoup plus où j'essayais d'aller ailleurs, tandis que maintenant, j'ai un 
appartement que je trouve beau, j'aime ce que je vois quand j'ouvre et je suis plus 
chez moi, je suis contente de rentrer chez moi. Ça me rend plus ... j'ai plus le 
sentiment de cocon, de que c'est chez moi en fait. J’accepte mieux que là c'est chez 
moi, alors que dans un immeuble moche, j'ai plus de peine à m’y sentir bien.” - 
Sabrina, 35, ville (ville) 
?
Beauty emerges from relations, which in turn, can be boiled down to actions. Indeed, 
like space, beauty is produced with movement. Whenever someone engages in an 
aesthetic experience, beauty always emerges from a movement, whether it is a virtual or 
actual movement. Even when someone quietly contemplates a landscape, they are always 
actively involved, projecting themselves outwards, not passively accepting whatever 
comes to their senses. As a matter of fact, it isn’t possible to do otherwise. It is the human 
condition. Jean-Marie Guyau argued that architecture is an art of introducing 
mouvement in the inert things; to built, is to animate (1906). People always find signs of 
life to be aesthetic, for life is a promise of movement, of actions: 
 
“Alors, moi j'aime bien la cour, là. Ça veut dire qu'il y a une vie de quartier. La 
terrasse aussi. On peut imaginer que les gens se connaissent, s'interpellent, se 
rencontrent.” - Monika, 62, périurbain 
 
“On sait bien qu'un tableau n'est jamais la saisie de la réalité, mais une construction 
de la réalité et en même temps dans la manière de faire cette construction de la 
réalité il y a une lumière, il y a des ombres, il y a un équilibre de ces différents 
éléments qui donne quelque chose de vivant et qui vient toucher 
émotionnellement.” - Walter, 60, village-périurbain (campagne) 
 
“[Photo 9] Ça c’est aussi une architecture que, moi, je trouve assez peu humaine en 
fait, pour moi, une fois de plus. (…) Bien, je pense que c'est aussi ça, en partie dans 
ce type d'immeuble qui suscite des associations négatives, je pense que c'est le côté 
aussi très, ou c'est très standardisé comme ça, chacun vit dans un environnement 
qui est un peu le même. Et puis là en fait moi ce qui, quelque part, ce qui me 
touche par exemple dans ce genre de trucs là, c'est de voir qu’on a quand même 
essayé de mettre des arbres et puis une place de jeux. C’est un peu ce genre de trucs 
là, finalement. (…) Mais je pense que finalement c'est un peu les seuls, surtout 
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dans quelque chose comme ça, qui est un peu, c'est un peu le désert de béton. On 
cherche finalement un peu les traces de vie, quoi.” - Urs, 42, ville (campagne) 
 
“- [Photo 2] Ce n’est pas un endroit qui m’intéresse, ce n’est pas où j’aimerais 
habiter.  
- Pourquoi ?  
- Parce que ça, je me rends compte que ce n’est pas un village. C’est un endroit, 
c’est simplement des maisons, on est là, il y a un petit peu de tout, il y a des 
anciennes. Il y a des toutes nouvelles. Pour moi, il y a pas de vie. Il y a de la 
verdure. Eux, ils ont le dégagé. Mais il y a pas de vie. 
- Ce que vous entendez par « vie »?  
- Là, je pourrais m’imaginer que c’est chacun pour soi quoi.” - Martha, 65, ville 
(campagne) 
 
“Le paysage en terrasse c'est, pour moi, c'est aussi un peu quelque chose comme ça, 
c'est-à-dire où on a… oui, c'est une espèce d'efforts comme ça de l'être humain 
pour s'approprier la nature que je trouve… en tous cas, ça me touche. Oui, un peu 
dans tous les paysages d'ailleurs, pas que dans les vignes quoi. (…) Même un 
chantier, pour moi, c'est quelque chose qui est aussi un signe de vie.” - Urs, 42, 
ville (campagne) 
 
 “- « Voir le lac », cela veut dire quoi en fait ? 
- Ah ! Pour moi c’est une source de vie. C’est vraiment lié à la base de la vie. Oui 
c’est l’espèce de liberté qu’on voit dedans, je crois. Tandis que quand on a quelque 
chose devant, on se sent plus fermé. Oui c’est vraiment l’espace, quoi. C’est pour ça 
que je dis, même un espace de verdure me fait le même effet. Ce côté libre qu’on a 
plus vraiment, et par le travail, et par la vie qu’on a maintenant, quoi. On est 
toujours avec des horaires. On est obligés de faire un tas de choses.” - Emilia, 57, 
ville (bord de ville) 
 
One could say that aesthetic qualities are not to be taken as properties of the 
environment per se, nor merely as the properties of a person reacting to the environment. 
The same action can be perceived as ugly or beautiful, depending on the perceiver’s 
entire outlook on the world. Inhabitants always see their (immediate) environment in 
relation to themselves, as an objective part of their style of spatiality, in which their 
humanity may be either rebutted or confirmed. Beauty is objective insofar as the 
relations that make it emerge are objective. Beauty is also subjective, because at the core 
of each aesthetic relation there is an imaginative subject offering his individuality to the 
world. Hence, I argue that aesthetic properties are properties that emerge from the 
interaction (relation) between individuals and their environments, in a process in which 
they constitute themselves as subjects, and in which each individual has an idea of what 
society should be like and what it should look like. 
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The Aesthetic Dimension as a Component of 
Spatiality 
Aesthetics is a matter of both a projective subject and a lived body. The body has a 
fundamental role in creating meaning in the world for human beings. In this sense, a 
systematic study of the aesthetic dimension cannot ignore the body, since it structures 
people’s situations and experiences within the world. With his concept “flesh of the 
world”, Merleau-Ponty “meant to describe the event where perception and meaning are 
born, not as a relationship between a constituting subject and a constituting object 
(traditional phenomenology), but as an intertwining or ensemble of being” (Bullington 
2013, 23). He intended to loosen up the classical subject-object dichotomy and 
investigate a foggy area between the subject and object in which embodied human beings 
experience the world. He puts it this way: 
 
“The sensible gives back to me what I lent to it, but this is only what I took 
from it in the first place. As I contemplate the blue of the sky I am not set 
over against it as an acosmic subject; I do not possess it in thought, or 
spread out towards it some idea of blue such as might reveal the secret of it, 
I abandon myself to it and plunge into this mystery, it 'thinks itself within 
me', I am the sky itself as it is drawn together and unified, and as it begins 
to exist for itself; my consciousness is saturated with this limitless blue. But, 
it may be retorted, the sky is not mind and there is surely no sense in saying 
that it exists for itself.” (Merleau-Ponty 1962) 
 
The world that objectively strikes a person’s senses needs therefore to be subjectively 
interpreted by a sensing subject. As in the famous example of the Gestalt psychology, a 
person cannot simultaneously see the vase and the two faces. They appear one at a time, 
meaning that the emergence of one or the other meaning depends on the subjectivity of a 
perceiver. At the same time, the drawing, which is on paper and carries both meanings 
simultaneously, “invites” the subject to see both the vase and the two faces. It offers itself 
to the perceiver’s subjectivity. 
 
As researchers, “if we disregard the subject-object dichotomy and focus upon the realm 
of the ‘in-between’, we will discover a lived unity that we could call a mind–body unity 
always present to the world, in one way or another. The ‘world’, again, should be 
understood as the dialogue between the embodied human being and the presentation of 
something which beckons to us as an invitation to understand.” (Bullington 2013, 25) 
This unity of the mind and body is what Merleau-Ponty calls “the lived body”, which is 
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both material and self-conscious. Since we are projective beings, our lived body is always 
oriented outside itself towards the world and engaged in a constant dialogue with the 
otherness that makes the world. As J. Bullington reminds us, “this intertwined mind–
body-presence is always embedded in a concrete situation. There is no world (as 
perceived) without a human to experience it, and there is no human experience that is 
not of the world. Thus, we cannot discuss the body as if it were something cut off from 
both mind and world.” (Bullington 2013, 25) 
 
Objects do not simply act on our body to produce sensations, and our consciousness 
does not simply flash a light on the objects of the external world. If we are to bypass the 
Cartesian mind-body dualism, the realm of subjectivity has to be expanded to something 
more than just a (floating) human consciousness. Merleau-Ponty approached the 
problem of intentionality by postulating that the human body is always actively engaged 
in the constitution of meaning. He argued that every real or imaginary situation must be 
anticipated in the movements of the body. In a working note published in “The Visible 
and the Invisible”, Merleau-Ponty writes: “The perceived world (like the painting) is the 
ensemble of my body’s routes.” (1968, 247). Whether someone is “looking at the actual 
Montagne Sainte Victoire or at one of Cézanne’s paintings of the same mountain, in 
both cases, what is seen, according to Merleau-Ponty, must be virtually prefigured or 
anticipated in the movements and possible actions of the living body. (…) Thus, the 
image is not simply an absence that is not observable for itself since it reflects the 
capabilities, movements, and anticipations of the body that make all perception 
possible.” (Perri 2013) It is a person’s “knowing” body that acts as a base upon which 
one can construct the other dimensions of existence, including the aesthetic dimension.  
 
Each aesthetic quality of the world includes a specific attitude suggested by the body 
itself that acts as synchronizer of the perceiver and the perceived world. The world 
affords itself in all its virtuality at the same time as the embodied subject produces 
meanings according to its interests, beliefs and fears. The real thus offers an almost 
inexhaustible number of connections between the objects that constitute it, but the final 
act of synthesis must be accomplished by the subject itself. This is why George Simmel 
remarks that “something is continuously being born from us” (2007, 74). By analyzing 
the discourse of inhabitants, I came to the conclusion that the meanings they derived by 
engaging themselves in the aesthetic experience appear as virtualities from the point of 
view of human action. It is as if the participants projected themselves into a virtual space 
and formed their judgements by contemplating virtual relations that the actual space 
could support: 
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“Je fais toujours du skate et j'ai commencé le skate vers 14 ans, et puis le skate… 
disons que le terrain de jeu, c'est la rue, donc c'est un environnement qui doit être 
très minéral. (…) Et puis c'est sûr, quand on va faire du skate et qu'on voit des 
bâtiments qui se construisent, avec des surfaces de béton assez grandes, des 
éléments peut-être inclinés, où on sait qu'on peut faire des figures de skate dessus, 
et bien ça, je trouve ça beau. Parce que justement je vois tout un potentiel de 
figures, potentiel de jeu, finalement.” - Martin, 22, ville (ville) 
 
“[Photo 2] Ça me plait moins parce que j'ai l'impression que c'est un peu moins 
vivant. Et puis ce que j'aime bien sur l'autre [photo 1], qu’il y a quand même un 
peu, ce côté tout le monde habite plus ou moins au même endroit, qu’il y ait plus 
facilement de la vie qu'ici où tout le monde est un peu éparpillé. Sans que ça soit 
forcément isolé. Les maisons elles sont un peu trop, je ne sais pas, un peu trop chic 
je dirais. (…) Moi je m'imagine moi-même et je sens que ça ne me conviendrait 
pas. 
- Tu t'es imaginé toi-même dedans et c'est comme ça que tu as fabriqué ton 
jugement ? 
- Oui.” - Amir, 25, ville (ville) 
 
“Vu comme ça, il faudrait se projeter dans l’autre sens justement. En fait, être à 
l’intérieur et voir le lac, c’est ça qui fait toute la différence.” - Emilia, 57, ville (bord 
de ville) 
 
“[Photo 16] Cette longue allée tranquille, on sent que c'est calme et tout ça. 
Comme je vous dis, le seul truc c'est que j'aurais encore planté quelques arbres, 
dans le meilleur des mondes. (…) Moi je trouve que c'est harmonieux. Même là, 
on se projette dans cette rue, on a envie d'aller au bout de la rue pour voir, qu'est-
ce qu'il y a à gauche, qu'est-ce qu'il y a à droite. Voilà.” - Sara, 48, ville (campagne) 
 
“[Photo 6] C’est superbe ça. Bon, là ces maisons n’ont probablement aucune valeur 
architecturale. Elles sont assez quelconques, mais là on a envie d'aller y habiter. On 
se dit que ces gens ils s'installent dans leur jardin là. On imagine les moments de 
convivialité très sympathiques. Ils font sécher leur linge dehors au grand air. Ces 
maisons sont de dates très différentes les unes des autres. On imagine une vie 
familiale. Plusieurs générations. Ça donne envie.” - Elisabeth, 64, périurbain 
(périurbain) 
 
If aesthetics is a matter of producing lived space through a lived body, this lived body is 
not to be understood as a mere objective materiality. Rather we should think of it as a 
subjective mind-body presence that carries in itself a sort of pre-reflected “operative 
intentionality”, as Merleau-Ponty calls it. The body itself possesses knowledge that is a 
pre-condition for the capacity to meaningfully project oneself into the virtualities of 
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aesthetic space. When people project themselves, they do not reflect on their virtual 
body. They do not calculate how they would have to move their body through the 
virtual space. The knowledge of the virtual body is as immediate and intuitive as the 
knowledge of the actual material body inhabiting the actual material world. 
 
“[Photo 2] C’est joli ça. Ça c'est beau. (…) C’est un endroit qui personnellement 
me ferait assez rêver. Si j'étais très riche, je me verrais bien dans cette maison, ou 
dans celle-là, cette vieille maison de maître.” - Sabrina, 35, ville (ville) 
 
“[Photo 9] J’aurais quand même de la peine à dire que c'est beau cet endroit. Je ne 
sais pas si c'est le style des immeubles ou, peut-être le fait qu'il y ait de petites 
fenêtres aussi, là il n’y a pas trop de balcons, c'est peut-être le côté nord, je ne sais 
pas, pas trop de balcons non plus. J’ai l'impression que ce n’est pas des endroits où 
j'aimerais vraiment vivre. En tous cas les immeubles roses là. (…) Quand je les vois, 
j'ai l'impression que dedans ça ne doit pas être des appartements très jolis aussi. 
Parce que les fenêtres sont petites, il n’y a peut-être pas beaucoup de lumière. J’ai 
l'impression qu'il y a aussi beaucoup de petits appartements, peut-être aussi. Et 
puis, par contre peut-être la tour qui est plus haute, ça a l'air différent, je ne sais 
pas. Mais je ne dirais pas qu'elle est belle non plus. Ça c'est vrai que, en tous cas 
aussi, la terrasse qui est devant, si je devais, je ne sais pas moi, inviter des gens pour 
aller boire un verre, ou je ne sais pas, si je voulais séduire une fille, ou je ne sais pas, 
demander ma copine en mariage comme ça, j'irais pas sur cette terrasse parce que je 
trouve pas que c'est un environnement que je trouverais beau.” - Lucas, 29, ville 
(ville) 
 
“Mais comment la photo [13] est prise, je pourrais me projeter, parce qu’on voit 
qu’il y a de l’espace entre les immeubles. On imagine qu’il y a quand même de la 
verdure un peu partout.” - Emilia, 57, ville (campagne) 
 
“[T]he imaginary is not an absolute inobservable” (Merleau-Ponty and Lefort 1968) 
since an image “reflects the capabilities, movements, and anticipations of the body that 
make all perception possible. That is, when we look at images, understood in the 
Merleau-Pontian sense, we are not confronted with a ghostlike presence that intrinsically 
refers to something that is absent or nonexistent. Rather, when we look at images, we can 
learn to see the one true world in a new way.” (Perri 2013). This is why Merleau-Ponty 
was against Sartre’s theory that imagination is a consciousness that does not “teach” us 
anything new. On the contrary, an image can surprise or disappoint us. On several 
occasions, our participants were surprised by their own aesthetic judgements, and this 
made them shed a new light on the external world: 
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“- [Photo 2] Les immeubles sont magnifiques, les architectures sont belles. Je 
trouve ça, ça c’est du moderne. Ça n’ a pas beaucoup d’intérêt. C’est vrai qu’il y a 
vingt ans, ils prenaient du temps à construire les bâtiments. Ils mettaient de la 
matière. Puis ça durait longtemps. Mais bon, il y a toujours ce lac devant. Ça me 
touche moins que l’autre, l’autre a plus de chose naturelle, comme la vigne. Elle a 
été implantée par des gens, mais ça fait plus un côté sauvage que ça, qui est déjà 
canalisé par les constructions. Pourtant là c’est un bord, carrément, un bord de lac. 
Donc pour les balades c’est génial. Il n’y a pas de route. Donc, je pourrais vivre là. 
Mais étonnamment j’aime mieux l’autre.     
- Et pourquoi vous dites « étonnamment » ?  
- Parce que je me surprends de mon choix. Ça me surprend. Là il y a le côté très 
verdure, justement les choses que j’aime beaucoup. Mais, pour moi, il y a un côté... 
C’est justement mes deux faces qui sont en contradiction, c’est un côté où je me 
sentirais plus isolée, et pourtant j’ai cette face très isolée, mais j’ai aussi besoin du 
monde. Là, je me sentirais plus isolée. J’ai l’impression que j’aurais plus de peine à 
me faire des connaissances dans un lieu comme ça que dans un lieu comme celui 
d’avant. Alors que l’architecture est plus belle là.” - Anellisse, 57, ville (campagne) 
 
“C’est rigolo, parce que c'est tout ce que je n’aime pas et puis en même temps 
l'image en elle-même n’est pas si déplaisante parce qu'on peut avoir l'imaginaire de 
boire un verre sur une terrasse, qui m'attire, je ne sais pas” - Christine, 40, 
périurbain (banlieue) 
 
“[Photo 5] C’est Lausanne. C’est familier. En fin. C'est un peu ce que je vois, ce 
que je connais. Bon je ne sais pas. Est-ce que, par exemple, je me verrais y vivre ? 
Oui, mais c'est marron, car c'est la description de ce que je n'aime pas” - Nina, ville 
(campagne) 
 
People can learn a lot about themselves by analyzing their aesthetic judgments. When 
someone claims that something is beautiful, it is as if they are saying “look this is me, this 
is how I see the world when I am not under the burden of everyday ethical decisions”. In 
moments of aesthetic engagement (which can last a few seconds or an entire hour), 
individuals give themselves up to the imaginative experience. The result of this 
experience might come as a surprise to them. It can even show them that they are slightly 
different from what they thought they were. The peculiar character of aesthetic space is 
that it allows an individual at the same time to express what they really are, and to be 
stranger in their own sensing body, strangers to their own words. This is why individuals’ 
aesthetic sensibilities should be a matter of a societal debate, contrary to the old latin 
saying that tastes should not be discussed (de gustibus non est disputandum). Personal 
subjectivity should be put forward, not suppressed: not in the sense of forcing it upon 
others, but in order to shed new light on what the world, and the inhabited space, can 
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mean to each one of us. Maybe it will reveal that we do not understand something, or 
that we based our judgment on contradictory premises, which in turn may lead us to 
rethink and reevaluate other judgments we might have. When someone is engaged in an 
aesthetic experience, they exhibit a particular kind of knowledge that is auto-reflexive and 
subject-centred. Aesthetic knowledge alters the sensibility of humankind by enlarging 
human awareness with new ways of understanding the world.  
 
“- La laideur, elle est interpellante puisqu’elle fait prendre conscience de ce qui est 
plus beau encore. Et la laideur pour moi c’est agressant. (…) Dans un bâtiment, ça 
m’interpellera plus, le côté laideur. Tandis que la beauté me prendra dans 
l’émotion, dans la vibration. Je ferais partie d’un tout beaucoup plus grand quand il 
y a la beauté. Quand il y a laideur, je suis en question.” 
- Quand vous dites « je suis en question », qu’est-ce que ça veut dire ?  
- Sur deux plans probablement, en me disant : « mais pourquoi moi je trouve ça 
tellement affreux ? Qu’est-ce que je ne comprends pas peut-être ? Pourquoi on a 
fait une chose comme ça ? Et pourquoi je trouve ça affreux ? Est-ce que c’est parce 
que ça ne me rend pas joyeuse ? Est-ce que c’est parce que je ne comprends pas ? 
Est-ce que je trouve ça simplement, finalement inesthétique et que ça sort trop du 
contexte ? » ou peut-être par manque de culture ? Mais étant donné moi qui aime 
que ça me touche, que les gens me touchent. Alors il y a quelque chose qui ne me 
touche pas. Je me dis « attend pourquoi ça ne me touche pas ? » Et puis après, je me 
dis « non, peut-être je ne suis pas prête à ça, et peut-être qu’il faut qu’on 
m’apprenne à voir différemment ou percevoir différemment. » (…) Mais puisqu’on 
définit clairement des concepts, oui, pour résumer, la beauté me touche et la 
laideur m’interpelle.” - Brigitte, 61, ville (campagne) 
 
In the aesthetic state of mind, individuals exhibit freedom from normal practical 
concerns, which paves the way to the importation of thoughts, feelings, and experiences 
about objects other than the one being looked at. In “The Aesthetics of Architecture” 
(1979), Scruton bounced off this thought in order to explore the role of imagination in 
the experience of architecture. He argues that the “experience of architecture - because it 
reflects an underlying act of imaginative attention - belongs to the active and not passive 
part of mind. It is, in a certain sense, free; it can therefore express the full burden of our 
intellectual conceptions, can be altered and amended through argument, can impose 
unity and order on its object when the literal mind would see nothing but disjointedness 
or chaos” (Scruton, Scruton, and Sparshott 1979, 103). He then concludes that “changes 
in taste are continuous with, and indeed inseparable from, changes in one’s whole 
outlook on the world, and that taste is as much a part of one’s rational nature as are 
scientific judgements, social conventions and moral ideals” (Scruton, Scruton, and 
Sparshott 1979, 106).  
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However, if the aesthetic is completely free from the ethical, how can the aesthetic 
dimension ever inform a person’s actions? Each and every one of the participants in the 
study claimed that aesthetics play a significant role in their decision-making processes. 
For some of them, aesthetic criteria even happens to be a fundamental criteria when they 
are faced with choosing one life story over another, or when they chose to live in one 
urban environment rather than another. This means that the relation between practical 
reason and aesthetic understanding cannot be easily bypassed. 
 
“Pour moi, quelque chose qui est vraiment laid, c’est quelque chose dans le 
ressentiment d’une mauvaise action, plus que dans l’aspect physique ou 
représentatif, en fin de l’image quoi.” - Chantal, 56, périurbain (campagne) 
 
“La laideur ? J'ai plus de peine de parler de la laideur. Pour moi la laideur, c’est 
plutôt les choses, genres des guerres ou gens qui profitent, qui abusent des faibles, 
pour moi c’est ça la laideur. Ce n’est pas physique, c’est moral. La laideur. (…) 
Pour moi, quelque chose qui est vraiment laid, c’est quelque chose dans le 
ressentiment d’une mauvaise action, plus que dans l’aspect physique ou 
représentatif.” - Chantal, 56, périurbain (campagne) 
The Aesthetic Character of Existence 
Views differ on whether ethics and aesthetics always inevitably overlap, whether one is 
more important than the other, and whether they can be separated from one another. 
Since the topic is almost inexhaustible, I will discuss only a small part of the broad issue 
of ethics and aesthetics by focusing mainly on choices concerning the inhabited urban 
environment. The traditional aesthetic inquiry that still dominates the discipline of 
aesthetics primarily analyzes the aesthetic experience of the spectator, who derives 
aesthetic pleasure or displeasure from the contemplation of an object (in most cases, an 
object of art). The spectator is usually observed as being liberated from any action, and is 
considered as being almost immobile and highly passive. In this sense, the realm of the 
ethical and the realm of the aesthetic are studied separately, ethics being concerned with 
human actions, and aesthetics with a sort of disinterested contemplation. If I consider 
more deeply the significance of this way of looking at things, aesthetics becomes a sort of 
second rate thing that could easily be ignored, while ethics becomes something that 
cannot be avoided simply because it affects our lives even when we choose to ignore it 
(because of the fact that the choice to ignore it is itself an ethical choice).??  
                                                      
37 Diana Collinson gave the overview of another well-known contrast between the two realms: 
“Ethical judgements are said to be made by reference to general rules and principles, whereas 
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Some scholars interested in everyday aesthetics are making important efforts to 
reintroduce the aesthetic dimension into our understanding of the everyday practical 
engagement with the world (Saito 2015). However, I believe that not enough has been 
done to explain how the aesthetic dimension influences our practical concerns, such as 
choosing a car over a bicycle, taking a train rather than a plane, hanging laundry 
outdoors or living in an apartment on the ground floor rather than in a rooftop loft. 
Nevertheless, our interviewees show little doubt when they claim that aesthetics plays an 
important role in their practical decisions in life, whether these are of minor or major 
importance:        
 
“Esthétiquement je suis dans un endroit magnifique pour moi et j'irai habiter nulle 
part d'autre.” - Victoria, 59, périurbain (périurbain) 
 
“S’il y’a quelque chose qui est laid, je ne vais pas le choisir, quel que soit le domaine 
justement.” - Mériel, 65, périurbain (bord de ville) 
 
“Il y aurait matière à remplir les heures! Pour moi l’esthétique est une chose 
importante, pour tout: le choix des endroits où je vais, des voyages que je fais, des 
habits que je choisis.” - Peter, 63, ville (ville) 
 
Thus, aesthetics is not only a matter of passively contemplating an aesthetic object, 
neither is it only a matter of carrying out a disinterested discourse about a space. Rather, 
the aesthetic dimension is part of a spatialized practical action. The aesthetic dimension 
changes the nature of a space because it changes the way an individual understands the 
object that makes a space. Since our existence as human beings involves both an 
alternating involvement with, and detachment from, the society, we escape in the realm 
of aesthetic only to realize that even the world of our imagination is based on our actual 
lived experience, which we relentlessly try to overcome. On the other hand, our practical 
day-to-day decisions are highly informed by this subjective imaginative world, which 
elicits some of our strongest emotions and guides us while we navigate narrow streets, 
wide beaches or dark forests. Although ethics seems to be the base upon which we form 
our aesthetic judgements, aesthetics constantly challenges the ethical categories. It simply 
does not allow them to firm up. Aesthetics continually gives rise to something new, 
something that can surprises us, and therefore, it creates a new set of meanings within 
our existing area of societal representations. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
aesthetic judgements are made by reference to the particular features of what is judged. In an 
ethical matter we act towards some end, whereas in an aesthetic matter, we experience something 
for its own sake.” (Collinson 1985) 
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To understand how precisely ethics interweaves with aesthetics, I will take a closer look 
at the real aspect of the virtual. As Slavoy Zizek (2004) understands it, the reality of the 
virtual represents the “efficacity, effectiveness, real effects produced and generated by 
something which does not yet fully exist, which is not yet fully actual”. In this sense, the 
possibility of something does not simply precede its existence. Rather, the virtual is an 
aspect of the real precisely because the real, as Henri Bergson argues, is never fully 
realized (2012, 73-87). Zizek gives an example of an authoritarian father: In order to be 
experienced as actual and effective authority, paternal authority has to remain virtual, in 
the sense that it is a threat. A father who truly has authority only has to look at his 
children and they obey. If he loses his nerve and starts shouting and exhibiting force, his 
authority loses strength. Beauty operates in a similar manner. A beautiful city is the city 
through which one can imagine beautiful spatialities, and if it becomes actualized, can 
lead to disappointment. This phenomenon is known to the Japanese as the Paris 
syndrome. It manifests as the inability to reconcile an imbalance between the popular 
image of Paris and the reality of Paris. The Japanese often imagine Paris as a city of 
beauty, culture and romance. However, they soon find out that Paris is not what they 
had imagined it to be.?? In this sense, some part of beauty must always partly remain 
virtual in order to be ‘operative’.  
 
It is this fusion of the ethical and the aesthetic that often leads us towards a choice. The 
point I want to put forward is that when individuals make an aesthetic choice, the realm 
of the ethical and the realm of the aesthetic merge. Beliefs and imaginings, i.e., the actual 
and the virtual, co-exist with a common focus, informing one another. The structure that 
allows this co-existence is precisely the aesthetic space, which in turn interacts with other 
                                                      
38 This is not a phenomenon reserved uniquely to Japanese people visiting European cities. In 
“The Confessions”, Jean-Jacques Rousseau describes his first impressions of the French capital: 
“How greatly did the entrance into Paris belie the idea I had formed of it! (...) I had imagined to 
myself a city of most imposing aspect, as beautiful as it was large, where nothing was to be seen 
but splendid streets, and palaces of gold and marble. Entering by the suburb of St Marceau, I saw 
nothing but dirty and stinking little streets, ugly black houses, a general air of slovenliness and 
poverty, beggars, carters, and menders of old clothes, criers of decoctions and old hats. All this, 
from outset, struck me so forcibly, that all the real magnificence I have seen in Paris has been 
unable to destroy this first impression, and I have always retained a secret dislike against residence 
in this capital. I may say that the whole time, during which I afterwards lived there, was employed 
solely in trying to find means to enable me to live away from it. Such is the fruit of a too lively 
imagination, which exaggerates beyond human exaggeration, and is always ready to see more than 
it has been told to expect. I had heard Paris so much praised, that I had represented it to myself as 
the ancient Babylon, where, if I had ever visited it, I should, perhaps, have founded it so much to 
take off from the picture which I had drawn of it. (…) the same thing always happen to me, when 
I see anything which has been too loudly announced; for it is impossible for men, and difficult for 
Nature herself, to surpass the exuberance of my imagination” (Rousseau 1996, 154).?
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human spaces through different forms of interspatialities.?? This is why the aesthetic 
dimension always nourishes and informs our actions and processes of decision-making. It 
is precisely because the aesthetic also concerns the actual that the aesthetic can influence 
the ethical, contrary to Sartre’s claim that beauty, as a value, can never be applied to the 
real actual object (Sartre and Elkaïm-Sartre 2004, 193). When dealing with an object, 
when making a decision, people are not only dealing with the actual present situation, 
but also with the virtual image of that given situation. This beauty has a reality itself, in 
the sense that it nonetheless structures the way people act in the world. Thomas, who is a 
student and has experienced some difficulties in finding an apartment in the city of 
Lausanne, describes the interaction of the aesthetic and the practical:  
 
“Je pense quand tu visites un appartement et déjà quand tu arrives, et tu n'as 
encore pas vu l'appartement, mais déjà la maison ou le lieu qui entoure, ça te fait 
déjà une grande influence, sur ton choix. Tu n'as pas vu l'appartement, déjà tu fais 
le choix. Ah oui ça me plait, ça ne me plait pas. Entre guillemets, c'est beau, ce 
n’est pas beau. Ça, c'est vrai, dans l'appartement même. Il y a une grande 
importance, pas forcement d'efficacité, mais de question de conception du lieu, si 
ça était bien concipé ou pas. Et après, je pense aussi de la beauté. (…) Parce que 
même si c'est totalement bien concipé mais chaque jour tu entres dans la maison et 
tu te dis que ça te plait pas, tu te sens pas forcement à l'aise. En même temps, si 
c'est super joli tu te dis chaque jour que la vue est jolie ou c'est beau, mais que, 
genre, si ce n’est pas bien concipé, genre, la cuisine est à un endroit ou ça ne vas pas 
du tout, ça ne va pas non plus, je pense. Je pense finalement quand même, on a 
plus tendance à tomber vers le: ah c'est beau, c'est pas parfaitement bien concipé 
mais bon, ça nous plait quand même. Je pense c'est plus probable d'aller dans ce 
choix-là que dans l'autre. C'est vrai.” - Thomas, 25, ville (campagne) 
 
Aesthetic values “have a kind of authority in practical reasoning that no mere preference 
can acquire. Not only is one called upon to justify with reasons when necessary, one 
must also learn to see and understand the world in terms of them. A value, unlike a mere 
preference, expresses itself in language such as that used by Alberti: it pursues what is 
right, fitting, appropriate and just. (…) A value is characterized not by its strength but by 
its depth, by the extent to which it brings order to experience.” (Scruton 1979, 32) 
Claudia and Daniela describe how aesthetics can sometimes precede the practical: 
 
“Typiquement, en termes de logement, je ne me verrais pas habiter dans une 
maison que je ne trouve pas jolie et dans laquelle je ne me sens pas bien, ou ça c’est 
un autre nuance, mais c’est vrai que l’esthétique compte. (…) Mais évidemment il 
                                                      
39 Jacques Lévy isolates three types of interspatiality: interface, nesting and cospatiality (Lévy 
2014, 49). 
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y a le facteur argent qui compte aussi, on est d’accord. Mais l’argent… Enfin, le 
côté beau c’est sûr que je vais d’abord regarder ce qui me plaît et puis après on 
regarde si c’est possible ou pas.” - Claudia, 34, périurbain (petite ville) 
 
“À mon avis, c'est primordial [l’esthétique]. Par rapport à l'acquisition d'une 
maison, d'un appartement. (…) On ne va pas aller habiter dans un endroit où on 
se dit, quand on regarde le bâtiment, on se dit "bof". Ce n'est pas mon truc? Par 
contre il est peut-être situé juste à l'endroit où... voilà, proche des transports 
publics, proche de l'autoroute, etc., et si pour moi la maison d'habitat général ne 
me plaît pas, il ne faut juste pas insister, cela ne sert à rien. Moi je crois au coup de 
coeur quand on est dans l'acquisition d'un habitat donc il faut que... oui, oui il faut 
que l'esthétique me plaise.” - Daniela, 43, périurbain (banlieue) 
 
The more humans individualize themselves, the more they want to subjectivize their 
environment. Nicole described some difficulties of living in an environment that was 
aesthetically unpleasant for her, which in turn led her to move away: 
 
“Ici, je suis locataire. Avant de venir ici, je devais quitter la maison où j'étais parce 
qu'on s'est séparé avec mon mari, et j'ai été visiter des appartements, des 
appartements, des appartements et je me suis retrouvée dans un appartement avec 
la vue sur le bâtiment voisin ou sur une décharge ou sur, oui, une usine, je me suis 
dit: je ne peux pas. Parce que pour moi c'est très important. Donc, quand je suis 
arrivée dans cet appartement ici, j’ai dit, bon, ce n’est pas tout à fait la beauté que je 
préfère, mais c'est joli, et puis je peux faire quelque chose où je me sente bien. Puis 
la vue est extraordinaire et tout ça, puis je me suis dit, ben voilà c'est là.” - Barbara, 
65, périurbain (périurbain) 
 
Luisa even considers that beauty holds the promise of happiness: 
 
“- Je n'aurais pas envie de rentrer chez moi si l'endroit ne me plaisait pas. Je 
n'aurais pas envie d'y vivre. J’aurais juste envie de fuir. Voilà. Il faut que je me sente 
bien dans l'endroit. Quand on avait acheté cette maison, on en avait visité pas mal. 
On rentre dans une maison, alors justement, que ce soit l'obscurité, que ce soit des 
murs bas, que ce soit des couleurs ou simplement l'architecture intérieure, on se 
sent tout de suite bien ou on se sent pas bien. On est arrivé dans cette maison, on 
s'est tout de suite sentis bien. Donc, visuellement, je trouve que c'est très très 
important. Il faut se sentir à l'aise dans l'endroit. Il y a des endroits où on n’a pas 
envie d'être. 
- Pour vous, se sentir à l'aise, ça veut dire quoi? 
- Un sentiment de bien-être. C’est quelque chose d'interne. On se sent heureux 
dans un endroit et malheureux dans un autre, enfin. Ce n’est peut-être pas à ce 
point-là mais c'est un sentiment de bien-être oui. De joie. Moi quand je suis entrée 
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ici, je me sentais euphorique, je me sentais chez moi, je me sentais bien. J’avais 
envie d’y rester. (…) Pour moi, [la beauté] est d'une importance capitale.” - Luisa, 
42, périurbain (petite ville) 
 
Naturally, it would be wrong to assume that the aesthetic dimension informs all of our 
decisions — indeed, people are capable of dissociating the two realms: 
 
“- Est-ce que tu dissocies le bien et le beau? 
- Oui, je pense que j'arrive à dissocier. (…) C’est légitime d'avoir des choses 
comme ça, parce que ça répond à un besoin, ce qui n'empêche que ce n'est pas 
beau. Voilà.” - Christine, 40, périurbain (banlieue) 
 
It is also important to point out that beauty does not necessarily lead to action. A person 
might find a thing beautiful and express a total lack of interest in it, in terms of actual 
involvement with it: 
 
“[Photo 16] Là je connais aussi ça. C'est sur Genève. Ça ressemble à une rue à 
Lausanne mais c'est Genève. Alors oui, c'est ces styles anciens, voilà, je pense, les 
hauts plafonds à l'intérieur, les parquets qui craquent, c'est esthétique voilà. Oui 
c'est esthétique, c'est joli, je ne pense pas que j'aimerai habiter là, mais c'est, voilà, 
c'est par rapport à Montreux, là c'est harmonieux pour moi. C’est de beaux 
bâtiments, c'est, la vue, c'est dégagé mais je n’y habiterai pas parce que ça ne 
correspond pas du tout à mon style, mais c'est joli.” - Daniela, 43, périurbain 
(banlieue) 
 
“J’adore les villes, je pense que je suis quand même une citadine. Si on me dit: “va 
habiter dans la campagne”, pour moi, ce n’est quand même pas mon truc. Je pense 
que je suis citadine dans l'âme, mais les villes restent belles à visiter pour moi, pas 
forcément à y vivre. (…) Oui je n’ai jamais vécu au centre-ville, d'une ville, jamais. 
Même si j'étais une fois, j'ai vécu quatre ans du côté de Vevey-Montreux, je n’étais 
pas à Vevey-Montreux. J’étais un petit peu en dessus. Même si j'ai vécu à Sydney, 
puis je vivais à l'extérieur, pas, même pas au centre-ville, j'adorais y aller. J’adore 
aller au centre-ville, me balader, shopping...etc. mais je ne me vois pas y habiter.” - 
Daniela, périurbain (banlieue) 
 
When a person is focusing on an object and an element of the scene provokes anegative 
aesthetic judgment, they find themselves in front of an aesthetic dilemma. The dilemma 
means “that we are divided between two conflicting ways of dealing with something that 
we initially do not aesthetically enjoy: one is to change the world such that the object of 
aesthetic displeasure is eliminated; the other is to educate people to change their aesthetic 
sensibilities such that the object, although itself unchanged, can be experienced as 
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aesthetically pleasing” (Carlson, 1976, p.69). Walter spoke of this dilemma in the 
following manner: 
 
“Soit je vais intervenir sur l'objet pour retrouver cette harmonie que j'ai, ou bien je 
vais me débrouiller pour aller vivre ailleurs. Transitoirement je peux accepter, mais 
je ne vais pas m'attacher. Maintenant je peux aussi m'attacher à un endroit et le 
quitter. (...) Attachement cela ne veut pas dire les pieds coulés dans le béton. Ça ne 
veut pas dire une absence de mobilité.” - Walter, 60, village-périurbain (campagne) 
 
Other individuals described similar situations: 
 
“Alors je me suis toujours interrogée est-ce que c'était plus important d'avoir des 
voisins qui ont une plus belle maison que soi-même ? Il vaut peut-être mieux avoir 
la vue sur quelque chose de beau que d'être dans quelque chose de beau qu'on peut 
pas voir.” - Christine, 40, périurbain (banlieue)  
 
“On peut changer l'esthétique. (…) Je ne resterais pas dans un endroit qui pourrait 
me plaire, mais dont l'esthétique n'est pas à mon goût (…) je changerais 
l'esthétique. Des meubles, des fleurs à droite à gauche, ou de la lumière, ou un 
coup de peinture, enfin quelque chose. Je ne resterais pas dans un endroit qui ne 
me plait pas. Ça ne m'est jamais arrivé.” - Luisa, 42, périurbain (petite ville) 
 
“On peut trouver beau parce qu’on y rajoutera de soi. (…) Cet appartement, il ne 
me plaisait pas donc, je n’étais pas bien. Mais je l'ai rendu beau, enfin, l'intérieur, 
pour finir, je m’y suis sentie bien le temps que j’y étais, parce que je me suis dit ben 
voilà c'est pour un laps de temps, il faut que je me mette et puis, je me suis fait, je 
me suis créé un cocon avec des choses que j'aimais. Donc oui, je l'ai rendu beau. 
Mais ça n'a pas empêché que l'endroit, le tour du cocon n’était pas beau, était laid. 
(…) Mais je pense qu'il y a des moments où on ne peut pas dépasser. Le laid, il est 
laid. On y rajoute des petites pointes de beauté, mais c'est éphémère.” - Sara, 48, 
ville (campagne) 
 
In any and all cases, beauty emerges when a person adds something of himself or herself 
to a societal object, when an object of contemplation becomes a sort of extension of the 
self. This is why Scruton argues that “we must then search for that core of experience, for 
that ‘surplus’ in which we find ourselves reflected, not as creatures of the moment, 
consumed in the present activity, but as rational beings, with a past, a present and a 
future”. (1979, 35) People try to identify themselves with the aesthetic object and it then 
becomes a part of their own existence, reflecting an image of their virtual fulfillment. The 
aesthetic is precisely devoted to the task of endowing the world with meaning in this 
way. Lara argues that the way we as humans organize our residential spaces in fact reflects 
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an image of our existence in the world. This resembles Foucault’s idea that the modern 
subject constitutes itself by establishing a certain “aesthetics of existence”, where ethics 
and aesthetics converge so closely that it is tempting to consider one’s life as an object of 
art (Thacker 1993). 
 
“Je pense que c'est une forme de reflet. Je pense qu'on agence son… en tous cas si 
on devait parler d'un appartement ou d'une maison, je pense que c'est assez le reflet 
de ce qu'on est et de la manière dont on vit et de la manière dont on aimerait être 
bien chez soi.” - Lara, 30, ville (ville) 
Aesthetic Judgements as Unactualised 
Societal Choices 
An aesthetic dilemma does not only reveal itself when one chooses between one pair of 
jeans or another, or between the white or yellow wallpaper. Aesthetic judgements are 
primarily societal choices. When an individual claims that this car or that house is 
beautiful, he/she does it with an idea of a society that comes with it. Maria, who has lived 
in a city her whole life, clearly expresses her disapproval of the neighbouring peri-urban 
environment — an ethical position which directly affects her aesthetic judgment: 
 
“Et ça, c'est une petite zone villas. Je ne sais pas ou ? Voilà. Alors. Je n'ai rien à dire 
beaucoup. (…) Ça, c'est dans toute l'Europe. Il y a des zones comme ça. C'est à 
dire des zones avec des maisons individuelles. Très collées, les unes avec les autres, 
puisque la terre est très chère. (…) Ça, c'est la fin d'une civilisation pour moi. Non, 
j'exagère. C'est un peu dommage. Ça a un côté, ça manque de partage. Chacun 
veut son petit espace, mais quand même collé aux autres. Moi j'aime bien voir des 
voisins autour de la maison. C'est plus la vie je trouve. Après, des gens disent: je 
suis le propriétaire. Je suis chez moi. Mon jardin. Mon garage. Mais l'espace qu'ils 
ont n'est pas immense. Ceux qui ont beaucoup, c'est ceux qui ont beaucoup 
d'argent et qui ont un grand jardin autour. Voilà.” - Maria, 59, ville (ville) 
?
Martin and Sophie share the same aesthetic sensibility as Maria with regards to the peri-
urban environment: 
?
“Je trouve un peu moyen, quand même. (…) Et puis on voit les maisons, qui sont 
avec un garage fermé, ce n'est pas très vivant. (…) Oui, ça fait un peu trop » villa ça 
me suffit ». Oui, je pense que c'est un peu ça qui me dérange, oui.” - Martin, 22, 
ville (ville) 
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“- [Photo 7] Alors là, je trouve ça horrible. C’est vraiment la maison mitoyenne des 
années... ça n'a pas l'air trop vieux mais, ça a un peu commencé dans les années ’90 
comme ça ou je ne sais plus. Ça, ça me plait pas, vraiment pas du tout. 
- Pourquoi? 
- Parce qu'ici il y a une sorte de diversité mais en même temps une sorte 
d'uniformité. Parce qu'il y a des blocs qui se ressemblent avec des sortes 
d'originalité dans les toits, par exemple, que je trouve pas très intéressante et puis de 
nouveau, on est dans ce truc ou chacun a son petit bout de jardin, je ne sais pas ce 
n'est pas... Pourquoi je n'aime pas? C’est une bonne question. Parce que ça sent la 
petite bagarre autour de la petite barrière, la petite séparation de jardin. Genre, on 
veut vivre ensemble, mais on ne veut pas vivre ensemble. Je ne sais pas, il y a un 
petit truc un peu... je n'aime pas trop. Voilà.” - Sophie, 36, ville (périurbain) 
?
Anna and Barbara, who both live in an individual house close to a historical village, find 
in a “chaotic” variety of the rich commune of Lutry, an image of anonymous individuals 
who do not cultivate any sense of community in their immediate residential 
environment: 
?
“[Photo 8] Ce que je n'aime pas c'est le côté éclaté des constructions. Cette 
incroyable variété. J'ai l'impression qu'ici le propriétaire est architecte, en ayant un 
chèque en blanc. À part pour les hauteurs, parce qu'il y a une certaine cohérence. Il 
n'y a rien qui sort. Il n'y a pas de gratte-ciel, mais, oui... Il y a de tout. Il y a des 
constructions en escaliers. Il y a des bâtiments modernes, très vitrés. Il y a des 
résidus, pas la première moitié du 20e siècle, qui ne sont pas particulièrement 
folichon, mais voilà. (…) Chacun vient dormir, faire ses courses. Ça ne parle pas le 
vivre ensemble, se retrouver au bistro, faire la fête. C'est des logements, c'est des 
habitations, c'est un dortoir.” - Anna, 60, village-périurbain (petite ville) 
 
“[Photo 8] Oh la la la ! Quel fouillis ! Ah oui ça c'est en arrivant sur Pully. Non, 
mais ça, c'est n'importe quoi. Pour moi ça c'est, alors c'est moche. Je suis sûre que 
tous ces gens ont une vue extraordinaire, mais je trouve ça, mais laid. Je trouve ça, 
c'est le fous-y-tout, à chacun sa petite idée. Ils sont à deux mètres les uns des autres, 
puis chacun c'est son style c'est n'importe quoi.” - Barbara, 65, périurbain 
(périurbain) 
 
Chantal, who lives in an individual peri-urban house, thinks that the repetitiveness of 
single-family houses near the town of Roche can tell us a lot about the community that 
lives there: 
 
“- [Photo 7] C’est les nouvelles constructions de Roche. Oui, on est effectivement à 
la montagne. Alors je trouve ça, ces maisons qui se ressemblent tac tac tac, je trouve 
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ça mortel, mortel. Autant celles-ci que n’importe lesquelles. Parce que derrière, ça a 
l’air d’être le même topo. Alors moi je me dis vivement qu’il y aient des grands 
arbres qui poussent pour un petit peu enlever cette espèce de… Non je trouve ça 
moche. 
- Alors ce qui est moche c’est le coté... ? 
- Le côté répétitif. Répétitif surtout. En plus le bleu, ça me donne froid. Donc le 
bleu je ne l’aime pas trop, mais c’est bon. Mais que ça soit répétitif comme ci ou 
comme ça donc tu vas à Chavornay, ils ont fait tout un quartier où c’est la même 
chose. Alors c’est moche, je trouve que ça fait pas… Alors, il me semble que ça doit 
avoir de l’influence sur la vue du quartier. Ça m’a toujours fait cet effet-là. 
- De quelle manière ? Tu as dit que le fait que ce soit répétitif influence la vie du 
quartier ? 
- Négatif, comme ça. Je trouve que ça a un effet négatif, enfin, sur la relation des 
gens entre eux. Je ne sais pas pourquoi, parce que c’est mon idée à moi. C’est un 
ressenti à moi. Bon, ce sont des quartiers neufs. Évidemment, c’est le problème des 
quartiers neufs, mais il me semble que la relation des gens entre eux dans les 
maisons qui se répètent de la même chose, la relation doit être plus difficile entre 
les gens que si chacun a une maison différente. Parce que peut être déjà si les 
maisons sont différentes, les gens qui viendront y habiter auront aussi des caractères 
différents, donc ça fera une autre dynamique d’habitants. Non, déjà rien que de 
voir ça… Chaque fois qu’on passe là devant, je me dis oh là, là, quelle horreur.” - 
Chantal, 65, périurbain (campagne) 
 
Claudia, who grew up in a small town on the coast of the Lake Geneva, and now lives in 
a house, shared her view on low rent-controlled housing (fr. habitation à loyer modéré - 
HLM), that is, a form of public or private housing found in France and Switzerland.    
 
“ - Voilà ce que j’aime un peu moins, les gros blocs comme ça. Pour moi, il y a 
juste rien d’esthétique, en fait. Rien de très joli. Si ce n’est les fleurs qu’ils ont 
rajoutées pour essayer d’améliorer la situation. C’est des immeubles, des blocs, rien 
de spécial, quoi. Enfin, si je pouvais ne pas avoir besoin d’y vivre, tant mieux, quoi.  
 - Et pourquoi ça t’évoque tout de suite ce sentiment ?  
 - Moi ce côté très carré, bloc, je n’aime pas trop. Probablement que c’est un peu 
associé à cette image des HLM plutôt négative, si tu veux. Tu te dis « Il y a peut-
être de la délinquance », ou bien peut-être le niveau social des gens est pas 
forcément élevé, ça n’a pas besoin de l’être, je veux dire. Mais c’est vrai que si tu me 
donnes à choisir ça et le quartier de villas à Coligny, les premières photos-là, ça me 
donne plus envie. Mais peut-être parce que, peut-être que j’ai un côté un peu 
bourge, je ne sais pas. C’est vrai que ça ça ne m’attire pas beaucoup, mais peut-être 
parce que justement, si j’ai le droit de rêver, bah voilà, je rêve pas à ça, tu vois. 
Après c’est ce côté assez, un peu comme des blocs soviétiques, comme ça. Oui, je 
sais pourquoi ils ont été construit, créés et tant mieux, c’est très bien, mais, c’est pas 
ce que je trouve le plus joli, quoi.” - Claudia, 34, périurbain (petite ville)  
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Silvia, who rejects the “forced” cohabitation that appears in collective low-income 
housing blocs, has a similar aesthetic understanding regarding the buildings: 
 
“[Photo 3] Ça c'est horrible. Ah mon dieu, dieu me préserve d'habiter au 
quinzième étage d'une tour. Néanmoins on a quand même l'impression, c'est 
quand même, la nature est respectée, y a beaucoup de verdure, donc les gens 
peuvent se sentir moins dans du béton, mais est-ce qu'ils ont le sentiment d'être 
moins dans du béton? (…) Mais toutes ces tours, ces alignements de grands 
immeubles, ces alignements d'appartements, mon dieu c'est de l'entassement de 
gens. C’est une cohabitation forcée.” - Silvia, 55, périurbain (périurbain) 
 
What I learned from the examples stated above is that aesthetic judgement is based on a 
certain idea of a society. However, the particularity of this kind of judgement is that it is 
made without any regard for the actuality of the premises upon which those judgements 
are based. Aesthetic attention often requires what John Keats called “negative capability,” 
that is, the ability to contemplate the world without any particular desire to reconcile its 
contradictory aspects, or fit it into rational systems. It reflects our capacity “of being in 
uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason” 
(Keats 1899, 277). If aesthetic judgement is a particular type of societal choice, then I 
can conclude that in the aesthetic mode people exhibit a particular sort of aesthetic 
justice, which might or might not necessarily correspond to their ethical principles of 
justice. When one claims that a thing is ugly or beautiful, one produces, in one and the 
same act, with more or less doubt, an image that tells the story of a certain societal 
situation: 
 
“[Photo 9] - Ces pauvres arbres, ils ne doivent pas se plaire. Ça pour moi, c’est 
vraiment se moquer du monde. Allez, on te met quatre arbres là au milieu et puis 
c’est magnifique, t’as la verdure.  
- Ça ne vous plait pas donc ? A part le manque de verdure… 
- Ah ! Non. Pas du tout. Ces petites places de jeux, là au milieu. J’ai même 
l’impression qu’il n’y a pas de bancs, il n’y a pas… ça m’a pas l’air très convivial. 
Pour moi, c’est vraiment l’excuse. On y met et puis comme ça on a fait ce qu’on 
devait. On devait mettre une place de jeux. Non, ce n’est pas beau.” - Martha, 65, 
ville (campagne) 
 
“Alors, c’est un quartier, je dirais, au centre de la ville un peu. Lausanne belle 
époque. A la fois, un peu bourgeois, mais pas bourgeois très friqué, genre Rumine 
et plus à l’est, hein. Je dirais plutôt un peu bourgeois, un bourgeois bobo, un tout 
petit peu bohême, mais avec aussi des éléments plus populaires, je dirais.” - Peter, 
63, ville (ville) 
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“- Oui ça c'est beau. Les immeubles alignés, le même style. Les appartements qui de 
l'intérieur doivent être pas mal. On a la rue mais on a quand même de l'espace. 
C’est une rue résidentielle j'imagine donc on ne doit pas avoir beaucoup de 
circulation. Pour vivre en ville, ça serait bien un quartier, un quartier pas mal. Mais 
je ne sais pas si les gens se connaissent à part ça. Je ne sais pas si de temps en temps 
on ferme la rue pour mettre les tables dehors pour boire un verre et faire 
connaissance avec les gens du quartier. Je ne suis pas sûre. Mais c'est de beaux 
bâtiments. (…) 
- Vous faites ça dans votre quartier où vous habitez? 
- Oui, on a fait ça pendant 8 ans, mais cette année il n’y a pas eu parce que ceux 
qui devaient organiser sont fâchés avec d'autres. Bon, c'est le quartier. Là, j'aimerais 
croire qu'il y a du quartier. ” - Silvia, 55, périurbain (périurbain) 
 
“Ce qui me gêne le plus, c'est que la paroi vitrée est taguée et ça, ça m'énerve parce 
que, ce ne sont pas les tags en soi parce que ne sont pas des tags méchants ni 
quoique. Ça soit même que ça pourrait être très harmonieux même. C’est cet 
irrespect du bien public, voilà, parce qu'il y a un mur en béton, et on est obligé 
d'aller taguer et ça, ça m'agace. Peut-être que je n'ai jamais rencontré de tagueur, 
pas tenter, qui pourrait m'expliquer pourquoi il faut taguer des murs en béton, c'est 
plutôt ça qui me dérange. Le fait que l'autoroute passe, comme je l'utilise tous les 
jours, je ne vais pas me plaindre de l'autoroute quand même. Voilà.” – Silvia, 55, 
périurbain (périurbain) 
 
All these interviews reveal that ethics and aesthetics cannot remain separated by the abyss 
that was constructed by Kantian philosophy, each concept jealously defending its own 
autonomy. Jurgen Habermas specifically focused on this problem when he claimed that a 
“reified everyday praxis can be cured only by creating unconstrained interaction of the 
cognitive with the moral-practical and the aesthetic-expressive elements” (Foster 1985, 
11-12). One might say that aesthetic knowledge is a form of practical reasoning, only it 
is a particular type of reasoning that, according to Scruton, is “characterised by no 
specific desire to ‘find out’, no special preoccupation with facts, since while these may be 
a necessary pre-condition for its exercise, their knowledge is no part of its aim. (…) it 
retains the character of freedom which is one of the distinguishing marks of an 
imaginative act” (Scruton 1979, 87). As aesthetic judgement involves a cognitive act, and 
so it would be safer to say that aesthetics is based on facts but these facts are ontologically 
subjective.  
 
Here lies the true force of aesthetic judgment, for when an aesthetic object strikes 
someone as beautiful, it is impossible to simultaneously experience it and to believe that 
that judgement might be wrong. This fact is well known to political actors who have 
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used this knowledge for various political purposes. As one of the most striking examples, 
Susan Sontag provides an example of Nazi Germany, where the confusion between 
reality and fantasy, expressed in films like Leni Riefenstahl's “Triumph of the Will”, can 
be taken as emblematic of the illusory aesthetic spectacle which simmered at the heart of 
fascist politics (1975). Such freewheeling aestheticism comes with the certain danger of 
aestheticising the whole of reality, which in turn represents the true danger of totalitarian 
political systems. Within this line of thought, Hannah Arendt observed that: "The ideal 
subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the dedicated communist, but 
people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction, true and false, no longer 
exists." (1973) Here it might be interesting to notice that the aesthetic dimension is 
highly neglected in electoral geography, and generally in studies whose purpose is to 
better understand why people vote for one political option or another (or why they do 
not vote at all). 
 
In the aesthetic mode, individuals are still concerned with the practical but they move 
the practical into the realm of virtual. In this sense, individuals become partially free 
from the burdens of the actual. Aesthetics is ethics without actual obligations. If in 
aesthetics everything is not permitted, it is precisely because everything is not permitted 
in ethics. But this is not a reason to dismiss aesthetics as being inferior to ethics. On the 
contrary, it is precisely because aesthetics provides a feeling of freedom to human beings 
that we constantly go back to it and reflect upon it. Finally, aesthetic judgement, if 
subjected to a serious analysis, can teach us a lot about what the deepest societal dreams 
are. Through such an approach, it might be possible to “come to an ethics that is more 
than a formal principle, but has a body and a heart” (Berleant 1999, 364). In the famous 
lines of “The Social Contract”, Rousseau speaks of the most important form of law as 
one “which is not graven on tablets of marble or brass, but on the hearts of the citizens. 
This forms the real constitution of State, takes on every day new powers, when other 
laws decay or die out, restores them or takes their place, keeps a people in the ways it was 
meant to go, and insensibly replaces authority by the force of habit” (Rousseau 1938, 
p.12). In this sense, I must agree with Terry Eagleton that power is somehow “inscribed 
in the minutiae of subjective experience” (1991, 20). Inadequately accounting for this 
fact may come at a high cost. 
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The Aesthetics of Everyday Life 
In “The Practice of Everyday Life” (1984 [1980]), Michel de Certeau argues that the 
social sciences lack a formal means by which to examine the ways in which people re-
appropriate societal artefacts in everyday situations. With no clear understanding of how 
ordinary people subvert the rituals and representations that social structures seek to 
impose upon them, the social sciences risk creating nothing other than a picture of 
passive consumers who follow institutionalized order without any possibility of re-
creating or re-producing it. His study stands today as a classical text that teaches us that 
the realm of repetitive practices, such as walking, talking, reading or cooking, include 
elements of creative resistance of ordinary people to repressive aspects of modern society. 
According to de Certeau everyday life is made of various “clever tricks” of the “weak” 
within the space established by the “strong”. In the influential chapter "Walking in the 
City”, he examines how the act of walking through the city involves taking various 
shortcuts and improvisation by which the pedestrian transforms the spatial order of a 
street. If researchers could observe the totality of such tactical acts, we would find that 
they substantially alter the nature of urban space for they actualize some possibilities that 
were not previously considered by institutionalized aspects of a society.  
 
In his analysis, de Certeau is primarily concerned with the practical, i.e., the ethical, 
aspects of the spatial tactics he describes. However, my argument here is that people 
create the world not only in the realm of actual, but also in the realm of imagination, 
which further influences urban spatialities. Aesthetic considerations might lead people to 
either affirm and respect the social and economic pressures from “above”, or to try and 
transgress it. Individuals can alter the character of urban spaces not only by using them 
in an unusual manner, but also by reflecting upon it in a way that transforms the object 
into something else. When someone walks from point A to point B, they might take a 
path that is twice as long simply because the environment of the second path is 
aesthetically more appealing. Aesthetics intervene in various acts of everyday selection 
between one street or another, one shop or another, one park or another. Space is not 
only practiced, it is also imaginatively inhabited. Thus the aesthetic dimension constantly 
changes the character of the world. 
 
“Le fait d’être, je pense, avec ce verger derrière, moi je trouve ça vraiment super 
beau. Quand tu fais ta vaisselle et tu as la vue sur la nature pratiquement, puis 
typiquement le matin quand il fait nuit, tu as l’église du village qui est un peu 
perchée, si tu veux, tu la vois au loin, elle est éclairée, donc ça fait un peu comme 
une cathédrale, si tu veux, que tu vois au loin. Donc c’est assez beau comme 
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paysage, directement, ce qu’on voit depuis la cuisine.” - Claudia, 34, périurbain 
(bord de ville) 
 
As Yuriko Saito writes, the flow of everyday life includes “doing things by handling an 
object, executing an act, and producing certain results, all motivated by aesthetic 
considerations” (Saito 2015). If researchers dismiss everyday experiences from the 
aesthetic discourse only because they do not enter into a classical format of analysis, or 
because they “cannot be subjected to a verdict-oriented discourse” (Saito 2015), we will 
simply impoverish the understanding of people’s day-to-day existence, which is actually 
highly aesthetic.  
 
“Pour moi, c’est un crédo, l’esthétique et la beauté, parce que c’est ce qui nourrit 
l’âme en dehors de mes yeux et de ma vie. (…) Ça me fait vivre. Ça me relie au 
plus haut. Ça m’apaise. Ça me rend curieuse.” - Brigitte, 61, ville (campagne) 
 
If someone is aesthetically attracted to something, they exhibit a sort of aesthetic agency 
that activates their capacity and willingness to act upon other components of a society. 
This aesthetic agency is actualised by protecting or maintaining the aesthetic value of the 
object or environment they find aesthetically appealing. On the other hand, if their 
aesthetic judgement towards an object or an environment is negative or unpleasant, they 
might decide to discard or ignore the object or the environment in question. While 
numerous aesthetes still argue against the idea of projecting the ethical and political 
realm into the sphere of the aesthetics, our metropolitan dumping grounds as well as the 
Earths’ oceans keep getting filled with ugly objects that were fashionable just five years 
ago.   
 
“La laideur. Alors, (…) tout aussi subjectif et tout ça, et puis y aura une sensation 
peut-être de, une forme de rejet, dans les extrêmes il y aura une forme de dégout 
peut-être, face à quelque chose de laid. Il y aura un sentiment contre voilà. Peut-
être que la beauté il y a un sentiment qui va vers, qu'on a envie d'embrasser, tandis 
que dans quelque chose de laid, il y aura une prise de distance.” - Lara, 30, ville 
(ville) 
?
My position is that everyday experiences are replete with aesthetic character, to the extent 
that any real situation of consciousness in the world is pregnant with the aesthetic. From 
the earliest stages of human history, a specific form of imaginative consciousness 
developed in which the aesthetic relations of man to reality were established. Aesthetic 
concepts and the aesthetic experience are important, for they open us up to particular 
aspects of human existence that we wouldn't otherwise have access to. 
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The Aesthetic Network: A Topology of 
Aesthetic Places 
Various aesthetic objects or environments, upon which the actuality and virtuality of an 
aesthetic experience depends, can be reunited under the general concept of aesthetic 
place. Two fundamental conditions need to be satisfied in order for a societal object to 
become an aesthetic space. First, the object needs to enter into the constitution of a space 
whose substance is primarily defined by the aesthetic dimension. And second, the 
distance between the constitutive elements of the object must be considered as non-
relevant from an aesthetic point of view. Any societal reality can become an aesthetic 
place, from a painting to a landscape. Take for example the city of Venice, which has 
circulated in the bloodstream of world culture for many decades. Many visitors of Venice 
have experienced the following phenomenon: No matter where they move or which 
street they cross, they find themselves immersed in a single space defined by its aesthetic 
components. The whole city, including its churches, houses, gardens, streets and squares, 
its canals and surrounding islands become an exceptional analogon, i.e., an aesthetic 
place par excellence, which allows them to engage in a deep aesthetic experience. For a 
contemporary visitor who finds him/herself enjoying the city, Venice becomes “semi-
transparent”, a fairy tale and a tourist trap at the same time. Thomas Mann writes about 
this in one of his celebrated novels: 
 
“This was Venice, the flattering and suspect beauty – this city, half fairy tale 
and half tourist trap, in whose insalubrious air the arts once rankly and 
voluptuously blossomed, where composers have been inspired to lulling 
tones of somniferous eroticism. Gripped by his adventure, the traveler felt 
his eyes drinking in this sumptuousness, his ears wooed by these melodies; 
he remembered, too, that the city was stricken with sickness and concealing 
it for reasons of cupidity, and he peered around still more wildly in search 
of the gondola that hovered ahead.” (Mann 2012) 
 
During their lifetime, humans create a network of aesthetic places. It is one of the many 
ways by which humans appropriate and imaginatively inhabit a three-dimensional 
topographical space of the material world. They do this by turning the material world 
into a topological network composed of various aesthetic places. The character of this 
space (its formal structure) can be well grasped by relating it to the concepts of 
synecdoche and asyndeton, developed by J.F. Augoyard, a French philosopher and 
musicologist. Augoyard’s work on walking and urban ambiances highly influenced the 
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writings of Michel de Certeau, and more particularly in his essay "Walking in the City”, 
where he writes:  
 
“Synecdoche consists in ‘using a word in a sense which is part of another 
meaning of the same word’. In essence, it names a part instead of the whole 
which includes it. Thus ‘sail’ is taken for ’ship’ in the expression ‘a fleet of 
fifty sails’; in the same way, a brick shelter or a hill is taken for the park in 
the narration of a trajectory. Asyndeton is the suppression of linking words 
such as conjunctions and adverbs, either within a sentence or between 
sentences. In the same way, in walking it selects and fragments the space 
traversed; it skips over links and whole parts that it omits. (…) Synecdoche 
re-places totalities by fragments (a less in the place of a more); asyndeton 
disconnects them by eliminating the conjunctive or the consecutive 
(nothing in place of something). Synecdoche makes more dense: it 
amplifies the detail and miniaturizes the whole. Asyndeton cuts out: it 
undoes continuity and undercuts its plausibility. A space treated in this way 
and shaped by practices is transformed into enlarged singularities and 
separate islands” (1984, 101).  
 
To be able to be produce aesthetic space, humans use both spatial techniques explained 
by de Certeau. Indeed, when we observe an object or an environment in the aesthetic 
mode, some elements rise from the scene and “excite” us. In a certain way, they jump out 
to the point that they fill the entire picture. These elements could correspond to pretty 
much anything: They could be something that reminds us of our childhood, a close 
friend’s house, or a girl in a street crowd. These details, this surplus with a higher value, 
are often taken to be an analogon of a whole. In this sense, a house can be experienced in 
a way that the fragments such as moldings, cornices, door handles, drawers, chests and 
wardrobes replace the totality, while conjunctions between the fragments remain totally 
or partially omitted. Anna and Barbara put it in the following manner: 
 
“Ce qui participe au beau de l'espace construit pour moi, ce sont les détails. Ce 
sont les détails, les particularités de finition, de moulures, de corniches, des 
encadrements de portes, les éléments de fermeture. Par exemple chez moi les 
fermetures en espagnolettes des vitrages aujourd'hui quand vous avez besoin de 
mettre des vitres dans une maison on vous propose du standard qui ne comporte 
plus ce type de fermeture. Quand ils ont mis le doublage des vitres, j'ai voulu qu'ils 
ne m'enlèvent pas cas. Ce sont des détails comme ça. Parce qu'ils me racontent la 
création de cette maison en 1930” - Anna, 60, village-périurbain (petite ville) 
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“Mais vous voyez par exemple, je suis allée en Inde, avec mon mari, on est partis 
avec un bus VW jusqu'en Inde et à Istanbul on a passé quelques jours, puis on est 
allés dans les vieux quartiers. Il y avait encore toutes ces maisons en bois, et puis 
c'était fascinant, c'était beau, mais c'était très très beau, mais on trouvait ça beau ! 
(…) Ces maisons étaient belles et puis chaque maison, justement a la trace, voilà, 
chaque maison avait la trace des gens qui y ont vécu parce que, quelqu'un faisait 
une dentelle en bois très complexe là, au-dessus de la porte, un autre c'était plus 
simple, un autre c'était les couleurs, quelqu'un d'autre avait mis, il y avait ces 
fameuses, ces heurtoirs pour taper à la porte, les mains là, il y en avait, voilà, on 
voyait qu'il y en avait des sophistiqués, des moins sophistiqués. Enfin chacun, c'est 
ça aussi la poésie, c'est de voir la trace des gens. Comme un tissu fait à la main où 
on trouve une erreur et y a une dame ou un monsieur qui a fait cette erreur derrière 
donc il y a sa trace.” - Barbara, 65, périurbain (périurbain) 
 
In "The Poetics of Space" Bachelard introduces the concept of "topoanalysis" to describe 
"the systematic psychological study of the sites of our intimate lives" (Bachelard and Jolas 
1994, 8). He wanted to investigate intimacy, immensity, intensity, vastness, the insides, 
and the outsides of our memories of a house and its various parts. He was guided by the 
conviction that our memories are not simple past experiences that are recalled from the 
past but rather that they are interweaved with the present, a part of our ongoing actual 
experience. For Bachelard, the house image acts as a representation of a “topography of 
our intimate being.” (Bachelard and Jolas 1994 p.xxxvi). If I broaden this analysis to 
include not only a house, but also an entire urban or natural space, we will find that our 
understanding of the world is often informed by a similar reasoning. When a person 
plans an evening walk, they might situate it in a network of more or less beautiful places 
of their immediate surroundings. Sometimes, one wants to be alone and chooses to go 
for a walk in a less attractive environement, perhaps an industrial environment — but 
this too is an aesthetic choice. Finally, when people travel to picturesque European city-
centres, many of us are used to more or less closing our eyes when passing through the 
endless suburbs of metropolitan areas. An important conclusion is that beauty or ugliness 
changes the nature of our practical involvement in the world.  
 
The example of Venice illustrates how aesthetic space can strongly influence other spaces, 
such as urban spaces or political spaces. On one hand, the constitution of Venice as an 
urban aesthetic place par excellence made it a target for millions of visitors from all 
around the world. On the other hand, the city has become quite expensive and thus 
unreachable for many people. In this sense, beauty can bring things closer to people, 
while also bringing them farther from people. This is why one could say that aesthetic 
categories alter the character of separation between humans and their environments.  
Joseph Brodsky observes this in the following way: 
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“The one thing the locals never do is ride gondolas. To begin with, a 
gondola ride is pricey. Only foreign tourists, and well-off ones at that, can 
afford it. (…) The sight of these decrepit Romeos and their rickety Juliets is 
invariably sad and embarrassing, not to say ghastly. For the young, i.e., for 
those who this sort of thing would be appropriate, a gondola is as far out of 
reach as a five-star hotel. Economy, of course, reflects demography; yet that 
is doubly sad, because beauty, instead of promising the world, gets reduced 
to being its reward” (1993). 
 
The aesthetic dimension has influenced both the revitalization of a deteriorated old city 
and the prevention of almost any new constructions due to the protection of Venice and 
its lagoon by the UNESCO World Heritage Organization. This is an example of how 
the aesthetic dimension gives “immanent” power to urban actors, allowing them to use it 
as an argument to influence society’s actions in the ethical realm or the legal realm. 
Indeed, in Venice this has led to another interesting phenomenon: One of the greatest 
cities of the medieval world, characterized by diverse styles and rich historical 
stratification (that is, it left strong testimonies of the specific restructuring of social 
relations and various lifestyles of its previous residents), has “organically fused into a 
coherent unit”, as is stated in the brief synthesis by UNESCO (2016).  
 
How is it that today people perceive the variety of styles in Venice as a coherent unit? So 
far I have tried to shed some light on the very conditions that allow individuals to engage 
in the aesthetic experience. However, phenomenology remains relatively silent on the 
question of why people get why people get involved in the imaginative experience in one 
specific way rather than another. As Martina Löw observes, in phenomenology, space is 
“described as being already having been constituted” simply because the condition of 
constitution cannot be analyzed by introspective phenomenological observation. As a 
consequence, many of the studies remain unhistorical (2016, 11). Thus, in order to 
answer this question, I need to turn to the modern condition and incredible set of 
circumstances that emerged with the rise of big modern cities. In other words, I need to 
shift the focus from the aesthetic experience to the aesthetic object itself, and investigate 
how urban and natural environments condition people’s aesthetic understanding of the 
world. Since place is always in a state of becoming, as the result of historically-contingent 
processes and social practices (Pred 1984), the question to ask is: By what social processes 
is an aesthetic place produced? I will terminate my study by investigating how aesthetic 
judgments evolve and develop, and to what extent the inhabited environment plays a role 
in this process. 
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6 The Aesthetic Dimension of the 
Urban Environment 
“L’espace d’aujourd’hui, c’est de ́ja ̀ en grande partie, le 
re ́sultat des actions de nos concitoyens d’hier. L’espace de 
demain, ce sera, pour l’essentiel, l’action de nos 
contemporains, construite et engage ́e aujourd’hui.”  
Jacques Lévy 
 
In what style should contemporary societies build? One way of approaching 
this problem is to try to detect the spirit of the age, and then to act according to the 
dominant set of ideals and norms that characterize it. Indeed, as Hegel writes, “no man 
can overlap its own time, for the spirit of his time [der Geist seiner Zeit] is also his spirit” 
(1993, 262). However, one need only make a short visit to almost any contemporary 
cities to find out that the task of detecting “the spirit of the age” is rather tricky. I would 
say - rather useful. The coexistence of different styles of architecture, the rapid changes 
that affect the urban landscape, the growing individualization of the components of 
contemporary urban society, but also the increasing speed with which societies make use 
of their existing spaces are in complete opposition to the idea of a common denominator 
that could capture the essence of the intellectual and cultural environment of an age. So 
instead of approaching this issue solely from a historical perspective, I suggest that it 
should be approached in terms of urbanity — the concept that allows a transcultural and 
multidimensional reading of society and its various levels. The question to ask is rather: 
What style corresponds to what urbanity?  
 
Focusing only on the visible actualised phenomena of an urban environment hides the 
fact that the world is much richer and much more complex that it appears to be ‘on the 
surface’. In the previous chapter, I argued that speaking of the aesthetics of the city 
requires understanding of a particular imaginative capacities of urban actors which allow 
them to surpass the actual material world. Aesthetic categories appear as a constant 
reminder of the power of that which does not appear visibly — that is, the virtual. In this 
chapter, I will be exploring how both the different urban environments and the 
individuals that inhabit them contribute to the production of aesthetic space. Since the 
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aesthetic space always emerges as a labyrinth of various constellations of meanings, which 
“we must accept never to know the totality and the closure” of, as Didi-Habermas argues 
(2005, 18), I will investigate how do categories such as the image, the virtual, and the 
aesthetic relate to the production of urban space? 
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Aesthetic Sensibilities in Switzerland 
For more than 200 years, Switzerland has been known for the beauty of its landscapes. 
The tourist industry, with a contribution of nearly 2 billion Swiss francs, strongly reaps 
the benefits of Switzerland’s aesthetic dimension. This is the case for the tourist industry, 
but not only. Mountains, lakes, medieval towns and villages are present everywhere, from 
newspapers and calendars to picture books and small packages of coffee milk. Yet, 
Switzerland is a highly urbanized and industrialized country. Its characteristic feature is 
an urban structure comprised of large numbers of small and medium-sized towns, and 
five relatively large urban centers (the largest Swiss city is Zürich, which has about 
396,000 inhabitants). Here you can find not only picturesque landscapes but almost all 
the landscape themes that are present in other European countries. This is partly a result 
of the heterogenous topographical qualities of the Swiss territory, and partly a result of 
the territories’ strong fragmentation (Schwick 2007). A researcher therefore is presented 
with unique opportunities to study the various gradients of urbanity, as isolated by 
Lévy,?? together with their aesthetic impact. 
 
According to the Swiss Federal Statistics Office, nearly 20 per cent of Swiss residents 
today live neither in a rural area, nor in a city, but rather, in an agglomeration with 
mostly detached houses. This low-density urban type occupies more land surface than 
central communes, which accommodate almost 60% of the Swiss population (Kohler 
2014). A 2003 study on Swiss spatial practices showed that there is a cultural and 
political polarization between the residents of suburban or peri-urban agglomerations, 
and the residents of larger centers — and especially, of the inner cities (Hermann and 
Leuthold 2003). This polarization does not coincide with socioeconomic boundaries, but 
rather reflects opposed lifestyles, which differ in the way everyday life is organized and 
practiced. The two lifestyles, one practiced in the dense and diverse city and the other in 
areas with a lower degree of urbanity, cannot be understood solely on their own terms. If 
as researchers, we want to understand what attracts residents to low-density 
environments, even at the cost of long daily car commutes, we cannot base our analysis 
on economic factors alone (see Fortin and Després 2009).  
 
Anyone interested in the evolution of the Swiss urban space will notice that different 
urban actors assign great importance to aesthetic questions. Thus, my aim is to approach 
the choice of residential environment (which is always a lifestyle choice) from an 
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aesthetic perspective. Indeed, aesthetic sensibilities in Switzerland have developed 
according to particular spatial, social and historical conditions in which the city played a 
pivotal role. 
The Beginnings of Spatial Planning in Switzerland: The Legacy of 
the Romantics and the Modernists 
Recognized already in the eighteenth century as a movement of radical transformation, 
modernity paved the way to the autonomy of the individual and the democratization of 
societies. Right from the start, modernist thinkers unilaterally insisted on economic and 
political individualism (as a promise of liberation from various “conditions”), which, in 
turn, could only be achieved by breaking free from certain traditional values. However, 
many authors over the years have noticed that the modern movement has always been 
accompanied  by a counter-movement, which has acted as a sort of protective response to 
the disruptive effects of modernity. Just as Romanticism was a rejection of neo-classical 
ideals, the “rediscovery” of an old picturesque town at the end of 19th century was 
likewise a reaction to the effects of modernity. Françoise Choay argues that modern 
processes eventually led to two different models of urban planning: the cultural model 
and the progressive model (Choay 1994). The innovation of modernity (i.e., the 
progressive model) was its commitment to derive beauty directly from function while 
breaking with tradition. It is no coincidence that simultaneous to the emergence of 
modernity, a “new” sensibility appeared — the cultural model — which was anchored in 
the recognition of historical heritage and the preservation of landscapes threatened by 
novel constructions. The two parallel and interconnected processes reinforced the two 
aesthetic ideals — the ideal of the city and the ideal of rurality. A detailed analysis of 
Swiss literature (Gsteiger et al. 1994) shows that the city has always been represented in 
opposition to the countryside. When the two were compared, the city usually came 
behind. The only exception might be the foreign metropoles who managed to elicit 
rather positive aesthetic emotions (Gsteiger et al. 1994, 136). 
 
In the final chapter of “La Suisse Urbaine” (1994), François Walter points out a strong 
connection between the characteristics of Switzerland’s spatial planning practices and its 
anti-urban ideologies. Walter argues that this ideology was “une réaction culturaliste à 
base ésthetique” (1994, 423). However, it is important to remember that before 1900, 
the urbanism of Paris and Vienna had an important influence on the way Swiss cities 
were imagined. Several cities modestly drew inspiration from the two cities (and 
particularly from Paris) to make plans for expansion: This was the case, for example, of 
                                                                                                                                             
40 E.g. hyper center, center, suburb, peri-urban, hypo-urban, infra-urban, tourist station??
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the plan Dufour for Geneva (1854), the extension of Basel (1850s), the Ringstrasse in 
Zurich and Pichard’s circle with the Grand Pont in Lausanne (1836) (Walter, 1994, p. 
394). The beginning of twentieth century marked a turning point in this practice, 
through the rediscovery of the old picturesque town. The origin of this movement can be 
traced back to the 18th century. Under the influence of Romantic literature, first from 
England and then from Switzerland, many started rejecting neo-classical ideals, which 
directly influenced a shift in the societal perception of the Alps. Indeed, before the 18th 
century, the Alps were perceived as inhospitable and were aesthetically dismissed (Senici, 
2005, p. 23). The cultural construction of the Alps emerged with the writings of the 
Romantics who “celebrated wild landscapes, (...) empty deserts, impenetrable forests, 
frozen ice wastes and, in particular, rugged mountains. (...) Orderliness and regularity 
were out; untamed wildness was in” (Beattie, 2006, p. 125). The works of the scientist 
Horace-Bénédict de Sausure, the Romantic painter Caspar David Friedrich, the poet 
Albrecht de Haller and the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau had a particularly 
profound influence on Western attitudes towards the countryside and mountain 
landscapes. 
 
Thus, the revalorization of an old picturesque town at the end of 19th century was 
likewise a reaction to a modern metropolis that threatened the established collective 
values and national identity. At the beginning of the twentieth century in Switzerland, a 
movement that was first initiated in the private sphere began to emerge: its purpose was 
to protect historical heritage and preserve Swiss landscapes. In 1900, Marguerite Burnat-
Provins, a French painter and poet who lived in Vevey, founded the “Ligue pour la 
beauté”, which inspired other patriotic organizations such as the “Ligue pour la 
conservation de la Suisse pittoresque” (futur “Heimatschutz”, today “Patrimoine suisse”) 
(1905), the “Ligue pour la protection de la nature” (1909), and the “Alpine museum” 
(1905). Using a highly emotional tone, she writes about her deepest concerns for 
Switzerland’s natural heritage and built heritage in the article entitled “Les cancers”. It 
was published in 1905 on the front page of the newspaper “Gazette de Lausanne”: 
?
“Mais les hommes ne sont pas les seules victimes de ce mal purulent ; les 
pays, eux non plus, n'échappent pas au cancer, à cette différence près 
qu'aucun génie ne peut les guérir de leurs ulcères monumentaux. (…) 
Pourquoi cette insulte aux beautés éternelles de la montagne? Pourquoi ce 
soufflet à une nature si noble, dont le rôle exclusive semblait être de 
charmer? Que la Suisse réponde. (…) Sur les terrains, impitoyablement 
nivelés, s'élèvent, en grappes pustuleuses, des bâtiments informes, l'horreur 
s'étend ou la grâce régnait. (…) Pauvre nature, étiquetée, prostituée !” (17 
March 1905).   
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Here Burnat-Provins is expressing a view labeled as “positive aesthetics” (Carlson 2005, 
75), expressed in the idea that the natural environment, insofar as it is unaffected by 
man, has only positive aesthetic qualities and values. At the end of her article Burnat-
Provins calls for action: 
 
“Ceux qui ne comprennent pas doivent être avisés, et retenus dans leur 
coupable irréflexion. Empêcher le mal, tuer le microbe, ou du moins 
l'affaiblir, n'est pas une atteinte à la liberté, c'est faire œuvre de haute 
sagesse et de patriotisme éclairé. (…) la cause de la beauté qui est chez nous 
une cause nationale.” (Gazette de Lausanne, 17 March 1905)   
 
It was a celebration of traditional aesthetics, which rapidly became an instrument for the 
critique of industrial society – which was seen as responsible for the country’s “crisis of 
identity” and “degeneration” (dégénérescence) (Le Dinh 1992). Many artists and authors 
supported this new anti-modern ideology — among others, Charles Melley, George de 
Montenach, and Guillaume Fatio. In the book “Ouvrons les yeux! Voyage ésthetique à 
travers la Suisse”, Fatio calls for action against “la laideur et la banalité de toutes les 
bâtisses modernes”. The book begins with a preface by Eugène Burnand, a Swiss painter 
and the president of “La nouvelle Société helvétique”, who writes: 
 
“Notre pays s'enlaidit avec une rapidité stupéfiante. L'affreuse ‘bâtisse’ 
envahit la campagne comme un champignon vénéneux. Et il y a des gens 
qui trouvent cela beau et qui s'enorgueillissent ! – Vous leur démontrez, 
noir sur blanc, que cela est affreux… vous le démontrez par comparaison en 
évoquant, en un ensemble infiniment attrayant, parfait émouvant, les types 
caractéristiques de notre architecture nationale, telle qu'elle était issue de 
nos mœurs, de nos conditions climatériques, de nos besoins, de notre âme 
elle-même” (1904, 7). 
 
Fatio’s book summarized the rising aesthetic sensibility towards rural picturesqueness at 
the time, which was being increasingly used in the construction of a new architectural 
and urban paradigm that rejected new architectural models. This ideology was formally 
articulated in 1896 during the National Exhibition in Geneva. At the event, a village was 
built over a surface of 23,191 square meters and was to be inhabited by 353 villagers. It 
contained a 40-meter tall mountain with an artificial waterfall, 56 houses, a church, 3 
farms and 18 alpine chalets. For Bernard Crettaz, this 1:1 model of The Swiss village was 
used as the catalyzer for numerous symbolic elements, with the aim of presenting the 
nation as a coherent entity (1987). The village was a pure construction, yet it provided 
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an architectural archetype to be dispersed throughout the country (Salomon Cavin, 
2005, p. 58). The city, or more precisely the big city, had no importance in the 
construction of a national identity. From the aesthetic point of view, the city lacked the 
stylistic uniformity on which such an identity could be constructed. This had a strong 
impact on the politics of spatial planning practices. François Walter affirmed that 
throughout the 1930s to the 1950s, the rural milieu affirmed itself as the principal 
protagonist in spatial planning — specifically, by protecting the land that urbanization 
endangered (1994, 1985). Often, it was not the city per se that brought about negative 
images, but rather the changes and metamorphoses of the inhabited environment that 
grew rapidly. 
 
In the collection of short essays entitled “Lausanne. Une ville qui a mal tourné” (Jaloux 
et al. 1945), which was presented under the umbrella of the “Mouvement pour la défense 
de Lausanne”, several authors expressed their worries about the city’s present and future. 
Aesthetic considerations appear to take on a central role in each of the five texts. Among 
others, F.C. Ramuz openly attacks new kinds of architecture that do not correspond to 
the existing character of the city. He writes of an architecture that no longer corresponds 
to the society that produced it. He concludes that if cities have been going in the wrong 
direction, it is because society as a whole, which “does not believe in anything, does not 
think of anything, does not feel anything”?? has been going in the wrong direction: 
 
“Or, si l’exemple de l’ordre impose l’ordre, l’exemple du désordre conseille 
le désordre. Il n’a eu qu’à partir du centre où il trouvait tous les 
encouragements et à gagner de là vers la périphérie. Le désordre et tous les 
désordres, pas seulement le désordre architectural et esthétique, qui n’est 
d’ailleurs que le signe du désordre intérieur ; mais le désordre dans les 
habitudes et dans les goûts, et le désordre dans les comptes (…) — et je 
n’insiste pas sur le spectacle d’une banlieue hétéroclite qui s’est répandue 
peu à peu dans tout le pays, des Alpes au Jura ; qui n’est pas seulement 
laide, mais morne (car il y a des laideurs vivantes), morne et morte, morne 
et proprette, et parfaitement satisfaite d’elle-même au milieu de la pire 
incohérence qui soit.” (Jaloux et al. 1945, 35-6).  
 
Originally, the text of Ramuz was published in the local newspaper Aujourd’hui on 18 
December 1930, as a reaction to the construction of the Bel-Air tower in the center of 
Lausanne. The tower epitomized the city breaking away from its traditional structure — 
which was considered organic and coherent — and in breaking from this tradition, the 
                                                      
41 In French: “ne crois à rien, ne pense rien, ne sent rien” (Jaloux et al. 1945, 38). 
  181 
city was seen as rapidly disintegrating. The members of Swiss patriotic organizations were 
not the only ones to condemn the diversification and densification of the urban tissue. 
An equally passionate attack came from the protagonists of the twentieth-century 
Modern movement itself. The vitality, diversity and vibrancy of the emerging industrial 
city came to symbolize only disorder, while the street itself was seen as an archaic form 
that the Modern movement was trying to leave behind. Since the increasingly 
fragmented and increasingly growing modern city could no longer be grasped in a single 
view, nor be understood as an organic unity, the main protagonists of modernist urban 
planning (Le Corbusier, Hilberseimer, and others) tried to achieve a new organicity 
through a kind of ex nihilo urban planning that sought to erase the city’s chaotic 
kaleidoscope. It is true that the traditional, like the industrial city, faced the enormous 
troubles in terms of living conditions of the workers, but nothing implied that the only 
way to achieve Light, Air and Sun was to brutally ignore the existing urban and social 
structure at the time. 
 
In an attempt to actualize their utopian ideas, a new aesthetic sensibility emerged from 
the uncritical romance of machines, but it was primarily developed, as André Corboz put 
it, against or alongside the city (cited in Jacobs 2002, 17). In the Charter of Athens 
(1933, CIAM), no aesthetic considerations were made except in the section on historic 
heritage (point 70) which stated that past historic styles should not be tolerated (Le 
Corbusier 1973). Aesthetics was discussed in terms of utilitarian considerations, and 
aesthetic experience was considered as nothing more than an experience of actual 
function — as if humans were creatures without a past or future, desperately absorbed by 
the present.  
 
Switzerland’s urban planners did indeed embrace the modernist aspiration for 
functionally-devised environments, but they considered it as a backdrop for picturesque 
nature. Armin Meili, a Zurich architect, is one of the central figures in this process. As 
the director of the National Exhibition in 1939 and later a director of “L’association 
Suisse pour le plan d'amenagement national” (ASPAN), he had a major influence on 
spatial planning in Switzerland. In his speech in 1942 entitled “Bases sociales et éthiques 
de l'aménagement du territoire national”, he presents his ideas for Swiss society: 
?
“Plus l'architecture est colossale, plus l'homme est petit. Partout où trop 
d'hommes vivent ensemble, on note des grèves, du chômage, avec la 
maladie, la famine et le paupérisme. Plus un espace supporte une 
population dense, plus son appareil économique est fragile. (…) Plus dense 
la population, moins elle est près de la terre. (…) Une conception fausse 
nous conduira à une émigration accrue, et à la course vers la grande ville. 
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De nos jours l'existence indépendante devient rare, et tend à plonger dans la 
masse. Des hommes méritants tombent dans l'anonymat. La responsabilité 
personnelle et son active transposition sur le plan politique disparaissent. 
On lui substitue le désintéressement collectif. Le voisinage entre familles, le 
ciment de nos communautés, se perd. (…) Nous devons avoir le courage de 
tracer, pour les cinquante ans qui viennent, le plan de notre pays tel que 
nous le voudrions. (…) Nous ne voulons pas d'amas de pierre, de fer et de 
béton. Les villes doivent avoir vue sur la nature, une ville doit respirer. (…) 
Notre beau pays est prédestiné à la création d'une métropole décentralisée, 
se déroulant comme un collier de perles du Bodan au Léman”. 
 
First, one can see how the ethical and social bases he is trying to construct for Swiss 
society have a clearly expressed aesthetic component. Indeed, Maili develops arguments 
against the rise of the big city, which he sees as a tower of Babel constructed with stone, 
iron and concrete. Second, he advocates for an urban environment with a lower degree of 
urbanity. Thus, he defends the preservation of town structures constructed before the 
20th century, which are characterized by strong compactness; At the same time, for new 
zones of urbanization, he advocates moving towards the model of the decentralized 
metropolis. Meili's discourse underlines some very important ideas regarding the way the 
city would be imagined and constructed during the following decades in Switzerland.?? 
“Nearly all the regional proposals from that period [after WWII] suggested an ‘orderly’ 
reduction of the concentration of urban development and encouraging decentralized, 
regional centers intended to reduce the pressures of development in the large cities. (…) 
The notion that there was something ‘un-Swiss’ about a large city (…) became the 
dominant axiom of Helvetian planning” (Diener, et al. 2005, p.186). The highway 
network, approved in a federal referendum in 1958 reinforced anti-urban tendencies that 
would eventually yield to urban sprawl. Thus, Swiss urban practices have been 
characterized by the following two parallel processes: the preservation of traditional 
picturesque towns and a preference for a low-density dispersed urban tissue.  
 
                                                      
42 From the 1950s onwards, due to tendencies to decentralize the Swiss territory, the spatial 
planning discourse became so abstract and functional that the concepts of ‘city’ and ‘urbanism’ 
were superseded by the concept of ‘communes’ categorized by their size and function. The article 
on spatial planning was incorporated into the Federal Constitution in 1969, which marked the 
progressive movement of the auto-regulatory property market toward the planning tendencies 
(Walter 1994, 13). Although the responsibility for spatial planning legislation was transferred to 
the Confederation, practical planning implementation remained essentially a matter for cantons, 
which in turn often delegated a number of tasks to communal local authorities. Spatial planning 
thus became more of a tool for the regulation of urban growth than a way of thinking about 
territory at the metropolitan level. 
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As is the case in several other European counties, the aesthetic and ethical ideals of Swiss 
urban planners were strongly influenced by the English paradigm of the Garden-City. At 
the beginning of the twentieth century, it seems that there was a consensus around this 
question between the different urban actors in Switzerland. As Walter noticed, this 
model found favor with utopians and progressivists, but also with the socialists and right-
wing liberals. It united the hygienists, urbanists and local authorities and had a very 
important influence between 1910 and 1930 (1994, p. 412). The Garden-City paradigm 
in a strange way united two ideals: the nineteenth century utopians’ dream of the self-
sustaining community, and the aspirations of the English bourgeoisie for a residence in a 
natural environment away from the city. At the center of this idea was again a 
paradoxical sentiment of both nostalgia for the pre-industrial age and a desire for growth 
and progress (see Fishman 1987).  
 
The examples given here are not to be understood as simply an overview of spatial 
practices in Switzerland. Rather my aim is to point out two things: First, that in the 
processes that structure the urban environment, both “small” and “big” actors play 
equally important roles; And second, that the aesthetic dimension always guides end 
influences the processes of decision-making. Beauty has the potential of activating the 
agency of urban actors and fundamentally influencing the realm of the ethical, i.e., the 
realm of actual action. In a particular manner, aesthetic judgments reflect humans’ 
attitudes towards stability or towards change which, I believe, is of fundamental 
importance for those who want to understand the processes that generate the inhabited 
environment.
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Fig. 20 – La condition humaine, René Magritte, 1933 © 2017, ProLitteris, Zurich 
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Landscape as an Aesthetic Place Oscillating Between Pristine 
Nature and Pure Artefact 
On March 11 2012, Switzerland voted on Franz Weber’s initiative “To put a stop to the 
invasive spread of second homes”. Its aim was to prevent the further urbanization of the 
Alpine region. Although the initiative had a number of very strong opponents,43 it was 
accepted by 50.6% of the Swiss population. During the campaign, voters were subjected 
to very powerful pictures of a highly urbanized Matterhorn. Urbanization was presented 
as a threat to the rural ideal — images and romantic discourses evoking the beauty of the 
Alps were among the strongest arguments used by activists during the campaign. Thus a 
new chapter was added to an old disagreement dating back to the time of the popular 
invention of the Alps in the 18th century. The campaign and debates that followed the 
vote demonstrated that the majority of arguments could be reduced to two tendencies 
which were “always presented as being opposed to one another: landscape preservation 
and self-focused development of the mountain areas (…) one champion[ing] a form of 
nostalgia for a rural Switzerland to be preserved from increasing urban development; the 
other speak[ing] of the struggle of peripheral regions to create economic activity” (Petite 
2013).  
 
Franz Weber, who grew up near Basel, studied philosophy and literature at the Sorbonne 
in Paris. In 1965, captivated by the beauty of the Engadine valley, where he was 
spending his holidays, he initiated a campaign to prevent the construction of a resort in 
Haute-Engadine. Having succeeded in this endeavor, he then continued his activism in 
many other regions and became famous for his action to safeguard the terraced vineyards 
of Lavaux, which today is a UNESCO World Heritage Site (see Petite 2013). Aesthetic 
concerns were at the origin of his involvement in ecological activism:  
?
“Our children have the right to enjoy the beauty of our mountain 
landscapes as created by Nature and culture [...] We have to strike a blow 
                                                      
43 “[A]part from the Parliament – the National Council and the Council of the States – which was 
mostly against the initiative, the federal Council also advised the people of Switzerland to vote 
“No”. Numerous other actors were also opposed to it: the cantons (Grisons and Valais), the 
Governmental Conference of Alpine Cantons (GCAC), the Association of mountain populations 
(Groupement pour les populations de montagne) as well as various professional associations and 
lobbies, such as the Swiss Hotel Association, Gastrosuisse, Economiesuisse and the Swiss 
Employers’ Association. The only groups in favour of the initiative were the Ecologist and 
Socialist parties along with some environmental defence associations, such as the WWF and Pro 
Natura” (Petite 2013). 
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against the spread of second homes and save our Swiss homeland” 
(Foundation Weber et Helvetia Nostra, 2012, p.3, translation Petite). 
 
Philippe Roch was another prominent activist who was particularly active in the media. 
His discourses continually point out the importance of protecting beautiful landscapes: 
 
“Economic and demographic pressures demand greater discipline in the 
field of building, planning and development if we are to preserve the 
magnificent garden that Nature has endowed us with. To vote in favour of 
the initiative To Put an End to the Unbridled Construction of Second Homes 
is an act of love for our beautiful country” (translation Petite, 2013). 
 
Weber's romantic landscape ideology is resolutely against the idea of urban development 
in the mountain areas. He argues that landscapes are a thousand times more important 
than the benefits to be gained by a handful of people (Swiss Review, 2014, p.17). At 
what point does a landscape meet the criteria of beautiful? He reveals only that he is 
“completely honest and impartial”, “rely on gut instinct” and that he prefers “manure to 
concrete” (Swiss Review, 2014, p.16-17). For him, urban sprawl, which indeed is a 
widely recognized problem in Switzerland (ARE, 2005), is equated with the city itself: 
 
“We have launched our campaign in part to save tourism. We don’t want a 
city stretching from Lake Constance to Lake Geneva. We don’t want cities 
in mountain areas” (Résidences secondaires: le grand débat de Forum, 
Forum, RTS, 16 february 2012, translation Petite, 2013). 
 
Here one should not mistake ecological awareness with the protection of picturesque 
landscapes. The western sensibility towards landscapes emerged around the nineteenth-
century. At that time, the theory of the picturesque provided an aesthetic ideal, which, in 
turn, led to a boost in Alpine tourism and the appreciation of foreign landscapes. “The 
term picturesque literally means ‘picture-like’ and the theory of the picturesque advocates 
an aesthetic appreciation in which the natural world is experienced as if divided into art-
like scenes, which ideally resemble works of art, as in landscape painting, in both subject 
matter and composition” (Carlson 2015). The construction of the concept of landscape 
was a double process, “first of separating and framing distinct elements from within the 
continuous flow and unbroken unity of nature, and then of creatively reconfiguring these 
parts within a new totality endowed with figural, abstract and, above all, emotional 
significance” (Kemple, n.d., p.8 quoting Simmel). The landscape becomes then “a 
figment of the imagination, a product of the viewer’s own cultural, social and 
psychological constitution” (Lothian 1999, 178).   
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In “The Philosophy of Landscape”, George Simmel draws attention to the common 
mistake of claiming that an actual “feeling for nature” emerged only in modernity: 
“Rather, it is the religions of more primitive epochs that seem to me to reveal a 
particularly deep feeling for ‘nature’. It is only the sensibility for that particular 
formation, a ‘landscape’, that emerged quite late; and that is because this creation 
necessitated a tearing away from that unitary feeling of the whole of nature. (...) nor 
Antiquity, nor the Middle Ages, nor the early Renaissance had any awareness of 
landscape” (Bleicher and Simmel, 2007, p. 23). We observe an interesting detour here. A 
detachment of the “subject” from the “organic whole” (announced with the Cartesian 
split) opened the path to the western conception of the landscape, while at the same time 
this conception was used as a tool to reclaim lost unity.  
 
For Michaël Jakob, the experience of landscape is first of all, an experience of ourselves as 
humans. The subject is not only an observer but a constitutive element of the landscape 
(Jakob 2008, 31-2). For a landscape to emerge, three elements must be present: nature, a 
subject, and a certain relation between the two (2008, 34). In other words, a certain 
space must be produced in order for a landscape to be able to emerge as such. This space 
is precisely the aesthetic space. Indeed, a landscape is an aesthetic place par excellence.  
 
“Pour moi ce qui est beau, c’est la nature. Vraiment ce que personne n’a touché, ce 
qui est vivant de base. Donc je vais faire énormément de balades dans la nature. 
(…) Chez moi dans mon salon par exemple, on n’a peint la mer sur les murs, on a 
fait un paysage. Enfin, on est revenus à la nature !” - Emilia, 57, ville (bord de ville) 
 
Now the question is: What does an experience of landscape teach us? If in the concept of 
landscape there is a certain idea of nature, one must not forget that this conception does 
not stand isolated from a general outlook on the world. Simmel already describes in 1908 
that nature and culture are “only two different ways of looking at the same thing“ 
(Simmel 1997). Indeed, there are as many conceptions of nature as there are societal 
models (fr. modèles de société) (Lévy and Lussault 2013, 716), and this hold true for the 
landscape as well.   
 
“Des paysages que je trouve laids, par exemple, c'est des paysages finalement où la 
vie est tellement, tellement canalisée et oui, non c'est tellement les trucs... que des 
champs de blés, tirés au cordon, avec quarante tonnes d'insecticide et d’herbicide 
partout, et on voit juste, même s'il y a vaguement encore quelque chose qui vit, 
finalement ce qui peut susciter de l'émerveillement ailleurs, ben là il n’y a plus 
grand chose pour en susciter quoi.” - Urs, 42, ville (campagne) 
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“[Photo 4] Ces immeubles sont trop hauts. Rasez-les qu'on voit le Jura ! Mais en 
même temps, est ce qu'il faut que tout soit uniforme ? Non, c'est une époque qui 
fait pas envie, ça.” - Elisabeth, 64, périurbain (périurbain) 
 
“Je suis lausannoise. (…) Ce qui est beau, c'est quand vous êtes dans le bas de 
Lausanne et que vous avez une vue au nord sur tout Lausanne. Ça c'est magnifique. 
Une belle vue sur la ville, une vue soit de bas en haut, soit de haut en bas mais 
quelque chose où on n’a pas le… où on a du dégagement. Voilà. Par contre, je ne 
suis pas du tout sensible aux charmes de la ferme isolée au milieu de la campagne. 
(…) Ça m'angoisse. Trop de vide tue le vide.” - Sabrina, 35, ville (ville) 
 
Other than this essential nature-society couple, there is another equally important pair of 
notions that broadens the understanding of human beings’ place in the world. In the 
discourse on landscape, one will always find people debating the natural-artificial 
dichotomy, where the “artificial” is the antonym of the “natural”.?? 
 
“Là il n'y a plus de nature donc non. Non clairement pas. (…) Trop construit. La 
main de l'homme est partout. Il n'y a plus rien de sauvage.” - Walter, 60, 
périurbain (campagne) 
 
“Pour moi il faut déjà qu’il y a des espaces verts. Si c'est bétonné partout je vais pas 
trouver beau même si l'architecture sera belle. Même si je vais trouver l'architecture 
belle, s'il n'y a pas des espaces verts je ne pourrais pas y vivre. Pour que ça soit beau, 
il faut un peu de nature pour moi.” - Patrick, 34, village (village) 
 
“[Photo 9] Ça c'est l'habitat d'aujourd'hui bien serré, enfin, non il y a pire 
maintenant. Voilà. Deux trois arbres, une caisse, les jeux, général quoi, je ne sais 
pas ce que c'est comme magasin. Bien voilà, ça c'est, il y a personne dessus mais ça 
montre bien un monde surpeuplé. Où tout est serré, tout est fermé. Il y a une 
espèce de cour intérieure, c'est bien joli mais non. Ça n’évoque pas. Vous voyez les 
arbres, ils les ont mis, ils les ont surélevés comme dans des caisses alors, c'est 
comme si on mettait des arbres en caisse donc, la nature elle n'est pas là. Ce n'est 
pas, voilà… On est dans du béton. Béton dessous, béton de côté. Il n’y a pas encore 
de béton dessus, ça va.” - Barbara, 65, périurbain (périurbain) 
 
In this sense, many inhabitants express judgments that mirror Marguerite Burnat-
Provins’s aesthetic positivism from the 1900s. This is by no means unique to 
Switzerland. As Allen Carlson argues, the roots of this view may be traced back to 
eighteenth-century Romantic’s ideas, at the very least, where the primacy of natural 
beauty was considered as the norm for the arts. In the nineteenth century, this became a 
                                                      
44 In general terms, the artificial is related to anything that is made or transformed by humans. 
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common idea within the social circles of landscape artists and others interested in the 
beauty of nature. For example, in 1957, John Ruskin writes: “There is this great 
peculiarity about sky subject, as distinguished from earth subject — that the clouds, not 
being much liable to man’s interference, are always beautifully arranged. You cannot be 
sure of this in any other features of landscape.” (Ruskin 2012, 128-9) This view has 
persisted throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, in the writings and 
activities of authors such as Henry David Thoreau and John Muir, renowned as some of 
the greatest influencers on the preservation of the wilderness. Their ideas continue to 
strongly resonate today through the various forms of environmental protection, but also 
in our day-to-day activities. As Emma Marris, a science journalist observes, “For many 
conservationists, restoration to a pre-human or a pre-European baseline is seen as healing 
a wounded or sick nature. For others, it is an ethical duty. We broke it; therefore we 
must fix it.” As she notes, wild nature for Muir was a necessity for the “tired, nerve-
shaken, over-civilized people” suffering from “the vice of over-industry and the deadly 
apathy of luxury.” (Marris 2011) Again, one can see that a certain idea of nature is always 
developed in relation to a certain vision of society.  
 
David Lowenthal, a geographer and member of the environmental conservation 
movement, writes about how History and Nature alter the present by imposing on 
inhabitants a dream-like image of American scenery. “By contrast with the idealised past, 
the present workday environment is considered not worth looking at. Nature is likewise 
thought preferable to artifice. The favoured landscapes are wild; landscapes altered or 
disturbed or built on by man are considered beneath attention or beyond repair. 
Adoration of the wilderness, like idealisation of the past, focuses attention on the remote 
and the special to the neglect of the nearby and the familiar. Conservationist 
organisations contrast sordid scenes dominated by man with lovely landscapes devoid of 
human activity — telegraph poles versus trees, a mass of people versus a mass of sand. 
The implication is clear: man is dreadful, nature is sublime” (Lowenthal 1968).  
 
Aarne Kinnunen (see Carlson 2005, 75) sharply distinguished the aesthetics of nature 
from the aesthetics of art, the former being positive and the latter negative. The basic 
assumption for positive aesthetics comes from the unquestionable idea that all virgin 
nature is beautiful and that negative criticism only comes into play when man is 
involved. This attribution of positive aesthetic qualities to anything that is natural is 
illustrated by a number of our participants: 
 
“Je pense que la nature pure, peu touché par des humains est en général assez joli.” 
- Thomas, 25, ville (campagne) 
 
  190 
“On a beaucoup voyagé, on a été dans plein d'endroits différents, aussi bien au 
Mexique, dans le Cénode ou dans la forêt ou en Guadeloupe ou n'importe où, je 
n'ai jamais trouvé un endroit nature qui soit laid. Alors là, ben voilà, on peut avoir 
des trucs complètement inesthétiques, foisonnants, un peu fous, mais je trouve que 
ça va, enfin que c'est tellement… Non, la nature est magnifique. Magnifique oui.” 
- Luisa, 42, périurbain (petite ville) 
?
“C’est clair qu'on est très impressionné quand on voit des paysages de désolation 
après des feux de forêt, après des choses comme ça, mais est-ce que c'est laid? Non, 
c'est impressionnant. C’est inhabituel, mais est-ce que la nature est laide ? Il y a des 
animaux qui sont terribles, qui font peut-être, surgir un peu d'angoisse, mais est-ce 
que c'est laid ? Moi, non, je ne vais pas appeler ça laid, non.” - Elisabeth, 64, 
périurbain (périurbain) 
 
“- Est-ce que vous pensez que la nature pure peut être laide ? 
- La nature pure ? Moi je dirais non. Si, elle n’a pas été touchée, non. Si elle est 
pure, elle n’a pas été touchée par l’homme. Moi je pense que tout ce qui est naturel, 
moi je dirais que c’est beau. Disons, je ne pense pas maintenant, à quoi je pourrais 
penser maintenant, qui serait laid dans la nature ? Non je ne vois pas.  
- Donc, la laideur vient plutôt avec l’homme ? 
- Ah, oui. Qu’est-ce qui peut être laid dans la nature ? Non. Je ne saurais pas à quoi 
penser.” - Martha, 65, ville (campagne) 
 
“- Est-ce que vous pensez que la nature pure peut être laide ? 
- Non, donc, la nature extérieure, pas la nature des gens, pas la nature de la nature. 
Non, je ne pense pas. Je pense qu’elle peut être très forte, très dure. Par exemple je 
n’aime pas trop les Alpes. Parce que c’est  une roche qui est pour moi pointue, 
agressante, cassante. J’aime beaucoup plus la rondeur du Jura. Mais on dirait de ces 
Alpes, si on utilise un terme anglais, on dirait : « oh ! c’est dramatic ! », donc ce 
n’est pas laid. C’est vraiment que ça suggère une atmosphère dure, un volcan, ce 
qui reste d’un volcan, des terres comme dans Lanzarote, et tout ça, c’est tout noir, 
mais c’est impressionnant !” - Brigitte, 61, ville (campagne) 
 
“Je ne pense pas que la nature, ça peut pas être laid. Nous on la rend laide, mais la 
nature en général n'est pas laide.” - Sara, 48, ville (campagne) 
 
“Je choisirai les endroits qui sont plutôt jolis à des endroits qui sont culturellement 
hyper intéressants. Je préférais les paysages aux villes, parce que personnellement je 
trouve que la nature est plus belle que la construction.” - Christine, 40, périurbain 
(banlieue) 
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Allen Carlson offers three possible justifications for positive aesthetics, and at the same 
time, provides us with arguments to the contrary. I will present a summary of his 
position, because it sheds light on some important theories that continue to influence 
many writers and scholars today. First, he refers to theories, upheld by authors such as 
Robert Elliot or Harold Osborne, that consider the experience of pristine nature as not 
being genuinely aesthetic. According to this view, nature can only be evaluated without 
judgment, whereas artifacts, as intentional objects shaped and designed by their authors, 
can be submitted to our judgments and aesthetic criticism. The essential problem of this 
view is that it suggests that nature is a sort of extra-social element and simply ignores the 
fact that the concept of nature itself is a social construct (see Rolston 1997). The same 
criticism can be addressed to the second group of authors, such as Burke and Kant, who 
held that the natural world is in a way outside of our control, since no artist creates it. 
According to this viewpoint, the appreciation of nature, which is potentially seen as a 
source of fear and death, dissolves into the positive aesthetic category of the sublime that 
designates the “amazement, wonder, or awe in the face of nature’s threatening otherness” 
(Carlson 2005, 79). The major error is that the theory of sublime suggests that “because 
the natural world is alien in the sense of not being of our making, it is therefore beyond 
our understanding”. Although the natural world, as Carlson writes, is not an artifact, this 
does not mean we cannot understand it. “It only means that we cannot come to 
understand it as we can understand an artifact, that is, in virtue of creating it” (Carlson 
2005, 79). Even what Carlson writes might not always be true, for a person’s 
understanding of nature can be informed by works of art. Such is the case with the 
notion of landscape, whose emergence happens to be a paradoxical process since a 
landscape was, in a sense, an artistic representation before it became a daily reality. As 
Jakob observes, a landscape is a copy that preceded the original (Jakob 2008, 32). The 
third group of authors are advocates for the idea that pure nature is always beautiful and 
rely on the well-known “theist view that the natural world is designed, created, and 
maintained by an all-knowing and all-powerful God” (Carlson 2005, 81). It is thus 
pointless to discuss its beauty since, being of divine origin, it is a perfect world. This 
position, as Carlson puts it, “suggests that the theist has a unique kind of aesthetic 
appreciation of nature”, which, in turn, “is counterintuitive in light of both the theist 
position on the problem of evil and the historical point of view of Christian theism” 
(Carlson 2005, 84). This is why, in order to find a justification for positive aesthetics, as 
researchers we must look to what seems to be the reality that this view opposes itself 
against, i.e., the world of humans and societies that they make (or destroy) with their acts 
and intentions. If I closely analyze the discourse of inhabitants who participated in my 
study, one can see that the artificial is often used to indicate some negative, false or 
deceptive aspect of a given societal situation:  
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“- Peut-être aussi la beauté, on pourrait lui dire qu'elle serait peut-être plus 
naturelle, alors que la laideur aurait quelque chose d'artificiel peut-être. (…) 
- Qu'est-ce que tu entends par l’artificiel ? 
- Dans le sens d'un artifice qui a été comme, je ne sais pas moi, du maquillage sur 
une femme. Du maquillage trop lourd dans ce sens-là par exemple. Quelque chose 
qui fait pas, qui, où on voit que la main  de l'homme est intervenue dans un sens 
négatif. Alors que le naturel, ça serait par exemple comme pour Rousseau qui dit 
que tous les hommes sont bons, etc., et naissent beaux, etc. Donc ça serait peut-être 
cette théorie, l’état naturel, sauvage, d'innocence. C’est peut-être ça lié à la beauté. 
- Donc est-ce que tu penses que la nature pure ne peut pas être laide ? 
- Non, je pense que très souvent, on la considèrera même comme laide, ou 
comme… Mais ce que je veux dire dans les définitions ou dans ce que ça évoque, 
on pourrait peut-être voir l'intervention comme quelque chose de négatif ou 
disons, l'artificiel comme quelque chose de laid, mais je pense que la nature peut 
être laide aussi. Il y a aussi l'idée d'un, typiquement, d'un jardin qu'on laisse à l'état 
sauvage, avec des mauvaises herbes... etc. Peut-être on le verra plus, si on devait le 
qualifier, on le verra plus comme laid, qu'un jardin qui a été parfaitement 
entretenu et... 
- Dans ce cas-là, est-ce que tu peux me redire ce que tu entends par artificiel ? 
- Peut-être... dans artificiel y a aussi la notion de, « qui cherche à tromper » aussi, 
« qui cherche à cacher », ce qui serait peut-être, comme un artifice, comme un 
dispositif, comme une astuce ou quelque chose comme ça qui serait peut-être de la 
tromperie. C’est peut-être aussi ça que je voyais dans l'artificiel. Dans le sens où il y 
a un agenda de quelqu'un qui va dire, là j'aimerais bien que ça, ça représente ça, 
donc je vais faire la chose de cette manière-là, comme ça. Artificiellement, on aura 
l'idée d'une représentation qui est celle que je voulais en fait. C’est ça aussi dans 
« artificiel ».” - Lucas, 29, ville (ville) 
 
“[Photo 11] Tout a été refait. Mais ça ne fait rien, c'est plaisant et puis les couleurs 
sont en harmonie. Un petit coin plus intime dans une ville et puis qui n'est pas fait 
pour les touristes. Ça ne donne pas un côté artificiel. Même si c'est visiblement très 
récent, c'est fait pour les habitants.” - Elisabeth, 64, périurbain (périurbain) 
 
“- [Photo 6] Oui, c'est presque carte postale (rire) … avec les vignes, beaucoup de 
vert, les maisons qui ont… oui… ces toits pointus qui, je trouve, s'intègrent bien. 
C'est peut-être l'image que j'ai de mes grands-parents (rire), mais voilà ! Ça je 
trouve très, très joli, oui. Oui, on ne voit aucune marque vraiment fortement 
artificielle, de route ou autre. Pas de grue. C’est plus la nature qui maîtrise le 
paysage. 
- Vous pensez que là… ? 
- Alors, bien sûr, les maisons, c'est artificiel. 
- Mais les vignes, ce n'est pas artificiel ? 
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- Si, si, c'est artificiel, bien sûr. Mais… c'est pas (rire)… c'est un autre niveau 
d'artificialité (rire) ! Puis sur l'esthétique, je pense qu'il y a des éléments artificiels 
qui sont, oui, qui sont plus positifs que d'autres.” - Martin, 22, ville (ville) 
 
“[Photo 1] Je regarde ce que je trouve laid parce que pour l'instant y a pas grand-
chose que je trouve moche, parce que ces petites maisons, je les aime bien. J’adore 
les arches, c'est quelque chose que j'adore. J’adorerais avoir des portes comme ça, 
après les vignes, bon ben voilà c'est la nature, c'est beau. On sait que quand on est 
là-haut on voit le lac et puis que c'est magnifique. Ben plus c'est gros, moins je 
trouve joli en fait. Plus c'est petit, plus je trouve joli. C’est un peu ça.” - Christine, 
40, périurbain (banlieue) 
 
Christine’s last thought sheds light on an interesting phenomenon. A picturesque wine-
growing village of St. Saphorin, surrounded by vine terraces created and then continually 
maintained by humans since at least the eleventh century, is perceived as a natural 
environment. ‘Natural’ thus comes close to equating something with being ‘authentic’; in 
other words, it is related to the reproduction of existing, as a sort of possibility of 
returning to the golden-age (Lévy and Lussault 2013, 106). An authentic environment is 
always an apparently stable organic environment devoid of inner tensions and 
contradictions (if such contradictions exist, they are usually dismissed as being artificial). 
When looking at the photograph of St. Saphorin, Elisabeth and Patrick specifically point 
out the artificial character of railroads that somehow deteriorate the organic unity of the 
village and its surrounding environment:  
 
“- [Photo 1] Mais ça c'est superbe! C’est superbe. Ben il y a justement une unité, là, 
de la partie bâtie avec encore juste l'église, mais c'est absolument fabuleux ! C'est 
clair que si on voulait faire quelque chose qui serait artificiel, mais impeccable, on 
effacerait les marques visibles du chemin de fer. Mais ce chemin de fer il est 
tellement indispensable et puis il apporte lui-même, quand on y passe, une telle 
vue. Non ces vignobles en terrasses, et puis le grand mur en haut, on ne peut pas, il 
est pas non, il fait partie du paysage, je pense qu'il est nécessaire pour le soutien. 
Non c'est un très bel endroit pour moi. Il n’y a pas non plus de constructions qui 
sont vraiment parasites, là. 
- Quand vous dites « parasites », vous pensez à quoi? 
- Je pense à des choses qui n'ont pas des raisons historiques comme celle-là et puis 
qui seraient du mitage du territoire. Sans relation directe avec la culture de la vigne. 
On connait très bien le village vigneron qui est très serré.” - Elisabeth, périurbain 
(périurbain) 
 
“[Photo 1] C’est tout ce que j'aime. On est sur le lac, il y a des vignobles, la forêt. 
Un petit village en bas, le paysage varié, donc en général ça me plait. Après, il y a 
des éléments qui sont moins beaux parce qu'il y a une ligne de train avec des pilots, 
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même deux, en bas il y a une autre. Avec les murs, ça fait beaucoup de lignes. Dans 
le même sens, ça dérange un petit peu. Et si on prend plus spécifiquement au 
niveau de village, des volets, s'ils avaient été tous rouges — plutôt que là, il y a un 
qui est vert, et puis il y a un bleu, là c'est bordeaux rouge — ça aurait été plus 
harmonieux.”  
- Tu penses que ce qui coupe un peu l'harmonie est la présence des différentes 
couleurs ? 
- Oui. Les couleurs et là, par exemple, il y a énormément de vitres alors qu'ailleurs 
c'est plutôt des petites fenêtres et puis après il y a deux grosses maisons plus à écart, 
encore une autre là-bas. Là, c'est tout concentré donc ça fait un peu bizarre aussi. 
C'est bizarre. On a l'impression que ça n'a rien à faire au milieu. (…)  Si on regarde 
l'église, j'aimerais un toit plus pointu. Le clocher fait un peu bas par rapport à la 
hauteur de la montagne. Et puis il n'a pas la même pente que le reste de l'église. Ça 
aurait été plus joli s'il avait la même pente que l'autre. Quand c'est bien pointu, ça 
fait plus l'église. Là, on dirait qu'il s'est effondré et puis ils ont fait au plus simple, 
au moins cher, disons, qui est quand même beau. C'est peut-être nouveau. Ce n'est 
pas ce qu'on voit tous les jours, les toits pointus, un coque dessus.” - Patrick, 34, 
village (village) 
 
Authentic usually means untouched by modernity. With authenticity comes the question 
of unity. Indeed, all authentic environments aim at an effect of unity. Categories of unity 
and disunity are first and foremost aesthetic categories, as first recognized by 
Schopenhauer (1957 [1883], appendix on architecture). Indeed, he argued that the effect 
of unity boils down to an effect of style. This is why I will focus my attention on the 
problem of style, which gained particularly importance with the rise of modernity and 
the particular societal conditions that emerged with it. 
Modernity and the Problem of Style 
“Vreme je s druge strane brda, tamo gde počinje svetski 
haos, ili haos apsolutno-otvorenog sveta.”  
Radomir Konstantinović  
 
The deep societal and environmental changes that took place after the rise of big cities in 
the nineteenth-century were perhaps the fundamental reason why urban questions 
became the focus of sudden interest. This shift was a reaction to changes happening in 
the lives and values of communities – changes that were different from anything else 
humanity had experienced before. In this new experience called ‘modernity’, the 
experience of space and time, of the self and of others, radically changed. Marshal 
  195 
Berman argues that we still live in the modern era, which endlessly creates the world 
anew:  
 
“To be modern is to find ourselves in an environment that promises us 
adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of ourselves and the world 
— and, at the same time, that threatens to destroy everything we have, 
everything we know, everything we are. Modern environments and 
experiences cut across all boundaries of geography and ethnicity, of class 
and nationality, of religion and ideology: in this sense, modernity can be 
said to unite all mankind. But it is a paradoxical unity, a unity of disunity: 
It pours us all into a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal, of 
struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish. To be modern is to 
be part of a universe in which, as Marx said, ‘all that is solid melts into air’. 
People who find themselves in the midst of this maelstrom are apt to feel 
that they are the first ones, and maybe the only ones, to be going through 
it; This feeling has engendered numerous nostalgic myths of pre-modern 
Paradise Lost” (Berman 1988, 15).  
 
Today, like in the nineteenth century’s growing cities, one is faced with the challenge of 
how to move and live in this ever-changing environment. The principal aim of this thesis 
is to find in aesthetic categories an entry point into how modern men and women 
constitute themselves as subjects. The idea is to shed more light, from an aesthetic angle, 
on how they struggle between individuality and generality, i.e., how they find a way to 
simultaneously individuate themselves and exist as a part of unifying encompassing 
context. Simmel argued that each modern individual has two main choices: either to 
become a unity himself or herself, or to join a unity as a serving partner (Simmel 1991, 
70). Using an idealized model, the choice can be seen as one between a society of 
individuals, or a community of more or less homogenous social order. It would be fair to 
say that as humans, we all oscillate between these two models of society, which never 
actually become fully actualized. The category of style can help observe both the 
individualization of the modern subject and its inclusion in one or several models of 
society. 
 
Style is always the function of uniformity (Konstantinović 1981, author’s translation). 
Each and every style is an unfurling of a certain outlook on the world, and thus an 
insistence on stylistic unity is always an insistence on a certain coherence regarding the 
way someone inhabits the world. At first sight, style subjugates an individual thing to 
some general law that also applies to other things. In other words, to stylize means to 
generalize. It means to isolate a particular spatial substance that allows one to organize 
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non-identical things into a finite order of similitude, to isolate a common denominator 
among a group of objects or events. A stylized rose, as Simmel writes, is “supposed to 
represent the general character of a rose, the style of rose, not the individual character of 
a specific rose”. This means that the concept of style is “a means of establishing 
relationships among individual works of art” (Ackerman 1962), which is also true for any 
other societal object (when someone says that two houses are constructed in the same 
style, it implies that they possess some qualities that negate their individual nature and 
carry the note of generality). Precisely how these relationships are established is the 
problem of aesthetics. Style has to be recognized as such, and this, as Andrew Benjamin 
writes, involves a relationship between “appearance, recognition and identification” 
(Benjamin 2006 p.x). What allows observers to perceive the fusion of Byzantine, Islamic 
and Latin Christian architectural forms as corresponding to the distinguished Venetian 
style involves a certain imaginative process that happens precisely at the aesthetic level. It 
is in the nature of world that two separate objects or events cannot share all of their 
properties, but it is in the nature of human thought that object or events are understood 
only through the similitudes that humans perceive, conceive or imagine they share.  
 
The problem of style is always connected with the problem of identity and 
transformation. The invention of historicity, as Benjamin understood it, was an attempt 
to establish a continuity that was broken by modernity. Although it would be wrong to 
assume that arguments for continuity are somehow the denial of the modern, it is also 
true that to affirm modernity implies a certain affirmation of the discontinuity 
(Benjamin 2006, p.xiv). Historicity involves continuity, novelty discontinuity. What 
unites us with the nineteenth-century modern world, according to Berman, are “the 
contradictory forces and needs that inspire and torment us: our desire to be rooted in a 
stable and coherent personal and social past, and our insatiable desire for growth — not 
merely for economic growth but for growth in experience, in pleasure, in knowledge, in 
sensibility — growth that destroys both the physical and social landscapes of our past, 
and our emotional links with those lost worlds.” (Berman 1988, 35). These inner 
tensions are clearly expressed in the following aesthetic judgments: 
 
“Écoutez je n'ai pas l'habitude de choisir les choses que je trouve laides. Je ne sais 
pas, si vous prenez mon bureau ici, eh bien, j'ai éliminé toute modernité, parce que 
bon voilà, c'est mon gout. Et je trouve que ce bureau est bien, voilà, pour moi. 
Donc, j’ai aménagé ce bureau alors que si vous allez dans tous les autres bureaux, ils 
ont des meubles complètement standardisés.” - David, 65, périurbain (ville).  
 
“Je pense que j’ai de la peine avec tout ce qui est moderne en fait. Alors qu’il y a un 
moderne [appartement] qui peut être super beau. Mais pour moi c’est que du 
pratique, des logements pratiques, utiles.” - Emilia, 57, ville (bord de ville).   
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“Comme je disais, des fois on est un peu… on peut trouver moches aussi des choses 
juste parce qu'on regrette quelque part une perte d'une certaine beauté. Je pense 
aussi peut-être que c'est dans ce sens-là qu'on peut être déjà presque irrité, par un 
chantier dans un quartier comme ça [photo 2]. (…) C’est vrai quand je repense 
maintenant à Saint Saphorin, c'est vrai que quelque part, d'un côté, y a quelque 
chose d'un peu artificiel aussi, de garder comme ça un village très homogène, 
qu’avec des maisons anciennes pratiquement où il n’y a presque pas une maison un 
peu plus contemporaine. Mais c'est d'un autre coté de moi.” - Urs, 42, ville 
(campagne) 
 
“J'aurais de la facilité à considérer quelque chose de beau, en terme d'architecture, 
etc., comme quelque chose de plutôt ancien. Il y a quelque chose d'assez, je 
pense… il y a pas mal de gens qui ont peut-être cet a priori. (…) Ce qui est plus 
ancien, néoclassique ou j'en sais rien, aura plutôt, sera vu comme beau.” - Lucas, 
29, ville (ville) 
 
“Chez mes grands-parents, il y a des trucs comme ça à l'intérieur. C'est une vieille 
ferme, que mon grand-père a retapée et y a des endroits où il a laissé les poutres 
comme ça. (…) Je suis allé parfois à la montagne. On allait dans des chalets et puis 
les balcons, ça ressemble un peu à des balcons de chalets. Mais je pense que dans 
ma tête, un peu, j'ai l'impression de facilement associer beau et ancien. Je ne sais 
pas pourquoi.” - Amir, 25, ville (ville) 
 
“[Photo 11] Oui, je trouve ça, c'est encore pas mal oui. Dans le genre paysage 
urbain, je trouve que c'est encore pas mal. (…) Mais ça, c'est typiquement le genre 
de trucs qu'à 20 ans, j'aurais trouvé ça moche. Alors ça c'est sûr. (…) Moi à 20 ans, 
pour moi un centre-ville, ça devait être comme Bâle ou Berne, en tous cas, des 
coins comme ça avec pratiquement que des bâtiments médiévaux anciens comme 
ça, médiévaux, en tous cas d'avant le XIXe disons.” - Urs, 42, ville (campagne)  
 
“[Photo 16] C’est à Genève. Ça c’est bien, c’est beau. Ça c’est peu comme le style 
de ce quartier ici. Oui ça c’est magnifique. J’aime bien. Parce que ça fait aussi 
penser un peu à Paris. Avec ces appartements mansardés et puis les toits en ardoise. 
Ça c’est vraiment… oui, belle époque, c’est très beau. Ça aussi, très beau, un peu à 
l’italienne, un peu néo-renaissance. Ça je trouve que c’est chouette. (…) Parfois je 
suis frappé par des gens qui ne regardent même pas, qui disent tout de suite « ah 
oui, voilà. Tout ce qui est plus vieux que 1500 c’est beau et tout ce qui est après, 
c’est laid ». (…) D’abord je dirais que c’est une sorte de mainstream, actuellement, 
quand on demande, je ne parle pas des architectes, des professionnels, mais disons 
chez les gens. Ils ne regardent même pas quelque chose qui est moderne. Il y a 
beaucoup de gens pour qui c’est a priori laid. Alors, pourquoi ? On est dans une 
époque où on pense que l’ancien est beau et le nouveau pas beau ? (…) Il y a une 
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part de nostalgie, je pense. Ça, les gens aiment parce qu’ils ont l’impression que 
c’est le bon vieux temps. (…) C’est le côté idylle, le paradis perdu, etc.” - Peter, 63, 
ville (ville) 
 
Stagnation occurs when thoughts and objects are perpetually replicated, but it is also true 
that unlimited variation is usually perceived as disjointed or chaotic. Modern individuals 
must position themselves between the consistency of a controlled, reassuring 
environment, often epitomized in the ideal of historicity, and the excitement of novelty 
which is always seen as otherness, as something that opposes itself to stylization, or as a 
mere negation of an existing style. Researchers must also be careful not to create an abyss 
between two apparently opposing ideals. As George Kubler writes in “The Shape of 
Time”, “invention is misunderstood in two ways: both as a dangerous departure from 
routine, or as an unconsidered lapse into the unknown. (…) Many societies have 
accordingly proscribed all recognition of inventive behavior, preferring to reward ritual 
repetition, rather than to permit inventive variations. On the other hand no form of 
society ever can be devised to allow each person the liberty to vary his actions 
indefinitely. Every society functions like a gyroscope to hold the course despite the 
random private forces of deflection” (Kubler 2008, 61-2). His argument is that 
innovation slowly emerges from habit, i.e., from long sequences of repetitiveness. This 
fact was theoretically recognized, perhaps for the first time, in 1946, by Lefebvre in his 
“Critique de la vie quotidienne”, where he argued that the triviality of the everyday holds 
a distinct potential for creative energy.  
 
Yet, there seems to be a significant difference in the dynamics of change between various 
environments. As it concentrates diverse urban actors on a dense territory, the city 
generates change through the intensity of its interactions. The cityscape and streetscape 
of the modern city are rapidly changing, perpetually leaving a trace of the changes 
occurring in the values of society. The heterogeneity of cities’ urban and architectural 
styles thus reflects the complexity of the urban space and social interactions. More than 
any other spatial configuration, the city is a place of coexistence for a variety of styles. 
“The full range of artistic careers, from precursors to rebels, thus can unfold only under 
metropolitan conditions, when a wide selection of active sequences is available” (Kubler 
2008, 88). This necessarily produces some drawbacks as well. The consequence of the 
unprecedented acceleration of trade and population of big cities is an increasing 
awareness of the need to protect our cultural and urban heritage. Innovation, replication, 
and mutation, as Kubler writes, are continuously conversing through time. What will be 
protected and how it will be protected is constantly submitted to the process of societal 
negotiation. The concerns of the aesthetic are also what simply ‘fits in’, and what does 
not. This choice is most often an aesthetic choice, though sometimes it is difficult to 
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admit this. Style, which epitomizes the problem of sameness and difference, of fitness 
and unfitness, is an issue that kept cropping up in all of the thirty interviews I 
conducted: 
 
“Lausanne, franchement, personnellement, je ne trouve pas qu’elle soit une belle 
ville. Il y’a un tel mélange de toutes les architectures, pas nécessairement très 
pensées, comme s’ils avaient fait au meilleur marché ou quoi. On construit un 
cube, pouf ! On en met les gens dedans et voilà. Tellement hétéroclite comme ça, 
tu as une maison comme ça, après tu as une autre différente. L’esthétique à 
Lausanne, en tout cas, l’urbanisme lausannois, je trouve que c’est assez 
catastrophique. Voilà, c’est ça ce que je peux dire de Lausanne. Je ne trouve pas que 
Lausanne soit une belle ville.” - Chantal, 65, périurbain (campagne) 
 
“[Photo 1] Ça s’accorde bien ensemble. Les maisons, déjà, sont, comment le dire, 
en harmonie, parce qu’ils ont respecté une même architecture. S’ils ont mis 
n’importe quoi, certainement, moins jolie. Ça ferait certainement moins un bel 
ensemble, le tout. Voilà, et même le village lui-même, s’ils avaient construit un truc 
moderne, en fait, sans respecter l’architecture générale, il n’aurait surement pas 
cette harmonie générale. Et puis les toits. Tu retrouves la couleur, la forme, en fin, 
non-moi je trouve c’est très harmonieux.” - Chantal, 65, périurbain (campagne)  
 
“- Qu’est ce qu'il faut pour qu'un espace habité soit beau ? 
- Bon déjà il faut que ce soit en harmonie avec ce qui est autour. Soit au niveau de 
la couleur, soit au niveau de la grandeur, de la taille et du style aussi. Si on a par 
exemple un village avec vingt maisons et puis qu'il y a quinze qui sont différentes 
totalement les unes des autres ça va pas être un beau village. Il faut quand même 
qu'il y a un style commun à toutes.” - Patrick, 34, village (village) 
 
“[Photo 14] C’est à Montreux, oui. Les styles très différents, avec ce truc 
extraordinaire. Ensuite le truc moderne, ça, c’est une belle façade, je pense, années 
20, 30, hein ? Mais j’aime bien ! Ça aussi, c’est un peu dépareillé, mais l’ensemble 
est plutôt chouette. (…) Alors, je trouve que quand il y a une certaine unité, même 
s’il y a certains éléments qui ne sont pas géniaux, il y a toujours quelque chose 
d’intéressant, dans l’unité. Alors là aussi, on peut voir sûrement deux ou trois 
choses qui ne sont pas prises isolément, qui ne sont pas extraordinaires. Mais il y a 
une certaine unité. Ensuite, je trouve que quand on mélange les styles, mais que 
chaque élément a une certaine beauté à soi, ça peut aussi devenir intéressant. (…) 
Là c’est un peu comme une femme qui s’habille un peu avec des trucs, qui mélange 
les styles, mais chaque habit a une certaine qualité.” - Peter, 63, ville (ville) 
 
“Les villes, elles sont telles qu’elles sont. Et puis, à moins si vous voulez vraiment 
faire une belle scène, il faudrait presque tout raser pour refaire, donc vous ne 
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pouvez pas. Là, chaque bâtiment est très différent les uns des autres, il y en a pas un 
qui est semblable. Donc c’est pour ça aussi que ça fait qu’il y a pas tellement de 
charme. Mais ça ne me dérange pas. Mais de là à dire que c’est une belle scène, 
non. Non. ” - Mériel, 65, périurbain (ville) 
 
“[Photo 10] Il n’y a pas vraiment d’unité finalement, t’as l’impression que les 
périodes architecturales cohabitent, ils changent un bâtiment pour en construire un 
autre, puis le style va avec celui de l’époque. Mais il n’y a pas trop d’unité. J’étais à 
Londres le weekend passé et là-bas, toutes les maisons c’est toutes les mêmes 
couleurs pratiquement. Il y a une unité, comme en Hollande aussi. Toutes les 
maisons ont le même style, la même couleur, alors ça peut être un peu ennuyeux, 
d’un certain point de vue. Ce qu’on a pas en Suisse, justement, nous, on n’a, je 
trouve, qu’on n’a pas un style de maison. On a plusieurs styles. Alors voilà, je 
trouve assez typique de la Suisse.” - Claudia, 34, périurbain (petite ville) 
 
“- Belles maisons à colombages. Là je vois aussi Strasbourg. C’est sympa. Ça c'est 
un quartier qui me plait, qui me plait beaucoup. Alors il y a du moderne, du plus 
ancien. J’aime bien le mélange, même le colombage qui est très ancien, je trouve 
que ça a beaucoup de charme. Ça c'est très esthétique, c'est très joli. Et cette bâtisse 
moderne, celle-là elle me plait. Et bien de nouveau, il y a beaucoup de fenêtres, 
donc j'imagine beaucoup de lumière. Et puis ces vieux bâtiments sont absolument 
magnifiques. Je trouve que c'est de la belle architecture qui a été bien rénovée avec 
de belles pierres blanches. C’est un joli quartier. Là, je pourrais presque m’y voir 
habiter. J’aime bien cette photo. (…). Là, ce mélange-là ne me dérange pas du tout, 
alors qu'il y a quand même trois styles complètement différents. Trois, voire même 
quatre avec ce bâtiment qui ne ressemble pas du tout a celui-là. Ça, oui c'est un 
mélange qui me plait. Je trouve ça très esthétique. 
- Pourquoi ? 
- Je ne sais pas. Je trouve que c'est harmonieux. Je ne vais pas reparler des couleurs, 
je me tais. Non, mais voilà, de nouveau les couleurs sont apaisantes, jolies. 
Étonnamment, le gris qui me déplaisait sur d'autres bâtiments ici, ne me déplait 
pas. Mais c'est marié à cette espèce de bleu-gris comme ça, donc j'aime beaucoup. 
Ça, c'est du récent que j'aime bien. Oui. Et puis ce colombage, je trouve ça 
absolument magnifique quoi, c'est de toute beauté.” - Luisa, 42, périurbain (petite 
ville) 
 
“[Photo 7] Ça, ça me plait nettement moins. Voilà de nouveau, tout ce qui est 
trop, toutes ces maisons contigües, qui se ressemblent les unes les autres”- Luisa, 
42, périurbain (petite ville) 
 
“Maintenant, mon impression c'est que tout le monde peut faire n'importe quoi. 
Dans le même village là à Saint Livres, il y avait plein de règlements et tout ça, et 
puis tout d'un coup, je suis remontée après quelques années, je vois des immeubles 
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en béton, des balcons en béton, ces espèces de trucs qu'on verrait, je ne sais pas, sur 
voilà une côte grecque pour un hôtel, mais pas là ! Alors, je ne sais pas ce qui s'est 
passé, mais dans les règlements communaux, y a un truc qui m'échappe quoi. Je me 
dis, en fait dans les communes, l'esthétique elle était aussi importante puisqu’on ne 
voulait pas dénaturer la cohésion du village avec ces maisons qui avaient une 
cohésion entre elles, puis maintenant, on s'en fiche, on démolit, puis on fait des 
immeubles et puis ils sont tous les mêmes.” - Barbara, 65, périurbain (périurbain) 
 
“[Photo 1] - Ça je trouve beau. Alors déjà le fait que ça ne soit pas tout plat. Le 
mélange nature et main de l'homme. Le fait que ça soit au bord du lac. Les types de 
murs, j'aime bien ça. Les maisons aussi. Alors ce que j'aime bien dans les maisons, 
quoi, les ... le fait qu’elles ne soient pas toutes droites, mais qu'elles soient un peu 
bordéliques si on peut dire. Les couleurs aussi qui sont, bon ça n'a rien 
d'exceptionnel, mais, sympathique. Voilà en gros c'est plus ou moins ça. Puis ça va, 
on ne voit pas trop le train, la ligne de train, donc ça va. 
- Tu penses que la ligne de train, elle est moche ? 
- La ligne de train en soi non, mais quand il y a le train qui passe tout le temps, je 
pense c'est un peu ... enfin moi, je ne sais pas, je n'habite pas là-bas, mais je pense 
que ça peut gêner un petit peu. 
- Et le village tu le trouves beau? 
- Oui, je l'aime bien, parce qu'il est un peu bordélique comme ça et puis que les 
maisons elles n'ont pas toutes la même hauteur. On ne s'ennuie pas en le regardant. 
Voilà c'est peut-être ça, ce que je n’aime pas en fait chez moi c'est qu'on s'ennuie 
en regardant... 
- Tu penses que là il y a une variété qui peut être... 
- Oui, il y a une variété, tout en ayant le même style. Parce que, y a une variété 
dans les types de toits, la hauteur, la largeur, l'assemblage, mais y a quand même un 
style dans le sens où, on n’a pas un grand bloc, rien à voir avec ça, les tons de 
couleurs sont plus ou moins pareils. Bon c'est quand même, c'est tous des toits 
pointus, y a des petites variations entre eux, mais y a quand même le même style, y 
a partout des cheminées, y a ces volets qui ne sont pas de la même couleur, mais 
qui sont partout plus ou moins pareils. Oui. Voilà c'est ça.” - Amir, 25, ville (ville)  
 
“[Photo 16] Ça me plait parce que c'est… il y a de l'unité. Même si vous prenez 
comme ça, il y a de l'unité imaginée, car c'est un peu un autre style. Non-moi je 
trouve ça plaisant.” - David, 65, périurbain (ville) 
 
There should be no confusion. Not every kind of unity is necessarily perceived in a 
positive manner. Unity is always a unity of something, and this “something” always bears 
the ethical and the political dimension. The repetitive character of low-income housing 
(often referred to as “blocs sovietiques”) excites different judgements than the uniformity 
of Haussmann facades in Paris or the organicity of the whitewashed villages of Puglia, 
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Andalusia or Greece. The appeal of the earlier pre-industrial environment lies in the 
apparent unity of the unique and the general – a unity expressed in the consensus 
regarding the question of style. The feeling of a “Paradise Lost” is in fact a reaction to the 
disintegration of the stylistic uniformity of the pre-modern time, as Simmel argued in 
1991 (1991). It is in this sense that is important for researchers to take into account the 
persistence of the suburban ideal, and the appeal of the picturesque ideal. The traditional 
picturesque town symbolizes lost ‘organicism’ while the suburban ideal is a chance for a 
unity regained. 
 
Et bien c'est un petit peu, c'est un peu comme l'histoire de Saint Saphorin quoi. 
C'est-à-dire, je pense qu'il y a des centres-villes comme ça, des fois ou justement 
conservés qui nous renvoient par exemple assez clairement vers une époque 
historique par exemple ou bien vers un style de vie qui est peut être aussi différent 
du nôtre maintenant ou des choses comme ça, et puis du coup ça génère comme ça 
des associations positives en fait, même de ce fait là en fait. Je ne sais pas si on 
prend par exemple...qu'est ce qu'il y a comme ça, je ne sais pas, certaine villes 
méridionales ou comme ça, à quoi je pensais par exemple...ben en Italie par 
exemple, il y pas mal de villes comme ça où on a vraiment l'impression quand on se 
promène (…) on est comme ça vraiment renvoyés vers un passé quand même 
relativement lointain. C’est ça. Je pense que des fois, pour moi, c'est peut-être ça le 
côté un petit peu idyllique. C'est, finalement, c'est aussi des choses qui nous 
renvoient vers un autre monde qu'on idéalise peut-être aussi d'une certaine manière 
et puis des histoires un peu comme ça.” - Urs, 42, ville (campagne) 
 
At the same time, too much unity might appear as disturbing as the total absence of 
unity. 
 
“[Photo 7] Monotone, monotone, monotone et puis bon, ben, ce toit, c'est 
probablement pas des idées très nouvelles, mais ce toit vu de l'extérieur me semble 
pas très gracieux. (…) Il n'est pas très intéressant. Surtout quand il se répète comme 
ça.” - Elisabeth, périurbain (périurbain) 
 
“[Photo 10] Alors je trouve que c'est dommage de mélanger les genres, voilà. J’ai 
plus aimé ce petit quartier résidentiel où il n’y avait que des petites maisons un peu 
pareilles, des jolies maisons villageoises, enfin il y a avait cela dit, une maison 
moderne au milieu, ça, ça ne me déplaisait pas. Maintenant de mélanger les gros 
immeubles, avec des anciennes maisons qui sont plus typiques, je trouve ça un petit 
peu dommage.” - Luisa, 42, périurbain (petite ville) 
 
Human beings’ preoccupation with style is first a preoccupation with time, with change. 
A change in style always marks the passage of time, for style is always a sign of 
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continuity, of stability. It eliminates inner contradictions and evokes consistency, 
neatness and security. The constitution of style is always a mark of a victory of being over 
becoming. Any preoccupation with style is automatically a preoccupation with a societal 
change. The question “In what style shall we build?” is another way of asking “In what 
society shall we live?” If researchers wish to explore the nature of change, the best thing 
to do is to ask people if they find cities ugly or beautiful: 
 
“[Photo 11] Moi j'adore l’assemblage comme ça. Il y a des bâtiments, ben, je passe 
de temps en temps ici, puis j'étais au gymnase ici, donc il y a des bâtiments que 
j'aime bien là. Surtout sur cette rangée-là, celui-là j'adore, même si les couleurs elles 
sont moches, j'aime bien… je ne sais pas, il y a quelque chose. Et oui, y a un 
mouvement là. Puis on voit que, ils ont rien de particulier les nouveaux bâtiments 
qu’ils sont faits mais en fait, je n'avais pas vraiment vu mais on voit qu'il y a quand 
même… ils suivent un mouvement. Ils ont fait l'effort de les intégrer à ce qu'il y 
avait déjà là. (…) Et puis y a des pavés, j'aime bien les pavés. En fait ce que j'aime 
bien, c'est le côté urbain en fait que, les maisons collées les unes aux autres, comme 
ça. Qu’il n’y ait pas la même hauteur. Elles ont, elles ont le même style mais elles 
sont différentes. Donc on peut déduire qu'elles ont été construites à des époques, à 
des moments différents. Et donc il y a une certaine histoire. Oui.” - Amir, 25, ville 
(ville) 
 
“- Alors, je dois dire que j'ai, par rapport à Lausanne, peu d'affection pour cette 
ville. Vraiment. Je n'aime pas cette ville. Donc je suis un Lausannois. Je suis né à 
Lausanne, vécu à Lausanne quasiment jusqu'à 50 ans mais je n'ai jamais aimé 
Lausanne.  
- Vous avez des raisons ? 
- Ah c'est l'architecture. Ah je déteste Lausanne. Enfin, il y a des quartiers qui sont 
plaisants, mais c'est une ville ou dès qu'il y a un immeuble intérieur à, disons 1950 
on détruit, on fait une tour, ou je ne sais pas. Ce n’est même pas des tours, parce 
qu'on n'ose pas faire des tours. On fait un immeuble moderne comme ça, bien en 
verre, partout, partout, partout. (…) 
- Que pensez vous, comment cette manière de faire s'est développé à Lausanne ? 
- Ecoutez moi, je pense que c'est le mauvais gout. C'est une ville de paysans. C'est 
une ville qui n’avait pas de patriciens comme Bale, Fribourg, Bern. C'est une ville 
qui était occupée par les Bernois. C'est une ville de commerce, de paysans… enfin, 
j'habite un village, et ce n’est pas ça. C'est plus de commerce. On détruit. Si vous 
cherchez de grands Lausannois, ou des gens qui ont habité à Lausanne, il n'y a 
quasiment plus de maisons. On met la petite plaque “ici a vécu", mais ce n’est pas 
la maison. C'est, si vous voulez, l'endroit géographique où a vécu quelqu'un, mais 
ce n’est rien. Vous voyez. Vous ne pouvez pas dire que la personne a vécu dedans. Il 
n'y a pas de passé. On n'ose quand même pas détruire l'hôtel de ville. Voilà. Ni le 
musée Arlaud, ni la cathédrale, bien qu'un temps ils voulaient presque faire, si j'ai 
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bien compris, un parking dessous. Voilà. Le château, on vas pas toucher le château. 
Mais si vous prenez le château, et si vous regardez les photos anciennes, il y avait 
une porte qui fermait cette rue. Ils ont rasé. C'est une mentalité depuis 1850 dans 
cette ville, c'est de raser. Vous prenez St François. Il y avait un couvent autour. 
Bon. C'est devenu protestant. D'accord. Il n'y plus de moines. Mais on a rasé pour 
faire l'hôtel de poste. Et pour faire la banque, machin. Le SBS à l'époque ou, bien 
après, plus loin, la BCV. Comment une ville peut raser un couvent des franciscains 
du Moyen Âge ? Non. Non. C'est un manque de gout. C'est un manque de 
respect. C'est tout ce que vous voulez, mais ce n’est pas de la culture. (…) Il y a 
beaucoup de gens qui ne comprennent pas, parce qu'ils adorent Lausanne à cause 
de la verdure. C’est vrai, c'est peut-être la ville la plus verte de Suisse semble-t-il. Si 
on fait abstraction de Sauvabelin, du bois du Jorat, évidemment, il n’y a pas mal 
d'arbres, c'est vrai. Mais ça ne me suffit pas.” - David, 65, périurbain (ville) 
 
“Lausanne, c'est horrible parce qu'ils construisent tout et n'importe quoi. Il y a 
toutes les modes, tout les styles, il y a tout. Le Syndic de Lausanne disait, à 
Lausanne il y a 300.000 habitants, mais je ne sais pas si c'est 300.000, s’il y a 
300.000 urbanistes. (…) Il y a des habitations qui sont certainement très chouettes, 
mais je ne sais pas si c'est un peu la ville qui me fait peur, je ne sais pas si j'ai envie 
d'habiter en ville. Parfois oui, parce que tout est proche, on n’a pas de problème 
pour trouver, je ne sais pas, pour aller à l'hôpital, un médecin, un dentiste, on a 
besoin de prendre le train, des bus ou je ne sais pas quoi. Mais sortir de chez moi et 
tomber sur un trottoir, sur une avenue, sur une rue avec des voitures, partout, ce 
n'est pas mon truc.” - Silvia, 55, périurbain (périurbain) 
 
When one speaks of a person’s style, one refers to a certain way of being, a way of making 
do with space, as de Certeau would say (1990), each individual being defined by a 
singular style of spatiality (Lévy 2013, 950; Lussault 2007). In his last work entitled 
“Esquisse pour une auto-analyse” (2004), Pierre Bourdieu specifically writes about a 
coherence between his style of being and his style of thinking, which reflects a certain 
consistency in the way he acts, works and writes. In a way, he was attempting to apply to 
his own case a method of analysis which he has performed earlier on the case of 
Heidegger and the case Flaubert - a certain archeology of individual style. To have a style 
means to affirm one’s own existence, which, as Pachet argues, is much less defined by a 
specific content, or an essence, and more by a way through which each individual 
appropriates or modifies content (Macé 2010). 
 
In September 2016, The Guardian published a text on unwritten dress codes, inspired by 
a study led by the government’s social mobility commission (Davies 2016). According to 
the study, wearing brown shoes is the ultimate faux pas among bankers in the City. 
“Never wear brown in town”, is an old rule about what shoes the gentlemen of London’s 
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financial district must wear. Apparently, the same negative judgments are applied to 
those who appear uncomfortable in a suit, wear a loud tie, or lack abstract qualities such 
as “polish” or “aura”. This strong sense of style has contributed to creating distance 
between investment banking candidates, and non-privileged candidates from non-elite 
universities and schools (see Moore et al. 2016). This is not a particularly peculiar 
behavior, characteristic of a certain social class. Indeed, examples of these kinds of 
behaviors are endless and observed in a variety of social groups. What City bankers share 
with religious and traditional communities, but also with organized armies, punk 
movement fans, or even naturists on a nude beach, is a strong sense of belonging to a 
group that is expressed through a certain consensus of style. To stylize oneself is always a 
sign of embracing a particular way of being (fr. manière d’être).  
 
Here one thing must be underlined. Unlike a work of art, the human subject is not a 
coherent unity. Individuals are always in a process of (re)constitution and full of inner 
contradictions, as the scientific works on cognitive dissonance have demonstrated (for the 
overview see Fischer et al. 2008). Because of their polytopic (Stock 2006) existence, an 
individual cannot be summarized as an organism, as a body. An individual is different 
than its body, because an individual stretches out to include themselves into the various 
societal levels to which production (or destruction) they contribute. An individual is 
never a unity for he/she exists as a part of society that is based, to a various degrees, on 
the principle of heterogeneity. 
 
The ethnologist Karla Werner suggested that the way in which inhabitants, as self-
reflective modern subjects, make do with the various spaces of the city, helps them bring 
together different or even contradictory aspects of their own individuality. Just as each 
part of a city can represent a part of their fragmented individuality, the city as a whole 
seems to help them construct a certain coherence out of a highly fragmented reality 
(Werner 1991). Aesthetic space provides individuals with the possibility of reconstituting 
(at least partially) the broken pieces of their modern urban existence and producing new 
meanings of the world they are a part of. Urban experience, as highly fragmented, is 
therefore highly aesthetic.  
 
When individuals interact in an environment, they also want their individuality to be 
recognized. What appears to be the specificity of modernity is precisely the 
unprecedented liberation of coexisting ways of being, i.e., the multiplication of coexisting 
styles.?? This coexistence of different styles appears to be an indicator of the degree of 
urbanity of a certain urban reality. Urban space, and more precisely public urban space 
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acts as space per excellence, where individuals expose themselves and at the same time 
observe others. It is therefore essential to understand how the urban environment shapes 
individuals’ aesthetic sensibilities and influences the way that their aesthetic judgements 
evolve and change, but also, how the aesthetic dimension orients and influences urban 
praxis.  
Aesthetic Judgement and the Gradients of 
Urbanity 
In 1994, the Pompidou Center in Paris organized a very important exhibition entitled 
“La ville, art et architecture en Europe, 1870-1993”, where painters, engravers, 
photographers and film-makers, as Françoise Choay writes, drew “attention to the dual 
nature of the city: beneficial for some, a symbol of progress and beauty, brimming with 
social life even in the anonymity of large crowds; and evil for others, synonymous with 
chaos, perversion, any type of ugliness and destitution that the cinematic aesthetic has 
captured so successfully” (Guiheux and Pompidou 1994, 24). As humanity moves 
through the twenty-first century, many are still guided by aesthetic ideals that originated 
in early nineteenth-century England, when many members of the rising bourgeoisie class 
started to reject the idea of living in the city center. They created a suburban 
environment that fed on the idea of exclusion – exclusion of both different styles of 
living and competing cultural values. As Robert Fishman argued, suburbanization was 
not the automatic fate of the middle class in the “mature industrial city” or an inevitable 
response to the Industrial Revolution or the so-called “transport revolution”. Contrary to 
the bourgeois English, the equally bourgeois Parisians and Viennese followed a very 
different vision and stayed in the city centre.?? To reject the city as a residential 
environment “was a conscious choice based on the economic structure and cultural 
values of the Anglo-American bourgeoisie” (Fishman 1987, p. 8). At the start, it was not 
a project planned by the government but rather a marginal form intended for, and 
created by, a restricted elite, which then grew to become the choice of residency for the 
English middle-class. It is one of the most striking examples of a bottom-up organization 
of urban space, and it demonstrates the fundamental role of ‘small’ actors (Lévy 2014) in 
the processes that structure urban environments. Suburbia emerged as a result of a 
                                                                                                                                             
45 A great paradox of modernist architecture lies in the attempt to establish one single 
international style, which is a profoundly anti-modern idea. 
46 During the 1840s, the most prosperous French merchants and bankers also left the crowded 
center, but not for suburban villas. Instead, they created a new urban district, called the Chaussée 
d'Antin, which embodied the ‘suburban’ principles of domesticity, privacy, and class segregation, 
but in an urban setting (Fishman, 1987, p. 109).?
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dazzling fragmentation of the modern city — a fragment that somehow found itself 
isolated — and should be understood and approached as such. In other words suburban 
or periurban environments need to be understood within the complex mechanisms that 
structure the city and its periphery.    
 
A single-family house with an exclusively residential character placed in a natural setting 
represents stability, a community raised on the primacy of private property, a chance for 
a family to develop in restored harmony with nature – a way of regaining the Paradise 
Lost. Peri-urban inhabitants are often couples and nuclear families in search for stability 
and ‘rooting’. The spatial, social and historical conditions in Switzerland appear to be 
quite favorable to the development of this particular urban type. First, the Swiss territory 
is highly fragmented both horizontally and vertically (Navez-Bouchanine 2002); Second, 
animosity toward cities has never ceased to be a sentiment shared by a large part of 
Switzerland’s population (Cavin and Marchand 2010) (although there has been an 
important shift regarding the perception of city over the last decade); Third, Swiss 
society has long cultivated the ideal of a closed nuclear family, and; Finally, its landscapes 
correspond to (or were seen at the time as corresponding to) the romantic aesthetic ideal 
on which the suburban picturesque image developed. A 2015 study based on the 
information of the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) showed that two elements distinguish 
peri-urban dwellers from non peri-urban dwellers: family formation and full-time 
employment. Occupation, income and education do not seem to show a significant 
importance for the moving in the peri-urban zone (Van Den Hende 2015). Periurban 
inhabitants express attitudes that are apparently anti- and pro- communitarian; they 
almost unanimously reject the idea of the “forced” cohabitation in collective popular 
housing blocs, and affirm the qualities of a small community of individuals with more or 
less similar lifestyles (the lifestyle epitomized in the single-family household and a strong 
dependence on the automobile) (Lévy 2013, 1080). This highly ‘stylized’ way of 
inhabiting is often clearly expressed in the aesthetic judgements of peri-urban residents, 
which appear as both the reflections and confirmations of their day-to-day spatialities, 
even often in an idealized manner: 
 
“- [Photo 15] C’est ça qui correspond au rêve. Il y a tout ce qu'il faut, là. Les jouets 
des enfants, leur côté « je vais faire quand même faire un peu écolo » en étant à peu 
près indépendants. Ils auraient pas dû mettre des plantes tropicales, ça, ce n'est pas 
bien du tout. Ils ont quand même séparé les voisins par une barrière, on veut quand 
même être chez soi. Non, ça, c'est la caricature, comme on n’en fait pas, des 
maisons individuelles. 
- Mais pourquoi pensez-vous que c'est un rêve quoi ? 
- Mais parce qu'on a envie d'être, on a envie d'avoir son nid, son chez-soi, c'est un 
rêve. C’est un rêve de ne pas avoir de voisin, de faire sa lessive quand on a envie 
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mais pas que c'est le jour que le concierge a indiqué. De pouvoir laisser ses enfants 
aller jouer, d'inviter les copains à boire l'apéro sous la tonnelle, même si après il 
faut tout ranger, tout nettoyer et tout. C’est vrai, ça fait envie d'avoir de la verdure. 
D’avoir des roses et un figuier et d'être chez soi. Ah oui, ça, c'est une envie, mais je 
suis mal placée pour dire qu'il ne faut pas !” - Elisabeth, 64, périurbain (périurbain) 
 
“C’est les anciens qui sont condamnés. Voilà. De toute façon, ils ont démoli ici, ils 
ont démoli partout partout. Il y avait une petite villa, il avait son petit jardin, il y 
avait l'étendage pour le linge, un petit... des arbres fruitiers, etc. Donc voilà, je 
pense que, les personnes, on les voyait dans leur jardin. Le voisin venait dire « salut, 
dis donc, je n'ai pas beaucoup de fleurs sur mon cerisier cette année, on n’aura pas 
beaucoup de cerises ». « Mais oui ». La poésie de la vie.” - Barbara, 65, périurbain 
(périurbain) 
 
“[Photo 5] Alors là c’est un peu la petite maison dans la prairie, dans les vignes. 
Oui, oui, très joli, quoi. Oui en fait, si ça pouvait être proche des commodités 
d’une ville ou autre, je trouverais ça assez parfait comme vie, dans le sens où, 
j’imagine, si s’est rénové à l’intérieur ça peut avoir vachement de cachet. Vue sur les 
vignes, c’est super joli, un peu tranquille comme quartier, je pense que c’est une 
belle maison.” - Claudia, 34, périurbain (petite ville) 
 
A 2008 study of the The Swiss national research program showed that when it comes to 
the attractiveness of cities, “families and elderly people are characterised by negative 
migration balances while international migrants, small households and young adults have 
positive ones” (Rérat et al. 2010). This reflects the observation of Aragones according to 
whom “[c]ities have more young people and single-person households, which have 
relatively high preference for rental dwellings… Generally, multifamily housing is a city 
phenomenon; rural areas have almost exclusively single-family housing stock. Rental 
housing is also strongly over-represented in central cities, whereas suburbs and rural 
regions have a predominantly owner-occupied housing stock. These preferences, of 
course, reflect variations in the availability and the price of land between cities and 
suburban and rural regions.” (Aragones, cited in Frankhauser and Ansel 2016, 57). A 
choice of a residential environment becomes the question of day-to-day experience and 
the way that everyday life is practiced and organized. Some city inhabitants do 
aesthetically dismiss periurban areas precisely because they dismiss the lifestyle that is 
actualized by this particular urban type: 
 
“[Photo 7] Là c'est vraiment un peu, Desperate Housewives comme ça, les 
quartiers résidentiels, ou tu sors de chez toi et t'as les voisins qui notent à quelle 
heure tu vas faire tes courses où j'en sais rien. Ça a un côté, pas assez d'anonymat 
dans une zone comme ça. Aussi le fait d'avoir forcément besoin d'une voiture, 
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parce que je ne pense pas qu'on peut vraiment se déplacer en transport en commun 
dans un quartier comme ça. Et puis le petit jardin aussi, là mitoyen, ça c'est 
quelque chose que je ne sais pas, pour moi c'est tous les inconvénients d'habiter en 
ville et puis tous les inconvénients d'habiter à la campagne réunis. (…) Ici, on est 
quand même plutôt, oui, au milieu de tout le monde et en même temps, on n’a pas 
les avantages de la ville qui sont liés à toutes les activités culturelles ou la proximité 
des transports ou quelque chose comme ça. Donc c'est quelque chose que je ne 
considèrerais pas ça comme beau. (…) En fait, ce n’est pas un mode de vie qui 
m'attire, donc j'aurais tendance à considérer aussi ces maisons comme moches.” - 
Lucas, ville (ville) 
 
“[Photo 12] Desperate Housewives là. En fait moi, ça me fait penser, il y a aussi des 
quartiers comme ça où, ce qui me fait encore plus peur, c'est, ils mettent police de 
proximité ou je ne sais trop quoi. C’est des autocollants ou ils disent, en fait, ils 
disent aux gens, c'est pour leur dire surveillez ce qui se passe autour de chez vous et 
faites la police en fait. Et si vous voyez quelqu'un que vous ne connaissez pas, 
appelez la police ou je ne sais pas. Il y a donc vraiment une forme de, aussi une 
paranoïa, de gens qui font justice eux-mêmes, ou qui appellent la police parce qu'ils 
voient des gens qui ne sont pas du village ou du quartier. Ça, c'est quelque chose 
que je n’aimerais pas devoir expérimenter quoi.” - Lucas, 29, ville (ville) 
 
“[Photo 7] Ça je n’aime pas. Oui, ça je n’aime pas. J’aime pas et en même temps, 
comment dire ? Je n’aime pas sur le principe. (..) Je n’aime pas. Ici, par exemple, je 
critique toujours Romanelle, je dis, moi je m'en fous, je préfère rester à Rolle 
locataire toute ma vie, que de m'acheter ma petite maison à Romanelle. Bon, c'est 
un peu snob de parler comme ça, parce que dans les faits, une fois si vous voulez 
vous acheter un bien immobilier et puis que vous n’êtes pas hyper riche, bien y a de 
fortes chances de tomber dans ce genre de choses. (..) Mais ça n'empêche, je ne sais 
pas comment dire, c’est un peu snob, mais non, je ne trouve pas ça très beau. En 
même temps, ça doit être chouette d'avoir sa maison comme ça. Mais ce n’est pas 
ce qui m'inspire le plus. Ça m'évoque les séries américaines, genre Desperate 
Housewives ou Weeds.” - Sabrina, 35, ville (ville) 
 
Between the ideal (image) of the picturesque village, the rustic vineyard house or the 
periurban area stands equally idealised (image) of a dense and diverse city, as a sort of 
their antithesis. However, between the two ideals there is an entire urban reality still 
waiting to be recognized as such. The presence of many neologisms shows how some 
environments generate relatively complex spatial configurations that are in opposition to 
traditional categories: e.g., “ville-territoire” (Corboz 1990), “Zwithenstadt” (Sieverts 
2000), “ville-diffuse” (Secchi and Ingallina 2006), “ville-campagne” (Berque 2008), or 
more recently, “horizontal metropolis” (Vigano 2011). The authors of these concepts all 
share the same intent of providing meaning to a certain spatial configuration that 
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emerged as a result of the dispersion and decentralization of the urban environment - a 
spatial configuration where the distinction between city, periurban neighborhoods and 
the countryside is no longer self-evident. For many inhabitants, decoding these territories 
appears extremely difficult. Sabrina who lives in the city of Lausanne and Chantal who 
lives in a nearby periurban area share a similar judgement regarding the aesthetic 
character of such an environment: 
 
“- [Photo 8] Oh ! Ça, je déteste. Ça, c'est le pire. Ça, c'est tout ce que je déteste. 
Oh ! C’est atroce. Ça, c'est laid. Ça c'est le style Pully ou Lutry ou je ne sais pas 
quoi. L’endroit c'est affreux, c'est le cauchemar absolu. Bien, pour moi c'est le 
cauchemar absolu parce que, comment vous dire ça... avant, vous m'avez demandé 
si j'étais sensible au manque d'homogénéité, je vous ai dit non, mais en fait oui. 
C’est n'importe quoi ça, pour moi c'est vraiment, je ne sais pas comment dire, c'est, 
on dirait que chacun a voulu construire son petit truc et puis il l'a fait et puis, ça va, 
je ne sais pas, avec un esprit un peu égocentrique, je ne sais pas comment dire. 
Non, je déteste. Vraiment c'est moche. Pour moi c'est moche parce que déjà ce 
n’est pas un centre urbain, mais quand même c'est vachement construit. Au moins 
la photo de Lavaux, enfin voilà, c'est une banlieue, enfin c'est un endroit bourgeois, 
mais c'est joli. Là vraiment, ce n’est pas joli, genre, chacun a fait son petit truc, c'est 
un peu industriel. C’est mort. 
- Donc est ce que ça veut dire que vous acceptez l'hétérogénéité, mais que quand il 
y a une idée de vivre-ensemble ? 
- Voilà exactement. C’est exactement ça. Oui c'est ça. Exactement.” - Sabrina, 35, 
ville (ville) 
 
“- [Photo 8] Ouf, là c’est un peu le foutoir aussi, pour dire franchement la vérité. Il 
y’a vraiment de tout. Non, moi, je trouve pas ça très… Ce n’est pas un endroit qui 
m’inspire. Déjà c’est l’est de Lausanne, et en plus c’est assez bruyant. Bien sûr, 
beaucoup de circulation. Non alors, ce n’est pas pour moi. À moins d'y être forcé, 
et après, tu trouves ton compte. 
-  Qu’est ce qu’il ne te plaît pas ? 
- Mais tout. L’anarchie des… même le tout, pas seulement l’anarchie des 
constructions, mais comme tout est conçu. En fin, qu’est-ce je peux te dire ? Il me 
semble dans ces quartiers-là c’est chacun pour soi. Tu fais que passer et puis les gens 
ils doivent… tu as l’impression que, oui, c’est chacun pour soi. Donc les gens ne 
doivent pas avoir de contact avec eux. Oui les uns avec les autres ou quoi. Je me 
trompe peut-être, mais moi ça me donne l’impression d’un endroit où tu passes, un 
endroit-dortoir ou quoi. Où tu passes, les gens passent là pour aller travailler, là 
pour entrer chez eux, mais, non c’est pas un endroit séduisant ça. (…) Il y’a peut-
être l’influence de la saison où étaient prises les photos, mais quand même, de toute 
façon, chaque fois qu’on passe là-bas, j’ai cette sensation.” - Chantal, 65, périurbain 
(campagne) 
  211 
 
Researchers often present the effects of urbanity by following the linear logics of the 
territory, which necessarily imply a lecture of society that follows that logics. Yet if I am 
to investigate the aesthetic character of urbanity, it is important to remember that, first 
and foremost, aesthetic space, as a space of aesthetic experience, has a topological 
character. To inhabit the urban environment aesthetically means it is necessary to surpass 
the rigid confines of territory by producing virtual spatialities with their inner logics and 
inner temporalities. This opens up the possibility for emergence of a rather interesting 
phenomenon: one can reside in one environment and inhabit another. This is why a 
purely pragmatic approach to the phenomenon of inhabiting comes with the risk of 
missing a fundamental part of the puzzle. Within a topographically delimited center, 
there will always be points that nihilate the very idea of the center itself. This is also valid 
in terms of the periphery. Some inhabitants of the city center reject its plurality and 
liveliness, seeing in the city nothing but an anonymous mass. At the same time, some 
inhabitants of the periurban areas dream of Geneva or Paris. Take for example the cases 
of Brigitte and David.  
 
Brigitte who now lives in Lausanne, was born and grew up in a small village in the 
canton of Jura. She speaks of her residential environment as a space where she used to be 
bored to tears, particularly on Sunday afternoons. Coming to the city for her studies was 
the beginning of freedom, of real independence: 
 
“La vie d’un village, c’est très sympathique et tout. Mais, c’est très oppressant, parce 
que tout le monde vraiment se connait. Il y a aussi vraiment la notion 
d’individualité dans la ville, et puis d’ouverture à un monde plus grand, de tous les 
possibles. La ville était pour moi toutes les possibilités. Dieu sait que Lausanne n’est 
pas si grande ! C’était l’époque, comme ça. Et de voir plein d’autres choses. Voir 
des gens pressés, d’être dans une vie qui bouge plus, où il y a plus de vie, la ville 
égal la vie, je crois.” - Brigitte, 61, ville (campagne) 
 
When she was shown an image of the countryside between Morges and the foothills of 
the Jura, with family houses surrounded by vineyards, she immediately produced an 
image of a certain lifestyle she believes is embodied by that specific environment: 
 
“[Photo 6] Pour moi, ça génère tout de suite des idées un peu passéistes, à savoir 
que la maman est à la maison, et puis elle emmène les enfants alors elle est obligée 
de prendre une voiture parce qu’il y a pas d’école tout près, c’est des choses qui sont 
tellement opposées à la vie. Ça me rappelle trop mon village, même si ça c’est en 
rapport avec la vigne etc. On peut imaginer une certaine qualité de vie. Ce qu’on 
ne montre pas, c’est peut-être les murs anti-bruit de l’autoroute qui passent à 2 km, 
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ou bien, je ne sais pas. Bon, je ne trouve pas ça beau, c’est-à-dire que je trouverais la 
nature belle s’il n’y avait pas les bâtiments, voilà.  Il y a des rajouts, de rajouts de 
maisons, c’est des conceptions de vie qui me font un peu froid dans le dos si vous 
voulez. On rajoute un bout parce qu’on va prendre les enfants qui grandissent, 
mais on ne veut pas les laisser partir trop. On va s’occuper des petits-enfants parce 
que comme ça c’est plus pratique. Socio-culturellement parlant, ce n’est pas mon 
truc. Non, ce n’est pas beau.” - Brigitte, 61, ville (campagne) 
 
David, on the other hand, was born in Lausanne, in the popular housing blocs of the 
Ouchy neighbourhood. He never found much pleasure in inhabiting Lausanne, despite 
the fact that he founded a family and spent a big part of his career in the city. When 
asked to comment on a photograph of Lausanne taken from the Lemanic lake, he 
expressed his opinion in the following manner: 
 
“- [Photo 5] Mais quelle horreur. Ça, c'est Lausanne. Ce mastodonte qu'on voit 
depuis, je ne sais plus où. Mais ça c'est voilà, un front comme ça, c'est affreux. Ça 
c'est le... qu'est-ce qu'ils ont construit ? C’est peut-être assez ancien. Ça c'est le truc 
de Georgette. (…) Non, mais parce que c'est un mélange, il n’y pas d'unité, il n y a 
rien. Ça c'est moche. Ah non, je ne sais pas. 
- Ça vous fait penser à quoi? 
- C’est un amas d'humains qui essayent de survivre dans une ville.” - David, 65, 
péri-urbain (ville) 
 
In contrast, his aesthetic judgement of a picture of family houses in the countryside of 
the Morges and the Jura is rather positive: 
 
“- [Photo 6] Écoutez, voilà de belles maisons, avec les vignes, l'univers construit. La 
maison, voilà, c’est une maison du 18ème. Vous voyez ça, par exemple, ce n’est pas 
très beau là derrière. La villa quelconque. En soi, elle est… je dirai rien, mais voilà, 
je dirai un peu. Ça, ça va. Bon c'est la nature, enfin bon la nature travaillée avec le 
vignoble. 
- Ça, ça vous plait un peu plus? 
- Oui, c'est sûr. Je ne cracherais pas si j'habite là, bien que j'aime quand même 
avoir, être dans un village plutôt que d'être isolé comme ça.” - David, 65, péri-
urbain (ville) 
 
At the same time, he does not consider himself as being anti-urban. Rather he positions 
himself against both the modern heterogenous city and the urban sprawl.  
 
“Je ne suis pas contre la ville. Non, parce que je vous ai dit, Fribourg, Neuchâtel, 
Soleure, enfin toutes ces villes je les trouve... moi je pourrai y habiter. Mais je suis 
un peu étonné qu'aux extérieurs des villes, on ne construise plus des ensembles qui 
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pourraient créer une cité à l'extérieur. On ne fait plus que des pavés. On prend un 
espace comme ça puis on... pouf… une tour là. Il n’y a plus de rue. Mais ça, c'est 
de l'anarchie si on veut. C’est de l'anarchie. Parce que voilà, ce sont des choses 
construites les une derrière les autres, en fonction de l'époque.” - David, 65, péri-
urbain (ville) 
?
Thus inhabiting is a concept that will allow the study of both processes of singularization 
and processes of uniformization. The inhabitant of a city that is upset by the constant 
fragmentation of his experience and the incapacity to grasp the logics of his or her 
environment can be put in comparison with his fellow citizen living in the periurban area 
who knows well the frustration coming from the paradoxal desire to achieve an organic 
unity with the immediate environment and to exist as a single and unique individual. 
One thing is sure. The city always appears to have a pivotal role: Each individual has a 
more or less clear idea of how the city should evolve and what it should be like. For this 
reason, I must repeat my agreement with Davidson (2015) that the category of the city 
should remain “an anchor for critical urban studies”. If researchers abandon the city as an 
empirical and theoretical category, it could lead to a divorce between urban theory and 
the human experience.  
 
“[Photo 5] Waw! C’est comblé ça. Alors beaucoup trop de choses. Un toit 
magnifique, ça, c'est toute la beauté. Ça, c'est le château d'Ouchy ça ? Oui. Bord 
du lac magnifique avec des bâtiments qui sont somptueux au bord du lac, mais tout 
ce qui est derrière, il y a trop, il y a beaucoup trop, et puis là, il y a vraiment pas 
d'espaces verts, c'est... toutes ces grues derrières, l'usine d'incinération, ça, c'est la 
grande ville quoi. Le bruit, le smog, la fumée, la pollution, enfin tout ce que je 
n'aime pas. (…) Toutes ces bâtisses qui sont les unes à côté des autres comme ça. Il 
y a trop, il y a beaucoup trop. Les tours, là qui ressortent comme ça, les grues... 
enfin, non y a... toute cette partie-là ne me plait pas, on va dire, 60%, 70% de 
l'image ne me plaît pas. Mise à part le beau lac, le beau bleu, le beau ciel. Voilà. Il y 
a tout ça qui ne me plaît pas.” - Luisa, périurbain (petite ville) 
 
“[Photo 5] On a des choses un peu plus anciennes, un peu moins anciennes puis 
après on a des trucs très contemporains comme ça. C'est très urbain, ça fait très 
ville, très ville de maintenant. (…) Bien qu'il y ait deux trois, deux trois bâtiments 
un peu moches au milieu de cette, de cette ville qui est plutôt une belle ville 
comme ça. Je pense que si on arrive à Lausanne, je ne suis pas objective, je suis 
lausannoise, mais, je pense que si on arrive comme ça typiquement en bateau, 
comme tu disais et puis qu'on voit Lausanne, on aura plutôt tendance à dire qu'elle 
a un côté, un côté joli, et puis les plus réac' ils vont dire qu'il y a des verrues 
modernes au milieu.” - Laure, 30, ville (ville) 
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“[Photo 11] Moi j'adore l’assemblage comme ça. Il y a des bâtiments, ben je passe 
de temps en temps ici, puis j'étais au gymnase ici, donc il y a des bâtiments que 
j'aime bien, là. Surtout sur cette rangée-là, celui-là j'adore, même si les couleurs 
elles sont moches, j'aime bien, je ne sais pas, il y a quelque chose. Et oui, il y a un 
mouvement là. Puis on voit que… ils ont rien de particulier les nouveaux 
bâtiments qu’ils ont fait, mais en fait, je n'avais pas vraiment vu, mais on voit qu'il 
y a quand même… ils suivent un mouvement. Ils ont fait l'effort de les intégrer à ce 
qu'il y avait déjà là. (…) Et puis y a des pavés, j'aime bien les pavés. En fait ce que 
j'aime bien, c'est le côté urbain en fait, les maisons collées les unes aux autres, 
comme ça. Qu’il n’y ait pas la même hauteur. Elles ont… elles ont le même style, 
mais elles sont différentes. Donc on peut déduire qu'elles ont été construites à des 
époques, à des moments différents. Et donc il y a une certaine histoire. Oui.” - 
Amir, 25, ville (ville) 
 
The complex mechanism through which modern individuals are able to generate images 
of the inhabited environment is perhaps best described by Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guatarri. In their famous work “Thousand Plateaus” (1987), they argue that modern 
societies define themselves through processes of decoding and deterritorialization. 
Decoding means to conceive a certain cultural logic or societal practice and to reorder 
(translate) it in one manner or another. This new code is often accompanied by a strong 
sense of style, whose purpose is to protect the new meaning and to erase what other 
societies have coded and decoded. The decoding mechanism allows inhabitants to 
produce various aesthetic assemblages, where the relations between components are 
displaced and replaced according to how the subject imagines them, and how relevant 
the subject considers them in reference to the societal frame they consider legitimate. 
Since (modern) urban reality is only apprehensible in fragments, this mechanism then 
serves to reconstitute a sort of new coherent totality with its inner logics, spatialities and 
temporalities. Parts are not simply smaller than the whole; They are profoundly different. 
A person’s relationship to parts of a whole differs from that person’s relationship to the 
whole. It is up to the subject to choose which fragments are legitimate enough to enter 
into their aesthetic conception of the world and to overcode them, as I have previously 
described,?? according to the principles of the synecdoche and asyndeton. This choice, 
however, seems to somehow be tied into the subject’s practical day-to-day interactions 
with their immediate urban environment.  
 
As Anthony Vidler pointed out, the fragment has a double signification: “[a]s a reminder 
of the past one whole but now fractured and broken”; and “as an incomplete piece of a 
potentially complete whole” always pointing toward some “possible world” (cited in S. 
Jacobs 2002, 17). At the same time, changing the scale might completely alter the 
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meaning that is attributed to the fragments. E.g. the same house can be perceived and 
imagined differently depending on whether it is judged in an isolation from the objects 
that surround it (although one can never fully abstract an object from its surrounding 
environment; Indeed, aesthetic objects are always contextualized) or whether it is judged 
in the immediate or even a larger context. At the same time, it is the subject who chooses 
to neglect or reinforce one element of a given context or another. It is up to him or her 
to choose the referential scale that will be used as the frame for an aesthetic judgement — 
a frame that is never fixed, nor stable. A particularity of the aesthetic experience is 
precisely related to the fact that an individual is free, at least partly,?? to imaginatively 
engage with the object of aesthetic attention. At the same time, any shift in perception or 
conception of the object necessarily changes the way one imagines that object.  
 
Elisabeth, who lives in a single-family house in the periurban district, speaks of how the 
recent societal discourse concerning the downsides of the periurban lifestyle has 
influenced her aesthetic judgements. Her shift in aesthetic understanding did not come 
only by paying attention to the news media. It also followed a certain change in the way 
the life is organized in these areas — a change that she directly experienced. She starts by 
giving us a description of her immediate residential environment and later expresses her 
aesthetic judgment in regard to a similar neighbourhood in the Vaud region:  
 
“- Est-ce que vous pouvez me décrire votre quartier? 
- Alors, quartier de banlieue d'un tout petit village, banlieue résidentielle qui avait 
l'avantage très important au moment où nous nous y sommes installés d'être habité 
par des familles qui avaient toutes, non, la majorité avaient une composition 
familiale à peu près semblable, c'est-à-dire des jeunes couples avec des enfants du 
même âge et ça a apporté une qualité de vie vraiment excellente à ce moment-là, 
qui bien sûr, plus de trente ans après a complètement évoluée. On pourrait dire 
qu'au moment où les gens se sont installés ici, une absence totale de haies séparant 
les maisons, puisque c'était le moment où on les plantait, donc des contacts très 
faciles ce qui maintenant n’est plus le cas. Outre le fait que les gens on vieillit, 
beaucoup sont partis, donc il y a eu après un mouvement. Et je pense que ceux qui 
viennent maintenant ne retrouvent plus ce qui faisait ce charme de ces dizaines 
d'enfants de la même portion de rue qui jouaient ensemble et qui étaient 
particulièrement attrayants.” - Elisabeth, 64, périurbain (périurbain) 
 
“[Photo 12] - Alors ça, c'est justement ces banlieues résidentielles typiques telles 
qu'on les connait chez nous, qu'on critique évidemment sous de très nombreux 
                                                                                                                                             
47 See the section “The Aesthetic Network: A Topology of Aesthetic Places”. 
48 See previously on the criticism of Merleau-Ponty regarding the Sartre’s conception of humans 
as ontologically free beings. 
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points. D’abord la haie de thuyas qui est une aberration écologique parce qu’on 
limite les espèces animales qui peuvent y vivre et ensuite le fait que chacun se cache 
derrière. Mais si on regarde bien, les gens ne sont pas tellement cachés, les gens 
délimitent leur espace, mais relativement bas quand même. Quand on voit ça, alors 
là il y a un mélange pas possible des genres, aussi des époques visiblement, tout est 
un peu, villa « ça me suffit ». Bien propre. Mais là, évidemment si je fais allusion à 
ça, c'est que je veux parler du choix qui était de montrer la place des voitures dans 
ce genre d'endroits par rapport à l'autre où c'était justement le choix des transports 
publics. Donc là, on dirait un peu des personnes un peu plus égoïstes qui ne 
veulent pas partager leur espace, qui veulent un transport individuel motorisé dont 
c'est le passé. C’est plus ce qu'on va essayer de promouvoir parce qu'on ne peut 
plus se le permettre. 
- Vous pensez que ça c'est le passé ? 
- Oui, oui. C’est le passé. Ces cinquante dernières années, parce que ce n'est pas 
assez densifié. 
- Mais pensez-vous que les gens ont encore envie d’y habiter ? 
- Oui, bien sûr. Mais ce n'est pas ce qu'on doit faire. Mais par contre le fait que ces 
maisons, par rapport à d'autres qu'on a vu sur d'autres pages, sont toutes un peu 
différentes. Bon il y en a peut-être deux semblables, ici ou là. Peut-être celles-ci, 
elles sont de la même époque peut-être, ça rend cette uniformité qui peut être 
déplaisante. Bon, là, c'est sympathique même si ce n'est probablement pas correct 
urbanistiquement. Ça, j'en suis tout à fait consciente, mais...il y a aussi une 
diversité dans les plantations. Donc je veux dire par là que les gens ont mis quelque 
chose d'eux. Non, c'est bien. 
- Donc quand vous réalisez ça, vous pourriez dire, oui c'est un beau paysage? 
- Non, non, ce n'est pas beau. Non, pas du tout. Mais je pourrais aller y vivre. C’est 
très ambigu là, tout à fait. Non je pourrais tout à fait aller vivre là, mais avec peut-
être un peu mauvaise conscience. 
- Donc vous pensez que le fait que ce genre d'habitation ait été critiqué a influencé 
le fait que vous le trouviez moins beau? 
- Bien sûr, oui. Tout à fait. Et puis de nouveau là, il y a pas d'œuvre architecturale, 
il n’y a pas de recherche.” - Elisabeth, 64, périurbain (périurbain) 
 
I can conclude, with no surprise, that interaction with other members of the society is 
crucial to people’s evaluative and discriminatory capacities. “Evaluation is crucial to 
personhood.” (Rescher 1990 p.10) Aesthetic judgement is evaluative, meaning that it is 
monitored and assessed by the judgments and behavior of others. In this sense, the 
beauty of any part of an inhabited environment, as an emerging property, is, to a varying 
degree, flexible and open to constant change, and this further depends on people’s daily 
practices and their interactions (whether direct or mediated) with other members of 
society. As Steven Jacobs writes, “it is in everyday experience that an aisthesis lies hidden 
that could excite a sensation of beauty without needing the slightest artistic intervention” 
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(S. Jacobs 2002, 22). People draw on their previous experiences, but, as evaluative and 
historical beings, they also draw on the experiences of others. Thus, societies and spaces 
created by these societies are essential for people’s engagement in the imaginative 
experience. Since a significant part of people’s day-to-day spatialities take place in the 
urban environment, it is therefore fundamental to ask to what extent this environment 
affects people’s capacity to see the world in an aesthetic manner. 
Aesthetic Judgement Matures in the Urban 
Environment 
Today, it seems that the word “environment” spans all scales, from the global to the 
local, but also all domains of human society (Lévy 2013, 342-3). Environments can be 
natural, industrial, built, work, domestic — they can be given as many adjectives as 
humans can isolate spatial substances.?? An environment can be defined as the sum of all 
realities exterior to a system that are connected to and condition the functioning of 
different parts of that system.?? In their daily interaction with other humans and societal 
objects, human actors create systems that are always incorporated into some sort of 
environment. Interactions between modern individuals happen in an urban environment 
that defines the lives not only of those who live in cities, but also of those who live in the 
suburbs, the periurban areas or the mountain areas. Though there are still some 
completely rural communities, mostly in Eastern and Southern Asia, they are on the 
verge of becoming included into a global urbanized system of more or less 
interconnected actors. To live in an urban environment means to act upon (and to be 
acted upon by) a spatial organization characterized by a certain degree of urbanity, which 
is a property that emerges from the density and double diversity?? of the components 
that make up the system. This density/diversity couple is not to be taken for granted. As 
Jane Jacobs observed, “[cities] are not like suburbs, only denser. They differ from towns 
and suburbs in basic ways, and one of these is that cities are, by definition, full of 
strangers” (Jacobs 1961), meaning that in the city, people are constantly exposed to 
otherness, to the different. A similar position is held by Lefebvre who understood the 
urban space as the simultaneity of the divergent and different, on the one hand, and the 
experience of the unknown, on the other (Lefebvre 1996, 129). 
 
                                                      
49 See the section “Three Attributes of Space”. 
50 See previously “The Components of a System”. 
51 See the section “Urbanity As Phenomenon Emerging From a Combination Of Density And 
Diversity”. 
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Since the appearance of the two classical texts by Lefebvre and Jacobs, both the city and 
its periphery have been subjected to change. On the one hand, “the periphery has gained 
in color, consisting no longer exclusively of monotonous residential suburbs, shopping 
malls, and industrial parks. It now also harbors a wide-ranging service sector. (…) 
Central cities, on the other hand, have frequently fallen appart into virtually 
monofunctional zones, office zones, gentrified neighbourhoods, ghettos, and commercial 
and tourist districts that have been converted into veritable theme parks. In Europe, for 
the benefits of mass tourism, historical centres have been refurbished, or even 
transformed into an open air museum, often cancelling out almost all of the precedent 
urban diversity.” (Jacobs 2002, 18-9) Since everyone is constantly subjected to various 
mechanisms of both fragmentation and unification, I find myself tempted to study each 
individual with his or her “degree of singularity”, as the title of the approaching academic 
seminar in Cerisy?? references. Since the temporality of the doctoral thesis is limited, I 
am not in position to produce such an “identity card” for each inhabitant who agreed to 
participate in this study. Instead, I will terminate my analysis by drawing attention to the 
fundamental aesthetic judgements and sensitivities that were common to all participants 
of the study.  
Public Space is a Space Per Excellence Where our Aesthetic 
Sensitivities Evolve and Mature  
In her essay “City Life and Difference” (1990), the political philosopher Iris Marion 
Young isolates four ideals of the city, where the ideal is the “unrealized possibility of the 
actual”.?? According to her, the four unique dynamics conducive to the formation of the 
city are: social differentiation without exclusion, variety, eroticism, and publicity. Social 
differentiation without exclusion means that heterogeneous social groups can co-exist 
side by side; Variety means that the various places of urban space serve several, often 
simultaneous, purposes. In the previous chapters, I dealt with the first two ideals. I will 
now focus on the last two ideals: eroticism and publicity.  
 
As a qualifying marker of city life, Young understands the concept of eroticism in the 
sense of Barthes (Barthes 1986). She defines it as “the pleasure and excitement of being 
drawn out of one's secure routine to encounter the novel, strange and surprising”, which 
                                                      
52 In June 2017, the seminar entitled “Carte d’identités. L’espace au singulier” will be held at the 
“Centre Culturel International de Cerisy”, France. 
53 What is interesting here is that Young understands an ideal as a virtuality. If the realm of the 
aesthetics finds its full expression in both the actual and the virtual, it becomes tempting to say 
that the city can only fully realize itself in the aesthetic realm. Even if this is the case, it does not 
prevent the ethical from striving towards the ideal. 
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she finds to be a pleasure, in opposition to the security and exclusion of the 
homogeneous community. She describes this sensation in the following words: “We 
spend a Sunday afternoon walking through Chinatown, or checking out this week’s 
eccentric players in the park. We look for restaurants, stores, and clubs with something 
new for us, a new ethnic food, a different atmosphere, a different crowd of people. We 
walk through sections of the city that we experience as having unique characters which 
are not ours, where people from diverse places mingle and then go home” (Kasinitz 
1995, 267). The interviewees pointed out something similar. Indeed, Urs provided an 
example of such an activity: 
 
“Moi j'aime beaucoup découvrir des villes, des paysages urbains. C’est vrai, aussi, 
que je pense que c’est pour ça que ça m’intéresse. C’est vrai que c'est quelque chose 
que j'aime bien, dans des villes par exemple, partir dans des quartiers un peu plus 
périphériques, juste aller tâter l'ambiance, aller voir comment je les vis, ces 
quartiers.” - Urs, 42, ville (campagne) 
 
Young argues that one derives pleasure “in being drawn out of oneself to understand that 
there are other meanings, practices, perspectives on the city, and that one could learn or 
experience something more and different by interacting with them” (Kasinitz 1995, 
p.267). At the same time, it was hard for me not to notice that the interviewees derive 
pleasure from the diversity of the city’s activities only if they are capable (or perhaps 
willing) to perceive them as such. Otherwise they see nothing of its beauty: 
 
“On voit que les gens ont besoin de cette nature. Il y a pas grand monde qui reste 
fermé. Ou alors si les gens restent enfermés chez eux, ils restent vraiment enfermés. 
Ils sont devant leur télé ou avec leurs jeux, ils ne vont pas vraiment en ville pour se 
balader. C’est mort la ville. À part le soir, les jeunes vont danser et tout ça. Mais 
c’est une autre vie. Il y a pas besoin d’espace, vu qu’il fait noir.” - Emilia, 57, ville 
(campagne) 
?
The last ideal, publicity, brings us to the phenomenon of urban public space?? that is a 
space “open to everyone, where anyone can participate in ongoing activities and 
discussion”. In this kind of space, “one always risks encounter with those who are 
different, those who identify with different groups and have different opinions of 
different forms of life” (Kasinitz 1995, 268). The public space is a public good that acts 
as both a key generator and an excellent indicator of the urbanity achieved in an urban 
area. As a space open to everyone and shared by all urban actors, whether they be 
                                                      
???An important part of my reflections on public space come from the series of lectures held by 
Swiss art historian Véronique Mauron Layaz, who teaches the theory of public space and the 
theory of image at the EPFL.?
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permanent dwellers or visitors, it transforms each of them into one another’s — a reason 
why people often (wrongly) identify equality with anonymity and mediation with 
alienation. Since anonymity is usually identified with a lack of individuality, it would be 
wrong to say that public space makes people ‘nobodies’. The very substance of public 
space is based upon the weak ties (Granovetter 1973) that enable one’s singularity to be 
unobtrusively perceived by others and, at the same time, it offers each urban actor a 
possibility to observe who the others are and how they exteriorize their own singularity 
through various ephemeral forms (e.g, hairstyles, make-up, gestures) as well as long-term 
forms (e.g., residential building facades, private cars, etc.). Behind the idea of public 
space lies the idea of “living together with that which is different”. Although most people 
encounter strangers outside of the public space as well, the particularity of the public 
space is that its referential space is the whole of society. In addition, the serendipity, i.e., 
the possibility of finding what one is not looking for, increases as the publicity of urban 
space increases (Lévy 2004).   
 
As “a portion of societal space within which any actor taking part can expect to 
experience an equivalent amount of diversity that is encountered with that portion’s 
referential space” (Acebillo, Lévy, and Schmid 2013, 123), pure public space is only an 
ideal. It can never be fully actualized — but this is the case with any other social reality, 
including the city. The city, as an ideal of an open world that assimilates otherness, 
remains only partially realized, just as the ideal of community, which can never attain the 
full level of social transparency where everything is totally visible and legible. This is why 
it might be useful to speak of the intensity of public space, or the degree of publicity of 
urban space (Ruzicka-Rossier and Mauron 2009). Spaces such as streets, squares or parks 
potentially appear as spaces with a high degree of publicity, because of their societal 
character and free accessibility. As one moves towards more communal spaces (e.g., 
“ethnic” districts, worship places) or places with reserved access (communal housing, 
gated communities), the publicity of the urban space diminishes. At the total opposite 
end of the spectrum are houses, flats or automobiles, which are individual places with 
reserved access (Lévy 2013, 366). Since everyday life is woven into this wide range of 
spaces, often existing in the both the private and the public realm, people’s aesthetic 
sensitivities develop through the various interactions they create through them. Hence, a 
person’s style of spatiality appears crucial to the development of the aesthetic judgment. 
Literature, art or movies can highly influence people’s aesthetic judgements, but it seems 
that nothing can replace a direct perceptible contact with an environment. It is therefore 
essential to know the difference between Erlebnis and Erfahrung, two German words 
that indicate two ways by which each individual can experience the world - Erlebnis, 
being related to the lived experience and Erfahrung, carrying a connotation of a 
structured knowledge (Elsaesser 2009). Aesthetic space offers each individual a chance to 
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freely recombine their fragmented Erlebnis-type experiences into a more solid Erfahrung-
type experience. 
 
“C’est vrai que dans l’adolescence, je me souviens, assez vite, quand je pouvais 
prendre le train toute seule, je pense que je devais avoir 14 ans, 15 ans, comme ça, 
j’adorais aller le mercredi après-midi. Je prenais le train toute seule. J’allais à 
Lausanne. En ville de Lausanne et je me baladais, puis j’avais l’impression « waw 
c’est très cool ! » Tu sais, d’être dans cette ville, j’aime beaucoup la ville en fait, je 
pense que je suis quand même pas mal citadine, même si j’apprécie beaucoup la 
nature, surtout maintenant en étant parent. Mais du coup, j’aimais bien aller au 
centre-ville à Lausanne, rien que de me balader dans les rues, je trouvais que ça me 
donnait un sentiment de liberté qui était assez prononcé, alors qu’à Vevey ou à la 
Tour de Peilz, le fait que ce soit petit, puis où tout le monde se connait etc, en tout 
cas ado, ça me plaisait moins, quoi, j’aimais bien la grande ville, oui. Grande ville à 
l’échelle suisse, quoi.” - Claudia, 34, périurbain (petite ville) 
 
“On allait tout le temps ce qu'on appelait « aller en ville ». On prenait le bus 
numéro 1 ou en voiture avec mon père. (…) On aimait aller dans les magasins, on 
allait (…) mais vous savez les loisirs de soir, on montait en ville et on faisait les 
vitrines. Avec mes parents et ma sœur, on avait 10 ans. C'était fermé, on faisait les 
vitrines, on se baladait dans la rue de Bourg, tout ce centre qui existe encore. Oui, 
on allait tout le temps.” - Maria, 59, ville (ville) 
 
“C’est vrai que le fait de se confronter à un environnement très différent, par 
exemple à Accra, la capitale du Ghana, là ça m'a marqué, car en Suisse il y avait... 
déjà niveau propreté, niveau ordre, et ça, ça a influencé quand même passablement 
la beauté du lieu. Dans le sens où il y avait des quartiers à Accra qui étaient très... 
très très délabrés, très délaissés, avec des... je ne sais pas... des pneus, des matériaux 
de construction et ça, ça dégradait vraiment fortement l'esthétique du lieu. Et ça, 
c'est vrai que je ne l'avais pas vu en Suisse. (…) Je pense que j'ai pas mal jugé, mais, 
en même temps, comme c'était nouveau, je pense que j'avais aussi envie de faire 
partie, disons, de ce décor-là et puis de trouver beau, finalement, peut-être quelque 
chose que j'aurais pas trouvé beau avec mon point de vue suisse, oui. Par exemple, 
il y avait des magasins — ça m'a marqué — des magasins de cercueils, avec des 
cercueils, mais vraiment des formes... oui, incroyables : en forme de fusée, ou bien 
de voiture de course, qui étaient exposés dans une espèce de petit hangar un peu 
délabré, pas très joli, mais disons il y avait ce contraste avec ces cercueils qui 
brillaient, magnifiques, et puis ce hangar complètement usé et puis je me suis dit 
"ah oui, ça c'est attirant, c'est joli à voir, c'est beau". Alors que c'était... ce hangar, 
je l'aurais pas du tout trouvé attirant autrement.” - Martin, 22, ville (ville) 
 
“Encore hier, je suis passée avec une copine au parc de Milan, vous voyez ou c'est ? 
Puis, je regarde à gauche et je dis « Mais ce n’est pas possible ! » Ma copine me dit 
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« Ils ont mis une usine. » Je lui dis : « Non, regarde, c'est des appartements ». Puis il 
y a la maison de maître qui est collée juste derrière et puis il y a deux petits 
bâtiments, il doit y avoir, je ne sais pas, quatre appartements ou je ne sais pas 
combien, ces machins tous carrés, tous blancs, tous serrés entre la route, la maison 
de maître, puis le parc et puis... je me suis dit « mais pourquoi ils ont mis ça là ? » 
Je ne sais pas.” - Barbara, 65, périurbain (périurbain) 
 
“Mais en fait, ce que j'aime bien, j’aime beaucoup les maisons. Je me balade 
beaucoup, je regarde beaucoup les maisons. Et j'habite dans un endroit où il y a 
énormément de... je n'ai pas de villa mais il y a tout autour beaucoup de villas. Il y 
a juste des villas, juste incroyables, et puis je suis très sensible à l'esthétique des 
maisons.” - Daniela, 43, périurbain (banlieue) 
 
A lack of interaction with the public space might lead to negative aesthetic 
understandings. This is the case with Thomas who grew up in a single-family house in 
the countryside without ever developing a particular interest for big cities.  
 
“- J’ai grandi en étant beaucoup dehors, en faisant beaucoup d'activités à l'extérieur 
aussi. L'école était beaucoup dans la nature et du coup j'allais peut-être une fois par 
mois dans une plus grande ville, mais tu restes beaucoup lié aux espaces peu 
peuplés, et je ne dirais pas, mais je ne suis pas habitué aux grandes villes.  
- Et tu te souviens ces voyages dans de grandes villes ? Comment tu les a vécu ? 
- D’une part, tu étais impressionné parce que tu disais chaque fois : c'est grand. Il y 
a beaucoup de monde, tu es impressionné d'une partie ou de l'autre. Et de l'autre 
part, tu es un peu, je ne sais pas si effrayé est le bon mot ? Mais tu es effrayé par 
tout ce gris, je trouve souvent. Cet effet que tu as dans la ville. D'une part c'est 
grand et impressionnant et, en même temps, d'une manière ou de l'autre, un peu 
triste. Parce que c'est souvent, je lie cela souvent au fait de se trouver pas important 
et dans un espace énormément gris. C'est souvent l'impression que j'avais.  
- Tu habites une ville depuis combien d'années ? 
- Depuis deux ans et demi. 
- Est-ce que tu as changé ? 
- Je pense que tu deviens moins choqué par la ville. Tu t'y habitue plus, et tu 
apprends à voir de petites beautés qu'il y a quand même dans une ville, mais de là à 
dire que je me sens cent pour cent à l'aise dans une grande ville, quand même pas. 
Tu apprends à trouver de petites beautés qu'il y a aussi dans la ville, par rapport à la 
nature, mais à ce point-là dire que je trouve la ville plus belle, ou que l'impression a 
changé, je ne pense pas quand même.” - Thomas, 25, ville (campagne) 
 
It seems that prolonged exposure to certain urban environments can lead to the shift in 
the way these environment are aesthetically experienced. Again, the problem of 
distinction between the concept of inhabiting and the concept of residing imposes as 
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fundamental. One can spend his or her entire life in an environment without really 
actively inhabiting it. A stone lying in water for years — it still can end up dry inside. 
 
“- Donc pour moi un immeuble, ça fait un peu l’effet d’une montagne, quand c’est 
trop proche. (…) 
- Et ça vient d’où ? 
- Ah ! Alors ça je pense que ça vient certainement de mes ancêtres, parce que nous 
sommes paysans de famille, et je sais que, nous, on était les paysans qui habitaient 
la ville. Moi je suis née à Lausanne, je suis née en ville, donc j’ai des manières de 
ville, bien sûr. Ils avaient une maison, il n’y avait pas de salle de bain. Ils avaient pas 
ce genre de confort dont nous on avait l’habitude. Mais au-delà du confort, moi 
j’étais super bien quand j’allais en vacances parce que j’avais de l’espace, parce que 
c’était des choses qu’en ville, on était un peu cloisonnés quand même. (…) Je suis 
née toujours dans le sud de Lausanne. Mais le sud-ouest. Et là on avait, encore une 
fois, de l’espace, parce qu’il y avait à côté de chez nous une forêt. On appelait ça les 
ruclons en fait, à l’époque, parce que les gens déversaient, dans certains endroits, les 
déchets. Il y avait pas encore les déchetteries, ça n’existait pas, donc les gens jetaient 
un peu comme ça. Donc on vivait à côté des ruclons, mais pas dans le ruclon. 
Nous, on jouait avec la nature, avec les arbres, on faisait des cabanes, après ils ont 
fait l’exposition nationale. (…) Le lieu, il avait quand même quelque chose de bien, 
c’était qu’on avait un petit jardin. Donc on avait un petit espace de verdure où on 
pouvait aller manger ou mettre la piscine pour les enfants. Une ! Il n’y en a qu’une 
qui a connu, qui est née là-bas, les autres sont nés ici. (…) 
J’ai de la peine à me projeter en ville, alors que j’habite en ville. Ça a été toute ma 
vie quand même, la ville. Mais c’est vrai quand on va regarder avec mon mari, on 
s’est plutôt dirigé sur le Valais, en haut plutôt, en montagne, pas en plaine.” - 
Emilia, 57, ville (bord de ville).   
 
In contrast, Urs, after being exposed to diverse stylistic expressions in the city of 
Lausanne, modified his judgement to aesthetically experience the city’s streets and city’s 
architecture in a new light: 
 
“Mais ça, je pense que c'est lié aussi un peu, je pense aussi au goût de mes parents. 
Moi j'aimais surtout les villes historiques, mais avec des centres historiques anciens, 
homogènes et puis c'est vrai qu'à ce niveau-là, bien Bâle ou Berne, c'est quand 
même des villes qui sont plus belles que Lausanne, franchement. C’est vrai que 
moi, Lausanne, c'était une ville que je trouvait plutôt moche et puis surtout qu'on 
arrivait par la gare. Je veux dire la place de la gare immonde, après...pour ça 
d'ailleurs je la trouve toujours assez moche, ça...je n'ai pas changé. Et puis c'est vrai 
qu'il y a des endroits horribles. Il y a plein de trucs comme ça que je trouve très, 
quoi qui sont quand même assez ratés. Puis après c'est vrai que, c'est...oui, c’est vrai 
que j'ai découvert plus tard en fait, vraiment en y habitant puis c'est là que j’ai 
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réalisé ce qu'elle avait aussi de beau. (…) Des rues que je trouvais immondes quoi 
quand je suis arrivé ici, que j'aimais vraiment pas du tout et puis maintenant, je 
trouve que c'est plutôt une architecture intéressante. (…) Là je suis juste un peu 
sorti de catégories reçues avec lesquelles j'ai grandi en fait.” - Urs, 42, ville 
(campagne) 
 
The two last examples point out another crucial element in the development of aesthetic 
sensitivity — the childhood environment, which is still a largely unmapped terrain. In 
human geography, a large subdiscipline focusing on children and young people was 
developed (Kraftl, Horton, and Tucker 2014; for a basic literature review in urban 
studies see Ellen and Turner 1997). Geographers who focused on children’s geography 
put an emphasis on the central role of space by calling attention to the reality that the 
social constructions of childhood are always spatial constructions too. 
Childhood as a Critical Period 
As Pauline von Bonsdorff observes, “[if] there is one area where the view of children as 
inferior and/or deficient beings has been less dominant, this might be the area of 
aesthetics” (2009, 60). Among the first thinkers who called into question the view that 
children are inferior to adults in all aspects was Rousseau. In the mid-18th century, 
childhood began to be viewed in a positive light, as a highly emotional state of freedom, 
creativity and, perhaps most importantly, of ‘innocence’ and ‘incorruption’. Interestingly 
enough, the discipline of modern aesthetics was created during at the same period.  
 
Here again I must again insist on not to confuse the aesthetic and the artistic. Since art is 
usually seen as a serious matter reserved for adults with high cognitive abilities and 
certain social capital, then when it comes to artistic issues, children can only appear as 
less knowledgeable and less experienced. If, however, aesthetics is considered as a 
dimension of society that influences the human experience of the world as well as the 
societal values and qualities that we give to social objects, then it appears that children are 
not only aesthetically active, but in many ways, perhaps even more active than adults. 
The two philosophers who put a strong emphasis on this fact were Merleau-Ponty and 
Bachelard. 
 
While he was a professor of child psychology and pedagogy at the Sorbonne, Merleau-
Ponty dealt extensively with the phenomenology of the childhood. In his series of 
lectures from 1949 to 1952 (Merleau-Ponty 2001), he argued that the the child’s 
experience of others is critical for any systematic attempt to understand individual and 
intersubjective existence. Since his discussions included an extraordinary range of topics 
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and references from various fields, I will primarily focus on the first and last lecture 
where he discusses the child’s relationship to language. Like von Bonsdorff (2009), I 
believe that a proper understanding of the mechanism by which a child acquires a 
language will provide us with a better understanding of the development of aesthetic 
judgement.  
 
In his discussion of language acquisition, Marleau-Monty describes language as a space 
that comes from the order of the subject. He criticises the philosophical perspective that 
sees language as coming from the order of things. He argues that in the view of 
Descartes, Kant, and so forth, “spoken or written words are” considered as “physical 
phenomena; the connection between word’s meaning and aspect is accidental, fortuitous, 
and conventional. (…) Language is an uttered message, but one without the force of 
effective communication. The word has no power of its own.” (Merleau-Ponty and 
Welsh 2010, 3). Merleau-Ponty argues that this conception devalues language because it 
turns it into a ready-made object. For him, a word is not a mere sign whose purpose is to 
give the mind “an occasion to remember what he already knows”. The word does not 
only summarize what already exists. Instead, he claims that language brings something to 
thought. Words are not just neutral signs, so “[l]anguage defies the sign-signified 
distinction”. Here is a similar criticism as that aimed at Sartre’s theory of imagination 
and the role of the analogon for the imaginative thought. 
 
In acquiring its first language, a child does not merely interpret a phonetic system, but 
rather enters a space of sounds and appropriates its phonetic characteristics, which 
Merleau Ponty calls register or “style” of a language. This means that “the child learns 
the differences between phonetic units of a language in a functional way, through use 
and situations, not through logical inference. Learning takes place through doing, 
testing, playing.” (Bonsdorff 2009) The immediate environment and the spatialities of a 
child appear as essential for the process of language acquisition. “Language is the 
indissoluble extension of all physical activity and at the same time is something new in 
relation to it. Speech emerges from the "total language" made up of gestures, mimicry, 
and so forth. But language transforms.” (Merleau-Ponty and Welsh 2010, 8) Play is here, 
as von Bonsdorff points out, more than intellectual gaming, for it fully activates the 
realm of imagination and emotions. Merleau-Ponty compares a child’s play with 
language with an actor’s relation to his role:  
 
“We can ask here, as with all games, to what extent does the child believe in 
the reality of imaginary situations? (…) But Sartre in The Imaginary shows 
that this is a false problem. The child, like the actor, is neither feigning nor 
is he in an illusion. He has left the plane of habitual life for an oneiric life 
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that he really lives. He renders himself unreal [s'irrealise] in the role.” 
(Merleau-Ponty and Welsh 2010, 35)  
 
By playing with language, a child extends his/her behavior, which in turn appears as  a 
manifestation of his/her imaginary life. This means that the process of language 
acquisition is highly aesthetic — a child takes up elements from the world and in the act 
of play combines them in a new way.  
 
The concept of play has an important place in aesthetic tradition. Like Merleau-Ponty, 
Gadamer took the Kantian emphasis on play and made it a cornerstone of his own 
aesthetic theory. He gave to the concept of play two elements that were missing in the 
Kantian conception: a historical dimension, and a strong emphasis on actual movement 
in the world that “invites” us to engage in aesthetic experience. He dismissed the idea 
that aesthetic judgment comes as a result of the free play of cognitive faculties, but 
retained the idea that the aesthetic experience is characterized by a free spontaneous 
structure, which cannot be expressed in the form of general laws but is nevertheless 
organized (Gjesdal 2012, 104-8). The main problem with the Kantian understanding of 
subjectivity was that it appeared as autonomous — as a result of the subject’s brain 
activity only. Gadamer (1989, 102), in contrast, observed that when the ordinary use of 
the word “play” is closely examined, the limitations of the Kantian perspective quickly 
become aparent. When one speaks of the play of waves or the light, one does not refer to 
the mental state of the observer, but to the actual movement of the waves and light itself. 
The aim of this play “consists in the maintenance of the movement itself” (Gjesdal 2012, 
107). As Kristin Gjesdal observes, Gadamer was drawing on the work of the Dutch 
anthropologist Johan Huizinga, whose study “Homo Ludens” (1938), pointed out that 
play is closely related to the emergence of human culture. “Play expresses a dimension of 
life that transcends the constraints of reproduction and natural needs. It is related to our 
most fundamental quest for existential meaning” (Gjesdal 2012, 107). In religious rites 
and festivals, which were described by Huizinga, Gadamer finds proof of human beings’ 
natural necessity to lose themselves in play, to be absorbed by the movement of play. 
According to Gjesdal, this is what makes the model of play a starting point for an 
account of the aesthetic experience.?? Movement seems to appear at the threshold of 
every aesthetic experience. 
 
By lending its sensing body to the world, a child learns to imagine and eventually learns 
to change the world into drawings, plays and role-changing games. Since a child is 
perpetually engaged in play, a child inhabits the virtual (the possible) more than an adult 
                                                      
???It must be noted that Gadamer was primarily concerned with the experience of art. 
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does.?? When Paul Klee copied a landscape painted by his 12-year-old son into his own 
1920 painting entitled ”Untitled (Tent City in the Mountains)”, he paid tribute to the 
creativity and inventiveness of childhood. Similar to Klee, other artists like Miró, 
Dubuffet and Picasso used art made by children (primarily for their novel way of looking 
at the world) as a source for their own aesthetic innovations (see Fineberg 1997) 
 
Since humans, as socially prematured beings, are naturally predispositioned for social 
interaction, a child cannot develop its linguistic capacities nor its sensibility without 
synthesizing various lived experiences with other humans (Lahire 2016, 54). If human 
beings’ social capacities develop through direct interactions with an environment, this 
must be true for their aesthetic representations too. If a person’s aesthetic judgment, as a 
result of unique imaginative activity, is to be awoken and enriched to the extent of being 
singular, this can only happen if a child grows in active interaction with other members 
of society (parents, friends, teachers, but also strangers in the streets and other urban 
spaces!). This brings to light the intersubjective and evaluative character of aesthetic 
judgment — a characteristic that was actually suggested by Kant in his discussions of 
taste and sensus communis.?? 
 
In the same way that “[t]he child's movement toward speech is a constant call to others”, 
aesthetic judgment demands the constant adjustment and approval of the others. “The 
child recognizes in the other another self”. (Merleau-Ponty and Welsh 2010, 20) A child 
is open to the world — rather than being centred on itself. In this sense, Merleau-Ponty 
argues for the contrary interpretation of the famous thesis of Piaget as regards to young 
children’s ‘egocentrism’. “Rather than being too much occupied with itself, the young 
child is characterised by a lack of ego, a world-openness and an accompanying tendency 
not to put boundary between ‘myself’ and the other. While this world-openess may take 
many forms and go through many stages, it is worth observing that it points to the 
sharing of meaning — in situations of play and language use, and in interpreting or 
understanding, and producing meaning.” (Bonsdorff 2009, 67) Like language, aesthetic 
judgement appears as the means of realizing “reciprocity with the other” (Merleau-Ponty 
and Welsh 2010, 20).  
 
                                                      
??? It might be argued that an important part of a child’s social education consists precisely in 
suppressing the imaginative element of experience, in order for a child to enter a certain cultural 
scheme. 
???As von Bonsdorff points out, “[i]t should however be emphasised that this theoretical, assumed 
shareability differs in decisive ways from the much more empirical and heterogeneous situations 
Merleau-Ponty seems to have in mind. Whereas Kant’s focus is on aesthetic judgement, Merleau- 
Ponty’s is on experience. In different ways both however deal with the constitution of a common 
human world (2009)”. 
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The fundamental importance of childhood was evoked by almost all of the interviewees. 
When asked to comment on how their aesthetic judgement has come to be as such, it 
seems to me that their responses can be summarized by the following words of Ivo 
Andrić, a Bosnian Nobel Prize laureate for literature: “At the beginning of all roads and 
paths, at the basis of the very thought of them, lies sharply and indelibly carved the path 
on which I made my first free steps (translated by L. Pašćanović)” Here are some of the 
examples:   
 
“Je rêvais ces maisons, de vivre là. Ça serait tellement chouette de vivre au bord du 
lac. Mais ça me paraissait inaccessible. Ça s'est donné, il y a une dizaine d'années 
plus tard. Donc il y a très longtemps. Ce qui participe aussi, comme enfant, j'ai 
passé toutes mes vacances d'été dans une cabane de pêcheurs, des planches en bois, 
et on y passait six semaines d'été. Cet enracinement là, comme enfant, participe de 
l'envie d'avoir choisi un endroit comme celui-là.” - Walter, 60, périurbain 
 
“- Les grandes villes m'auraient plutôt fait fuir. Beaucoup de bruit, beaucoup de 
circulation, ce genre de choses je n’aime pas trop. Bon étant petite, je n'allais pas 
souvent non plus dans les grandes villes. Mais si j’y restais avec mes parents, on 
allait à Genève rendre visite à ma tante ou des choses comme ça. Je n'aimais pas du 
tout les grandes villes. J’étais bien dans mon petit village. Et encore maintenant, 
voyez, on a choisi un village et non pas une ville. J’ai vécu à Lausanne. On était un 
petit peu excentrés vers la forêt, vers le lac de Sauvabelin. Je n'avais pas le sentiment 
d'être en pleine ville. Mais je n'aurais jamais pu être en pleine ville. Mais peut-être 
parce que j'ai toujours vécu dans un endroit qui fait plus villageois que grande ville. 
- Qu’est-ce que la ville vous fait au niveau esthétique? 
- Ça aurait plus tendance à me stresser. Tous ces bâtiments les uns après les autres, 
pas d'espace, pas assez de couleurs. Oui, ce n’est pas quelque chose qui me plaît.” - 
Luisa, 42, périurbain (petite ville) 
 
“Comment mon gout s'est fabriqué ? Vous posez… c'est quasiment la 
psychanalyse. Écoutez, moi je pense que mon gout s'est fabriqué une part à 
l'opposé quand même du milieu d'où je suis né, car c'est un milieu extrêmement 
défavorisé. Il n’y avait pas beaucoup de belles choses autour de moi. Enfin, je n’ai 
rien trouvé, si vous voulez, à part un meuble de mon arrière-grand-père, ce qu'on 
appelle des secrétaires. Comme ça, il n'y avait rien à retenir. J'avais un oncle qui 
mêlait des anciens meubles. C'est vrai, quand j'étais gamin, bah, il avait une belle 
chambre. Parce qu'il collectionnait des meubles, disons de brocante, mais de 
qualité. Bon. C'était quand même pas des meubles d'antiquaires. Donc là, je me 
suis un peu fait à ce type de meuble. Mais il n’habitait pas non plus, il n’avait pas 
beaucoup d'argent non plus. Ils n’habitaient pas dans un château, mais il avait du 
goût pour l'endroit où il était.” - David, 65, périurbain (ville) 
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“Ben ça commence depuis tout petit forcément, parce que d'abord on a un 
environnement, on connait pas autre chose donc forcément, voilà, après on 
commence à aller voir un peu ce qui se passe et puis on peut comparer avec son 
environnement, avec, ou alors, mais je pense que là où on vit au départ façonne 
quand même pas mal la suite, si on a eu un environnement qui nous a plu petit, 
peut-être qu'on a envie de retrouver les mêmes sensations, si on a eu un 
environnement plutôt qu’on aimait moins, on a envie de se construire ailleurs.” - 
Silvia, 55, périurbain (périurbain)   
 
“- Comment votre gout s'est fabriqué ? 
- Depuis la naissance. J'habitais en Angleterre dans une forêt, dans un grand hôtel. 
Quand je suis venu là, dans l'appartement, ça m'a quand même manqué beaucoup. 
(…) On passait tout notre temps dans le foret. En hiver, mon père avait un énorme 
jardin. Moi j'ai vécu une vie très naturelle. Proche de la nature. Alors c'est pour ça 
qu’ici maintenant j'adore et j'ai la chance d'avoir continué.” - Victoria, 59, 
périurbain (hypourbain) 
 
Like Merleau-Ponty, Bachelard finds the source of inhabiting in childhood, which is a 
period for learning to spontaneously daydream (Lévy 2013, 118). Within the childhood 
home, he argues, a person experiences how to be (and how to become!) themselves. A 
house is a human existential, oneiric and cosmic space, and it is through active 
imagination that one gives meaning to a life. He sees the house as a shelter where one can 
dream in peace. Bachelard's felicitous space is often compared with Heidegger's 
existential space and his nostalgic writings on the subject of dwelling. An example of this 
can be found in the description of a peasant hut in the Black Forest, in the final chapters 
of his essay “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” (1971). Both authors give „importance to a 
home which is built to reflect all stages of the human life – from birth to death – by 
including spaces both for the child's crib and the coffin as well as the areas for daily adult 
activity.“ (Jacobson 2009, 363). This attitude is understood as a response to the modern 
urbanism of the 20th century.  
 
Henry Lefebvre, who admired both authors, writes in The Production of Space of “the 
terrible urban reality which the twentieth century has instituted, embellishing it with a 
nostalgic aura while also suffusing the work of its critics. Thus both Heidegger's and 
Bachelard's writings — the importance and influence of which are beyond question — 
deal with this idea in a most emotional and indeed moving way.” Victoria speaks of her 
relationship to both childhood and modernity in the following way: 
 
“- Pourquoi l'ancien vous plait beaucoup plus que le tout nouveau ? 
- Je crois peut-être c'est la ressemblance à l'enfance où j'ai habité. Et puis, il n'a 
aucun caractère. Et tout de suite je suis attiré par le bois. L'enfance était comme ça 
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et puis maintenant, tous nos chalets et tout ce qu'on a construit, c'est toujours avec 
le bois, le bois, le bois. C’est pour ça que les fleurs, le bois, les balcons, ça me plaît.” 
- Victoria, 59, périurbain (hypourbain) 
 
Once again, it seems that there is no necessity to be nostalgic. Nor is there any reason to 
restrain our analysis to the family home, as Bachelard did. Human beings can potentially 
inhabit the entire urban space, and the inhabitants in my study clearly showed that their 
judgements span the entire spectre of environments. 
 
“Alors j'habitais dans une petite maison familiale qui ressemblait à un chalet de 
montagne, donc tout en bois. Mais ma famille avait la chance, enfin, d'avoir un 
petit terrain et donc j'ai eu la chance d'avoir un jardin, d'avoir donc de la verdure 
tout autour de chez moi. Et puis, j'étais en périphérie de Lausanne, j'habitais Prilly. 
Donc oui, avec un petit jardin, donc, j'allais manger des fruits dans mon jardin, 
j'avais un pommier enfin, un poirier, enfin, vraiment j'ai eu une enfance très 
proche de la nature malgré qu'on était à côté de la ville. Je pense que j'étais 
privilégiée donc peut-être que ça, ça a influencé, après comme je vous disais, j'aime 
beaucoup la nature enfin les choses... j'ai besoin d'être proche de la nature, donc je 
pense que oui. Si on a toujours eu l'habitude d'être dans un coin bétonné après ça 
se développe sûrement différemment. Mais c'est vrai que moi, pour qu'un endroit 
soit beau pour moi, j'ai besoin de la nature, donc je pense que oui, quand j'étais 
petite, j’ai été influencée. J'ai eu la chance de pouvoir vivre dans un endroit comme 
ça donc, oui.” - Sara, 48, ville (campagne) 
 
“Ce qui est bizarre, c’est que, par exemple, l’est de Lausanne, ne m’attire pas du 
tout. J’ai pas du tout l’envie d’aller habiter là-bas dans ce coin-là. Je suis toujours 
attirée par l’ouest de Lausanne, et c’est drôle par ce que je ne suis pas la seule. Il y’a 
plein de gens qui préfèrent ce côté-là, et Lausanne apparemment c’est un peu la 
frontière. (…)  J’ai toujours préféré ce côté, alors peut être parce que je suis née ici, 
que j’ai mis la tâche ici, etc., mais ça, c’est marrant.” - Chantal, périurbain 
(campagne) 
?
“- Comment ton goût s'est fabriqué ? 
- Je pense que c'est l'habitude depuis tout petit de vivre dans ce milieu.  
- Tu penses que l'enfance joue beaucoup d'importance ? 
- Oui. Après ça n'empêche pas que si on me met ailleurs, je vais peut-être trouver 
un autre décor très beau, mais… peut-être si je n'étais pas né ici, je verrais le village 
différemment. Je le trouverais moins beau, j'y trouverais plus de défauts peut-être. 
(…) Comme enfant, j'allais très peu en ville. Même adolescent, j'aimais mieux être 
dans la campagne avec mon papa que d'aller au cinéma ou de me promener en 
ville. Je passais le temps plutôt avec mes cousins qui habitaient à côté, faire des 
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cabanes en foret que d'aller dans les magasins ou jouer aux jeux vidéo.” - Patrick, 
34, village (village) 
 
By interacting with others, human beings learn how to imagine. Aesthetic education 
consists precisely in the transmission of one’s own images to others. Influenced by the 
works of the American School of Cultural Sociology, Merleau-Ponty saw childhood as 
“an initiation into a certain cultural environment” (Merleau-Ponty and Welsh 2010, 20). 
Some straight parallels can be made between his position and Bourdieu’s term ‘habitus’, 
understood as “the set of dispositions that individuals acquire through socialization, 
particularly early life, and which orient them towards the social and physical world 
around them” (Sayer cited in Wan 2011, 82). Barbara and Maria point out the role of 
parents when their children are young: 
 
“Les premiers qui vous font la différence entre jolie et pas joli - quand vous avez 4 
ans, un pull, un jouet — c'est les parents.” -  Maria, 59, ville (ville) 
 
“Ah, mais mon goût, j'avais un papa artiste et voilà, il me montrait les belles choses. 
Même si, je ne sais pas moi, le tableau d'un peintre que, bien peut-être qu'il ne 
trouvait pas terrible, mais il disait toujours : « Oui, mais tu vois là, ce qu'il a fait là, 
ça c'est intéressant, regarde comme c'est beau. » Donc voilà. Donc j'ai été entrainée 
comme ça, de voir aussi, même s'il y a une beauté partielle, bien voir ce qui est 
beau aussi.” - Barbara, 65, périurbain (périurbain) 
 
What seems to be the particularity of childhood is that children engage in collective 
meaning-making, much more than adults to (Kennedy 2012, 174-251). This leads von 
Bonsdorff to conclude that “the child existence is therefore more one of Mitsein, of 
being-with-others, than of self centredness. For the child, in a shared situation there is 
not one centre, but two or several — as many as there are participating agents” (2009). 
Since humans get their first conceptions of who “the others” are at an early age, one must 
not forget that “the other” is also an aesthetic category. “The other” is never a self-
evident concept. It must always be constructed through a process of a meaning-making. 
It is in interaction with others that human beings learn who others are and what they are 
like.  
 
As Helen Levitt observes in the opening of her short movie entitled “In the Street”, 
which brilliantly captured the street life in New York's Spanish Harlem during the 
1940s, the urban space takes the role of a theater and a battleground, where “every 
human being is a poet, a masker, a warrior, a dancer: and in his innocent artistry, he 
projects, against the turmoil of the street, an image of human existence”. One need only 
pay attention to a children’s chalk drawings and messages on the streets and walls (see 
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Levitt and Agee 1987), to see how children perpetually engage in creation of ephemeral 
forms of art, which lay there as a testimony of their emerging individuality and 
imaginative consciousness. Their drawings are not a matter of a self-centered individual. 
Rather they are expressions of someone willing to share with others how the world might 
be and might appear to them. 
 
The point here is that childhood always takes part in the mechanisms that structure 
individual lives and is not merely a step that has to be conquered towards adulthood. 
The spaces of childhood stay with us even when we become adults. “The aesthetics of 
childhood is not just about children, but about the human situation.” (Bonsdorff 2009, 
74) A 2009 study of the residential choice in the periurban districts in Quebec (Fortin 
and Després 2009) indicated that when it comes to the living environment, inhabitants 
seek elements they were familiar with during their childhood in low-density suburbs or 
rural communities. Proximity to nature and the appreciation of natural landscapes seem 
to play a determining role in their choices. The authors conclude that an approach based 
on purely economic grounds and planning using only a rational basis is destined to fail. 
They highlight the need for more qualitative research about residential representations, 
which would complement and complete quantitative studies about residential choices.  
 
In the following paragraphs, Claudia, who is 34 years old, explains how she grew up in 
an apartment in a small city of the Tour de Pailz near the Lemanic lake. She first 
expresses her admiration for high-standing single-family houses in the residential 
neighbourhood, and then tells us that as a young girl, when she was in third grade, she 
was impressed by the beauty of the houses where her school friends lived. She had a 
similar feeling in relation to her grandparents’ house in Austria, where she used to spend 
her summer holidays. I have chosen to cite almost the entire passage on the matter for it 
points out to a certain consistency of an image during a lifetime: 
 
“- [Photo 2] C’est magnifique. C’est des villas. Il y a pratiquement des villas de 
maîtres. Ça serait un peu ma villa, ma maison de rêve, un peu comme celle-là, dans 
le genre. Si je pouvais me permettre.  
- Pourquoi ?  
- Parce que je trouve que si l’intérieur peut être rénové tout en gardant le charme de 
l’ancien… C’est des maisons avec souvent des hauts plafonds, des beaux parquets, 
des moulures, je trouve que ça a énormément de cachet. Le style, je trouve que c’est 
hyper beau comme maison. Après j’aime aussi beaucoup les trucs modernes. 
(…) Elles sont un peu grandes, mais je trouve magnifiques. Et oui, je trouve toutes 
ces maisons-là sont vraiment magnifiques : là avec le lierre c’est beau, et puis la vue 
sur le lac, c’est joli, quoi.  
- Pourquoi tu penses que c’est un beau paysage ? Pourquoi les maisons te plaisent ? 
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- Je trouve que c’est un mélange entre la nature, les arbres. C’est très vert, et puis au 
milieu c’est déjà… c’est quartier résidentiel. C’est huppé, là-bas. Voilà, les maisons 
sont belles. Elles sont bien entretenues. C’est pas la zone HLM, quoi. Pour moi 
c’est l’inverse, c’est vraiment le côté plutôt chic, super beau, ça fait un peu rêver, 
même si je pense qu’à moins de gagner à loterie ! (…) On est dans le rêve, mais 
voilà je trouve que les maisons sont très jolies. Belles couleurs, j’adore avec ces 
petites tuiles, c’est vraiment des magnifiques toits aussi. Les couleurs, ça me plait. 
Ces volets bleus, les maisons blanches, c’est super joli, celle-là où aussi, ça m’a 
toujours fait… Oui, j’avais une copine qui habitait dans une maison un peu 
comme ça, je me souviens, j’étais devant sa maison et puis ça me faisait rêver, quoi. 
Petite, si tu veux. Donc c’est vrai que j’ai toujours bien aimé ces maisons comme 
ça. Et puis ben je trouve que c’est un joli quartier. Oui je pense que ça doit être 
assez agréable la vie là-bas, quoi. Enfin, à vivre en tout cas. 
- Quand tu me parles de cette copine, pourquoi ça t’évoque tout de suite ce 
souvenir ?  
- Oui, parce qu’elle avait une maison comme ça. Mais c’est vrai que j’ai toujours été 
attirée par les belles maisons. J’adore me balader, regarder sur les bâtiments, plus 
que le reste, donc, du coup… Elle, elle avait cette maison, et ça me faisait rêver. Je 
me disais « Mais waw ! C’est trop de chance d’habiter dans une telle maison ». 
J’avais une autre copine qui habitait dans une autre maison, c’était aussi, ça vous 
faisait rêver. Sa maison, l’autre, elle était au bord du lac. C’est une maison plus 
petite, mais tu sais vraiment à deux pas du port de la Tour de Pailz. C’est juste 
magnifique. (…) C’est vrai probablement parce que moi, j’habitais dans un 
appartement qui était, rien de très spécial, si tu veux, en tant que tel, et d’avoir ça, 
c’était un peu un rêve, quoi. Et puis je trouve qu’esthétiquement elles sont belles, 
quoi.  
- Et pourquoi tu penses que cette petite maison était mieux qu’un appartement ?  
- J’imagine que c’était bien plus grand, spacieux et… (…) C’était une petite 
maison, façon de dire, elle avait quand même un ascenseur dans la maison, c’était 
plus petit dans le sens des plafonds moins hauts, comme ça. Moi j’étais petite, je 
devais être en troisième primaire, donc... Tu vois c’était... Mais, c’est vrai que, oui 
je trouvais qu’elle avait énormément de cachet, cette maison avait une âme, 
vraiment. Et puis, elle était vraiment hyper bien située au bord du lac, 
pratiquement, elle avait une super terrasse, vue sur le lac, c’était aussi vraiment pas 
mal, agréable, quoi. Puis du coup j’allais assez souvent chez elle, c’était ma 
meilleure amie, et puis du coup, je me sentais super bien dans sa maison. J’étais 
vraiment là « Oh ! J’aimerais trop avoir une maison comme ça ! » Donc, et puis, 
voilà, c’est vrai que ça, quand tu me demandais tout à l’heure qu’est-ce qui a fait 
que je suis là maintenant, par rapport à mes goûts, je ne dirais pas que c’était 
déterminant ces moments-là, mais j’ai l’impression que depuis toute petite, j’avais 
ce goût pour les jolies maisons, quoi, si tu veux. Mais peut-être, parce que c’est pas 
ce que j’avais chez moi, dans ma famille. Mais le fait d’avoir une maison, c’est vrai 
que j’aimais bien. Dans ma famille en Autriche, mon père est autrichien, et quand 
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on allait en vacances là-bas, mes grands-parents chez qui on logeait, ils avaient une 
grande maison. Je trouvais ça génial d’habiter dans une maison par rapport à un 
appartement, en fait. Le fait, je sais pas, d’avoir plusieurs étages, le fait d’avoir ou 
d’être indépendant, de ne pas avoir des voisins, voilà.” - Claudia, 34, périurbain 
(petite ville) 
 
Childhood appears as a critical period where aesthetic structure is awoken by the 
relationship that the child creates with societal objects and other persons. It is in 
childhood that human beings first learn to become both bounded to and separate from 
each other, and this is also true for aesthetic bounds and aesthetic separations. Urban 
science researchers still need to study how the imaginative potential of humans is 
activated and patterned by its interactions with urban environments, and by interactions 
within urban environments.  
“Living Here and Not Elsewhere”: The 
Aesthetic Dimension of the Residential Choice 
The European Environmental Agency suggests that where unplanned, decentralized 
development dominates, sprawl will occur in a mechanistic way (Uhel 2006). This might 
be true, but it presupposes that inhabitants desire to live in such an environment and this 
desire is far from being a universally shared value. It is important to understand why 
some individuals see chaos and disorder where others see beauty and liveliness. By closely 
analysing the participants’ discourses I have concluded that adopting a new style of 
inhabiting usually comes with a shift in a person’s aesthetic understanding of the urban 
environment. Again, this is not a recent phenomenon. 
 
In the 1970s, during the time that ecological issues were emerging, there was a strong 
demand for habitats to be increasingly moved away from the city, i.e, for habitats to be 
in proximity to natural environment. Cheap gasoline and massive transport structures 
may have aided the construction and popularization of periurban areas, but I argue that 
this movement from the city to the periphery could not be accomplished without the 
emergence of a particular aesthetic sensibility. Studies performed in Switzerland between 
1970 and 1980 indicate that among the first reasons for moving to the periphery of the 
city were urban annoyances and a wish to live in the country (Longchamp 1989). 
Salomon Cavin observes a paradox here: City exodus results in an urban sprawl, which in 
turn, provokes anti-urban attitudes (Salomon Cavin 2005, 75). It seems that a lifestyle 
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change comes with a change in almost every dimension that orients individual choices, 
and this is certainly true with the aesthetic dimension. 
 
In a recent collection of essays edited by Pierre Frankhauser and Dominique Ansel, a 
group of authors argued that the preferences for one residential location over another are 
not fixed; they may change throughout life. They underline the importance of experience 
in the various places that people live, which enables individuals to progressively refine 
their choices. They further argue that the existing literature on residential modes 
underlines the importance of understanding what does it mean to adopt a certain 
lifestyle, which seems to boil down to the spatio-temporal dimension and its economic 
implications (Frankhauser and Ansel 2016, 57). This seems to be true in the Swiss 
context as well, as Thomas and Pattaroni have argued in their study of the middle-class 
families’ residential choice (2012). An important international literature (for a review, see 
Aragonés 2002) has demonstrated that all stages in life bear the potential for change: 
“leaving the parents’ home, sharing with a partner or otherwise, joining the labor market 
or changing jobs, having children, getting divorced, children leaving home, retiring, or 
simply growing old, and so on” (Frankhauser and Ansel 2016, 57). Since all these 
situations require of an individual to modify his or her spatialities, it may entail changes 
in the way his/her everyday life is practiced and organized. While factors that prompt 
people to change their residential environment are quite well identified, factors that make 
them hesitate to leave seem to be less well known.  
 
In any case, the level of urbanity that an individual inhabits (actually as well as virtually) 
must always be taken into consideration. When it comes to a choice between a detached 
house or a collective dwelling in the French context, the above-mentioned group of 
authors underline a decisive role of the perception of density. Following the 2007 study 
for the French “Observatoire de la ville” (Gault and Bedeau) the authors observed the 
contradictory feelings of individuals opting for a detached family house. On one hand, 
the periurban residents expressed a preference “for privacy, to live in a cocoon with a 
garden”, while on the other side, they too had a desire to be surrounded by schools, 
shops, and neighbors, i.e., to have “urban and neighbourhood services and social 
relations that are more characteristic of a dense urban fabric” (Frankhauser and Ansel 
2016, 60). Thus, the detached house appears as both “attractive because it is calm and 
private” and repellent “because it is isolated and therefore lonely”. After analyzing several 
studies on the French territory, studies performed in Madrid (Amérigo and Aragonés 
1990), Barcelona (Pol 2002), and the study of the Dutch residential environmental 
satisfaction (Adriaanse 2007), the authors made an important observation: residential 
satisfaction seems to depend more on subjective criteria than on objective criteria 
(Frankhauser and Ansel 2016, 64).  
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In the following paragraphs, I will provide some examples of how the immediate 
residential environment influences the aesthetic judgments that the inhabitants might 
have of the urban environment. Nina, who grew up in the low-density neighborhood of 
Neuchâtel, speaks of her arrival in the city of Lausanne where she was confronted with a 
different lifestyle and a relatively new and unfamiliar urban landscape. She speaks of how 
this change of lifestyle came with a shift in the aesthetic understanding of the urban 
environment: 
 
“- Je pense que je suis influencée par le milieu ou j'ai grandi. (…) C'est la 
campagne neuchâteloise. Un endroit qui s'appelle Val-de-Travers. C'est 
vraiment… il y a plein de montagnes, plein d'endroits où on fait des balades. C'est 
vraiment un petit village, pas beaucoup d'habitants.  
- Et quand le changement a eu lieu ? 
- Quand je suis venue faire mes études ici.  
- Est-ce que tu te souviens comment ce passage t'a influencé ? 
- Alors je me souviens que je n’aimais pas du tout Lausanne. Je trouvais qu'il y avait 
trop de gens. Je détestais prendre le métro. Les gens étaient entassés. Vu que je 
venais d'un petit village, j'avais l'habitude que mes voisins me disent bonjour. C'est 
ridicule un peu. Mais j'avais l'habitude que mes voisins me disent bonjour. Que sur 
le chemin les gens me disent bonjour, et c'est pas forcement le cas dans une ville. 
Ça me faisait bizarre. Je me rappelle que je disais toujours bonjour aux gens dans 
mon immeuble et il y avait des gens qui ne me répondaient pas, ou qui devaient se 
dire que j'étais un peu bizarre. Mais non, au début, ça ne me plaisait pas tellement. 
- Et au niveau visuel, comment tu trouvais la ville ? 
- Je pense que je voyais pas grand chose, parce que je pense que je faisais toujours 
les mêmes chemins, j'allais faire mes commissions et j'allais à l'UNIL. Au début, je 
restais pas beaucoup dans la ville, et j'aimais beaucoup la vue par exemple depuis 
l'UNIL. Elle est super jolie. Mais après ce que je voyais, je ne trouvais pas que c'est 
particulièrement beau. Sauf à Noël, là je trouvais que c'était joli. (…)  
- Est-ce que tu pourrais me décrire ce passage en ville un peu plus en détail ? 
- Je pense que déjà j'ai commencé à voir plus de choses, aller dans différents 
endroits, du coup ça a fait que ça m'a plus plu. J'ai vu des choses différentes et puis 
aussi au bout d'un moment, c’est devenu un environnement familier. Enfin, j'ai 
commencé d'avoir des habitudes ici, à faire ma vie ici et du coup forcément ça m'a 
plus plu. (…) Mais après, si un jour je ferais une famille, je me verrais moins en fait 
dans une ville. 
- Pourquoi ? 
- Justement, je pense que du fait que j'ai grandi plus à la campagne, je me dis que 
mes enfants ne pourront pas aller jouer dehors. Parce que si j'habite plus près de la 
route, et je n'ai pas de jardin, ils ne peuvent pas jouer sur le trottoir. (…) 
- Et tu penses que la ville ne convient pas aux enfants ? 
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- Alors finalement oui, parce que j'ai rencontré énormément de gens d'ici qui ont 
grandi ici et qui disent que c'était super quand même de grandir ici. Mais moi j'ai 
toujours imaginé plus la campagne. Parce que moi j'ai grandi à la campagne et 
j'allais jouer dehors et il n'y avait pas de risque, il n'y avait pas trop de routes 
partout et voilà nos parents pouvaient nous laisser dehors sans trop de surveillance 
et sans trop de s'inquiéter. Il y avait des enfants à côté. J'imagine mieux ça.” - Nina, 
25, ville (campagne) 
 
Lara, in contrast, was born in Lausanne and spent her whole life in a dense urban 
context. She strongly appreciates the lifestyle related to the dense city, and also finds 
much (aesthetic) pleasure in the liveliness of street life: 
 
“- Moi j'ai toujours habité au centre, très centre-ville. Je suis née à Lausanne. J'ai 
toujours vécu à Lausanne et j’ai vécu au centre-ville vers le Tunnel au départ. Après 
j'ai vécu en Plaines du Loup, avant, au tout début j'ai vécu dans le quartier des 
Plaines du Loup, vers le stade de la Pontaise, qui est un quartier plus populaire. 
(…) Je pense qu'on avait vraiment une super enfance parce qu'on jouait tout le 
temps dehors. C’était des blocs, je ne sais pas si tu les a déjà vus, que je trouve 
d'ailleurs assez beaux, mais maintenant ils ont changé. C’était des balcons qui 
avaient des petits carrés comme ça. C’était très joli. Maintenant ils ont rempli les 
balcons, donc y a une espèce de couleur un peu vert, caca d'oie qui est comme ça, 
qui remplit ces trous. On a vécu là-bas jusqu'à nos, je ne sais pas nos douze ans, 
depuis qu'on était petits, on était tout le temps dehors, tout le temps, tout le temps, 
et c'était super parce qu’il y a plein de parcs et de machins où tu peux aller sans les 
voitures, sans tout ça (…) On était assez libres aussi. Je pense qu'aujourd'hui on 
fait plus attention peut-être aux enfants, qu’ils ne peuvent pas sortir à cause des 
voitures, à cause du trafic, à cause de tout ça. J'ai plein d'amis qui ont des enfants 
comme ça et puis qui réfléchissent déjà à quitter la ville pour aller en campagne 
parce que c'est mieux pour les enfants, la pollution et tout ça. La violence. (…) 
- Est-ce que tu penses que c'est justifié tout ça ? 
- Ben, je ne serais pas objective parce que, parce que moi j'adore la ville quelle 
qu’elle soit, je suis trop citadine je pense, j'aime être dans le bazar de la ville, j'aime 
bien, ça ne me dérange pas. J’ai pas un problème avec trop de voitures, j'ai pas, je 
ne suis pas, enfin, j'attends d'être plus vieille et peut-être pour aller... mais c'est… 
non, je plaisante. Ça ne me dérange pas, j'aime bien en fait ce poumon comme ça, 
cette vie-là donc en fait, je trouve plutôt triste parce que je trouve que les gens 
s'isolent et puis qu'en fait, ils vont vivre en campagne pour avoir trois voitures, et 
puis on se voit moins, voilà”. - Lara, 30, ville (ville) 
 
A prolonged exposition to a certain reality might lead a person to change the way they 
perceive, conceive and imagine it.  
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“Mais disons surtout ce qui a dû être dérangeant c’est que là il devait y avoir des 
petites maisons qu’on a dû raser pour mettre ça. Et après voilà, il faut que la nature, 
la ville doit  évoluer et continuer, quoi. Mais ça n’a rien à voir les uns avec les 
autres. C’était des choses qui détonnent.  Mais après on se fait à tout. On voit 
même plus, c’est ça en fait, à un moment donné. Des choses qui nous ont choqués, 
au bout d’un moment on les voit dans la nature, ça se fond dedans, quoi.” - Emilia, 
57, ville (campagne) 
 
“J’ai tellement l'habitude de cette vision-là [photo 3], elle m'est très familière, donc, 
je ne peux pas la trouver complètement moche.” - Valérie, 36, ville (périurbain)  
 
“Dès le moment où on habite un endroit et on l'investit, probablement qu'il ne 
sera jamais complètement laid.” - Urs, 42, ville (campagne) 
 
“Je pense qu'on ne voit plus ce CHUV. On n'y pense plus. C'est intégré. La tour 
Bel-Air, c'était un scandale. Maintenant c'est un patrimoine. Je pense qu'on est 
dans le fond du problème. Vous voyez ?” - Maria, 59, ville (ville) 
 
The last example illustrates how both beauty and ugliness can become lived values, 
embodied in the structures of daily life to the extent that they become almost “invisible”. 
Thus, an individual becomes unaware of these values’ influence on their day-to-day 
choices. An image becomes so solid that it becomes an inseparable part of one’s 
spatialities. An individual simply knows that an object or a landscape is beautiful and 
does not think of it any more in. It is a sort of phenomenon that is so internalized that 
the person does not know that he/she knows it. However, this does not mean that the 
aesthetic dimension has ceased to perpetually inform one’s actions. As Elias argued, 
people often take for granted the complex interdependencies in which they are situated 
and the historical dimension of these interdependencies.?? Once again, this is why 
aesthetic considerations must always be a part of societal debates.   
 
“On regarde pas dehors pour voir ce qui est est beau parce qu'on habite là.” - 
Victoria, 59, périurbain (hypourbain) 
 
“En règle général on y va parce qu’on trouve beau, oui. Quand c'est des voyages, 
mais il y a aussi des vacances qu'on fait régulièrement dans une station depuis que 
j'étais petit ou là, c'est plus du repos. Bon c'est beau aussi, mais on connaît 
tellement qu'on ne fait plus attention. On fait moins attention que c'est beau. 
Après ça dépend du type de vacances, mais en général si c'est un voyage à l’étranger, 
                                                      
???See the previous section “Studying Subjectivity: A Spatial and Historical Analysis of Aesthetic 
Judgment”.?
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on choisit quelque chose de beau qui nous plaît visuellement.” - Patrick, 34, village 
(village) 
 
“Un immeuble comme Philip Morris, qui est tout en verre, voilà, moi je ne le 
trouverais pas forcément beau. Mais à force de le voir, je ne le vois même plus, en 
fait.” - Emilia, 67, ville (ville) 
 
“- Est-ce que les Alpes peuvent être laides ? 
- D’une part, tu connais et c'est pas forcement spécial, donc tu vois pas souvent 
non plus comme quelque chose de spécialement beau. (…) Ça reste beau parce que 
d'une part c'est un peu, comme on a dit avant, où tu te sens à l'aise, c'est-à-dire, où 
tu as grandi aussi (…) et d'autre part, vu que tu connais (…) peut-être ça 
t'impressionne déjà moins.” - Thomas, 25, ville (campagne) 
 
Aesthetic categories always carry the imprint of other societal dimensions. Aesthetic 
judgments bear a strong historical component. When beauty emerges, the entire history 
of humanity can potentially emerge as well. However, history is not the only dimension 
that can emerge. Aesthetic judgments are equally pregnant with political and economic 
dimensions. The following examples illustrate this quite explicitly: 
 
“- Si j'étais multimillionnaire, je ne m’achèterais pas un yacht avec des robinets en 
or, parce que je trouve ça de mauvais gout. Le goût des riches simplement, je ne 
trouve pas ça beau. Les grands yachts qui valent 120 millions, moi je trouve ça 
extrêmement laid. 
- Pourquoi ? 
- Mais parce que c'est du tape-à-l'œil. C'est affreux. Donc, moi je m'achèterais pas 
la villa sur la côte, là avec un hélicodrome. Vous voyez, pour faire descendre un 
hélico il faut un hélicodrome, et puis je ne sais pas quoi. Non merci. Si on me 
donnait, je ne sais pas, si on me la donnait, je la revendrais.” - David, 65, 
périurbain (ville) 
 
“On est dans une logique des frics, c'est tout. (…) Parce qu'on sait que le rapport 
argent est tellement énorme. Moi j'appelle ça vendre son âme. Mais il n'y a pas que 
nous qui l'avons fait. Et c'est plutôt ça qui m'ennuie que le bâtiment lui-même.” - 
Maria, 59, ville (ville) 
 
“Des bâtiments sans âme je trouve ça triste. Tu vois des milieux comme je te parlais 
de la rue de la Borne là, sont ses anciens bâtiments des années 60, 50 qui n’ont pas 
d’âme, qui sont froids, qui ne s’empreignent pas de l’humanité, en fait, voilà. Ça je 
trouve moche.” - Chantal, 56, périurbain (campagne) 
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“Bon ce qui est laid, par exemple, c'est les bâtiments qui sont juste en face de nous-
là, ils sont affreux, pour une bonne partie. (…) C’est vraiment typiquement ces 
trucs, des types d'architectures que je trouve un peu déconnectées du vivant. 
D’ailleurs, ce n'est pas par hasard que c'est des espèces d'assurances, enfin, je pense 
que c'est un monde un peu spécial, quoi.” - Urs, 42, ville (campagne)   
 
“[Photo 1] Ah voilà, ça c'est St. Saph. Et j'aime beaucoup. J'aime beaucoup 
puisque c'est Lavaux. Il y a de l'histoire. (…) J’aime cette esthétique-là à cause de 
l'histoire, dont c'est le porteur, dont c'est le symbole.” - Walter, 60, village-
périurbain (campagne) 
 
Figures, percentages, and economic facts are necessary but far from sufficient to explain 
the complex processes behind each residential choice. Objective criteria fail even more 
when it tries to investigate the underlying reasons for such a decision. The price and size 
of a new home often mean little if one finds the surrounding environment ugly.  
 
“Ecoutez, je prends un cas que je connais bien qui est le mien. Disons, je suis 
représentant de la classe moyenne. Si je cherche un appartement, d’abord là aussi 
chez moi, il faut que je trouve, au prix que je peux payer, plus ou moins dans le 
quartier, etc. Mais disons chez moi, si les exigences fonctionnelles de base sont plus 
ou moins remplies, le beau intervient assez vite. En d’autres termes, je suis prêt à 
payer plus pour quelque chose de beau. Je suis prêt à aller dans un quartier où je 
dois faire plus de déplacements, parce que l’appartement me plaît. Je dirais pour 
moi, c’est l’un des critères qui peut-être après le prix, la question du transport, c’est 
un des trois ou cinq premiers critères.” - Peter, 63, ville (ville) 
 
“Quand on prenait le train, adolescent, pour aller à Genève, quand on arrivait juste 
avant la gare de Bellevue, bon c'était un train qui s'arrêtait partout, quand on 
arrivait juste avant la gare de Bellevue, là, on voit le Mont Blanc d'une manière 
majestueuse avec le lac devant, puis tous les jours, il est différent. Des fois on le voit 
pas, des fois on le voit partiellement, il est rose, il est bleuâtre, il est très blanc, il est 
orange, il est jaune, il est gris. Tous les jours, on réfléchit même pas, on le regarde 
et puis on voit que cette beauté elle change, puis les changements de lumière font 
partie de cette beauté du Mont Blanc.” - Barbara, 65, périurbain (périurbain)  
 
“J’ai juste une crainte. Si le guy à côté il claque (rire), il meurt, qui va reprendre sa 
maison après ? Parce que vu que tu as le droit de construire plus grand, donc ils 
vont construire plus grand pour occuper plus de terrain et la ils vont piquer mon 
soleil couchant. Alors ça, mon soleil couchant pour moi. Si je devais déménager, je 
choisirais, et ça je pense tout le temps, une habitation, que ce soit un appartement 
ou n’importe quoi, où je puisse avoir le soleil l’après-midi. Pour moi le meilleur 
moment de la journée c’est l’après-midi, fin d’après-midi, le soir avec le soleil qui se 
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couche. C’est le moment le plus rouge pour moi.” - Chantal, 65, périurbain 
(campagne) 
 
By constantly pointing out the complexity and ambiguity of human existence, aesthetics 
teaches us that no phenomena should be a priori dismissed as irrelevant for our 
understanding of the world. In the same way that the psychological, economic, or 
political dimensions sharpen and influence a human being’s capacity for discrimination 
— i.e., the capacity of each individual to make choices —, the aesthetic dimension brings 
societal objects and individuals closer to each other in one respect, and farther away from 
each other in another. If we as researchers aspire to clearly understand the functioning of 
urban systems (as well as any other social system created by humans), we cannot stop 
short of exploring its aesthetic dimension since it runs through our entire society and is 
strongly and inseparably interconnected to the other dimensions of society, which hold it 
together as a system. 
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7 Conclusions: On Coexistence of 
the Actual with the Virtual 
“From my words you will have reached the conclusion that 
the real Berenice is a temporal succession of different cities, 
alternately just and unjust. But what I wanted to warn 
you about is something else: all the future Berenices are 
already present in this instant, wrapped one within the 
other, confined, crammed, inextricable.”  
Italo Calvino 
 
In the 1974 book “The Invisible Cities”, Italo Calvino writes about the 
Venetian merchant and explorer Marco Polo who tells stories about 55 different cities to 
the Mongolian emperor Kublai Khan. The cities he describes are all unique, with each 
city encapsulating a particular aspect of urban life. For example, the twin city Valdrada is 
built on a lakeshore, so that the city is mirrored in the water. The spider-web city 
Octavia is made between two steep mountains, suspended over the void. In Eusapia, the 
inhabitants have constructed an identical copy of their city, deep underground. These are 
just a few examples of the 55 cities he describes. Marco Polo also describes a number of 
other places he claims to have visited. At some point, the emperor remarks that Marco 
Polo never speaks of his home city Venice. With a smile, Marco Polo instantly replies: 
“What else do you believe I have been talking to you about?” The message of Calvino is 
clear: Invisible is not the same as nonexistent.  
 
All the ‘invisible’ cities described by Marco Polo are the invisible part of Venice because 
the reality of Venice exists not only in its actuality, in what can be observed of it: it also 
exists in its virtuality — it is also made of its inhabitants’ imaginative projections. 
Different virtual Venices coexist in one and the same moment, informing each other and 
participating in the production of the Venetian urban space. The task of aesthetics as a 
discipline is to investigate what objectively informs individuals’ imaginative perceptions 
of an aesthetic object, which can be any societal object including the city. What all great 
artists have in common is precisely the capacity to make the invisible visible, to transform 
the virtual into the actual, and, by means of various techniques of representation, to 
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point to other possible worlds. The main argument of this thesis is that this particular 
imaginative activity is not reserved solely to artists — each individual, to a greater or 
lesser degree, uses their imaginative capacities in their day-to-day interactions in society. 
Studying the aesthetic dimension can help urban researchers better understand how the 
world becomes internalized or externalized by inhabitants, as imaginative urban actors. 
What needs to be better understood is how the novelty is born in a constant dialogue 
between the ethical and the aesthetic. 
 
Since space is rooted in the separation between the components of social systems, one of 
the most important tasks of urban sciences is to investigate the nature and structure of 
this separation. Aesthetic phenomena, such as beauty, are important for scientific 
investigation precisely because they alter the distance between societal objects. They 
bring societal objects closer to one another in one respect, and farther away in another. 
The fact that humans are bounded to, and separated from, each other by means of 
learned abilities, including aesthetic emotions and aesthetic judgments, accounts for one 
of the most striking differences between the natural world and human societies. Aesthetic 
qualities are not to be taken as properties of the environment per se, nor merely as 
properties of the person reacting to the environment. Rather, they are properties that 
emerge from the interaction (relation) between individuals and their environments in a 
process in which they constitute themselves as subjects, where each individual has an idea 
of what society should be like and what it should look like. However, what remains 
unexplored in this study is the relationship of images to language, i.e. to which extent the 
narrative sequentially of language can express the simultaneous character of human 
imaginative consciousness.  
 
Recent "turns" in social sciences, namely the visual, qualitative, actorial and spatial turns, 
all indicate that researchers are putting a greater emphasis on the individual. I therefore 
insist on a theory of social organization that gives due consideration to reflexive and 
imaginative human actors, who have their own interests, beliefs and commitments. It is 
essential to recognize that humans, unlike the components of systems that are found in 
the natural world, are capable of particular sorts of action due to their imaginative 
capacities that allow them to go beyond the actual perceived world. The aesthetic 
dimension directly involves the human imaginative consciousness, which in turn 
activates the realm of the virtual, i.e., the realm that exists only in a latent state, and does 
not appear visibly (fr. qui n'est qu'en puissance). Since every human intentional experience 
is spatialized, I investigated a particular spatial structure through which the aesthetic 
experience occurs as such. I called this structure the aesthetic space.  
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The aesthetic space is a product of human imaginative consciousness — it is an 
imaginative space. It encompasses both the actual and the virtual. While engaged in 
aesthetic experience, humans exhibit a particular sort of intentionality through which 
they bring to mind what is absent and invisible through what is present and perceived. By 
making use of their lived body, individuals are capable of engaging in a particular sort of 
imaginative play through which memories of the past, anticipations of the future and the 
actualized perceived present are conjured together, informing one another. The order that 
allows this co-existence is precisely the aesthetic space. This space is topological in nature 
and purely subjective, for relations between objects do not exist independently from the 
perceiver — objects are solely related in the ways the perceiver imagines them to be 
related (which does not exclude the possibility that what is imagined actually occurs as 
such!). In the aesthetic space, the world becomes a pure subjective representation. 
However, unlike mere fantasies or hallucinations, the production of aesthetic space 
strongly and inextricably depends on the actual perceived world. As Merleau-Ponty 
perpetually argued, the freedom of imaginative thought does not come when human 
beings turn away from the actual reality of the world, but rather when they turn towards 
it. It is precisely because individuals imaginatively focus on the here and now that they are 
able to detach from the actual world and enter the virtual. The pleasure of aesthetic 
experience is both an effect of an aesthetic object, as well as a particular mode of 
understanding the aesthetic object. Researchers cannot therefore consider individuals as 
mere passive agents, for both the production of aesthetic space and the emergence of 
aesthetic phenomena necessitate an individual’s active engagement. 
 
 
Fig. 21 - The production of aesthetic space 
 
Over their lifetime, people, as spatial actors, create a network of aesthetic places. It is one 
of the many ways by which humans appropriate and inhabit the three-dimensional 
topographical space of the material world. The aesthetic dimension is a part of a 
spatialized practical action, and is not just a matter of passive contemplation. Aesthetic 
space provides each individual, as homo aestheticus, with the possibility of reconstituting 
the broken pieces of their modern urban existence and therefore the possibility of 
producing new meanings in the world they are a part of. Since the aesthetic dimension 
always nourishes and informs individuals’ spatialities and their decision-making 
processes, my research explores how the subjective realm of the aesthetic has proved itself 
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able to generate conditions that lead to action, and consequently influence other 
dimensions of society, especially in the ethical, political or legal realms. 
 
If aesthetics plays an important role in human decision-making, then the following 
question appears: How does one's mode of aesthetic understanding evolve from seeing 
the world in a certain way to seeing it in another way? I argue that any research on 
aesthetic sensitivities that neglects the direct lived experience with the inhabited 
environment will be seriously incomplete. It is in the interaction with urban and natural 
environments that inhabitants develop their aesthetic sensibilities. This is why, to be able 
to investigate the choice of residential environment from an aesthetic perspective, I 
established a direct contact with the inhabitants of the Lemanic Arc region in 
Switzerland. I prepared and conducted interviews that consisted of both classical semi-
open interviews and photo-interviews and used some strategies of the grounded theory to 
dissect, examine and compare the participants' discourses. The interviews with the 
inhabitants allowed me to make a variety of conclusions:  
 
1. The aesthetic experience elicits strong emotions, activates the agency of urban actors 
and influences their individual and collective actions;  
2. The immediate urban environment strongly influences people’s aesthetic judgments, 
public space acting as a space per excellence where aesthetic sensitivities evolve and 
mature;  
3. The aesthetic judgments of people in Switzerland developed in particular spatial, social 
and historical conditions, where the city played a pivotal role. 
4. Childhood appears as a critical period for the development of aesthetic sensitivities 
and an individual’s early-age residential environment acts as a point of reference for their 
future aesthetic judgments; 
5. Aesthetic judgments are unactualised societal choices made under partial freedom 
from the burden of actual ethical decisions. 
6. Since aesthetic judgments require of a person to position themselves on issues of 
identity and transformation, studying the aesthetic dimension allows researchers to better 
understand the process in which individuals are constituted as self-reflexive subjects.  
7. A change of lifestyle comes with a shift in one’s aesthetic understanding of the urban 
environment.  
 
If subjected to serious analysis, aesthetic judgment can say a lot about the society. Since 
our existence as human beings involves both an alternating involvement with, and 
detachment from, the world, we escape in the realm of aesthetic — only to realize that 
even the world of human imagination is informed by our actual lived experience, which 
we are relentlessly trying to overcome. But this escape is important to be studied for what 
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it tells us is that there is not any marginal scientific objects - things that were dismissed as 
irrelevant can suddenly appear as fundamental for understanding the way individuals 
make choices and act in society. This is why individuals’ aesthetic sensibilities should be 
a matter of a societal debate, contrary to the old Latin saying de gustibus non est 
disputandum. If aesthetic categories emerge from an imaginative play between the actual 
and the virtual, this play is too serious to be taken for granted.
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